In the book under review, a high-ranking U.S. National Security Council official, Thomas Graham, analyzes developments in Russia over the past decade. But the main topic of his study is Russia’s future, rather than past. Is Russia’s recovery really possible and will it be able to regain the Big Power status?

The West that was so enthusiastic about democratic reforms in Russia hoped for its swift transition from a political democracy to a market economy. Yet the West grossly overestimated the opportunities that opened up before the new Russia. Graham, an authoritative expert on Russian affairs, believes that the main reason for that was the West’s inadequate knowledge of the very essence of the Russian state. In the scholar’s opinion, Russia has a specific mentality and political traditions that had for centuries been making it quite different from the West. After 1991, no cardinal change has occurred. Only a European faзade has appeared, with the country remaining as it was. Behind this faзade, the so-called vlast [power, authority] (p. 6) is still functioning. Vlast is a specific system of rule in the Russian state that has been developing for centuries. Graham notes that both the system of vlast, and society itself, not being European, were not ready for radical democratic changes. As for Western leaders who were ready to assist the new Russia, they overlooked the existence of the old political elite behind the democratic faзade.

The author believes that the formation of Russia as an independent state was not the result of a well-conceived policy – that was a kind of historical accident connected with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Speaking of the causes of the demise of the USSR that started back in the 1970s, Graham points out some major drawbacks of the Soviet political and economic establishment and also the specifics of the concrete historical period. Mikhail Gorbachev’s attempts to reform the country backfired and only precipitated disintegration processes. In the meantime, Gorbachev’s opponents, above all Boris Yeltsin, succeeded in playing up the “Russian card” (pp. 17-20), demanding full political and economic autonomy for the RSFSR. Yeltsin’s team, Graham says, did not actually insist on the breakup of the Soviet Union – they believed that, remaining part of the Soviet Union, it was impossible to carry through sweeping reforms to improve the situation in Russia. Thus, the Soviet Union’s days were numbered and all the attempts to set up a new entity to replace it failed.

Russia’s “young reformers” believed that the West’s moral and financial support was a guarantee of success. It is not surprising therefore that a pro-Western vector fully dominated Russia’s foreign policy when it became the USSR’s successor. Despite all the reformers’ rhetoric about the “rebirth of Russia,” in the author’s view, they were more concerned with retaining their power and pushing reforms, than with safeguarding the Russian state. Hence the sharp increase in centrifugal trends inside Russia. But, Graham holds, Yeltsin managed to bring the processes threatening Russia’s integrity under control, though serious contradictions still remain between the Center and the provinces.

Analyzing the 1993 Constitution, the author concludes that it had resulted in the restoration of one-man rule in Russia. But this “super-presidency” was ephemeral in Graham’s opinion, which fact is explained by Boris Yeltsin’s peculiar style of rule and failing health. The latter resulted in the appearance of a new form of “dual power” (p. 26) – there emerged powerful political-economic coalitions struggling for various spheres of influence. All this was happening against the background of an ever-growing economic and social crisis. Taking advantage of the instability in Moscow, the regional elite strove to loosen their dependence on the Center.

Graham calls the period between 1993 and 1999 the crumbling of the Russian state and the return to “feudalism” (p. 25). He believes that there were four factors that allowed Russia to retain its integrity. Those were its geographical position, the absence of mighty regional centers of power, ethnic homogeneity and international surroundings. Assessing the performance of Russia’s first president, Graham assails Yeltsin for numerous mistakes and failures. At the same time he acknowledges that Yeltsin was faced with the hard task of preserving Russia on the wreckage of the Soviet empire.

Vladimir Putin, who became Prime Minister in August 1999, was dead set, in Graham’s view, to stop the crumbling of the Russia state, ameliorate the situation at home and prop up Russia’s foreign policy positions. Right after his inauguration, Putin launched a resolute offensive at the power centers that opposed the Kremlin. The objective of that attack on the regional barons, oligarchs, media and State Duma was to consolidate central authority. Putin managed to score considerable successes along these lines of offense, yet, Graham says, the position of the current Russian president is not as strong as it may seem. The power struggle still continues “behind the scenes” (p. 51) and the president is opposed inside the Kremlin (the “family,” secret services, young reformers), as well as outside (the governors and oligarchs who have retained their influence). Putin, the author stresses, has achieved economic growth and political stability – but to the detriment of democratic principles, in a setting of curbed press freedoms and human rights infringements. Many healthcare and education problems also remain unsettled.

In the author’s opinion, Russia has failed to integrate into the Western world and regain the status of a Great Power. Yet it is playing an important role in maintaining global security. This is why Washington has to develop good relations with Moscow. Graham urges the United States to assist Russia in shaping a market democracy and create external conditions for Russian economic recovery, keeping an eye on the observance of human rights and freedoms there. The author also touches on new positive shifts in American-Russian relations in the wake of the September 11 tragedy.

More than ten years have passed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. In Graham’s opinion, the transition period in Russia has ended by now. Russia stands somewhere in-between a market democracy and several variants of authoritarian rule – from communist to fascist. In other words, both the hopes and the fears of the Russian reformers and the West have materialized. A return to the Russian traditional political system has occurred and today’s model has much in common with the czarist regime. Graham believes that today’s shaky stability in Russia might be threatened by internal collisions and external interference. For the time being, such threats are non-existent. This is why the key issue is whether the country will be able to sustain an economic growth rate needed to regain the Great Power status. The author calls economic growth the principal condition for Russia’s rebirth. At the same time, to really become an influential state, Russia must also settle problems pertaining to the demographic situation, intellectual potential and infrastructural development. The country’s future – a new recession or a slow and gradual recovery – depends on the solution of these problems. Russia may turn into a threat to the whole world, but it may equally consolidate international stability. Whether Russia will achieve steady economic growth rates and lasting political stability and whether it will regain the lost positions in the world is a question that remains open for Graham.