Globalization is currently one of the most popular subjects amongst the social sciences, and is especially well advanced in the U.S. and West European countries. The principal differences arising in the debates on this subject in these countries are not so much concerned with defining the essence of globalization as with estimating its consequences. It seems that other nations have been more involved in discussing the phenomenon of globalization. They are debating whether they are capable of playing a special role in this process, or whether globalization is not some alien, if not hostile, force. It is no surprise, then, that the bulk of Western research concerning globalization has been confined to methodological investigation which fails to provide a profound analysis of the existing reality; the social scientists who speak on behalf of the developing countries introduce ideological treatises where a selective study of practice corresponds with expedient conclusions.

The latter approach is the method practiced by Russian social scientists, confirmed in great measure by two recent books on globalization, both of which have stirred interest and public attention. One of them was written by a group led by Mikhail Gorbachev, the other by Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation. These books prompt some important conclusions about the specifics of sociological thought in Russia today.

At first glance, the books under review seem completely dissimilar. The one written under the auspices of the Gorbachev Foundation is devoted to the theoretical comprehension of the contemporary global processes and only its concluding part, which does not exceed one-fifth of its volume (G, pp. 445-548), is devoted to Russia. In contrast, Zyuganov’s estimation of globalization (Z, pp. 8-170) anticipates his general reflections on the destiny of the socialist idea and Russia’s place in the modern world; this book will require some effort in discriminating his frequently profound thoughts from common ideological trappings. Zyuganov’s work creates the impression of being better integrated; the author consistently, although not always very convincingly, advocates his vision of the global situation.

The book edited by Gorbachev is actually a collection of essays, each one dealing with the author’s “pet subject.” In contrast with Zyuganov’s singular contribution, readers of the Gorbachev book will have to work hard to discover the individual positions of its authors.

Nevertheless, both books have much in common. Their chief similarity derives from the mutual desire to speak out earnestly on some imaginary issues, criticizing or praising the product of their own imagination which, naturally, requires no proof, instead of examining the hard facts of globalization.

Gorbachev distinguishes between ‘globalization’ (as an objective phenomenon) and neoliberal ‘globalism’ (as a policy deserving condemnation. G, pp. 13-15). However, he fails to propose any explanations for the shortcomings of the contemporary world. One of the contributors to Gorbachev’s book, Victor Kuvaldin, has an incomprehensible term ’globality’ in the title of his article (G, p. 31), but never once (!) does he make mention of it throughout his piece. Globalization as a notion remains largely undefined throughout the almost 600-page book. The most Gorbachev does is note that “globalization …is primarily the result of the technological revolution in information theory and telecommunications” (G, p. 13). Kuvaldin maintains that “globalization is a process that molds the global human community,” following the discovery that “the absolute majority of the Earth’s inhabitants are gradually approaching a common understanding of the basic principles of the organization of life” (G, pp. 35, 32)! What those “basic principles” actually are is a subject that is not even mentioned. In this context it is only natural that Valentin Tolstykh notes that “the question ’What is globalization?’ is now crudely and visibly” turning into the question ’What kind of globalization is it?’” (G, p. 374).

In my opinion, such “turning” stems from the absence of an answer to the first question.

The obscurity and consequential inadequacy that accompanies the Gorbachev book are characteristic of a number of the themes. For example, while examining the consequences of globalization in the economic sphere, Oleg Bogomolov and Alexander Nekipelov note that “there are no recognized criteria of fair distribution of the economic effects of globalization.” In the same breath they claim that “even in the absence of hard and fast definitions of what is fair and justified and what is not, we can speak of disproportions that need to be eliminated” (G, p. 117). But if there are no hard and fast definitions of what is fair and justified, is it not better to agree with Hegel who believed that “all that exists is reasonable”? No wonder those same authors follow up their three-page quotation from Joseph Stiglitz with a very candid evaluation: “There is no better way of putting it” (G, p. 142). Perhaps, it is not worthwhile trying?

The political aspect of globalization is analyzed by Mikhail Ilyin. He articulates the features of the new century as “an increasing complexity of policies and structures of political organization… and an increasingly clear-cut delimitation of various levels of political organization,” noting that “the saddest thing about all this is that those levels are quite definitely disunited.” Does that mean that the prospects are none too rosy? Not at all, since “alternative structures of global political organization can be suggested and built up” (G, pp. 245, 248). Perhaps, they can. But where can we find an analysis of what already exists?

Frankly speaking, the Gorbachev Foundation experts seem to have little respect for their readers. They overburden their book with empty and occasionally misleading statements. It is obvious that “aid programs must above all be oriented to the needs of the recipients and not the donors” (G, p. 66); there is no doubt that “the advantages of economic globalization do not materialize automatically and not all countries are aware of them in full measure” (G, p. 115); it is quite possible that “the noticeable increase of reciprocal ties in the world through mutual penetration of its individual parts is not yet the result of, but rather the ’promise’ of, globalization” (G, p. 194), while “cardinal restructuring of the existing world order should be viewed as the first and top priority of global security” (G, p. 436). What is the conclusion of all that? What future scenarios do the authors envision for the development of the world? The reader will not find answers to those critical questions.

The worst thing, however, is that the Gorbachev book declares “imperatively” that “post-industrialism – a term that until recently has been obscure in its social content – is now being replaced by, and equated to, ’globalism’ which emerges as a definite geostrategic tendency and policy” (G, p. 390). Actually, the term ’post-industrialism’ stopped being obscure as far back as in 1976 with the publication of Daniel Bell’s famous book, whereas ’globalism’ remains one of the least defined notions used by sociologists to this very day, and the two terms are “equated” only in the book under review.

The above is but one of the many indications that most of the co-authors in the Gorbachev book have a very vague idea of Western publications, and what they do know has not been gleaned from original works on globalization. The only noticeable exception is the essay by Vladimir Kollontai on Western concepts of economic globalization (G, pp. 147-192). The author has chosen respectable sources that really deserve attention against a heavy mass of printed matter on the subject. It is rather amusing that for his impressive analysis Kollontai used more material than the rest of the authors combined.

Now, what about the book by Gennady Zyuganov? The author seems to be less inspired to explain the development and theory of globalization than to present his position as a politician and party leader. Yet, he does not see fit to dispense himself from defining the basic notions, and that is an indication of his respect and interest for the reader. He distinguishes between ’globalism’ and ’globality’ (Z, p. 12), and uses ’globalization’ in the philosophical and concrete meanings (Z, pp. 13-15).

In his book, Zyuganov focuses on the deep historical roots of the globalization process, noting that “the era of great geographic discoveries contributed no less to globalization than the creation of space communications systems” (Z, p. 13). He cautions against exaggeration of the scope of globalization, pointing out that “economic interdependence in 1990 remained almost at the level of 1910” (Z, p. 294). The author also gives a detailed description of the origin of the contemporary globalization which, in his view, grew out of the economic and political system that took shape in the wake of World War II (Z, pp. 18-33), as well as of the development of ideas about the globalizing world. We can only regret that Zyuganov compares viewpoints that do not always carry the same weight as regards their significance and impact on the development of theoretical thought, and that he speaks more of those scholars who popularized rather than of those who created new concepts (Z, pp. 23-25).

It is also a disappointment that although Zyuganov mentions the research done by scores of authors (Z, pp. 89-103), nowhere does he provide his quotes with references. In any case, the first part of his book offers a much clearer (and more adequate) understanding of what contemporary globalization is and what its consequences are, than the manuscript authored by Gorbachev and his colleagues.

Basing upon the above foundation, Zyuganov builds an extremely realistic analysis of recent events. He denominates the sweeping changes in the principles of the world order launched by the incumbent American leadership as a “demolition of the Yalta system and the entire balance of power in the world” (Z, p. 138), as a “coercion to globalization with the backing of military power” (Z, p. 126). He convincingly proves that the terrorist acts of September 11 were largely provoked by the U.S. foreign policy (ibid), and that the “international community” – on which the group of authors led by Gorbachev stakes so heavily – “is today no more than another name for imperialism with the United States in the lead” (Z, p. 149). (It is noteworthy that the author never suspected that the U.S. would make so bold as to ignore all consideration for the said community and start the war in Iraq without putting the issue to vote in the UN Security Council.)

Unfortunately, Zyuganov’s constant harping on the global aggressiveness of imperialism subtracts from the credibility and weight of many of his arguments. On top of that, without any need whatsoever, he resorts to the ideological arguments of the pre-perestroika times. Naturally, the U.S. bid to remake the postwar model of the world, its attempts to establish hegemony, its interference in other countries’ affairs cannot but evoke condemnation. However, it would be naive to expect the vacuum caused by the collapse of the U.S.S.R. to remain unfilled. Even in the context of geopolitical strategies as set forth by Zyuganov, the U.S. policies appear as quite logical. Hence, not indignation but a search for possible lines of action capable of neutralizing and restricting such policies is required.

Such an approach would be more natural of Zyuganov who is known as one of the few people who did not swallow the bait of antiterrorist demagogy that has gained such widespread traffic of late. On the one hand, he notes quite reasonably that it is “absolutely inadmissible to lump together any and all armed action for national and social freedom under the legal definition of terrorism” (Z, p. 151); on the other, he points out that the war on terrorism should not allow for extraordinary measures and international coalitions. His reference to the experience of the French authorities in 1961 through 1963 (Z, pp. 161-163) appears to be the most honest thinking – of all made public in Russia – on how the fight against terrorism should be organized. Zyuganov stresses that the world “in which the final vector of big politics will develop under the influence of various global and regional centers of power and poles of influence”, “will remain complicated, full of conflict, affluent and difficult to predict” (Z, pp. 350-351, 351).

It is quite obvious, however, that Zyuganov’s capacity to provide precise estimates of the new realities that sets him apart from the Gorbachev Foundation experts is all too often depreciated by his efforts to follow ideological clichOs. His description of Western society as “the highest stage of imperialism” (Z, pp. 84-85) sounds none too convincing. His attempts to depict “intellectuals” as “the new class of workers of the 21st century” (Z, pp. 210-211) are quite puzzling, and his bid to describe bourgeois governments weaned on the individualism of their citizens as “hirelings of independent Robinsons” (Z, p. 250), etc., sounds naive, to say the least. But these shortcomings pale in comparison with the flagrantly ideologized assessments that he makes when he speaks of the influence globalization has on Russia’s future.

The Gorbachev Foundation experts and Zyuganov choose two different approaches to the analysis of this problem, both of which, in my opinion, are equally acceptable. Understanding how dependent Russia is on worldwide processes, Gorbachev and his colleagues assign it a passive role. Zyuganov, on the contrary, believes that Russia is quite capable of playing the opponent to the present-day model of globalization. There are points on which the authors partially agree: the disastrous state of Russia’s economy (G, p. 483; Z, pp. 258-261) and the significance of Russian traditional values for the country’s progress (G, pp. 442-443; Z, pp. 363-386). The two books also agree in their evaluation of the present-day Russian political system as a regime that is inclined to develop in the direction of authoritarianism and autocracy (G, p. 452; Z, pp. 298-299). Where do they differ?

Gorbachev and his colleagues do not provide a clear-cut answer as to which road Russia’s reforms should take. Three possibilities are named: Russia retains the raw materials orientation of its economy, becomes industrially oriented, or stages a post-industrial breakthrough. However, in their opinion, a “big leap… which would make it possible to reduce the time needed for economic modernization is unacceptable to Russian society at present and incompatible with the essence of post-industrial change” (G, p. 486). The conclusion they come to is that it would be best for the country to “become party to certain generally meaningful and basically progressive tendencies” (G, p. 487).

Apparently, this approach does not provide for any possibility of developing a prudent policy of economic reform. Neither does the analysis of Russia’s position on the international stage go further than a simple enumeration of all the outstanding possibilities (G, pp. 498-508).

Gennady Zyuganov’s stance does not allow for such vagueness. Presuming that the immediate future holds in store “a war of the worlds” in which the traditional “Russian world… will face the apocalyptic world of cosmopolitan conglomeration and liberal egocentrism” (Z, p. 223), the author builds an ideologized system of goals, wherein he persistently opposes Russia to the West (Z, pp. 302-332). He believes that “the citizens of Russia of all nationalities will have enough wisdom … not to succumb to nationalistic frenzy” (Z, p. 325). At the same time he states that if “the policies of Russia… are today determined by Abramovich, Mamout, Chubais and Aven, one can well imagine how far they have strayed from the country’s genuine interests” (Z, p. 397). Zyuganov (Ph.D.) fails to bolster his arguments when he refers to the “profound analysis” of globalization processes made by Patriarch Alexii II and the Church Councils (Z, pp. 339-342). As they say, “Render to Ceasar that which is Ceasar’s, and to God what is God’s.”

Sad to say, those examples are but an incomplete list of the many misunderstandings and blunders made by the author. It is apparent, however, that all these errors are of ideological nature and stem from the desire to appeal to the political feelings of the reader.

At the same time the book contains clear-cut and uncompromising stipulations which cannot but evoke solidarity with the author. Zyuganov is quite convincing when he speaks with irony of the reasons for the thaw in Russian-American relations and of the nearsightedness of such policies (Z, pp. 388-389, when he says that Russian federalism is an unviable structure (Z, pp. 366-367), that the current centralization of authority is nothing but another move toward authoritarian rule (Z, pp. 372-374, 407), and, finally, when he says that the artificial boosting of the ruble exchange rate (which encourages imports and holds back the development of local industries) is “one of the greatest hoaxes in world economic history” (Z, p. 267). “Plato is my friend, but my best friend is truth.” The overwhelming majority of Russian readers will find Gennady Zyuganov’s book much more appealing than the pretentious work of Mikhail Gorbachev and his colleagues.

On the whole, the perusal of those two books evokes sad thoughts. The impression is that the Russian intellectual elite has so far failed to produce a consistent analysis of the situation in the contemporary world that would be based on hard fact and take due account of the opinions of their counterparts abroad. The Russian intelligentsia seems to have lost its capacity for evaluating the achievements and failures of the authorities from positions of principle, to set out landmarks and propose goals for a meaningful forward movement. It is also sad that many reasonable and well-grounded studies of globalization, as well as quite sensible analyses of the ongoing processes in the country, are dressed in hopelessly outdated ideological packaging to be consumed by the Russian public. The result is that such a situation rules out a constructive and serious dialog among scholars and the general public, a dialog that is critically important for the current stage of the country’s development.

Vladislav Inozemtsev, Doctor of Science (Economics), is Director of Research of the Center for Postindustrial Studies, Chairman of the Board of Advisors of Russia in Global Affairs, Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Svobodnaya Mysl – XXI magazine.