The article was published in Russian in Analiticheskiye Zapiski, Dec./2002. This article was prepared with the support from the Russian Foundation for Fundamental Research, Grant No. 01-06-80087. Data herein cited is based on public opinion monitoring sponsored by the Institute of Comprehensive Social Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The polls were held in 2002 and, partly, in 2001.

The Russian people have a positive attitude toward increased cooperation with the European countries, recent public opinion polls indicate. This survey, organized in the summer of 2002, revealed that 51.5 percent of people support the efforts of the Russian government’s joining the European Union, together with the idea of entering a common European market. The figure is much greater than the actual number of so-called zapadniki (Russian people with a pro-Western orientation); it also includes a percentage of those who believe that Russia is not a European nation in the classical sense, but rather a peculiar Eurasian civilization. Those in favor of the drive toward greater European cooperation also include some people who believe that the Western nations are not necessarily inclined to cooperate with Russia, but would rather work toward its enfeeblement. Nevertheless, the poll demonstrates that the Russian people find European orientation preferable to many of the other options available for Russia’s development.

However, the Russian people appear to have far less unanimity when it comes down to assessing their country’s position in Europe. This is proved, in particular, by what they say about its place in Europe, as well as within the European market (see Table 1).

Specifically, the data demonstrates the dominance of the proponents of integration into Europe over the skeptics. But the results also prove that skepticism is strong, with almost a third of those polled believing that accession to the European Union is either not mandatory, or simply unnecessary for Russia. Importantly, the opinions of the proponents for European integration and the skeptics are close to parity in the major Russian regions, including Moscow, where 42 percent of those polled are in favor of EU integration, while 39 percent are opposed to it.

The proponents for greater European cooperation have a proportionate representation throughout all age groups, but their percentage is much less amongst those in the population who are 60 years old and over. On the other hand, the survey results indicate that the number of opponents to integration in this age group is similar to that in other samplings coordinated along the age principle (see Graph 1).

A comparison of what Russians of different age groups and social status think about different aspects of cooperation with Europe suggests that the situation is not homogeneous; actually, the consensus may be labeled ’bifurcational.’ It may have different vectors of development (including the adverse ones) and is likely to remain rather ambiguous, that is, until life itself coordinates the concepts of Russo-European rapprochement and reveals its possible forms.

It will be of little significance to reiterate the importance of Russia’s cooperation with Europe at this time. What matters here is that cooperation cannot be a one-way street, and maintaining the dynamics between the two powers is highly contingent on what our European partners are presently doing.

This perspective demands that we closely examine what Russians think about Western Europe’s motives for building relations between the two powers.

The survey shows that there is a tiny minority of the population (4.5 percent) who believe that the Europeans do not have any genuine interest in cooperating with Russia. Of the Russian respondents, many tend to believe that the developed European nations are interested in this country’s withdrawal from the economic crisis, but they differ in why West-Europeans should have this interest.

Table 2 displays, in descending order, the opinions concerning what the Russian people believe to be the true motives behind Western Europe’s rapprochement with Russia.

The data proves that a large number of Russians trust the West-Europeans. They believe that they are interested in making Russia an equitable economic partner, fostering Russia’s nascent democratic institutions and market reforms, and procuring its intellectual and cultural potential. These views correlate with the opinion that the Europeans would like to see the European continent a common home for both Russians and themselves. At the same time, however, almost half of the Russian population (48.0 percent) holds a totally different opinion. They suggest that the Europeans are not truly interested in Russia’s economic revival since they still perceive it as a potential threat to the West.

In terms of the social profile of this category of people, the needy and poor make up two-thirds of the respondents. The age factor is also relevant, as young people (under 35) and senior citizens (aged 60 years and older) display a greater tendency to hold such views than other groups. Remarkably enough, those who suspect the West of being apprehensive about Russia exceed the number of people with alternative views by over 100 percent amongst those who are 20 years old and younger. The variability of opinions on this question was a mere one to four percent amongst respondents between the ages of 35 to 60 years old.

Another manifestation of this skepticism is found in the dominant belief (60 percent of those polled) that Europe narrowly focuses its interest in Russia on its vast natural resources. Differences in age and educational levels have virtually no relevance here. However, Russians who are limited to an incomplete secondary education display a higher tendency to trust the West-European proposals to build an equitable economic partnership with Russia. They more rarely support the statement that Europe only needs Russian oil and gas (see Graph 2).

The group of people born in the period 1972 through 1982 stands out from the others. These people started their careers at the outset of Mikhail Gorbachev’s restructuring program, or during the commencement of liberal reforms, when the idea of joining the civilized world was just beginning to sweep through the nation. The representatives of this age group do not share the view that the Europeans are mostly interested in Russia’s natural resources, but are more inclined to link the cooperative efforts of the Europeans to their opposition to the U.S. global hegemony. However, older age groups (over 30) are again characterized by a pragmatic interpretation of the European intentions for cooperation with Russia.

Regional variations reflect the biggest difference of opinions, with the gaps reaching 10 percent to 20 percent, or more. The residents of Moscow suggest more frequently than other Russian citizens that the Europeans focus disproportionately on pragmatic values, while the population of the northwestern region, the upper Volga and the Vyatka River basin is less likely to insist on it.

The conviction that Western Europe may have some interest in Russia’s high cultural and intellectual potential, together with its abundant natural resources, appears to be a rather strong opinion. This is most often stressed by people with a full or incomplete higher education, as well as by the segment of the population aged 20 years or younger, who are mostly students.

Regional differences are evident here, too, with those respondents living in St. Petersburg (a city often referred to as the cultural capital of Russia) eagerly supporting the idea of European integration. Muscovites and the population of the northern and northwestern regions, which are strongly oriented toward a market economy, support the idea of cultural and intellectual interests with less enthusiasm. The analysis of the results reveals an amazing correlation of opinions. The regions where people tend to place emphasis on the use of Russia’s cultural and intellectual capability also emphasize its geopolitical and geostrategic importance, i.e. Russia’s part in counterbalancing U.S. dominance in the world.

A noteworthy poll result concerns the question of Europe’s actual readiness to establish an equitable partnership with Russia, and its commitment to promote democratic values and market reforms. Few respondents provided a positive answer: 17.0 percent and 14.0 percent, respectively. These responses vary significantly across different regions, with the Muscovites displaying the greatest amount of pessimism.

However, to conclude from these numbers that Russia sees the West as reluctant to establish a partnership on equal terms would be incorrect. The general understatement is that Russia has a modest assortment of opportunities it could offer to the West. It is most manifest in the responses as to whether or not this country may hope to consolidate its positions in Europe over the next ten years. The percentage of respondents who believe that the West disproportionately focuses its attention on Russia’s natural resources is approximately the same as the percentage of those who believe that Russia’s natural resources enjoy the greatest competitive advantage on the European market (Table 3).

The data shows that the Russians place science, high technologies, and defense exports as possible second and third highest in a European market. Industrial production, as well as culture and education, gathered slightly over 12 percent. Agriculture, nicknamed “a black hole of the Russian economy,” takes the last position with eight percent. The total number of respondents who believe that Russia has absolutely no chance to consolidate specific positions in Europe comes close to seven percent.

Responses to the last question reflect the strong opinions of the youngest people polled. They place a greater emphasis on the development of science and high technologies, and rank them slightly ahead of natural resources – at 46.7 percent and 41.6 percent, respectively. This group stressed the importance of education (21.7 percent) – 50 percent more than the average percentage in this group. Young respondents are less inclined to believe that Russia has no other chances for strengthening its positions in Europe; this figure drops to 1.5 percent amongst the group of people under 25. Is this a case of youthful confidence, or a belief in one’s own ability to correct the situation? The answer will be clear over time. What is more important is that despite certain peculiar aspirations, young respondents still exemplify the mainstream tendency. Generally speaking, the young are more optimistic than the older generations, although people in the age bracket of 25 to 31 years old are not as hopeful as the eighteen-year-olds.

The opinions of the average man-on-the-street amazingly correlate with the opinions of the Russian experts. By way of illustration, I can compare the data of the 2001 poll held among Russian foreign policymakers. The overall layout of figures suggests that experts have generally the same opinions as rank-and-file Russians. It also indicates that the general public is well informed about the international situation. The distinctive difference in the results of the two polls is that the foreign policy experts place a much greater stress on arms exports – a 100 percent increase over the ordinary citizens. The closeness of the results prompts us to conclude that the Russians – policymakers and ordinary people – have a similar hierarchy of priorities for what determines cooperation with the European Union. This hierarchy of priorities is clearly demonstrated in Table 4.

A discussion of the prospects of Russo-European cooperation must certainly take into account an entire range of background factors (social, cultural and historial), which significantly affect the opinions and apprehensions of the Russian people. This is most obvious amongst the responses concerning particular organizations that have been traditionally involved in the East-West standoff, with NATO occupying the top position in this regard. The Russian public has the worst perception of the North-Atlantic pact compared with other organizations uniting the European nations: the very mentioning of NATO provoked a negative reaction in 70 percent of respondents.

The unclear purposes of NATO, as well as its vague intentions toward Russia (“Are we friends or foes?”) arouse an association of this bloc with a military threat, and hence a certain psychological discomfort. The overall lack of clarity was manifest in how Russians responded to a possible conclusion of a Russia-NATO cooperation treaty which would create a union between them.

The respondents were offered to choose from several possible options for a Russia-NATO rapprochement, and each option gathered approximately 15 percent of support (see Table 5). However, the negative statement “NATO was an offspring of the Cold War, and it must be dissolved” attracted the largest percentage of agreement, although it was far from an overwhelming percentage (more than 27 percent). It is worth noting that the consensus of the ordinary people and the experts seem to display more agreement on the NATO issue now, while in the mid-1990s the population was more at ease with the bloc than were Russian policymakers.

Yet, the worries and doubts that Russians find to be marring the prospects of a rapprochement with Europe go beyond NATO expansion. The people in Russia are apparently apprehensive of a “peaceful” expansion of the EU, as well as of the situation that has recently transpired around the Kaliningrad region (Russia’s enclave in the Baltic region which is now experiencing certain travel impediments with the mainland). Russians show an unwillingness to yield to the imaginary or real pressures they face, while the vast majority of Russian society has adopted an unequivocal line on defending its national interests over Kaliningrad. The idea that it must have the same status as any other Russian region received the support of over 60 percent of those polled (see Table 6).

Almost 20 percent of the respondents found it possible to combine the enclave’s current political and juridical status with a free economic zone. This option was supported by middle-class people, most of them having obtained a full or incomplete higher education. The group also includes some people under the age of 35. On the other hand, the idea of making Kaliningrad a Russia-EU condominium, as well as the suggestion that the enclave may revert back to German rule in the future, proved to be the least popular statements, attracting an approval rating of just 2.7 percent in each case.

The responses featured in Table 6 vary across demographic groups and geographic areas, but the average responses on the Kaliningrad status issue remained the same across the country. Geographical differences are more pronounced than the differences in age, education or welfare. Amongst various age groups, the difference between those who insist that Russia maintain its sovereignty over the Kaliningrad territory and those who do not shows a steady proportion (11:1 to 12:1), whereas the regional variations are as great as 8:1 to 21:1.

The second set of issues is centered on Russia’s relations with Western Europe. They boil down to what status Russia will have if it joins the European Union, and how this process would be linked to the restructuring of the post-Soviet area; these questions are important since there is no clarification yet as to how the European integration can be balanced with a similar integration process within the Commonwealth of Independent States.

European officials in Strasbourg and Brussels clearly find dialog with the Russian Federation as a separate entity preferable, but the actual feasibility of that approach is yet to be seen. Russia itself is a powerful center of gravity surrounded by a galaxy, albeit somewhat haphazardly organized. Russia is fully aware of its position and is reluctant to discard it. And should Russia be forced to choose between Europe and Belarus, for example, the choice will not automatically be in favor of the Europeans.

The poll has shown that Russians display solidarity in terms of their international cooperation, integration and development of Russia’s relations with Europe. Major proportions of the opinions expressed are clearly presented in all groups, irrespective of the respondents’ age, education, welfare, or residence in the urban centers or countryside. The results indicate that Russian society is highly homogeneous in that respect.