In 1986, a number of people in the U.S. political establishment raised the issue of the United States withdrawing from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the predecessor of the current Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Their arguments for their proposal sounded simple and attractive to many – the balance of the Helsinki process had been upset. In 1975, when signing the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the Soviet Union achieved recognition of the inviolability of national borders, whereas the liberalization of the Soviet political regime, promised by Moscow, turned out to be superficial and temporary. In 1986, many thought that the Helsinki process was reversing.

This conclusion prompted U.S. congressmen to call on their president to withdraw from the Helsinki process. Lawyers from the State Department and the Library of Congress, who worked on this issue, concluded that technically it was easy to do. The president needed only to withdraw the U.S. signature from the Final Act, notifying all the participating states about it. However, the U.S. Helsinki Commission (which includes members of the Congress and government) found such a move precipitate and recommended refraining from it. The Commission presented the following arguments against U.S. renunciation of the Final Act.

First, U.S. renunciation would not annul the Final Act and would not stop the Helsinki process. Moreover, the U.S. would thus voluntarily waive the opportunity to influence the process and would let the Soviet Union take a dominant position in it. This circumstance would hardly displease Moscow, which from the beginning of the process “strongly preferred to have CSCE with the Americans looking on from the outside.”

Second, U.S. renunciation of the Final Act would produce a negative effect among U.S. allies in Europe, as well as neutral and non-aligned countries, which would interpret withdrawal as “a sign of decreased U.S. interest and influence in Europe.”

And finally third, U.S. withdrawal from the process could move the issue of human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to the periphery of East-West relations. But this is precisely what American critics of the CSCE wanted to avoid.

The Commission proposed that the U.S. patiently and more actively pursue its goals within the framework of the Helsinki process. Official Washington eventually followed these recommendations. By 1989, there appeared signs of a breakthrough in the discussion of the human rights issue and political pluralism. The OSCE Vienna follow-up meeting in 1989 settled all issues of humanitarian cooperation, which had been heatedly debated ever since the Final Act was signed.

Twenty years later, Moscow seems to have changed roles with Washington. Today, Russian politicians complain about imbalances in OSCE activities: a geographic imbalance (the organization’s work is focused primarily “east of Vienna;” that is, in the countries of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union) and a thematic imbalance (from Russia’s point of view, there is an unjustified overemphasis on human rights to the detriment of other areas, among them security, economy and environment).

Moscow is displeased about the autonomy of some OSCE institutions, above all the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) which monitors elections. The Russian leadership openly accuses independent OSCE institutions of bias and double standards and says they have been “privatized” by Western countries, first of all by the United States. Now Russian politicians say that there is no use in such an OSCE and ever more loudly urge their government to withdraw from the organization.

Of course, the present situation does not exactly mirror the 1980s, and the OSCE today markedly differs from what it used to be. Now it is not just a series of conferences and meetings of experts, but a system of existing structures and institutions.

It is not clear, though, what Moscow wants to achieve. Does it want the OSCE to step up its activities “west of Vienna” or to just reduce their scope in the East? Does it want the OSCE to focus more on security in Europe or to curb its human rights efforts? One can assume that Russia would like the OSCE to pay less attention to human rights and more attention to security issues that evoke the Kremlin’s concern.

However, although the present situation does not literally repeat that of 1986, the dilemma now facing Moscow in many ways is similar to that faced by Washington more than 20 years ago: withdraw from the OSCE or persistently seek that the OSCE in its activities take into account issues of interest to Russia. These should include not only matters that have been harshly criticized by Moscow in recent years, but also more general trends in the organization’s development, which often remain beyond the framework of public discussions in Russia.

These include, in particular, a gradual reduction in the scope of OSCE activities and the increasingly prominent direct interaction of the U.S. and the European Union with OSCE members located “east of Vienna.” Against this background, the issue of the expediency of Russia’s withdrawal from the OSCE is not as simple as it seems to be.

SHRINKING OSCE ACTIVITIES

The idea that the OSCE focuses its activities only on the “East” (mainly in the form of missions and various centers and offices) is generally true, but it requires an essential specification. The main region of the OSCE’s field work has always been Southeast Europe, namely the countries of the former Yugoslavia and Albania. The territory of the former Soviet Union has never been a zone of any large-scale OSCE presence. Its Balkan missions in this decade account for half of the OSCE budget, whereas projects in the former Soviet Union make up about 20 percent (Graph 1). The same goes for the size of OSCE missions. In the last few years, the OSCE has sent 79 to 81 percent of its international staff working in the field to countries in Southeast Europe.

Graph 1. Allocations for Activities in Southeast Europe and the Former Soviet Union (% of OSCE unified budget)

OSCE field operations peaked in the late 1990s-early 2000s. The financing of OSCE field operations has seen absolute and relative reductions since then: from ?184 million in 2000 to ?118 million in 2007, and from 87 to 70 percent of the OSCE unified budget over the same period. The organization’s international staff has been decreasing accordingly. Both the rise and decline in OSCE field activities largely coincided in time with changes in the situation in the Balkans. The scale of the OSCE presence in the former Soviet Union changed little, except for recently, when it has been decreasing as well.

The largest OSCE mission was deployed in 1999 in Kosovo. In 2000, its international staff included 649 employees. In 2007, it had dropped to only 283 employees. The mission in Croatia reached its peak in 1998 when it involved 280 employees. In 2007, on the eve of the mission’s closure, this figure stood at a mere 30 people. In 2002, the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje involved 300 employees; in 2007, its staff included only 82 people.

The tendency to reduce the scale of OSCE field operations has been growing in recent years – primarily due to a downsized presence in the Balkans. In 2008, the OSCE closed its mission in Croatia, which has been replaced by an office in Zagreb. The future of the OSCE’s largest missions to date – in Kosovo and in Bosnia and Herzegovina – is still undecided. The European Union plans to take over some or all of their functions in the foreseeable future. OSCE activities in Macedonia have been decreasing, too.

This trend suggests that the OSCE will continue to cut its activities in the participating states. The closure or simple reduction of the missions in Kosovo and Bosnia is equivalent to an almost 50 percent reduction in funds related to OSCE field operations, and to a 50-plus reduction in OSCE international staff. Meanwhile, the curtailment of OSCE activities in the Balkans is not being compensated for by any significant build-up of an OSCE presence in the former Soviet Union (Graph 2).

Graph 2. Budgets of OSCE Missions in Southeast Europe and the Former Soviet Union (million euros)

The largest OSCE mission in the territory of the former Soviet Union is in Georgia. It accounts for about one-third of all OSCE expenses in the former Soviet Union. However, after the termination of the monitoring of the Russian-Georgian border, this mission underwent the most significant reductions. Its budget has been cut in half over the past five years, while the number of personnel has been reduced from 148 to 64 people (including staff under individual member-countries).

The scope of OSCE operations in other former Soviet countries – in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia – is rather modest. The OSCE centers in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have the largest budgets and staff. But their aggregate budget is comparable to the budget of the relatively small OSCE mission in Serbia. At the same time, the strength of OSCE international staff in Serbia is 50 percent greater than that of the OSCE centers in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan taken together.

The trend toward a gradual reduction in OSCE activities “east of Vienna” is confirmed by a marked decrease – especially since 2007 – in extra-budgetary funds allocated by the participating states for the implementation of projects by OSCE missions. The largest cuts in extra-budgetary contributions to the OSCE came from the U.S. – more than by half in 2007. The reason for the move was not Washington’s disillusionment about the organization’s effectiveness, but the need to find additional funds for the implementation of other projects in other parts of the world.

The aforementioned figures are not needed to make an assessment of the OSCE’s work. The problem is not whether it was necessary to conduct registration and draw up electoral registers in Albania amid chaos and virtually from scratch, and to train local staff to do this work. The problem is not whether the financing of projects for assembling light weapons and small arms in Tajikistan was effective, or how useful the OSCE’s skills development programs for the Kyrgyz police were – and not even whether the OSCE should provide assistance in drawing up electoral registers, say, in France.

Also, it is not so important whether we give positive or negative assessments to the OSCE’s work “east of Vienna.” What is important is that the peak of its activity is over. The scope of the organization’s operations – above all, in the Balkans – has been steadily decreasing. This decrease is not compensated for in any way by stepped-up activities in the former Soviet Union. In particular, since the OSCE closed its Assistance Group to Chechnya and gave up election observation in Russia in 2007, the organization has not been engaged in any activity in this country.

If Russia’s criticism was aimed at having the OSCE reduce its activities “east of Vienna,” then this is happening today by itself. But if the Russian goal was to have the OSCE broaden its activities in the West, then this task requires a different solution.

NO OSCE, NO PROBLEMS?

The continued presence on the OSCE agenda of such issues as the rule of law, the formation and development of democratic institutions, human rights, and free and fair elections (in Belarus, Uzbekistan and some other countries) is often taken as an attempt to go against the “when-in-Rome” rule. This irritates the political class, which wants to continue living according to its own laws. This irritation sometimes translates into a desire to withdraw from the organization if it does not offer any tangible benefits in exchange. No wonder Russian politicians have such ideas as well.
Again, the matter is not how rational this desire is, but whether withdrawing from the OSCE would solve the problem and whether it would make the life of the Russian political elite more comfortable.

Moscow’s withdrawal would hardly bring about the collapse of the OSCE. Actually, all of Russia’s neighbors are interested in the organization in one way or another. Kazakhstan, which is to hold the OSCE chairmanship in 2010, is preparing intensively for this mission. Even Belarus and Uzbekistan, which have found themselves in political isolation in the West, view their presence in the OSCE as an important symbol of their involvement in the pan-European process, despite all “costs.” However, these costs are not so great and in any case are controllable as the level, scope and quality of interaction with the OSCE and its institutions (the nature of missions, their strength, the nature of projects, etc.) are determined primarily by member-states.

The attitude toward the OSCE could change, perhaps, only in Georgia, which now views the organization as an instrument of Russian policy. If Russia withdraws from the organization and thus stops influencing decision-making regarding the activities of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, official Tbilisi will only welcome such a turn of events.

So, even if Russia withdraws, the OSCE will continue its traditional activities, although perhaps on a still smaller scale than today. Moscow will no longer participate in shaping OSCE policies and it will finally lose its levers of influence over OSCE interaction with neighboring countries. While not working toward a substantial reduction of OSCE activities “east of Vienna,” including in the humanitarian sphere, Russia will hardly have this organization build up its efforts in the West (if we really want this, of course). Moscow will even lose the capacity to criticize the organization and demand its in-depth reform, while the OSCE will remain and will become a tool – perhaps, even in a greater degree than today – for advancing political and other know-how along the West-East line.
The “No OSCE, No Problems” principle does not work in practice. Humanitarian issues are on the agenda of many international organizations today, including the agenda of their cooperation with Russia and other post-Soviet states. If the OSCE weakens or dramatically reduces its activities in the territory of the former Soviet Union, this factor will speed up the formation of other mechanisms of Western political influence within the framework of direct EU/U.S. cooperation with the newly independent states. Today, these mechanisms are in a rudimentary state, but their emergence will affect these countries’ relations with Russia.

All OSCE participating countries – except for those in Central Asia – are members of the Council of Europe, whose efforts are focused on issues of strengthening democratic institutions and protecting human rights. The Council’s standards in this sphere are not lower – and in some aspects even higher – than OSCE requirements. There is no doubt that the Council of Europe will be ready to assume the function of observing elections as well, which is now performed mainly by the OSCE. The Council will apparently adopt standards and technologies of the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), which is so unpopular in Moscow, or will possibly take this organization under its wing.

The last few years have seen the EU step up its policy toward Russia’s neighbors. Countries in Eastern Europe (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus) and the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) are now targets of the European Neighborhood Policy, under which they themselves choose the pace and areas for closer integration with the European Union, without necessarily becoming full members. In 2007, the EU adopted a strategy also toward Central Asian countries, inviting them to build mechanisms for direct political interaction. All countries in the region, including Uzbekistan, did not fail to take advantage of this opportunity.

The rule of law, democratic institutions, free elections, and human rights are all priority issues in the EU’s political dialog with its Eastern neighbors and with Central Asian countries. The agenda of Brussels’ cooperation with Central Asian nations also includes issues traditional for the OSCE such as: the reform of law enforcement bodies and keeping their staff; modern methods and technologies of border control; and fighting drug trafficking, organized criminal groups, corruption, terrorist and extremist activities.

In other words, the European Union is already gradually entering the OSCE realm in its interaction with all former Soviet countries, including Russia. In relations with Moscow, Brussels also seeks to institutionalize the dialog and cooperation in the issues of human rights and the rule of law. These issues have been included in the European Commission’s mandate for negotiating a new framework agreement with Russia and may prove to be a stumbling block at Russian-EU negotiations.

However, this kind of EU activity is not duly formalized and not effective yet. Brussels, which finances about 70 percent of expenditures related to the OSCE’s work in former Soviet countries, prefers not to act independently, but via this organization. Yet one can now hear in the European Union ever louder voices of those who believe that it is time for the EU to take over the tasks that the OSCE is unable to cope with. If the EU backs up its “good governance” standard with the benefits of economic cooperation – the EU is the main trading partner of virtually all former Soviet countries – and with financing projects in various fields, this can make the EU a very influential development factor in the region. Indeed, over recent years, the OSCE has been lacking precisely an independent economic weight for stimulating interest among member states in cooperation.

Another important matter is the reform of the security sector and the establishment of democratic control over it. This is an element and condition for NATO’s interaction with newly independent states. The importance of this aspect of cooperation should not be overestimated, since the intensity of the participation of former Soviet countries in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program differs greatly. But this subject inevitably comes to the fore for countries that seek rapprochement with the Alliance and especially those seeking to enter it.

Therefore, Russia’s withdrawal and even the collapse of the OSCE would not solve any of the problems that Moscow would like to get rid of. This refers to the activities of the OSCE and other European and Euro-Atlantic structures in the territory of the former Soviet Union, and to Russia’s relations with these organizations. The transfer of Western political know-how over to the post-Soviet East would continue all the same. But the scope and nature of these activities in relations between Western countries and Russia’s neighbors in Eastern Europe, the South Caucasus and Central Asia would then be determined without Moscow’s participation. In addition, Russia would have a reduced capacity to get organizations involved in this process to be more active “west of Vienna.”

Russia’s withdrawal would have only one result: if it leaves the OSCE, Russia would stay aloof from these processes of its own free will and would lose its last chance to influence them.

HOW TO GET THE OSCE FOCUSED ON THE RUSSIAN AGENDA?

During his visit to Germany on June 5, 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proposed holding a pan-European summit to prepare a new “European security pact.” The idea of finding a new consensus among participants in the pan-European process has been in the air for over the past year. No doubt, its promotion is certainly important, but it should not push into the background the solution of practical issues that are vital for the further functioning of the OSCE.

The program for the organization’s in-depth reform, which Russia advocated until recently, provided for the implementation of the following institutional, legal and procedural transformations.

First, Russia insisted on an institutional reform of the organization aimed at establishing stricter control on the part of the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna over the organization’s basic structures, which operate independently on the basis of their own mandates (ODIHR, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the rather independent field missions). The Permanent Council makes decisions on the basis of consensus, and all the participating states have veto power.

Such a move would mean that all major decisions, which are now independently made by individual OSCE institutions, would need unanimous approval. For example, OSCE election observation missions would not be allowed to make public their assessments before they are discussed by the Permanent Council.

Second, Russia insisted on stronger political leadership and control by the Permanent Council over mission activities. In particular, the Council would audit the allocation of extra-budgetary funds to missions for specific projects and the expenditure of these funds (including the practice of secondment). The idea is to gradually phase out the deployment of missions in individual countries in favor of creating “thematic” missions that would operate in all OSCE member-states. Thematic missions would focus on joint counteraction to new security challenges (terrorism, drugs, weapons and human trafficking, etc.).

Third, Russia advocated streamlining the OSCE’s operation and internal governance procedures, which often formed spontaneously on the basis of decisions made by the Ministerial Council and the Permanent Council. To this end, Moscow proposed making the OSCE a legal entity, adopting the organization’s Charter (Russia distributed a draft Charter in the summer of 2007), and unifying standard procedures for governing various operations of the OSCE and its institutions. The respective functions should be concentrated in the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna. To this end, it is necessary to reorganize and strengthen the Secretariat, as well as the powers of the Secretary General, while preserving their accountability to the Permanent Council; change the personnel policy and increase the representation of countries located “east of Vienna” in the central structures, basic institutions and missions; and revise the scale of contributions to the OSCE budget and bring it in line with the participating states’ solvency ratio, which would imply, in particular, reducing Russia’s contribution.

In recent years, a broad coalition has formed in the organization that advocates its increased effectiveness through restructuring and improved governance. The discussion of these issues has brought about essential yet insufficient changes in the OSCE’s operation.

However, many states find the requirements of Russia unacceptable, which actually propose confining autonomous OSCE institutions in a rigid corset of political consensus. This would make the organization’s efficiency dependent on the success or failure of political bargaining between Russia and its OSCE partners, and would throw the organization back into the times that were not very successful for it, namely the 1980s.

A reform of the OSCE like this would be unpromising and unproductive. It would be more reasonable to think how the organization’s seeming shortcomings could be turned into advantages.

The day-to-day activities of OSCE missions and institutions, performed irrespective of the course of political negotiations, open many opportunities for implementing projects of interest to Russia. To restore the balance in the organization’s work, it would be enough to intensify activities in sectors that are of priority for Russia, such as countering new challenges and threats to European security. Such activities must be made systematic and aimed at preparing specific practical conclusions and recommendations, which later could underlie decisions by the OSCE’s Permanent Council and the Ministerial Council.

Organizing such activities with the participation of all interested member-states of the OSCE today does not require – at least, not always – a preliminary consensus. Reliance on the Secretariat and its units would allow this work to be done on the basis of extra-budgetary funding. If Russia now realizes the need to strengthen one or another field of OSCE activity, it needs only to allocate the required resources and to second its staff. One can be sure that Moscow’s initiatives would meet with a positive response from many member-states and they would be ready to join in the funding.
Balance in OSCE activities can be restored without insisting that some field of its work be curtailed – these activities have recently been decreasing in any case. This goal should be achieved by initiating such OSCE activities that Moscow thinks better meet its interests and better reflect its views of how the organization should develop.

As a matter of fact, Kazakhstan embarked on this path a year ago, upholding its right to the OSCE Chairmanship. Astana proposed programs aimed at promoting the development of other Central Asian states, and came out with an initiative to take projects under OSCE auspices to assist Afghanistan in the struggle against drug trafficking.

Moscow will be able to improve the balance in OSCE activities just as much as it is ready to fund work required for this. However, this takes political will. If Moscow does not really want that, nothing will come out of it.