On July 14, 2007, the then Russian president Vladimir Putin issued a decree suspending Moscow’s observance of its commitments under the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). The formal reason for the suspension was the refusal by a majority of countries to ratify the Adapted CFE Treaty, which allegedly put Russia at a disadvantage with regard to its Western partners in the wake of NATO enlargement.

Moscow imposed a moratorium on implementing the CFE Treaty in December 2007 and gave the other participating countries 150 days (in accordance with Article XIX of the Treaty) – until July 1, 2008 – for the full-scale ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty. If this does not happen by that date, Russia reserves the right to fully withdraw from the treaty. In order to attach greater political and legal significance to the Russian president’s initiative, the State Duma adopted a special bill on November 7, 2007.

THE CFE TREATY AND THE ADAPTED CFE TREATY

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed on November 19, 1990 in Paris by 22 participating countries in the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, and came into force in November 1992. The document imposed quantitative limitations on the deployment of conventional arms and military equipment in Europe – from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains – in five major categories: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery (with a caliber of 100 millimeters and higher), combat aircraft and combat helicopters. In order to reduce the concentration of armaments and rule out surprise attacks by either military bloc, the parties limited the number of tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery systems in four zones: the Central Zone, Extended Central Zone, Super-Extended Central Zone, and Flank Zones in the north and the south of the CFE area of application.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States’ summit in Tashkent on May 15, 1992 divided the Soviet quota of armaments between the newly independent states. The disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, the elimination of the bloc confrontation in Europe, and the admission of Eastern European countries to NATO brought about the need to reconsider the basic provisions of the CFE Treaty. Former Warsaw Pact members joined NATO – together with their armament quotas, while the balanced bloc limitations, as stipulated by the Treaty, remained in force. In addition, Russia was particularly discontented with the flank limitations under the CFE Treaty and the appearance of “gray zones” in the territory of some countries that had joined NATO but had not acceded to the CFE Treaty.

The member states of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) signed an agreement on the adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the Adapted CFE Treaty) at their Istanbul summit on November 19, 1999, which reflected the changes in geopolitical realities. The adapted treaty set national and territorial – instead of bloc-based – limits on conventional armed forces. National limits apply to all categories of armaments belonging to a given country and limited by the treaty, whereas territorial limits apply to domestic and foreign battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery.

However, only Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine have so far ratified the Adapted CFE Treaty. Western countries have refrained from following suit under the pretext that Moscow has not met its political commitments made at the OSCE Istanbul summit to withdraw its military bases from Georgia and Moldova. Moscow argues that in the case with Georgia it has met its commitments in full, while the withdrawal of Russian military equipment from Transdniestria is a bilateral issue and cannot be an obstacle to the ratification of the Adapted CFE Treaty by other countries.

Meanwhile, many experts believe that the “virtual” quota ratio between NATO and Russia does not pose any real military threat to Russian security. Moscow’s moratorium can rather be viewed as a Kremlin resource for foreign-policy bargaining with the United States, NATO and the European Union on various regional issues. At the same time, it is the absence of real military threats that makes the achievement of an agreement to preserve the CFE regimes possible.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CFE TREATY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

On May 15, 1992, Russia and the three South Caucasian states – Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia – agreed in Tashkent on the maximum-allowed levels for armaments and military equipment in the region, thus dividing the former Soviet Union’s quota for the region among themselves. At the OSCE Istanbul summit, the South Caucasian states signed the Adapted CFE Treaty, which provided for a revision of the flank limit quotas, but never ratified it.

Nevertheless, Armenia and Georgia did not violate the CFE provisions. Moreover, during hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh, for example, Armenia invited international CFE inspectors, who found no violations of Yerevan’s international commitments under the treaty.

Azerbaijani experts and sources claim that Armenia is keeping large amounts of its weapons and military equipment in Nagorno-Karabakh. In this case, however, we have a basically different situation which is in no way related to Yerevan fulfilling its commitments. The armaments and military equipment located on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh do not belong to the Armenian Armed Forces, but to the army of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR), which is not recognized by the international community. Nagorno-Karabakh seized a large part of these armaments from the Azerbaijani Army during the hostilities of 1991-1994. In addition, the NKR came into possession of armaments and military equipment of the 366th motorized rifle regiment of the former Soviet Army, deployed in Stepanakert [the administrative center of Nagorno-Karabakh – Ed.]. Thus, the legal non-recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic by the international community creates problems with the extension of the CFE Treaty’s provisions to its Armed Forces.

But in the case with Azerbaijan, we have seen obvious breaches of the CFE Treaty throughout its duration. In particular, after the hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh were over and until the mid-1990s, the number of battle tanks, armored combat vehicles and artillery systems declared by Baku by far exceeded its quotas (apparently, Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry officials presented real figures about the armaments and military equipment that were in service with Azerbaijan’s Armed Forces “due to ignorance”). Later, Baku declared its armaments in amounts that it was allowed to have under the Protocol on National Ceilings for Conventional Armaments and Equipment Limited by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, although Azerbaijan did not cut its armaments during that period.

So, there are reasons to say that Azerbaijan considerably exceeded the amount of armaments and equipment allowed by the CFE Treaty. Also, active purchases by Baku of large amounts of armaments and military equipment (see Tables 1 and 2) did not affect its official figures either.

Moreover, for several years Azerbaijan tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to increase its quotas for armaments in circumvention of CFE provisions. It argued that its population and size by far exceed the figures of other small participating states to the CFE Treaty, and these figures were important in determining the ceilings for armaments and military equipment. Arif Yunus, a prominent Azerbaijani expert, admits: “As this treaty imposes strict limitations on the maximum number of troops, armaments and military equipment for Azerbaijan, it has to hide the real figures.”

Table 1. Azerbaijani Arms Imports in 2004-2006 According to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms

Table 2. Azerbaijan’s Armaments and Military Equipment Officially Declared Under the CFE Treaty (in parentheses – CFE-allowed levels), units

One has to admit, though, that neither the “basic” nor the Adapted CFE Treaty offer real and effective arms control mechanisms for the South Caucasus. This factor provides ample opportunities for Azerbaijan to bypass the CFE provisions (even by removing combat equipment from areas where it is permanently deployed and hiding it in the mountains several hours before the arrival of international military inspectors).

The legal relic of the Cold War has proved to be untenable with regard to regional and sub-regional security systems in Europe, as well as in areas of “frozen conflicts” and in unrecognized states in the territory of the former Soviet Union. The South Caucasus is a peculiar region as there are three separatist enclaves there, which have no real contacts in the field of security with their former parent states. This factor creates serious problems for projecting CFE mechanisms into the zones of the Nagorno-Karabakh or Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts, for example.

On the other hand, political problems that cause disagreements between major Western countries and Russia have also made the CFE Treaty hostage to global political processes. However imperfect the CFE mechanisms may be, they helped to contain militarization in the South Caucasus and to build confidence in the military sphere there.

THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF RUSSIA’S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CFE TREATY

After Russia withdraws from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, the treaty will naturally no longer apply to it, but theoretically one can assume that other European countries will continue to observe it for a while “by inertia.” However, without Russia’s participation, new initiatives for limiting conventional armaments in Europe will be ineffective and irrational and will not have a long-term future.

However, for two South Caucasian states – Armenia and Georgia – keeping the CFE Treaty in effect would be advantageous in any event due to their political interests and security priorities.
In particular, Tbilisi is interested in the treaty, as it indirectly helps it reason its position on the issue of the withdrawal of Russian military bases according to the 1999 Istanbul accords. Also, Georgia uses the treaty as a propagandistic and legal resource against the Russian military presence in Abkhazia – the problem of a military base in Gudauta.

On the other hand, it is very important for NATO-oriented Georgia to fully observe the CFE Treaty as it seeks to take the position of a respectable security partner in the eyes of Western countries. This factor makes Tbilisi be particularly accurate and detail-minded in providing data to the UN Register of Conventional Arms in keeping with CFE procedures.

Finally, the flank limits to some extent restrict Russia’s military presence in the North-Caucasian Military District, which is adjacent to the Georgian border.

Armenia is skeptical about the real effectiveness and efficiency of the CFE Treaty for containing militarization in the South Caucasus; yet it advocates the treaty’s preservation as it is still a mechanism that curbs the regional arms race. Russia’s withdrawal from the CFE Treaty does not meet Armenia’s interests, and Yerevan, despite its allied relations with Moscow, will likely try to keep its membership in the treaty, if Western countries find a possibility to modernize or extend it. But all these efforts will make sense for Yerevan only if Baku complies with the treaty, which is very doubtful.

The only country in the region that is not at all interested in preserving the CFE Treaty is Azerbaijan, which has been actively arming itself. Moreover, Baku has declared its wish to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem militarily. Observers agree that Baku will take avail of Russia’s withdrawal from the treaty to launch uncontrolled militarization. Azerbaijani expert Dzhansur Mamedov admits: “It is a good move for Azerbaijan: as we are going to build up armaments, Russia’s withdrawal only unties our hands. Now it is necessary that our authorities not make compromises with forces that will try to make us observe the CFE limits.” According to preliminary data for 2007, Baku purchased from Ukraine alone an additional 60 122-mm D-30A howitzers with 13,000 shells; 20 BTR-70 armored combat vehicles; 145 300-mm rockets for the 9A52 Smerch multiple rocket launcher; 50 anti-tank guided missiles; and about 11,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles.

However, some experts believe that Russia’s withdrawal from the CFE Treaty may result in a heavier Russian military presence in the South Caucasus, specifically in Armenia, due to a build-up of armaments and military equipment at Russia’s 102nd military base stationed there. The Russian military presence in Armenia was legalized within the CFE framework at the Istanbul summit in the form of the so-called “temporary deployment.” The Adapted CFE Treaty allows each participating state to host on its territory temporary deployments in excess of its territorial ceiling by no more than 153 battle tanks, 243 armored combat vehicles and 140 pieces of artillery. The amount of CFE-limited armaments and military equipment now deployed at the 102nd base does not exceed the “temporary deployment” level, while the number of Russian battle tanks in the area – even if counted together with battle tanks in service with the Armenian Armed Forces – does not exceed Armenia’s territorial ceiling.

At the same time, experts say that the relatively limited “potential” theater of operation does not require more heavy materiel at the Russian military base in Armenia. Therefore, an increase in the number of armaments at the 102nd military base is unlikely while the CFE Treaty remains in force. Russia may only replace outdated types of armaments and equipment, modernize some of the equipment, and partially replenish the base’s military assets.

But if NATO countries decide that continuing to comply with the CFE Treaty is senseless now that Russia has withdrawn from it, or if they start creating an alternative mechanism for arms control in Europe without Russia’s participation, all the prerequisites will emerge in the South Caucasus for a full-scale arms race. In this case, the prospects for a build-up (or conservation) of the Russian military presence in Armenia must be considered on the assumption of other political conditions.

PROSPECTS FOR THE CONTAINMENT POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

The suspension by Russia of its observance of the CFE Treaty and related agreements and protocols creates a new situation in arms control in Europe. In this light, the South Caucasian participating states to the CFE Treaty have different views on the ways to ensure their national security.

Georgia will undoubtedly harshly criticize Russia for its withdrawal from the CFE Treaty, which will let Tbilisi again link its security interests with those of NATO countries and even try to use this factor to achieve a desirable development of the situation involving Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Azerbaijan will take advantage of the possible collapse of the CFE Treaty to make uncontrolled purchases of armaments and military equipment from other countries, thus launching an arms race, and will use the build-up of its military arsenal to exert pressure or even blackmail in the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.

Armenia may show more insistence in advocating the need for retaining Nagorno-Karabakh’s control over the territory of lowland Karabakh as an essential condition for keeping the military-political balance in the zone of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict and as a guarantee of the non-resumption of hostilities.

In case the CFE Treaty collapses, the chances are very good that an arms race will begin in the South Caucasus. However, its possible consequences for security in the region are not clear.

First, it is difficult to say how a build-up of Azerbaijan’s military arsenal will affect its combat capabilities if hostilities resume in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone.

Second, despite increasing purchases by Baku of expensive armaments, the Armenians may make up for this military build-up with cheaper “countersystems” or defensive weapons that will be effective enough to maintain the current frontline and thus not yield to the armaments and military equipment purchased by Azerbaijan.

Third, Armenia can compensate for its lower financial capabilities, compared to Azerbaijan, by using its preferential status offered by the allied relations with Russia and its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which groups seven post-Soviet countries. For example, when Azerbaijan purchased expensive MiG-29 fighter aircraft from Ukraine in late 2006, it was announced that a joint Armenian-Russian air defense group, equipped with advanced surface-to-air missile systems, was beginning its duty in Armenia.

In addition, the overt militarization of Azerbaijan creates political preferences for Armenia. Baku’s bellicose statements provide Yerevan and Stepanakert with additional arguments for substantiating their rights to the territory of lowland Karabakh and for the need to keep it under Armenian control, as it is an important factor in maintaining stability and overall military balance in the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation. The more Azerbaijan talks about an early beginning to military actions aimed at liberating Karabakh, the more confidently the Armenian party can say that any territorial concessions are inadmissible. Relinquishing the territory may change the military balance and tempt Azerbaijan to really start hostilities. Therefore, it is in the interests of the international community to keep this territory under Armenian control – this will be the most effective guarantee of non-resumption of war by Azerbaijan; it will preserve regional stability and strengthen security.

The new spiral in the arms race in the Armenian-Azerbaijani confrontation zone creates a situation that has been well known since the Cold War era, when mutual deterrence reduces the likelihood of the outbreak of hostilities. The present military potentials of the parties are a far cry from those during the period of hostilities in the mid-1990s. The killing capability of some of the weapon systems, for example, the 9A52 Smerch multiple rocket launcher in the Azerbaijani Army or the WM-80 Typhoon multiple rocket launcher in the Armenian Army, makes them comparable to tactical nuclear weapons.

A mutual build-up of armaments in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone at this stage reduces the probability of hostilities. Stability in the conflict zone will be maintained due to a new “balance of threats,” which will force the parties to keep the fragile peace for a long time to come. But, of course, this cannot make up for serious measures to strengthen security and build confidence in the region, which must pave the way toward a full-scale settlement of the conflict.