Russia’s operation to enforce peace and its five-day war with Georgia took place just before the seventh anniversary of the start of the war on terror. The war has lasted for as long as World War II and many analysts have predicted it will never end. But the five-day war interrupted the expected course of events. It is not so much about a war on terror now as about a new Cold War. All the factors are in place for events to develop in such a way.

SEPTEMBER 11 AND AUGUST 8: DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES

It would seem at first glance that there are more differences than similarities between what happened in the United States on September 11, 2001 and in South Ossetia on August 8, 2008. Some think these events should not be compared at all. In the first case we have a sudden attack by an unidentified source (later called Al-Qaeda) using unconventional tools of aggression. In the second, there was an expected attack by the regular army of a specific country on a self-proclaimed republic, which de-jure is part of this state.

However, the similarities outnumber the differences.

First, both atrocities might be branded as crimes against humanity, because they deliberately targeted civilians and resulted in a tragic death toll;

Second, they both hit the world’s largest countries that have nuclear arsenals. Al-Qaeda leaders were aware that they had issued an order to destroy American citizens on the territory of the United States, while Georgian leaders realized that, while firing their salvo systems at Tskhinvali, they were killing citizens of the Russian Federation (who make up an overwhelming majority) in a territory adjacent to Russia;

Third, both the United States in 2001 and Russia in 2008 mustered similar resolve to stave off the attacks and took measures to prevent further attacks.

The difference in the legal aspect of the retaliation is obvious. The strike against the armed formations of the Taliban in Afghanistan was sanctioned by the UN Security Council, while Russia, in rebuffing Georgia, was guided by the peacekeeping mandate agreed on in the Dagomys Treaty and the UN Charter that provides for protecting citizens from aggression.

But the main difference was that Al-Qaeda’s attack on the United States led to the establishment of a broad international coalition of countries with various technological levels and geopolitical interests. In effect, a concept of an international war against terrorism was shaped, where Russia played and continues to play an important role.

Georgia’s attack on Tskhinvali and Russia’s retaliatory operation to force Georgia to peace sidelined Moscow politically and has put into question Russia’s further participation in the antiterrorist coalition.

In other words, August 8, 2008 became September 11, 2001 in reverse for Russia. Both events were not ordinary episodes in history. They have influenced the global reconfiguration of world politics in the 21st century.

These events concern many things: international law, which has a number of mutually exclusive norms; the bloc system of countries; patterns of action in conflict areas; and forecast estimates of how a situation will develop. For example, many Western analysts doubt the legitimacy of “promoting” (from the point of view of potential danger) the fanatical anarchists behind the attack on the twin towers to the rank of nuclear power. Some crimes that are normally handled by the police have turned into “military actions”: it might seem sometimes that the reason behind this is to justify excessive budget spending and keep the police down.

INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE STRONG

September 11, 2001 helped the U.S. to legitimize a new type of military action earlier tested in Grenada, Panama, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. These were military campaigns in territories of sovereign states without a declaration of war, but with the use of bombing raids that did not necessarily target military facilities. These kinds of operations became an informal concept in the 1990s known as the doctrine of “humanitarian interventions.” NATO’s war against Yugoslavia in 1999 can serve as an example.

The eroding criteria of the use of force was caused by the collapse of the global geopolitical balance of forces, but the ambiguity of many provisions of international law on the main issue – of war and peace – was also an important reason. This ambiguity and contradictions in the UN Charter, and a number of pacts and declarations, were rooted in the so-called “trap of self-defense,” or, to be more specific, “preventive self-defense.” It established the groundwork for the “war against terrorism,” justifying the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, though neither Kabul nor Baghdad had ever challenged the United States through direct aggression.

In the first case, the start of preventive military action came on the strength of intelligence that Al-Qaeda had been planning an attack on the U.S. from Afghanistan. But the same argument could also justify strikes at Pakistan, a close U.S. ally, where Al-Qaeda’s influence was as strong as in Afghanistan. In Iraq, “the preventive war” was not even based on intelligence, as former CIA chief George Tenet recently revealed in his book, but on the basis of dubious materials falsified by Dick Cheney’s milieu. The Iraq war has resulted in 300,000 to 650,000 deaths, most of which were civilians, according to estimates by various independent U.S. and European organizations.

The contradiction between the self-determination of nations and territorial integrity of the states became another “trap” for international law. An arbitrary interpretation of these principles to meet certain geopolitical interests, together with a biased view of events, led to the illegal recognition of Kosovo by the United States and a number of other states.

August 8, 2008 brought such changes to the international scene that the “catch of self-defense” and “the catch of self-determination” became a trap for U.S. politics in the Caucasus. Moscow, in effect, snatched the “hot potato” from Washington in a big political game. Moreover, its reasons for fighting Georgia are real, unlike those of the United States. Russia reacted to the attack on its peacekeepers and ethnic cleansings against South Ossetians, with Abkhazians standing next in line. Most South Ossetians and Abkhazians are Russian citizens.

After August 8, Moscow used another legal ambiguity of the UN Charter – “the catch of peacekeeping,” which enabled it to implement any preventive military action on the strength of a regional peacekeeping mandate, issued per agreement between two or more states. The U.S. had no such mandate for any of its three designated wars.

The reality that developed after September 11, 2001 and August 8, 2008 is such that the “catches” of self-defense, self-determination and peacekeeping in ambiguous UN documents can be used to justify war against sovereign states. This requires military might and political will. The United States demonstrated this capability after September 11, and Russia - after August 8.

International rules on war and peace are unlikely to change, and the existing ambiguities will persist. The United Nations will continue to exist because the world needs norms, no matter how vague.
The international law of the 21st century will remain the law of the strong, giving legitimacy to actions and means, and marking the right and the wrong. But after the August events, the phrase “war against terrorism” is ceasing to be the only “advertisement” of the use of force aimed at attaining political objectives.

AN ANTI-MAFIA COLD WAR

The Kremlin’s show of political will shocked the West, long used to a docile Moscow. Many wanted to slap sanctions on Russia and isolate it. But even the most aggressive politicians and analysts admit the West’s limited ability to exert a real influence.

The threats to Russia’s development are not external; they largely come from within. The peak of oil production has passed, and starting in 2010, the trend toward a recession will gain momentum. Of the country’s 14 largest oil fields, seven have been depleted by more than 50 percent.

Production at the four largest gas fields has been decreasing as well, but not because Russia is running out of oil and gas reserves. Rampant corruption and organized crime play a large role in the ineffective use of resources and the underfunding of new projects.

A national anti-corruption plan adopted just before the Russia-Georgia conflict uses a certain pattern to limit the lawlessness of officials. But it conspicuously lacks measures to fight the mafia. Corruption is just a gangland tool for deriving super profit, including in the fuel and energy sector.

A law-enforcement strategy to fight international organized crime that the United States adopted in April 2008 gives priority to fighting the mafia in the energy sector. It designated Russian organized criminal groups as the main source of danger.

Incidentally, it is this tool of putting pressure on Russia that the West is likely to use most actively. Threats were issued hard on heels of Russia’s recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
On August 26, 2008, The Washington Post wrote in an editorial: “There is certainly no reason why U.S. and international agencies should not vigorously pursue the numerous allegations of corrupt practices by Russian firms. If Kremlin-connected companies violate Georgian or international law through their actions in the occupied provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, their assets – gas stations in the United States, for example – could be subject to seizure.”

Britain’s Financial Times called for retaliation against Russia by its own methods: put pressure on Russian business and adopt discriminatory measures against it. On August 27, The Washington Post published an unprecedented article titled “Target the Kremlin Pocketbooks” by David B. Rivkin Jr., a former Justice Department official, and Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, a lawyer. They suggested instigating “a law enforcement campaign targeting Russia’s ruling elites.” “If enough pain is inflicted on them, they will demand foreign policy changes and even seek to replace Putin,” the authors said.

According to their recommendations, “whenever they have jurisdiction to do so – which should be often – U.S. and EU regulators should examine the business transactions of people close to Putin’s regime for money laundering or for securities, tax and other economic irregularities. Asset tracing and long statutes of limitation should enable Western authorities to examine years’ worth of business activities. The U.S. Justice Department should aggressively prosecute any instances of Kremlin-connected market manipulation, fraud, tax evasion and money laundering that fall within its reach.”

“Subpoenas, indictments, asset forfeitures, judgments and travel restrictions will hit where even the most callous bullies feel pain: squarely in the wallet[...] Pursuing the oligarchs through the courts would not require the United States or Europe to take a single action ‘against Russia.’ U.S. and allied governments could note that these activities are consistent with overarching Western efforts to curb public and private corruption. Meanwhile, publicizing Western investigations into illegal activity by Moscow businessmen and returning the ill-gotten gains to the Russian people should please even the fiercest Russian nationalists.”

The recommendations are actually an undisguised interference in Russia’s internal affairs, presented as a fight against global corruption and international organized crime. These are the methods of the “new Cold War.” Earlier, such directives were confidential, but now they are freely published.

The West began testing such methods of influencing Russia several months before the five-day war. For example, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held hearings on energy resources in the spirit of the anti-mafia cold war against Russia on June 12, 2008. Zbigniew Brzezinski was one of the experts who testified and their testimony ran along the same lines as the Washington Post article. British courts adopted as tough a tone when questioning Russian oligarchs in economic, civil and legal disputes in July 2008.

This kind of pressure might prove much more effective than the classic “gunboat diplomacy.” The U.S. and NATO do not have the clout now to start a military confrontation with Russia – there are too many problems everywhere. The “new Cold War” with Russia is likely to become an “anti-mafia” one.

Russia must be ready and try to stay a step ahead. Its further development, regardless of the model it chooses – militarized or very liberal – is impossible without a powerful anti-corruption project. It should not fear the West starting an anti-mafia cold war, instead Russia must use this as the reason for its operations “Clean Hands” and “Anti-mafia.” An emphasis must be placed on the return of stolen assets to Russia and the arrest of multi-millions in assets purchased abroad. In that event, the U.S.-conceived operation “soft power” will play not against Russia, but to its benefit, contributing to its purification and development.

There are no easy solutions in the oncoming anti-mafia war. It is important not to get trapped by economic initiatives. It would be unwise to assume that all of the 300,000 Russians who own huge amounts of property in London are corrupt or belong to mafia clans. But the checks into the legality of the income – which must involve Western fiscal and law-enforcement bodies – must be sweeping. The mechanisms were worked out long ago and are part of the toolbox of Russia’s financial watchdog, Rosfinmonitoring, operating through the Egmont intelligence network, and Interpol’s Russian Bureau.

For example, one might compare the lists of big Russian property owners abroad, compiled by Western tax authorities, with the lists of suspects in criminal cases concerning corruption and economic crimes. Or Russia could compile lists of suspects in these cases and make international requests to search the bank accounts and property of each suspect.

The mechanisms of arresting accounts and property and their subsequent forfeiture, with the view of repatriating stolen and legalized funds, are spelled out in the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2003). Russia ratified these international agreements and can use them in full measure. If the work of Russian law enforcement agencies and secret services is vigorous and coordinated, it might be possible to repatriate tremendous amounts of funds, while making the West an active participant in the process and not giving it a reason to call Russia a criminal country.

There is no doubt that the anti-mafia cold war will see a “battle of lists.” The West will start palming off to Russia the names of those who it believes make up the circle of “Putin’s friends.” Russia meanwhile will be demanding information about other persons. My own working experience at Interpol’s Russian Bureau shows that those who stole Russian funds and legalized them abroad are not known to the public at large. They never give interviews and do not have their faces smiling at us from glossy magazine covers.

Fighting the mafia is a fine art. We should not allow bona fide entrepreneurs who are expanding business abroad in Russia’s interests to fall under the block of Western and Russian reprisals. This is what the ideologists of the new cold war in the United States and Europe will be striving toward. They need to get rid of economic competitors, instigate a mutiny and resist Russia’s policy among the most mobile part of the population.