The story is told of a celebrated hypochondriac whose gravestone read “I told you that I was ill!”

We are at a very difficult point. As I write, the world’s financial system is in chaos. By the time this article is printed, I trust the panic will be over; but the effects of the crisis will be with us for years to come, and will affect us all. For the third time in less than two decades, after 1991 and 2001, unexpected and unpredicted events have burst upon us in a way that changes the world.

For years, we have been telling each other that today’s big problems were global and transcended national boundaries; that we had no rational choice but to tackle them together. Now we find ourselves again in the midst of global tumult (with further huge issues of nuclear proliferation, energy, climate change, water and so on clearly visible on the horizon) – and our divisions remain. Are we going to sink into the ground, still saying:  “I told you we needed to work together”?

In August, the rift between Russia and the West, which had been widening for five years, became a chasm. Decisions were taken and policies made, in different capital cities, on a basis, not of rationality and mature calculation, but of hot-headed emotion, short-sightedness and ancient prejudice. There were serious and dangerous miscalculations on all sides.

The result of a conflict which was both entirely avoidable and also seemingly inevitable (or so it had come to appear over the past few years) was that our divisions grew even wider. In his speech in Evian in October, President Medvedev spoke of a “trend of growing divisions in international relations,” of “the United States’ desire to consolidate its global rule,” and of “NATO bringing its military infrastructure right up to our borders… No matter what we are told, it is only natural that we should see this as action directed against us.” In the previous month he told the Valdai Forum that Georgia’s “cynical and bloody attack under the slogan of restoring constitutional order” had put “an end to the last illusions about the current security system’s ability to function reliably:” the world had changed, for him and for Russia, much as it had changed for the United States on September 11, 2001.

At an emergency Summit in September, the EU’s leaders used unprecedentedly strong language. They were “gravely concerned by the open conflict which has broken out in Georgia, by the resulting violence and by the disproportionate reaction of Russia… Military action of this kind is not a solution and is not acceptable… The European Council strongly condemns Russia’s unilateral decision to recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That decision is unacceptable…”  In the United States, Senator McCain accused Russia of “stark international aggression;” his rival Presidential candidate, Barack Obama, spoke of “the challenge posed by an increasingly autocratic and bellicose Russia” and said the conflict had “opened a huge divide between Russia and the international community.”

Almost one year ago, I argued in Russia in Global Affairs (No. 1, 2008) that analogies with the Cold War could not be taken seriously; that neither the leaders of Russia nor of the “West” (however defined) sought a new confrontation; but that the trust that had existed up to 2003 had evaporated and needed to be rebuilt, step by step.

Is this still a tenable argument?

At a recent conference in Italy, I repeated my argument that the West (let us say Russia’s partners in the G8 – the EU, the U.S., Japan and Canada) and Russia needed to find ways of resurrecting the level of trust necessary for stability, security and cooperation on major strategic issues. I was immediately challenged by a Parliamentarian: how could anyone now speak of “trust”? Was this not an absurd notion, with Russia and the West each accusing the other of hostile intentions?

It was a fair point. In August there was no trust. There is no point now in rehearsing the conflicting interpretations of the conflict, and the barrage of accusations and counter-accusations: there will never be a consensus on who bears the greatest responsibility for this unnecessary war. But what is beyond dispute is that confidence in our collective ability to manage European security was severely shaken.

So what do I mean by a necessary level of trust? Clearly this cannot at present mean “partnership.” In August it finally became manifest to those who had failed to appreciate the point before that partnership was off the agenda. But if we are to deal sensibly with each other, we need predictability; we need an accurate understanding of each other’s interests and intentions; and we need the ability to communicate rationally.

These are the elements which need to be restored. With the vastly freer and more normal interchange between Russia and the West since 1991, one would have expected a more sophisticated level of mutual understanding to develop. But a paradox of the past 17 years is that the gulf in understanding among policy-makers is, if anything, wider than it was during the Cold War. Russian and Western leaders view each other through the prisms of their own systems. This leads inevitably to miscalculations – of which the events in the Caucasus were the most serious of recent years, though far from the first.

Trying to escape from these prisms, let me pose three questions which are fundamental to our ability to deal sensibly with each other: What does the Russian leadership want? What does the West want? How might we reconcile our interests?

Of course, neither Russian nor Western opinion is monolithic. There are extreme views on both sides, gleefully proclaiming a mythical “new Cold War,” and if we allow them to control the debate they risk turning the myth into a reality, much to the detriment of all of our interests. As Boris Dolgin has put it, Russia’s isolationists are close allies of Western supporters of containment. Each feeds off the other. But I shall try to focus on what appears to be the mainstream of educated opinion, leaving propagandists to one side.

WHAT DOES THE RUSSIAN LEADERSHIP WANT?

Some months ago, before the events in the Caucasus, I heard a Russian expert say “We are strong again – but we don’t know what it’s for.”

In a recent article for the “openDemocracy” internet journal, Alexei Arbatov has posed the question: Will the August crisis be an isolated episode in the post-Soviet space and in relations between Russia and the West – or the “first swallow” of a new phase in the disintegration of the Soviet empire – henceforth on the Yugoslav model?

President Medvedev has set out five guiding principles for Russian foreign policy, but does Russia have a strategy?

I put this question to the President when he lunched with the Valdai Club. He replied that “The aim of any foreign policy is to ensure a good domestic life. Foreign policy is itself only a means for achieving internal political goals… The foreign policy of any state should be designed to ensure the stable development of its economy, its social sphere and ensure normal standards of living for its people.”

That is not an answer with which any reasonable person could argue, but let me risk going a little further. Four objectives seem to have been uppermost in Russia’s external policy of the past five or so years.

The first is security.  Like any large country or group of countries, Russia seeks to maintain the power to deter attack or coercion. But, historically and to the present day, Russia feels less secure about its boundaries than any other major power. To the West and, especially, along its long Southern and South-Eastern borders, Russia lacks natural frontiers and logical definition; and worries about a lack of manpower, exacerbated by demographic decline, necessary to populate and defend vast border areas. So Russia tends not just to seek security within its own borders, but remains attached to the historical idea of a buffer zone: it wants to retain the ability to influence or coerce neighboring states (most of which were within the Soviet Union) and above all to prevent these states from forming close alliances with other powers. The influence of such powers tends to be seen as hostile, in a zero/sum sense.

The second objective is to assert independent sovereignty. The policy elite has developed a concept of sovereignty which claims exceptional status for Russia: along with the United States, China and India, Russia is declared to be one of a small group of global powers which enjoy fully independent sovereignty. The aim of such powers is to enjoy unconstrained freedom of action and to avoid domination by other powers. Russia has claimed the right to act beyond its borders to protect “the lives and dignity of Russian citizens, wherever they may be” and to give “special attention” to particular regions or a “zone” where it asserts “privileged interests” (to quote President Medvedev, though previous Russian governments have asserted the same interests, going back to Foreign Minister Kozyrev in the early 1990s). The leadership also demands that there should be no external interference in Russia’s internal affairs, reserving the right to make a very broad definition of “interference” (which has embraced broadcasting, promotion of civil and political rights, religion, charitable activities by non-governmental organizations and aspects of cultural and educational interchange and of foreign investment).  A narrative has been developed whereby the 1990s is seen as a period of malign Western interference in a weakened and humiliated Russia (whereas the West thought that it was trying to assist the Russian people, support the Russian transition, and forge a new partnership).

A third objective, closely linked to the second, is to ensure, once again, global recognition of Russia’s status as a major Power. Since the riches rolled in from oil five years ago, the leadership has marched under a banner proclaiming that Russia is strong again and can no longer be ignored or taken for granted. They wish to be the strategic interlocutor of the United States; an equal partner of China; a power with a full vote in European issues and an Asian-Pacific power, as well; a senior member of all international clubs; an actor in the Middle East; and the patron of a network of “friendly” or client states.

The fourth discernible objective has been to seek Russia’s full integration into the global economy. Russia wants to be able to make use of its comparative economic advantages, and to translate them into political influence. It wishes to become much more than a “raw materials appendage” to the West and China, and, by exploiting its human capital, to join the ranks of the advanced economies.

Russia’s pursuit of these goals has been beset by a number of contradictions. It wants to use economic strength and economic development, entirely legitimately, to advance its position in the world; but the lack of restructuring and investment has left the economy dependent on a narrow base of hydrocarbons and other raw materials. It wants to be a leading power within the status quo, and puts international law and the strengthening of the multilateral system at the head of its priorities; but has acted outside international law in the Caucasus and elsewhere, and has been reluctant to accept the rules, constraints and ethos of the clubs it joins. Does the sanctity of international law (the President’s first principle) take precedence over what he has described as the “indisputable priority” of protecting the lives and dignity of Russian citizens, wherever they be? Moscow seems to be divided between those who want to confront the West, and those who believe that this would be hugely damaging for Russia’s interests; and between those who wish to use economic blockades and the threat of force against neighboring states, and others who think a policy of attraction would be more productive than coercion. The President declares that Russia wants “friendly ties with Europe, the U.S. and other countries in the world;” but Moscow gives the impression of looking out at a world full of adversaries – a hostile United States; NATO and the EU joining in encroachment on Russia’s interests; potentially treacherous post-Soviet states with grievances; destabilizing forces to the South; and, looming as a future threat from the East, the emergent Chinese superpower. Some allies might be helpful: Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela scarcely fits the bill.

Given these contradictions, it is not surprising that the West is confused and uncertain about Russia’s intentions – that the element of predictability I mentioned earlier has been lost. The appearance of Russian armor 20 kilometers from Tbilisi and aerial attacks deep inside Georgia were manna to Western apostles of containment and a new Cold War, just as Saakashvili’s bombardment of Tskhinvali must have delighted their isolationist Russian counterparts. General Ivashov regretted that the Russian forces had not been allowed to take Tbilisi itself. The American neocon John Bolton struggled to contain his glee when interviewed about Russian recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Two of a kind: each makes the other’s day. But neither offers a viable strategy for the management of the world in the 21st century. Both represent failed philosophies.

WHAT DOES THE WEST WANT?

Russia has no less reason to feel confused about Western objectives, although the Russian leadership is more adept at coping with the confusion. Even to speak of “the West,” as Russians invariably point out, begs the question: what is the West? How is anyone to interpret the bizarre, Janus-faced decisions taken by NATO at Bucharest, stalling the applications of Georgia and Ukraine for Membership Action Plans while declaring the road to eventual membership to be open? How can the United States have failed to detect Saakashvili’s intentions and deter him from his idiotic attack? As Fyodor Lukyanov has rightly pointed out in a recent article (published on the internet in Polit.ru and openDemocracy), the West appears to have no more of a long-term strategy than Russia.
Let me nevertheless suggest certain objectives around which Western governments broadly coalesce.

The first, as with Russia, is security – the security of their states and the collective security of NATO and the European Union. The important point here is that the West does not see a direct threat from Russia. We have this from no less an authority than the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates (speaking at a NATO meeting in London in September). The hierarchy of threats to Western security is headed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism – especially where they have the potential to overlap.

A second vital objective is to preserve peace, stability and prosperity in Europe. This is why the conflict in the Caucasus was not treated as a minor episode in a distant country, but set alarm bells ringing. Like the wars in the Balkans, it was a reminder that peace in Europe could not be taken for granted; and, more ominously than in the Balkans (notwithstanding the Pristina incident), it raised the possibility of a direct confrontation between Russian and U.S. forces. It underlined the fact (not new to the expert community, but hitherto unappreciated by Western public opinion) that Russian and Western objectives are undeniably in conflict in the shared neighborhood of post-Soviet states, where the Russian concept of a buffer zone or “zone of influence” is incompatible with the rights of sovereignty, self-determination and freedom of choice promoted by the West.

A third objective is to advance or protect the global interests of Western countries. In the Cold War, this entailed bloc-to-bloc confrontation and frequently proxy wars with the Soviet Union. We are now in an entirely different situation, with many competitors and combinations; no inbuilt confrontation; and, quite often, alignment of the interests of Russia and different Western countries. Some of the sharpest competition has been between Western countries.

Fourth, though no less important, is defense of the rule of law and global order. But here there are manifest differences, which the war in Iraq has highlighted, between Western countries, and not just Western countries, about how this is to be achieved.

Many in the West would add a fifth objective – the promotion of democratic values and human rights. While this may sound like motherhood and apple pie, it leads to a critical debate about methods and priorities. The moral case for removing Saddam Hussein, who bore responsibility for mass murder and obscene torture, was very strong; but the idea that Western-style democracy could be imposed on Iraq was simplistic and fallacious. The inconsistency and double standards of the Western approach are glaring: critical of Russia and China (and much more so of, say, Burma and North Korea), but, for reasons of Realpolitik, almost silent on countries like Saudi Arabia.

How does this translate into policy toward Russia? Not very clearly. The Bush Administration has veered like a drunken sailor between trying to ignore Russia, seeking Russian help on specific issues, and denouncing Russia. Its approach has lacked any coherence or semblance of strategic vision. The European Union has been no more coherent, because of its internal divisions. The mainstream of EU countries does have a vision. It would like to form a genuine partnership with Russia (but not a partnership at the expense of others, whether the United States or former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states), and to promote, over time, much closer integration of Russia with Western and Central Europe. There would be obvious benefits, in terms of peace and prosperity. However, with partnership off the agenda and unattainable in at least this generation, the EU is not clear what it wants. It needs to continue to engage Russia; but also to restrain and deter what it sees as aggressive and coercive approaches to neighboring countries, including EU member states, and attempts to divide and manipulate the European Union itself. It is confused about how to do this.

CAN RUSSIAN AND WESTERN INTERESTS BE RECONCILED?

The means by which the Russian leadership has sought, rhetorically, to reconcile its position with that of the West is a curious one. Having long complained (and not without justification) of Western double standards, the Kremlin appears now to have adopted the “Bush Standard.” The language used by the Bush Administration (and its supporters) has been tape-recorded and played back. 8/8 is equated with 9/11 – a nation-changing moment which creates a new mind-set and justifies extreme (and if necessary unilateralist) measures. The opponent is depicted as a mad dictator who, like Saddam and Milosevic, must be dragged before a court to face charges of genocide (notwithstanding, in this case, palpably thin evidence). Tony Blair is quoted: his arguments for “humanitarian intervention” and his defense of standing alone when you are convinced you are in the right. If Western nations choose to recognize Kosovan independence without UN approval (albeit 9 years after the conflict and after lengthy, UN-supported negotiations over status), Russia has the right to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia (whose leader told the Valdai Club that he wanted, not independent statehood for his tiny mountain territory, but unification with North Ossetia within the Russian Federation).

The problem with the Bush Standard is that it has gone right out of fashion. For reasons which need no elaboration (the single word “Iraq” is sufficient), its authors – Cheney, Rumsfeld and a gaggle of neo-cons – are utterly discredited even within their own country. The Bush Administration will shortly slither ignominiously into history, leaving the United States a much weaker country than they found it. And the U.S.A., a country with a remarkable capacity for regeneration, will have learned from this bitter experience and will set out on a different course.
So this doesn’t seem like the best model to follow. We need a better model.

We have the building blocks. There is no objective need for confrontation. President Medvedev declared at Evian that “we are in no way interested in confrontation.” It would be the avenue of last resort, and would be expensive and damaging to all of our interests.

We have a vital shared interest in the management of global problems. And the crises in the Caucasus and the financial markets have had the salutary effect of reminding us of our interdependency and of our ability to cooperate when we are forced to do so.

We now need to draw the right lessons from these crises.

First, Russia and the West need to talk to each other. Frankly. And not just during a crisis.

Second, in that spirit of frankness, we don’t need to like each other in order to cooperate – but an atmosphere of strident animosity makes talking much more difficult and risks leading to the confrontation which both sides say they wish to avoid. Many things have happened inside Russia which have tarnished Russia’s reputation abroad and which stand in the way of partnership. The West will continue to criticize such actions; but, until such time as the Russian people themselves decide on a change of course, Western governments will need to work with a system which they may not like but cannot alter. Likewise officially-encouraged animosity toward the West has built up to a fever pitch in Russia, for a variety of reasons. Blaming an external enemy is an old political gambit. Political leaders on both sides need to be careful about playing to the nationalist and xenophobic emotions of the domestic gallery, or they will risk finding themselves boxed in by the forces they have unleashed. Threatening language has become part of the problem.

Third, and most importantly, we must address the heart of the problem. As has become increasingly apparent, there is one strategic issue over which the objectives of Russia and the West divide sharply, one fault-line between us. This is the arc of mistrust, which stretches from the Baltic states through Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova along the Black Sea to the Caucasus and into Central Asia (with a risk that unilateral actions could extend it further northwards into the Arctic). How this is handled will, I believe, determine Russia’s relationship with the West for many years to come.

The immediate task is to prevent the situation from getting worse. We cannot afford a repetition of August. The ceasefire arrangements in Georgia must be respected. Nothing should be done elsewhere in the “arc” to create new tensions: no provocations, reawakening of dormant conflicts, blockades, disruption of energy supplies. Ukraine should be allowed to hold its elections without outside interference. NATO should avoid repeating the mistake it made in Bucharest. The enlargement of the European Union has been a much more successful process than the enlargement of NATO, in part because it has no military dimension, but also because the EU has never been afraid of discussing it with the Russian government (the talks before the last enlargement, including over Kaliningrad, being a good example). NATO enlargement was mishandled from the outset. Decisions were taken ad hoc, without a strategy or proper calculation. Misleading signals were given to Moscow as far back as 1990. NATO should have built up its partnerships with Russia and with prospective new members in parallel. It is not necessarily wrong, per se, for NATO to enlarge; but the prime consideration should be the stability and security of Europe. For now, talk of possible membership for Georgia and Ukraine is premature as well as irrelevant to the real security needs of both countries.

Much the same could be said of missile defense. This is an unnecessary argument. In the spring of this year I was told by two very senior representatives of the foreign policy establishment in Moscow that, while Russia did not like or see the rationale for the proposed installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, it could live with them so long as inspection arrangements were agreed whereby Russia could be assured they did not constitute a threat. One must hope that the next U.S. Administration will review these plans. If it goes ahead with the program, it would be wise to address concerns expressed by Moscow, which are far from irrational.

However, we have to think beyond these immediate steps. If we are to rebuild mutual understanding and predictability and pre-empt future threats to European stability, we need to have serious and structured discussions about the issues which divide us. We talk about global issues in a variety of organizations, but when it comes to European security, a long agenda has accumulated which we have simply failed to discuss.

President Medvedev has issued a challenge to the West to discuss European security. The initial Western reaction has been sceptical, seeing this as a rather old-fashioned ploy to undermine NATO and delink the United States from Europe (an impression enhanced by the strident attacks, which he and his predecessor have made on U.S. unilateralism). In my view, the West should take up Medvedev’s challenge. We cannot expect a meaningful response from Washington until the next Administration is up and running around the middle of 2009. This gives the European Union and the European members of NATO time to explore the idea and to formulate a position to put both to Washington and to Moscow. First, they should conclude that a structured negotiation – inevitably complex, and probably lasting several years – is necessary, and that they will devote resources to it. Second, they should think about the format. All states of the OSCE area should be represented equally: there can be no question of negotiating over their heads. Organizations will also need to be represented, as Medvedev has suggested. Third, they should look at Medvedev’s ideas on content, and add to them. He has made some important points about commitments to sovereignty, territorial integrity, the inadmissibility of the use of force and dispute resolution procedures. There is an obvious read-across here to events in the Caucasus. No one sitting down with a blank sheet of paper would have devised the international boundaries inherited by the 15 states of the former USSR. They were an accident of internal Soviet administration (and in some cases the whims of Stalin and Khrushchev) and not based on any ethnic, economic or strategic principle; but any attempt to change them now, except by agreement, would risk the dire consequences described by Arbatov in his article. The “recognition” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia set an extraordinarily dangerous precedent for attempts to change these boundaries unilaterally and by force. Reaffirmation of the inviolability of frontiers and of territorial integrity is critical to future stability.

I accept that such a negotiation would be cumbersome, slow and expensive. But the alternative is worse. We risk lurching from one dispute to another in an atmosphere of deepening suspicion and hostility, and again lining up as proxies in regional conflicts. It would be far better to have Russia and Georgia voicing their grievances across a table than fighting in South Ossetia; far better for us all to be talking through microphones rather than megaphones.

I end where I began. The world is in too bad a state for us to indulge our prejudices and animosities. “The global system is paralyzed on a scale that now surpasses 1929,” wrote the economist Will Hutton on 12 October, “without collaboration and leadership, we face disaster.” That does not just mean disaster for improvident Western bankers. There has been no safe haven in this storm. Alexei Kudrin said of Russia in the same week: “The abundance we have experienced is drawing to a close. Our country’s oil and gas output is likely to peak in 2008. We won’t see this much revenue again. In that sense, we are crossing a historic boundary.” The weaknesses of all of our economies have been brutally exposed.  Protectionism and isolationism would make these ailments worse. The need to pull together and act together has not been greater at any point since the Second World War. Is it too much to hope that the crisis will bring us all to our senses?