Despite the obvious heterogeneity in the evolution of former Soviet republics, the territory of the former Soviet Union is still afloat as a unified political and social association. The formally non-existent post-Soviet political organization is invisibly interlinked by energy and transport corridors, markets, trade and economic relations, which took shape back in the Soviet era. The peculiarities of the administrative and state systems and the propagation of the Russian language are the results of the presence of the Russian empire and the Soviet Union.

This territory is unique. There is hardly anywhere else where one can find such a conglomeration of countries that are linked to each other not only by a common history and culture, but also by a common political geography. The Commonwealth of Independent States has a strategic advantage over similar organizations, such as La Fr‡ncophonie, which is an international organization of cooperation among French-speaking countries, or the Commonwealth of Nations. These consist of territories scattered around the world because their metropolitan empires were sea powers during the colonial period of their development. In contrast, the countries grouped in the CIS have common borders, which allow for the establishment of a single economic space and a customs union, and free movement of capital, manpower, goods and services.

The Commonwealth is the only platform that can serve as a starting point for reintegration projects. The CIS gave rise to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) – perhaps the two most promising projects in the territory of the former Soviet Union. However, their potential is not being fully tapped.

There are several reasons for this. First, post-Soviet states are not ready for the establishment of supranational institutions due to the heterogeneous development of their political systems. In many of them, corruption and the struggle for power are dominant elements in the functioning of their state systems, and the ruling politicians do not want to share their power with supranational bodies.
European Union countries are also facing certain problems because of the different levels of their economic systems; however, their political development has been reduced to a basic common denominator – that is, democratic norms. But is a democratic model really necessary for launching a serious phase in post-Soviet reintegration? According to the theory of alliances, associations can group any countries: large and small, democracies and authoritarian regimes, monarchies and republics.

Russia links the post-Soviet territory and is a guarantor of its integrity. Having gone through the stage of primary formation, the former Soviet republics are now at a crossroads: they can either evolve toward reintegration on a mutually advantageous economic basis by creating a Eurasian Union patterned after the European Union, or set up new barriers in a bid to become part of other integration structures.

The latter choice will inevitably bring about heightened tensions and a major revamping of the established world system. Both paths have real and equal possibilities.

PREREQUISITES FOR INTEGRATION

Any great power needs a zone of influence of its own to project its national interests. For Moscow, this is the territory of the former Soviet Union where it is the locomotive of integration processes. It is a natural buffer, free from the political and military-strategic dominance of the West.

In economic terms, adjacent countries are the starting point for breakthroughs by Russian businesses into world markets, as well as an outpost and a testing ground (in the best sense of these terms) for the success of Russian companies’ foreign strategies. The ruble will not become a global reserve currency if it is not accepted as a common currency in the CIS.

Russia’s security is inseparably linked with the territory of the former Soviet Union. This does not imply only the military infrastructure and military facilities located on the territory of some countries. The very status of Russia as a great power is inseparable from the former Soviet territory. It is the bulwark of Moscow’s real strategic influence in the world, the only existing remainder of the once-powerful Union, and, finally, Russia’s chance for global revival. This is why Russia’s National Security Concept defines the Commonwealth’s territory as a zone of its strategic national interests.

NATO’s insistent attempts to expand into the CIS can be explained by its desire to block the Kremlin. The destruction of the territory of the former Soviet Union would be a serious shock for all the participating countries and, above all, for their economies. The security, stability and development of the post-Soviet territory directly depend on the situation in Russia. In previous years, major economic crises quickly crossed the borders of CIS member countries.

Today, when Russia’s policy in the post-Soviet territory is slowly turning toward integration, the methods of implementing the foreign policy interests of the West are also undergoing significant changes. First, these changes include the renunciation of the practice of changing political regimes by revolutionary means and of an isolation policy; an active use of double standards, which even Moscow now does not shun; and bold attempts to destroy the Commonwealth by means of a policy of alliances (NATO’s enlargement or the creation of alternative unions without Russia’s participation).

To retain its positions, Moscow vitally needs to offer an attractive and competitive model for developing a common territory. The paradox of the Kremlin’s relations with former compatriots is that, while recognizing the priority of this aspect, Russia is not yet ready to seriously invest in reintegration. Thus, we see numerous misunderstandings and political crises.

In today’s world, where the habitual international law system has been destroyed and where events are developing rapidly, Moscow can no longer count on the loyalty of former Soviet republics if it does not back up its expectations with real and, most importantly, mutually advantageous proposals. It is also important to overcome the psychological “Soviet Union complex” and stop viewing post-Soviet states as loyal by default. Building new relations must imply sincere willingness to make serious investments in the economic, political and social systems.

Russia should not involve post-Soviet countries in an ideological confrontation with the West and the more so to force them to support Russia’s use of force. Another undesirable development would be the formation of alliances as a counterbalance to NATO or other Euro-Atlantic structures. Such alliances are the first to collapse as they degrade from an effective instrument for solving problems into a senseless union established for the sake of ideological confrontation. CIS countries will not likely find a proposal attractive to establish a structure intended to support confrontation with the West, while participation in this structure would not bring its members any benefits except for good relations with the Kremlin.

Obviously, the task of preserving the territory of the former Soviet Union amid intense pressure from the West is very difficult. Moscow does not yet have a wide range of instruments to exert pressure, except for force. However, the examples of Georgia and Ukraine show that such pressure does not build the confidence required for the successful development of relations, and the more so, it does not help to popularize the idea of deeper cooperation.

The present situation can be described as a reconstructive period. The former approach, based on remnants of the Soviet structure, is being transformed into a new system of interaction, although it stems from methods that have already been developed. In other words, the CIS has successfully fulfilled its primary mission of preserving the post-Soviet territory in a conflict-free and full format as far as it was possible. This stage is now over. Today, Russia is acquiring real opportunities for transforming the post-Soviet territory into an integrated platform of a new type. Moscow’s main goal should be to create a model for cooperation where post-Soviet countries would seek mutual rapprochement, as is happening now in the European Union, without fearing the Kremlin.

The matter at hand is not just bilateral or limited associations, but a Greater CIS. Here one can combine approaches proposed by Belarus and Kazakhstan. Minsk, as the capital of the CIS, stands for integration on a larger scale, including all CIS countries. Astana advocates integration on a smaller scale, but does not object to a larger number of participants in individual integration projects. It is important that a new framework of relations between post-Soviet states guarantee that their interests are balanced.

A MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS ALLIANCE

The Heartland Theory advanced by Halford Mackinder back in 1904 [in which he refers to the continuous landmass of Eurasia – Ed.] is now being uniquely embodied in the territory of the modern CIS. Apparently, alliances will balance interests in this region in the next few years. This form of cooperation does not presuppose aggression by large and strong countries against smaller and weaker ones. The establishment of an alliance would be mutually advantageous as it would enable small states to influence the policies of their strong neighbors.

Participation in an alliance would give small regional leaders a chance to enter the international arena and have an impact on global politics. As for influential countries, an alliance would ensure their stable and constructive presence in the region and actively promote their interests. The framework of an alliance would help to resolve conflicts of interest in the best way, while a flexible alliance policy would help to involve players that traditionally are not considered to be regional, but which have goals of their own.

In the territory of the former Soviet Union, the policy of forming alliances has its nuances. The fundamental principles here are economic benefits and firm guarantees that each other’s interests will be observed. Confidence is based on voluntarism as regards entry to and withdrawal from the alliance. Usually, such an important element as the possibility of withdrawing from an alliance at the initial stages is excluded from fundamental documents or is present only by implication, as until recently was the case with the EU, for example. Two factors will determine the effectiveness of the organization: how influence is distributed among the participants and the level of cohesion and coordination of mechanisms.

The specific development of the system of post-Soviet relations today does not allow an alliance to have no leader or group of leaders. Few doubt that Russia will be the leader and other states are ready to accept its leadership. But the emergence of a new association in former Soviet territory will not mean Moscow’s monopoly over it. The EU experience shows that integration does not infringe on a state’s right to its own niche in foreign policies if there are strong guarantees that its interests will be respected. Moreover, the instruments and influence of individual countries may increase.

Many post-Soviet states are trying to free themselves from Russia’s influence. The creation of an alliance in which CIS countries would have real instruments for interacting with their powerful neighbor, as well as mechanisms for regulating their political closeness to or remoteness from Russia, could help them avoid taking rash actions and could ensure the stability of their development. At the same time, they could integrate into the world community while respecting Moscow’s interests. Today, however, any attempt of rapprochement with the West triggers aggressive steps from the Kremlin. Such a system of relationships has exhausted itself.

BALANCING THE INTERESTS

EU countries and the United States certainly are not interested in preserving the integrity of the territory of the former Soviet Union. Conflicts between them and Russia may arise over energy and other issues; and the faster Moscow consolidates its global role, the more probable these conflicts will be. Few people now have any doubts that Russia has regained the status of a world power. At the same time, responsibility for any foreign policy moves is markedly growing, too.

In 1907, the Anglo-Russian Convention defined the two empires’ spheres of influence in Central Asia and actually put an end to the Great Game between the two powers for supremacy in the region. I do not advocate, of course, following the example of our predecessors. Yet two things are obvious.

First, the further constructive development of the former Soviet territory requires delimiting the degree and density of the influence of stronger countries, as it is impossible to get rid of such influence.

Second, today, a hundred years after the Convention entered into force, the structure of international relations does not allow for ignoring the interests of former Soviet republics. During the years of confrontation (including the Cold War), small states did not have significant levers of influence over the superpowers, and most of them played the role of minor actors in crowd scenes. A major reason for that was the largely ideological essence of the blocs. Now the situation is different.

The territory of the former Soviet Union has changed after the short war between Georgia and Russia, after Tbilisi withdrew from the CIS, and after Moscow recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia’s traditional partners from among its neighbors have taken a noticeably wait-and-see position. Ukraine was actually the only country to express its position promptly and in a clear-cut manner. Members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization failed to express a clear and unified foreign policy line, and this was against the organization’s Charter, which binds member-states to provide military and, most importantly, political support to any of them. Meanwhile, Russia, which engaged in hostilities, needed such support.

The military and economic alliances in post-Soviet territory – CSTO and EurAsEC, respectively – are organizations that are structurally similar and that are driven by Russia. They provide a basis for a new, more powerful integrated entity. However, to develop these structures, it is necessary to unify joint projects and turn them into real areas of common interest and active cooperation, rather than form ideological anti-Western blocs.

Almost all significant economic projects and investment are impossible without firm and stable guarantees for the security of their implementation. A stable system of regional security is also vital for building up the transportation of energy resources, which is an important element in mutually advantageous uses of the transit potential.

The establishment of an international forum (a Eurasian Cooperation Forum) for interaction between Russia, other post-Soviet states and the West could be an interim step in this direction. The forum, which could be opened to other interested parties, can serve as a compromise between Moscow and Western capitals, creating conditions for the constructive development of the post-Soviet territory.

Such a forum would help find solutions, balance conflicting interests and prevent the post-Soviet territory from collapsing. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization can serve as a model here: it has helped Russia and China to delimit their interests in Central Asia and channel contradictions between them into a constructive course, while not forgetting about the interests of Central Asian states themselves, as well as the interests of regional neighbors.

Nuclear proliferation, the drug threat, fundamentalism, terrorism, separatism, the problem of water supply, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, and NATO’s enlargement – all these problems require a solution. The above-mentioned forum could also contribute to the development of the CSTO – not only militarily but also as regards its peacemaking missions, which in the future could be extended beyond CIS boundaries. For now, NATO is in no hurry to interact with the CSTO, although there are real areas for cooperation, for example, the stabilization of the southern borders of the CIS and joint operations in Afghanistan.

Under no circumstances should Russia be interested in “asymmetric responses” to the West. Such foreign policy moves in the territory of the former Soviet Union would only undermine, once and for all, confidence in Moscow among the ruling politicians of neighboring states. The further development of the post-Soviet territory is impossible without a powerful organizational/integration structure. History is giving Russia a chance – after almost a century – to once again become a center of constructive attraction. But is Moscow ready to give up part of its coercive levers of influence in order to reintegrate the post-Soviet territory?

The present integration processes have predominantly economic and military aspects. At the same time, social cooperation, which implies all spheres of cultural and, most importantly, linguistic interaction, as well as the formation of a friendly attitude toward Russia, is being relegated to the sidelines. Meanwhile, there are very few Russian lobbyists in CIS countries.

Practice shows that the successful promotion by a country of its economic interests is impossible unless it simultaneously works to form a friendly attitude toward itself. For years, the main drawback of Moscow’s policy in the territory of the former Soviet Union was that it limited its contacts to the political forces of neighboring states or, even worse, only to certain political leaders and clans which had come to power by accident after the Soviet Union broke up. So, the replacement of regimes in post-Soviet countries could result in their giving up a friendly policy toward Russia. This self-limitation of Russia brought about irreversible consequences. For example, the pronouncedly anti-Russian regimes in Georgia and Ukraine are now real and clear threats of collapse for all the territory of the former Soviet Union.

SEEKING TO FORM RUSSIAN LOBBIES

Until recently, the ways Russia and the West implemented their strategic interests on the territory of the former Soviet Union differed significantly.

The West supported non-governmental organizations, created and actively developed cultural centers, established linguistic and educational ties, and provided grants for education and the development of private enterprise. Thus, it supported oppositional quarters and even helped some countries escape from Moscow’s influence.

Russia, in turn, has achieved the opposite result. Of course, there were objective reasons for this: Moscow’s setbacks were directly linked with crises and conflicts inside the country, yet this factor cannot serve as a justification for the current state of affairs. Moscow is alarmed by a sharp drop in the number of ethnic Russians and in the Russian-speaking population in countries that were part of the former Soviet Union.

First, the proliferation of the Russian language has been significantly decreasing because there is no longer a great need for Russian in CIS countries. National languages are replacing Russian.

Second, the position of Russian-speaking people – who are not native speakers in non-Russian countries, yet they are not necessarily ethnic Russians – has been complicated by their forced integration into new societies following the breakup of the Soviet Union. These newly independent states now have a new national identity, in which Russian speakers are assigned a minor role compared to the indigenous population.

The erosion of Russian-language self-identification – or even a common Soviet one – in CIS countries stems from Moscow’s failed policy in this area. Apart from Russia and Belarus, the Russian-language identity is only somewhat strong in Kazakhstan. This is largely due to the will of the Kazakh leader, to the country’s geographical proximity to Russia, and to common strategic projects. But basically, the remnants of this identity in CIS countries rest on splinters of the Soviet past, which has been persistently and hatefully destroyed in the CIS for over 15 years.

Russia has repeatedly emphasized the strategic priority of the post-Soviet vector in its foreign policy, which was further confirmed by the first visit of President Dmitry Medvedev to Kazakhstan and by an earlier informal CIS summit held in Moscow in February 2008. Addressing the summit, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin personally assured CIS leaders of the continuity of Russia’s policy.

In practice, however, very important elements of the strategy are missing. If there were a pro-Western diaspora in some CIS country, which spoke one language and which were a carrier of a kindred culture, it would certainly enjoy serious financial, moral and cultural support. Moreover, its most influential representatives would most likely be involved in state structures and would engage in lobbying the interests of respective countries.

Meanwhile, the pro-Russian diaspora in CIS countries, ignored by the mother country, has actually collapsed – most have emigrated, while those who remained have formed a new Russian-speaking community. It is a complicated, although not unpromising, phenomenon, which requires a special approach, as neither ethnic nor linguistic, or even legal criteria can precisely reflect the essence of this socio-political entity. International experience suggests that a diaspora policy can and must occupy a special place in plans to achieve one’s foreign policy goals. Meanwhile, the Kremlin simply has no levers of soft influence over former Soviet countries, while the Russian-language diaspora could serve as such a lever.

The status of the Russian language in former Soviet republics has become a kind of yardstick of the local governments’ loyalty to Moscow, while the availability of Russian-language mass media has become a political lever in the hands of the ruling politicians. Kazakhstan has announced the beginning of the preparatory stage, starting in the last quarter of 2008, for implementing plans to replace the Cyrillic script with the Latin alphabet. The switch to Latin is expected to be completed within ten years. Of course, Moscow will seek to delay the changeover, but it will most likely be unable to stop the process.

All five Central Asian countries are intent on adopting the Latin alphabet. One of the arguments in favor of switching to Latin is its use for developing banking, IT and innovation technologies. To a certain extent, Cyrillic impedes their integration into global economic and information systems and the development of large-scale international projects.

Meanwhile, such an “innocent” thing as an alphabet change is significantly increasing the possibilities of Ankara, which has been seeking to promote its interests in Turkic-speaking regions since the 1990s. Considering the natural gas rivalry, the strategic geographic location of Central Asia, and the role played by Turkey in the West, the possible consequences of these efforts are obvious. So far, all serious attempts by Ankara to break deep into Central Asia in the energy and other sectors have been successfully blocked in the Caucasus by the geographic location of Moscow’s ally Armenia. Recently, there has emerged one more obstacle to Turkey’s overcoming the Caspian barrier – that is, the development of a military-political entity, namely, the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

Some noticeable changes have taken place recently in Russia’s policy of promoting its interests in the territory of the former Soviet Union, such as the beginning of business expansion in the form of telecommunications, banking and energy projects. But this is only a small part of a bigger policy required to form friendly lobbies in the territory of the former Soviet Union. However, the social aspect of this policy, which is vital for success, is nowhere in sight yet.