© "Russia in Global Affairs". № 1, January - March 2009

The global crisis is being discussed so much that there seems to be no aspect left that has not been analyzed in depth.

The answer to the question “Who is to blame?” is well known. Everyone blames the greed of Wall Street and the irresponsibility of the state which refrained from controlling the markets. Another classic question – “What to do?” – does not have a generally accepted answer yet, and, to all appearances, will never have. Despite unanimous statements that countries should coordinate their efforts in order to overcome the recession, their practical actions reveal their willingness to try to survive single-handedly.

It still remains unclear what comes next, how the economic cataclysms will affect the alignment of forces in the world, who (if anyone at all) stands to gain from the crisis, and whether one should expect fundamental changes in the international system.

The Director of the Foreign Policy Planning Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, Alexander Kramarenko, holds that the crisis is a natural result of post-Cold War attempts to impose one type of political and economic development on the world. He believes that the crisis is opening an opportunity to build a truly effective world order.

Olga Butorina says that globalization is acquiring an increasingly manifest regional dimension. Differences in economic development between various groups of countries make them react in different ways to the crisis, thus promoting regional coordination. The author views the crisis as a chance for a “decisive breakthrough in financial integration within the CIS framework.” Recent months have shown that in the conditions of universal decline post-Soviet countries have no one to rely on except Moscow.

Vladimir Mau believes that the crisis has made the inseparable interdependence of the Chinese and U.S. economies still more evident. The development of this tendency will result in a geopolitical reconfiguration on the world arena. In particular, it issues a challenge to the other actors in international politics. This applies, first of all, to the European Union, which may lose its status of a privileged partner of the United States, and to Russia, which may find itself on the sidelines of major global processes.

Stefan Schepers offers his own scenario for a strategic rapprochement between Russia and the EU, which would mark a markedly new stage in Europe’s unification and turning into a powerful center of power. In his view, such integration would be in line with the general logic of European development over the last few centuries and, especially, over the last 60 years. A new pan-European project would be as ambitious as the idea put forward in Western Europe after World War II. Georgy Velyaminov shares this point of view. He believes that a pan-European alliance is an imperative, but it cannot be set up unless the issues of security and confidence are resolved. Both authors suppose that attempts to achieve close rapprochement between Russia and the EU would meet with displeasure or, more likely, opposition from the U.S., which views such developments as disadvantageous to itself.

Adrian Pabst suggests that the presidents of Russia and the U.S. should revise the security arrangements in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian space. He believes that the views of presidents Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev with regard to future threats are more adequate to reality than the views of their respective predecessors. General Victor Yesin proposes practical ways to overcome the deadlock in Russian-U.S. discussions about the deployment of elements of the U.S. missile defense system in Central Europe. This issue poisoned the atmosphere between the two countries under President George W. Bush.

The crisis serves as yet another reminder of how much the Russian economy depends on the situation on the hydrocarbon market. Vladimir Feygin analyzes why oil became a subject of unbridled speculation during the economic boom of the 2000s and how price leaps and falls could be avoided in the future. Andrei Bely discusses the new conditions in which large Russian oil and gas companies have found themselves after the lending bubble collapsed, making the investment issue into an acute problem.

Businessman Vladimir Yevtushenkov sees in the crisis a chance to overcome the “Dutch disease” and introduce a new, innovation philosophy based on a new type of state-business interaction.

Leokadia Drobizheva raises an issue that has now become particularly acute, namely national self-determination and nationalism. Last year was marked by the recognition of independence of new states (Kosovo, Abkhazia and South Ossetia), which caused mixed reactions in the world and was described by many as unlawful. The author discusses how the huge potential of national sentiments could be used for the good cause of development. Mikhail Delyagin  proposes a plan for Moscow’s actions vis-à-vis Abkhazia and South Ossetia – territories that are in a very difficult economic position.

Our next issue will continue analyzing the aftermath of the crisis, specifically its impact on global security.