Central Eurasia, especially the part located between Iran and Russia, is facing many problems at the moment. The region’s future is challenged by economic problems, poverty, ethnic and religious conflicts, intervention by great powers and a lack of any general arrangements for solving these problems. Most of them could be resolved using regional mechanisms and thus have a positive impact on resolving other problems as well. Addressing such an important agenda requires cooperation from all the countries in the region, however Iran and Russia could be most effective in this regard, by providing conditions for regional peace through dialogue and cooperation.

Achieving stability in Central Eurasia has a promising history with 15 years of coexistence and cooperation among Iran, Russia and other countries in the region. This article will attempt to analyze the possibilities and opportunities for attaining peace and cooperation in the region from a “social-constructivist” approach. In fact, it offers an Iranian scholar’s outlook on how this issue is understood in Iran – by the government, academic quarters and society.

MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION

Political science provides many theories for the analysis and explanation of international realities, phenomena and problems. Many theories have offered solutions to conflicts and crises from the prescriptive and normative approaches. For example, from a realist’s point of view the only way towards peace and cooperation is a “balance of power.” Liberals point out common ideas and goals and relevant institutions as necessary conditions. From their point of view democracy within states is the key to resolving conflicts. Theoreticians of the “foreign policy school” consider domestic factors at the individual, group, organizational, social and national levels; they also regard regional and global constituents as effective factors. From the post-modernist approach, specifically discourse analysis, there may be different discourses coming from different layers of power. In each period of history one of them is dominant and forms a foreign policy. Therefore, peace and cooperation are transitory, but the hegemony of peace discourse can have a positive effect on other countries.

In the latest theory of international relations, constructivists emphasize the significance inter-subjective comprehension of other states as the main factor in international politics. [Through inter-subjective perception people form shared meanings used in their interactions with each other and as an everyday resource to interpret the social and cultural life. Inter-subjectivity emphasizes that shared cognition and consensus is essential in the shaping of our ideas and relations. –  Ed]. From the constructivist point of view, states have a historical social identity and interact in a way that helps them reach understanding of each other.

A state may develop an inter-subjective understanding of another state as a source of threat, hostility and insecurity, or, alternatively, regard it as a friend. The inter-subjective understanding may regard the other power’s growth as a mounting threat, or it may regard it as an ordinary thing. Mutual understanding forms a comprehension of mutual security either according to a competitive (Hobbesian) or cooperative (Kantian) model. Therefore, although the historical and social identity of states may prepare the ground for competition or cooperation, current interaction affects mutual understanding and redefines the states’ identity and interests. The relations between states in each period develop according to one of the two models – cooperation or competition.

TWO DECADES OF COMMON EXPERIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING IN CENTRAL EURASIA

Iran and Russia have ancient deep-rooted identities and their interaction in different periods of history has helped them develop different understandings of each other. From the second half of the 16th century until the end of the 17th century, that is, for 150 years, their interaction was marked by cooperation. But from the 18th century until the end of the 20th century, the two countries experienced both warm and cold wars, and their understanding of each other would fall under the notions of threat and hostility.

The year 1989 should be regarded as the start of a new era in relations between the two countries. Both Iran after the Islamic revolution and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union were transformed and gained new identities. The two countries started a new interaction with new identities in the 1990s. Today, Tehran and Moscow cooperate peacefully in different spheres, observing the UN Charter principles and the interests of other states. The cooperation involves bilateral issues and regional matters in Central Asia, the Caspian region and the Caucasus.

This interaction has acquired a new dimension which can be described using such terms as “friendship,” “common interests” and “essential cooperation.” Mutual understanding has provided a basis for mutual help and has shaped positive bilateral relations. The growing level of this interaction is confirmed by both political analysts and state officials of the two countries.

Unfortunately, this mutual understanding and cooperation has not embraced the entire region and has not culminated in any kind of cooperative structure of Iran, Russia and other countries of the region. The two countries have so far been unable to establish mechanisms for institutionalizing these achievements, yet it is still possible to find a solution to this issue.

After 1992, Iran and Russia gradually reached an understanding of mutual interests in Central Asia, the Caspian region and the Caucasus that formed a basis for their cooperation in these regions. Such factors as the growing influence of Western powers and their allies (Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan), the permeation of existing regional crises into the territories of the two countries and the atmosphere created by the 1989 agreement have culminated in expanding cooperation.

Cooperation projects have helped to alleviate pessimism in relations between Iran and Russia. There is a new generation of managers and officials with cooperation experience that can be used as a pattern by their colleagues and the next generation. Cooperation makes representatives of the two countries learn each other’s language more seriously and creates increased interest in the two nations.

In contrast to the Yeltsin era, Russia today pursues an independent foreign policy at a global level. Iran’s and Russia’s independent activities on the international stage and a series of global interactions are a factor that helps counterbalance U.S. unilateralism. The independent policies of Russia, Iran and other countries, particularly the new emerging economies, contribute to the diversification of the international system, promotion of national sovereignty and respect for the principles of international law, such as the non-use of force and non-intervention.

A strong Russia enjoying the power of self-defense can act more effectively in restricting NATO’s influence. This is a significant issue for Iran. Together with new emerging powers like China, India and Brazil, which are seeking independent action, an independent and powerful Russia and an independent and powerful Iran could create a basis for synergy in the international system.

At the regional level the two countries can enjoy more positive cooperation. Iran and Russia have the capacity to create effective institutions in Central Asia and in the Caucasus in order to solve problems related to development, security and cooperation in these regions. Such institutions could take steps towards economic, cultural and political integration. As an Islamic country with a progressive political system, Iran can effectively replace patterns propagating hostility towards Russia.

The two countries showed concern over the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis and Iran acted as mediator in it. Tehran and Moscow held a series of meetings beginning in 1994 on the civil war in Tajikistan, which eventually resulted in reconciliation and an end to the crisis in 1996. Their cooperation in supporting the Afghan Northern Alliance in 1996-2001 also helped form strong resistance to the Taliban offensive.

Tehran and Moscow realize that extremist ethnic and religious movements operating in the regions located between Russia and Iran might endanger their interests. That is why they regard each other as colleagues and have tried to resolve problems through joint efforts.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow had a negative view of Iranian activities in Central Asia. But this view changed due to Iran’s pragmatic policy and to close cooperation between the two countries on some issues, including the Tajik crisis.

The civil war in Tajikistan was in fact a battle between Islamists and democrats on the one hand, and Communists on the other. The Communists, with support from Russia and Uzbekistan, seized power and the opposition withdrew to the Afghan borders and killed several Russian solders in a series of military operations. For Moscow, maintaining the former Soviet border was essential: if Tajikistan were lost, it would mean that the southern border would be open. Therefore, solving the problem by diplomatic means became a major task for Moscow. In autumn 1994, a ceasefire agreement was signed in Tehran between the parties engaged in the Tajik civil war. Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov and leader of the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan Abdullah Nuri were invited to Tehran the next year, where they signed an agreement on a peaceful resolution to the conflict. They agreed to maintain the ceasefire and set up a council to solve the problems. Finally, in 1997, the Tajik government and the opposition forces reached a final agreement on this regard.

Iran’s mediatory role in reconciling the hostile groups in Tajikistan increased the country’s overall significance and position in creating peace and stability in the region. Russians became aware of Iran’s positive role. Importantly, Iran acted as a mediator in the Tajik conflict while Russia supported the Tajik government. Russian forces were officially present in that country. By convincing the Islamist opposition to reconcile with the Russia-backed government, Iran played a difficult and important role. Unfortunately, the problem was resolved for the benefit of the Dushanbe government and Russia’s regional position.

In another instance cooperation between Iran and Russia involved the resolution of the Afghan issue. After the Taliban seized power in 1996, Iran and Russia supported the Northern Alliance. In the same year, the Iranian foreign minister, in emphasizing the warm relations between the two countries, called for closer cooperation in resolving the Afghan issue and Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov visited Tehran. As a radical group, the Taliban were regarded as a threat to the security of both Iran and Russia. So Tehran and Moscow decided to confront the Taliban together. Moreover, both countries were facing the problem of drug trafficking from Afghanistan. Tehran and Moscow signed an agreement to combat drug smuggling.

The next years saw an increase in cooperation between the two countries in that sphere. The U.S. eventually overthrew the Taliban with Iranian assistance and with the support of Russian forces. After defeating the Taliban, it was expected that Moscow would show sensitivity towards the presence of U.S. and other Western countries in Afghanistan and Central Asia and turn towards India, China and Iran in order to form a kind of balance against the West.

In recent years, notwithstanding that the two states do not regard each other as rivals or threats, their cooperation at the regional level has been less pronounced than was expected and has taken the form of sustainable implicit arrangements. For instance, in Central Asia Russia did not welcome Iran’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Iran only succeeded in being accepted as an observer member in July 2005 with the assistance of smaller countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. From the Russian point of view, Iran can give a different meaning and direction to this organization due to its specific foreign policy, especially as regards the U.S. and the West. On the other hand, Iran’s non-involvement may limit the organization’s capacity for reaching a common stance on security.

Furthermore, Russia seeks to maintain its influence in the CIS, including countries in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and regards it as a basic priority. For this purpose Russia has such mechanisms as the CIS. So generally speaking, Russia wants the CIS out of the others’ control. However, Russia is gradually losing its influence in the region. While Georgia and Azerbaijan are getting closer to the West and Turkey, Central Asia is very likely to become increasingly close to China. Right now there is already a considerable presence of Chinese and Koreans in Kazakhstan and Chinese energy pipelines will reach the Caspian Sea in the next two years. In these circumstances Russia will not have any better option than Iran.

The Caucasus has always had a special significance for both Iran and Russia. Back in the 18th and the 19th centuries, most rivalries (called “the great game” that involved the Ottoman Empire, Iran, Russia and Britain) took place in that region. The Caucasus is a mixture of different ethnic groups, with eight autonomous republics located in the north, and three independent and four autonomous republics in the south. Its proximity to the Black Sea is of critical importance to Russia (especially given its present relations with Ukraine, NATO expansion and the growing influence of other Western institutions). For Iran, neighboring the insecure Caucasus region, which is bogged down in ethnic conflicts and identity problems, creates certain concern. Iran and Russia are sensitive to the ethnic crises in the region, including Nagorno-Karabakh, and regard them as a threat to their national security and their regional influence, but they have pursued different policies in that regard.

Moscow, which has a special relation with Armenia and military bases in that country and enjoys broad influence in Azerbaijan, and both of these countries are dependent on Russia in different spheres, uses various tools in order to sustain its influence in the region. Until 2007, Russia maintained military bases in Georgia and rented the Qabala radar base in Azerbaijan. Russia also has broad relations with regional ethnic groups, including Abkhasians, Ossetians and Ajars, and has been supporting them against central governments.

Another issue is the presence of foreign powers in the region, and Georgia’s and Azerbaijan’s growing relations with NATO, which is causing concern in Iran and Russia. Unfortunately, the two countries have not been successful in reaching cooperation in confronting these developments.

In late April 2005, Russia proposed establishing a new defense formation, specifically a rapid reaction force in the Caspian, which was welcomed by Iran. The force was apparently intended not just to repulse terrorist threats, but also to oppose the Western military presence in the Caspian. In fact, Moscow’s proposal was triggered by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s visit to Baku on April 12-13. Immediately after his visit local media claimed that Washington intended to build major bases, extensive radar and air-defense facilities in Azerbaijan from which to attack Iran or from which a sophisticated radar network and a tripartite military bloc, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, could be built. “Azeri-American plans aim to further develop the Operation Caspian Watch plan, whose purpose is to help the Azerbaijani navy defend its coastal and offshore oil platforms that Iran has previously threatened and to enhance Azerbaijan's participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace.” While the Russian-Iranian gambit is clearly intended to counter Washington and NATO, it also indicates a significant modification of Iran’s stated policy of opposing the militarization of the Caspian.

The idea to demilitarize the Caspian Sea region was propounded by Iran during a visit by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei in 2002. Later, in 2005, Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested that all the coastal countries of the Caspian Sea, including Iran, form an organization to preserve peace, order and security in the Caspian region. While Putin’s idea of a new organization was focused on maintaining peace, Iran considered the economic growth and development of the region, as well.

Russia’s proposal regarding military activity in the Caspian Sea consisted of two points. First, Russia suggested that a formula to maintain the military forces of the littoral states be included in a Caspian constitution and proposed establishing a military formation around the Caspian Sea that would be at an adequate and reasonable level. Second, Russia proposed that Caspian Sea resources be used solely for peaceful purposes and the use of force or military threats be forbidden. Today some of the coastal countries are moving towards a demilitarization of the Caspian, while others, which have a large military force, are seeking the maximum use of the Caspian. As for Iran, it should adopt a clear policy with regard to the demilitarization of the Caspian Sea, but it should be considered that from Iran’s point of view, the demilitarization of the region will deprive it of any defense capability.

Russia has at least 105 warships in the Caspian Sea, most of which come from its Black Sea Fleet which was transformed after several disputes with Ukraine over the Crimea. So Russia is the naval superpower on the Caspian Sea. Iran, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan lag far behind. Iran put the reinforcement of its military force on the agenda in 1998 and since then it has established two bases in Anzali and Chalous. The eastern part of the Caspian Sea is patrolled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and the western part, by the Iranian Navy. The chief commander of the Iranian Navy issued a warning to potential “enemies” that every hostile plan would be confronted by the Iranian army and said that only the five littoral states have the right to determine the Caspian Sea’s legal regime.

Russia’s proposal to the Caspian littoral states to create a multinational rapid reaction force was fueled by yet another consideration: the Caspian region has turned into a crossroads for terrorists based in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other countries in the region. Using the disarranged state institutions of the Caspian littoral countries, terrorist paramilitary groups penetrate – through secret and sometimes visible channels – to Kazakhstan, Russia and the Caucasus.

The Caspian Sea issue is a multifaceted and complicated one and even though Iran and Russia agree on some points, such as the non-presence of non-littoral countries, preventing energy pipelines from going through Turkey and the establishment of a new legal regime for the Caspian Sea, they disagree on other points. In Iran’s opinion, the Russian-Kazakh agreement of July 1998 and the Russian-Azerbaijani agreement on dividing the Caspian Sea run counter to the understanding reached previously by the two countries. These agreements keep pressure on Iran to reach agreements with neighboring countries.

Despite the agreement on preventing East-West energy pipelines, Iran and Russia have not reached any agreement on exploiting each other’s geographical advantages. Russia is considering emerging as a monopoly and becoming what Putin calls an “energy superpower.”

Iran started negotiations with Russia through official and non-official channels several years ago. Given the importance of the sea surface issues for Russians, Iran implicitly stated that if Iran’s interests are protected in the sea bed, it would support Russia’s position concerning the sea surface. According to a letter of understanding between Iranian and Russian officials, Russia agreed that Iran should have a 20 percent share in the Caspian Sea. Also, a series of negotiations have been held at which amendments to the legal regime, including replacement of the “median line” by a “dividing line,” were discussed.

As far back as 1992, former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani proposed establishing an organization of the Caspian littoral states at a meeting of Caspian leaders in Tehran. Although the idea was generally accepted and preparations for establishing a Secretariat were launched, some countries – moved by greed and U.S. temptations – chose petty policies for using the Caspian’s resources.

In October 1996, negotiations among the five littoral states on the Caspian’s legal regime were held in Ashgabat. The representatives discussed the adoption of a Caspian legal convention that would determine the rights and obligations of the littoral countries. In addition to negotiations on the legal regime, other high-ranking meetings regarding Caspian problems were held on such issues as shipping, fishing, meteorology and marine urgency. Some countries also made proposals concerning security issues. The first significant result of these meetings was the signing of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian Sea on October 26, 2003 in Tehran.

On October 16, 2007, Tehran hosted the second summit of Caspian Sea nations. Although the forum failed to resolve the contentious issues and showed the lack of agreement between Iran and Russia on some points, Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad expressed assurance that “in these negotiations we reached final agreement on many problems and I hope that from now on, the leaders’ summits will be held regularly.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin said that “it is better to have more shared waters and fewer borders among the five countries. Our efforts should be aimed at cooperation and coordination in managing marine resources and sea reconstruction with due regard for environmental protection and our interests.” He also reiterated that limitations regarding the seabed and below the seabed should be removed. “The North Caspian has removed these limitations in line with the agreements, the South Caspian should learn from that.”

Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov confirmed that the practice of unilateral actions in the Caspian Sea is unacceptable for Turkmenistan. “Primarily this concerns oil operations at sites that are not covered by agreements between the parties,” he said.

Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev called for revising the existing quota system for the sturgeon fishing, which is largely a legacy of pre-1991 agreements between the Soviet Union and Iran. [Under the existing system, Iran is entitled to 45 percent and Russia to 27 percent, with the remaining 28 percent distributed among Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. – Ed.] “These agreements should go down to history,” he said. He proposed dividing the water area into sovereign territorial sectors at least 12 nautical miles wide for each country, drawing fishing zones 12-30 nautical miles beyond the sovereign zones, and creating an open zone in the center of the sea, with freedom for shipping and negotiated national quotas for fishing.

In emphasizing the growing importance of the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev pointed out that the five leaders should “consolidate understanding for providing peace and security in the Caspian.”

The Caspian summit in Tehran culminated in the adoption of a 25-point Declaration in which the parties expressed their commitment to make the Caspian “a region of peace and stability, stable economic growth and prosperity, good-neighborliness and international cooperation of the littoral states based on equal rights.” The other points included commitments to hold regular meetings of the heads of the Caspian littoral states; refrain from the use of military force in mutual relations; and abide by the principles of respect for human rights and non-interference in internal affairs.

THE NEED FOR COMMON ARRANGEMENTS

The Iranian political system defines its identity as a cultural, religious and regional one and regards domestic efficiency and independent foreign policy to be its major priorities. Iran has sought to play an active role in the Islamic world, especially as regards cooperation in resolving regional conflicts. Among Islamic states, Iran, as a moderate country, has never supported extremism as a tool for solving problems. Iran backed Russia as an observer member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. At the regional level, Iran maintains ties with the countries of South Asia, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and Central Eurasia (Central Asia, the Caspian and the Caucasus). Iran’s role in each of these regions depends on their significance for its national interests.

Central Eurasia is of special significance for Iran due to geographical, political and economic reasons. Iran’s relations with the countries of this region have been mostly favorable, except for occasional misunderstandings. Iran is one of the important partners of these countries.

Resolving the economic, political and security problems of Central Eurasia requires the formation of broad regional structures with all the actors present in them. Iran and Russia have major roles in resolving this task. However, these two countries consider the region in different ways. Moscow regards the region as the “Near Abroad”. Indeed, since the 18th century it has been Russia’s so-called backyard due to its direct presence there, political and cultural influence and strong religious ties. For Iran, historical, cultural and religious ties with the region are important. Iran regards this region as a historically cultural part of ancient Iran, which is now strongly affected by both the Russian and Western cultures. Iran assumes cultural and political roles which might comprise the promotion of common interests with Russia and other countries in the region.

The development of relations between Iran, Russia and other countries of the region over the last fifteen years has provided a favorable inter-subjective context with no threats and a common understanding that all the states are interested in seeing a stable and prosperous Central Eurasia. During these years the countries of the region have learned to understand each other in a new environment. This new environment has set all these countries on a new social and political stage that has helped them redefine their identities and national interests.

Thus the development of relations between Central Eurasian countries shows how states with different identities encounter other states in a new environment, and how they gradually develop a common understanding as a result of interaction. Central Eurasian countries have adopted new identities under the new circumstances. This approach has shaped an inter-subjective context that has laid the groundwork for cooperation and made it possible to resolve the problems through dialogue. This understanding and cooperation provide prerequisites for institution-building and establishing common economic, political and security arrangements that will set behavioral norms, rules and regimes. If such institutions are not created and such norms are not formed, relations between the countries might be endangered by uncontrollable events and incidents. Furthermore, in this case there exists a high risk of damage to the relations and emergence of an undesirable atmosphere of misunderstanding and mistrust.

What worries us at the moment is that despite the common experience of cooperation and the existence of a common inter-subjective context for upgrading the level of cooperation from bilateral ties to the regional level, no effective regional arrangements have been created so far. These arrangements may be established in Central Asia and the Caspian Sea. If such arrangements are created, the possibility for dialogue and problem solving will increase manifold.

The experience of Europe, East Asia and North America in establishing such arrangements and forming behavioral, economic, political and security norms and rules indicates that the newly-formed structures represent common interests in a way that all the countries have to behave within the framework of agreed regimes. Such regimes prevent the aggravation of problems to a critical level and help resolve them to the benefit of the engaged parties, minimizing the possibility of interference by an external power. In the absence of such regional organizations smaller countries tend to invite greater powers in order to challenge regional powers. The latest research on regional institutions and regional regimes shows that these mechanisms are critical for providing a favorable environment in which the countries may develop a common understanding of each other’s policies.

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In analyzing international affairs, the social-constructivist theory pays particular attention to the identity of states, their interaction and the inter-subjective understanding resulting from the experience of interaction. A common experience and an inter-subjective context help the states define their identities. A common subjective context helps create a cooperation mechanism, institutionalize it and make its behavioral regimes obligatory for all interactive parties.

Iran and Russia have acquired new identities in the course of two decades of cooperation in a new environment. The interaction between Iran and Russia and among other Central Eurasian countries takes place in a favorable inter-subjective atmosphere. However, this cooperation has remained bilateral and limited as no effective regional arrangements or institutions have been established to further cooperation, stability and security in the region. As long as this is the case, cooperation between the two countries runs the risk of damage.