According to widespread belief, the new Russian order conforms to the “sovereign” political culture of the country, which makes this order stable and irreplaceable. I believe this is a completely erroneous assumption and has harmful repercussions, which I am ready to prove.

In fact, both an institutional analysis of the government system and sociological studies show that the new Russian order is extremely unstable and has very little legitimacy in the eyes of the public.

REHABILITATION OF THE RUSSIAN MAN IN THE STREET

Many would associate the causes behind the establishment of a parasitic state and the stupor of modernization in Russia with its national political culture: as the culture, so is the result, they would say. Understandably, those pleased with the result will find this explanation quite satisfactory. Yet it is amazing that the Russian public at large, who are very unhappy with the current situation, also complain for some obscure reason about “this special culture of ours.”

Here are some purely logical arguments against this “verdict” for Russian political culture.

First, political culture is a complex notion and therefore is not unequivocal. Any explanation of a political process using this notion is likely to be multi-layered, complicated and vague. So let us not rush to make references to political culture.

Second, there are often multidirectional trends even within one political culture. The prevalence of one tendency over another may depend on the socio-historical situation and specific circumstances. In this event claims that the dominant tendency is an authentic expression of the national political culture may work as mere propaganda or political myth-making.

Third, any national political culture in the contemporary global world is a volatile and elusive phenomenon. Even the latest descriptions of political cultures are not suited for interpreting or predicting the future of nations.

Now we will move on from general judgments to specific assessments. Leading sociologists from the Levada Center – Lev Gudkov, Boris Dubin and Alexei Levinson – presented a sociological manifesto with a consistently critical view of Russian political culture in a series of interviews in Novaya Gazeta (2008, Nos. 23, 40, 46, 60, 63, and 82). The very name of this series – “A Composite Sketch of the Russian Man in the Street” – is symbolic, as it describes the results of sociological studies that bring multiple scientifically-proven accusations against the average Russian.

This individual, who learned to adapt to the political regime in the Soviet era, has adapted to a “repressive state” again. Of course, he does not want repression, but demands that the incumbent authorities deliver what the authorities of yesteryear provided – socialism. That it, this individual still seeks a paternalistic attitude from the government.

The Russian man in the street reasons as follows: “Even though my salary is not large, it is guaranteed, and my work is calm and not strenuous.” In general, Russians crave order, not freedom; they believe in a “special path” and reject Western values, which are alien to them. They support the incumbent political regime and their “loyal discontent” seems to be the only thing with which they can confront the government. This only strengthens the existing political system. Therefore, Russian public opinion “legitimizes and takes for granted the things that the Western community would find unthinkable.”

Many assessments presented by the Levada research – and other studies, as well – testify to a sad social reality: Russians do not trust each other and see no opportunities to influence social development outside of their immediate milieu. Social unity is sustained not by the solidarity of Russian citizens, but by official agencies; patriotic values are largely declarative (when asked “What is patriotism?” 70 percent of respondents said: “It is love of one’s native country,” and only 20 percent associated patriotism with the wish to “do something for their country”).

And yet, the verdict is not final and it can be appealed. The Russian man in the street deserves rehabilitation. For the sake of consistency I will formulate the features – very popular and quite imprecise – of Russian mass political culture and comment on them.

First Feature. Russians have inherent paternalistic expectations and a considerable portion of the population (41 percent according to the Levada Center) is nostalgic about the Brezhnev era.

This is not surprising. A majority of Russians supported the renunciation of the Soviet system, hoping for a better life and a larger income. Instead, they found themselves hit by a socio-economic downturn unprecedented in its intensity and duration. During the subsequent economic revival, the country never reached the pre-crisis economic and consumer level it had achieved during the Soviet era. On top of that, during both the economic slump of the 1990s and the revival of the 2000s, the gap between the very rich minority and the poor majority was rapidly increasing. Therefore, the argument that “life used to be better” is economically motivated and quite justified.

Is the Russian craving for real order in the country an obstacle to modernization? Not at all; on the contrary it facilitates it. For years Russians have persistently posed the question of national development before the progressive elite: Where is the government? Indeed, public opinion reflects a strategic lack of modernization in the country – a shortage of useful and developing statism, which can and should be an important conceptual element of Russian modernization. This does not imply backtracking to authoritarianism. The state must play a strategic, innovative and organizing role. Consider India’s experience; its tremendous effort to modernize and democratize a huge and disintegrating society would not have been possible without statism – the ideology and practice of the government’s constant developing impact on public life. Perhaps we should also go along this path of socio-economic modernization – by building a multi-ethnic nation-state?

Second Feature. Russians are known for a very high level of xenophobia, which allegedly exceeds Europeans’ by an order of magnitude (the Levada Center reports that the increasingly popular slogan “Russia for Russians” is supported by more than half of respondents). Consequently, ultranationalists are likely to come to power in a genuinely free election.

But if we consider nationalist sentiments in the West, we will see that the electoral success of the ultra-rightists in Austria, Germany and France belie the low level of xenophobia in Europe. We should also keep it in mind that by comparing the mindset of Russians and Europeans before 2008, we would actually be comparing a deeply injured and split Russian society with a prosperous Europe, basking in economic and geopolitical success.

As to estimates, I will cite the opinion of Leonty Byzov, a leading Russian sociologist who sees a rather rapid growth of civil identity in modern Russia. “As many as 55.6 percent of those polled preferred to call themselves ‘citizens of Russia;’ 38.1 percent stated their nationality, including 34.2 percent who said they were Russians.”

As for the radical slogan “Russia for Russians,” the share of its supporters peaked at 17.1 percent in 2001-2004, but has not increased since, remaining at 10 to 11 percent.

Third Feature. The stable mass support that Vladimir Putin receives points to the monarchic mindset of Russians and the fact that they do not need democracy.

The monarchism of Russian political consciousness should not be overestimated or dramatized into a myth. Consolidation around the leader in transitional societies is an anthropologic law, not a national trait. The support for Putin as president rested on two socio-psychological factors – expectations for social stability and national unity. Putin’s presidency met those expectations to some extent, which sharply contrasted with Yeltsin’s rule that degenerated into painful phobias of social instability and of a disintegrating country.

By the end of Putin’s first term sociological studies indicated that a majority of voters had no illusions about the outcome of his rule.

Table 1 shows the “balance” of public evaluations of Putin’s successes and failures, based on an opinion poll conducted by the Levada Center in March 2004.

Table 1. Putin’s Achievements and Failures during His First Term (% of all respondents)

Remarkably, Putin’s achievements and positive opinions of his policy are associated with a higher standard of living and related optimism. With regard to all other Russian problems Putin has a negative balance of achievements/failures, and he scored the lowest when respondents were asked about the fight against corruption.

Tsarist illusions are retreating into the past. For example, halfway through Putin’s second term the Kremlin began to leak information that Putin was considering a third term as president – and received quite discouraging feedback from opinion polls. An overwhelming majority (81 percent) of Russians opposed abolishing nationwide presidential elections and allowing parliament to elect the head of state.

More than half of those polled (67 percent) objected to making Russia a “parliamentary republic” in which the prime minister (that is, Putin) becomes the real head of state, and to abolishing the article of the Constitution which limits the president to two successive terms (54 percent). Russians also rejected the idea of Putin’s transferring power to his successor with a view of coming back in one election cycle (49 percent opposed this option and 29 percent supported it).

There was a considerable gradual expansion of pubic demand for democracy during the Putin presidency. Despite efforts by the authorities to “guard” Russians from such “alien ideas” as open criticism of the government in the mass media and the need for a political opposition, these very ideas have been firmly established in the mind of the Russian public as a social norm. The Levada Center reported in 2000 that more than half of the Russians surveyed believed that criticism of the government in the mass media “benefits the situation in the country” (56 percent), while about one quarter of the respondents (27 percent) held the opposite view. In 2004, the share of the supporters of government criticism in the mass media increased to 65 percent, whereas the share of those opposing it dropped to 21 percent.

In 2000, the ratio between those who supported and those who opposed the idea that Russia needed a political opposition was 47 to 29 percent, respectively. In October 2004, 66 percent of the respondents agreed that Russia needed public movements and parties opposing the president and which were capable of influencing developments in the country. The share of those who believed otherwise decreased (21 percent).

The attitude of Russians towards a multi-party system has undergone radical changes as well: a system of two or three political parties looked increasingly attractive in 2000. Support for a one-party system decreased from 43 percent in 1999 to 34 percent in 2004. Also, the public was negative and sceptical about a decision to do away with the direct election of governors and introduce a proportional electoral system that does not envision the election of local deputies in their constituencies.

The beginning of Putin’s second term was marked by a barely visible, yet very significant, shift in public sentiment. A broad public demand emerged for real, systemic and socially-effective changes; it formed peacefully within the framework of the stabilization consensus.

THE DEMAND FOR QUALITY GOVERNMENT

According to the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM), the number of Russians who are confident that the country needs vigorous and radical changes (44 percent) almost matches those who call for stability and progressive reform (48 percent).

There is a prevailing opinion – both in Russian government circles and with the public at large – that the reformist potential of advanced groups of Russian society is close to zero, since representatives of the new middle class, a fortiori wealthy Russians, are interested more than anybody else in preserving the status quo under which they have advanced to more advantageous social positions.

To confirm or disprove this “verdict,” the author of this article, with assistance from the Liberal Mission Foundation, researched the Russian “development elites.” The target respondents were representatives of socio-professional groups, well-known in their regions and professional associations, with an established social status, prestigious positions and who perform important public functions (governance, defense, protection of law and order, jurisprudence, entrepreneurship, corporate management, healthcare, science and education, mass information and public expertise). We did not poll top government officials or heads of large corporations (i.e. the ruling elite).

The results of the research show that Russian elites, despite their cultural narrow-mindedness and weak public influence, have a potential for facilitating the development of society. The elites actually form a milieu for the creation and growth of public capital.

This positive trend manifests itself in the growing number of new public associations that bring together professionals, apartment owners, coalitions of people seeking to defend their rights and interests, and groups of volunteers working with children and young people.

A critical view of the established system of government and its effectiveness clearly prevails in development elites. The Russian ruling administration regards the “power vertical” built at the beginning of this decade as its major achievement and a token of social stability. However, an overwhelming majority of respondents believe that the strengthening of the “power vertical” has resulted in an excessive concentration of power and the bureaucratization of the entire system of governance, and thus has decreased its social effectiveness.

This turnaround in public opinion among the elites clearly reveals new important social circumstances. First, the advanced part of Russian society no longer regards the strengthening of the “power vertical” as a progressive concept of state-building: its viability for mobilizing the will of the nation and legitimizing the ruling regime is extremely low at present.  Second, the main point of the social and political development agenda henceforth is the quality of the government.

The results of the poll show that Russian elite groups pointed to the “functional failures” of the incumbent government in the vital directions of social development back in the pre-crisis spring of 2008. The government failed to bridge the gap in incomes between the rich and the poor, resolve the problem of affordable housing, ensure the right to fair court hearings and improve health care. In addition, the prevalence of negative and very negative evaluations shows that the government has obvious troubles in ensuring free elections, developing education, establishing and maintaining uniform market rules, ensuring the personal safety of citizens, and protecting the right of private property. Also, elite groups are very displeased with the way the government determines and implements its national economic strategy.

Contrary to the widespread claim, an absolute majority of respondents in elite groups (in all groups with the exception of law enforcement) do not share the idea that the development of the Russian nation should rest upon the unquestionable primacy of the state in public and economic life. The Russian development elite has made a civilized choice, if it is understood as the choice of institutional principles of development. They are practically unanimous in the belief that the nation should evolve under two basic principles: the supremacy of law (including with regard to the authorities), and competition in the economy and politics.

The model of state capitalism, lobbied and implemented at the top level, by no means enjoys the support of the Russian development elites. A majority of them would prefer normal capitalism with common, genuinely state rules of the game, which benefit honest competition and the broad development of entrepreneurship.

An analysis of the sociological data helps reveal and formulate the pressing demand from the elite groups to the country’s leadership for a new course of governance and national development. Here we should first of all note the points of consensus within the elites, i.e. the development priorities, supported by an absolute majority in elite groups. These priorities include:

1. Government investments in the development of human capital;

2. Adjustment of the reform strategy in the housing and utilities sector;

3. Ensuring real political competition, separation of powers, openness and accountability of the government to society;

4. Bringing the party system to a decent form, worthy of the citizens of a free and civilized country;

5. Replacing the appointment of regional governors by the Russian president with a new procedure, based on public opinion and people’s will in the regions;

6. Development of self-dependence for local self-government, including the right to own property and collect taxes, which would help perform self-government functions.

Along with the above points of elite consensus, we should highlight prevailing opinions in the following important imperatives of national development:

•  systemic government incentives for private and corporate investment in fixed assets and technological renovation;
•  a more open and competitive procedure for forming the government, ensuring a real discussion of alternative government programs and selecting the best ones;
•  enhanced parliamentary control over the executive branch;
•  reform of the judicial system that would ensure citizen (consumer) control, as well as honest criteria and procedures for corporate responsibility on the part of judges;
•  an end to government control over the information policy of the mass media, while ensuring effective public, not bureaucratic, control over the observance of public interests in the field of mass information.

Judging by the number of responses given by those respondents who stick to the old course, they are in the minority, comprising one quarter to one-third of all polled elite groups. State security officers, the main beneficiaries of the regime of the 2000s, are in fact the only elite group where the supporters of the old course dominate. But another part of the “security class” – army officers – does not favor the incumbent regime or its succession, and support changes instead.

Unlike state security officers, the bureaucracy is very much divided. Even in federal agencies, the supporters of the old course only make up slightly more than 50 percent, while regional officials, dissatisfied with the degree of their influence upon federal and regional affairs, are increasingly supportive of institutional changes aimed at the system’s liberalization. In all other elite groups, the number of supporters of the old course is quite small and never reaches one quarter of respondents.

The position of the business community deserves special note. Business people tend to believe that Russians have little capability for civil self-organization or discipline. On the other hand, many entrepreneurs are wary of the West, or, rather, the West’s policy towards Russia. While giving a very negative assessment to efforts by the ruling administration to establish and keep uniform market rules, most Russian business people come out against the concentration of economic advantages within a small group of state-owned companies, calling for the liberalization of economic and political life and for the development of self-dependence for local self-government.

It looks like “the party of the old course” has no consolidating ideas. The “power vertical” no longer inspires; the establishment of state corporations only aggravates the division and strife. The threat from the West is not obvious or serious enough, whereas the institutional insufficiency of the government system is quite obvious to everybody, even to the powers-that-be, not to mention economic or public groups.

The results of the study show that the share of liberals – i.e. those who stick to the principles of the supremacy of law and competition – in Russian elite groups is nearing half of all respondents.

Liberal views among the Russian elites are shared by almost every-fifth security official (more often an army officer than a policeman), every third official, about one half of all entrepreneurs, managers, lawyers and doctors, and the absolute majority in science, education and the mass media. It is noteworthy that Russian liberals are active participants in public associations that enjoy the trust of society and bring together professionals, neighbourhoods, rights activists, parents of students, athletes, culture lovers – in other words, they are more active than others in creating public capital.

So what is the significance of these obvious trends presented by sociological studies? If the incumbent government system were more open and sensitive to public opinion, the consolidation of liberal preferences in economic, civil and – in a considerable portion of – government elite groups would end up with a replacement of the ruling administration and/or the political course. After all, it is for such an adjustment of government policy – preferably evolutionary and procedural – that political systems are needed. But the current Russian political system does not work. The “power vertical” was built in the 2000s with the sole purpose of reducing or eliminating the dependence of the ruling administration on the will or opinions of subordinates, including the elite groups.

Many experts have repeatedly warned that the powers-that-be are driving themselves and society into an institutional trap, because the bureaucratic mechanisms of systemic stability, when tested, may prove to be mechanisms of systemic inadequacy that only worsen the crisis.

The Russian institutional trap is the mechanism of the functioning of state and political organizations which is hard to change. Importantly, the established procedures determine, shape and adjust public conduct to a considerable extent. So when we speak about the opinions currently prevailing among Russian elites and their desire for change, we must have considerable reservations.

On the one hand, a majority of Russian elites share President Dmitry Medvedev’s program thesis that “freedom is better than non-freedom” and are ready to accept it as an ideological foundation for national consolidation. It is an extremely important sociological fact, as it provides the necessary condition for the beginning of change and its possible success.

On the other hand, Russian elite groups are not ready to launch public change on their own because they lack initiative; they are incapable of collective action and of determining the policy of the state. In modern Russia, successful people mostly practice the strategy of individual adaptation; they shun public activity and are often prone to social cynicism.

This is not only a matter of fear for the authorities. People who profess consumer individualism – being focused on their own survival, adaptation and on competition amongst themselves – mistrust each other. The “horizontal” mistrust within elite groups is very strong and actually matches the mistrust of officialdom. Jealous mistrust of each other is the major factor that undermines the ability of “the best people” for public cooperation in general and collective influence upon the authorities in particular.

Thus, the consumer adaptive individualism and mutual mistrust within elites, together with the specifics of “sovereign democracy,” are a major obstacle to a normal political withdrawal from the crisis through the establishment of effective parties or factions within the ruling party. Yet an obstacle can be overcome. How long can the difference in potentials between the rather liberal Russian elites and the oligarchic system of bureaucratic capitalism build up? Presumably, it may take a long time. But this is not important any more, since the economic crisis that began in the autumn of 2008 has turned a change of government policy, something that used to be wishful thinking, into an issue of vital choice.

The key factor in the development of Russia at the beginning of the 21st century is the contradiction between resources (natural, technological, social and human) which are sufficient for modernization, and the inefficiency of the state which leads to a very ineffective use of the above resources (national resources in the first place), their insufficient development and even degradation. Russian public opinion has raised the issue of quality of government, putting it at the top of the national development agenda. This social demand cannot be ignored – particularly in conditions of the globalization of information, economic and human exchanges. There is broad public accord concerning the need to build an effective political system and modernize the state administration as the first crucial move in socially-effective changes.