Russia’s National Security Strategy up to 2020 that President Dmitry Medvedev enacted by decree on May 12, 2009 is a document that will lay a conceptual foundation for the solution of crucial tasks.

It is meant to offer a clear vision of how state power in the broadest sense – the president, the cabinet of ministers and legislative agencies – plans to avert the further breakup of the territory of the former Russian Empire, which began with the disintegration of the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s.

On the other hand, this document sets out a vision of how Russia plans to ensure its national security in new conditions as the state that succeeded the Soviet Union.

REVISITION OF NOTIONS

Unlike the traditional notion of state security borne out of the Soviet era, which primarily envisioned the defense of state ideology, institutions and interests, national security is much broader and far less aggressive – at least in countries like the U.S. where it appeared earlier. It includes not only (and not so much) the concept of state security – even though the latter is part and parcel of national security – but rather the notion of the security of a nation forming the state (its people, values, institutions, territory, the environment, etc.). In other words, the security of the things which the Soviet state security concept neglected and for which the Soviet Union eventually had to pay with its own collapse.

That is why it would be only natural to expect that the new Russian concept would keep the element of state security without attaching to it the dominant position it has had in the past. Considering the bitter experience of the Soviet Union, the Russian government should have realized that the country’s security can be supported only by a broad set of measures aimed at consolidating the security of the entire nation, of which state institutions are but a part.

As regards the security of the nation, it is easy to break the notion down to a system of measures aimed at resolving the key problems of its existence – such as providing its people with inexpensive, high-quality food products, decent housing, an efficient transportation system, up-to-date systems of public health and education, jobs and a good quality of life. The solution to these problems would be the only factor to offer hope that the nation itself would actively counteract the tendencies of a further decay of Pax Russica, wherever they might originate.

According to this understanding, the system of priorities and the content of interests of Russia’s national security should have passed an adjustment procedure. The experience of the Soviet Union highlighted the necessity of combining national security and national construction policies, as it is impossible to maintain security efficaciously without it.

These nation-scale tasks should have been solved with the aid of political mechanisms that would take into account international experience in the sphere of national security and the complexity of building a nation in critical circumstances. In other words, this means democratic mechanisms.

Even in light of these few considerations, the volume and complexity of national security tasks go beyond the boundaries of the routine bureaucratic procedure of determining the needs of state security and call for more sophisticated patterns that would help set adequate tasks, mobilize the nation’s resources (not only the state machinery, but also the business community, intellectuals, political parties and movements) to keep up its integrity and stability.

However, the Russian intellectual community and state institutions have not devised a document that would contain an unbiased and profound analysis of why the Soviet Union fell apart. We really need to come to terms with and understand why a militarily powerful state, a nuclear superpower controlled by a single mass party with a fairly advanced ideology and having a ramified party/state machinery and omnipotent secret services broke down under the pressure of destabilizing forces.

Had a high-quality document in this vein been prepared, it would have played a crucial positive role in formulating the concept of the country’s security.

On the one hand, it could focus on the weak aspects of Russian statehood that broke down twice under the blows of crises over the past 100 years – in 1917 and 1991. On the other hand, it would help resolve one of the central problems of nation-building in today’s Russia; i.e. the formulation of a Russian national idea.

THE SOURCES OF THE NATIONAL CRISIS

The very budding of this idea is linked in many ways to an understanding of why the country has not been able to break out of a crisis situation for over a hundred years and its national institutions have not been able to work out a valid form for its constitutional organization. Russia has had six constitutions beginning with the 1905 October Manifesto and there is still a feeling that a stable and steady constitution has not been formulated yet. Let us recall that the U.S. has had only one constitution – albeit appended with amendments – in the over 230 years of its existence.

That is why the core problem of Russia’s national security is to identify the sources and parameters of the extended national crisis. This problem manifests itself in the unsatisfactory condition of the state and its political system, society and the classes that make it up, social layers and groups. The relationship between state and society appears to be deficient too, as it mostly rests on historical tradition rather than on law, religion or force (although force did underlie relations between government and society during Stalin’s reign).

Leaning on the historical tradition undoubtedly makes Russia’s statehood resilient, and puts restrictions on the opportunities for its modernization and reaction to crises. Thus, whenever the world’s development demands adequate reaction to changes in the environment, Russia either irreparably falls behind others (the latter could be seen during the reign of Nicholas I and Leonid Brezhnev) or sinks into self-isolation.

In this connection the content of Russia’s national security lies in its ability to develop in unison along with changes taking place in other developed countries – industrialization, computerization, the launch of hi-tech technology, scientific progress, etc. But whenever Russia does not make any headway or falls behind other countries (for different reasons – the spread of bureaucracy, the omnipotence of the secret services and the arbitrariness of legal agencies), it does not stand up to competition and develops a feeling of existing in a – real or potential – hostile environment. This entails a crisis of its institutions and social structure – a situation emerges that is fraught with the country’s real disintegration.

This means that the content of the national security strategy is inseparable from Russia’s reaction to global developments. Russia stayed in a benevolent self-isolation or even euphoria of the “Third Rome” until History could put up with this (until Peter the Great’s reign). But as soon as the historical process put Russia in the face of stronger and more advanced neighbors, modernization and the assimilation of foreign experience began to determine the contents of its security policy.

The Communist ideology and the self-appraisal of Russia as the global political center (in essence, a revival of the Third Rome concept) warded off the sensation of a risk of defeat in competition for awhile, but the Cold War and the burden of expenses it bore regenerated the understanding that Russia should stop wrestling in vain with developed countries and should try to build a relationship of the type and amount that would be comparable to that of its membership in the Entente at the beginning of the 20th century.

The price of the understanding that came too late turned out to be quite dire – the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This phase of Russia’s development should not be over-dramatized, as almost all empires fell apart in the 20th century. The Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire did so after World War I, while the British, French and Portuguese Empires ceased to exist from the 1950s through the 1970s. Apparently, there is a sliver of truth in the supposition that the imperial model of the state outlived itself everywhere in the 20th century and the nation state model came to dominate, as it helped integration in the international community with the aid of an array of international organizations and regimes. The disintegration of the Russian Empire, which began in 1918-1920 when Finland, Poland and the Baltic countries became independent along with the rise of national governments in Ukraine, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, was stopped by the Red Army, yet the inner prerequisites for it lived on, thus making the Soviet Union’s departure unavoidable in many ways, in spite of the stressful emotions associated with it.

However, stating these facts should not calm us down or reconcile us to what happened. On the contrary, it should put us on alert, since it is very difficult to identify the moment when the disintegration of the Empire ends and conservation of the nation’s core begins – the way it happened to Britain and France when they lost their overseas territories. Unless proper conclusions are drawn, the collapse – especially if one considers Russia’s size and problems of government – may go on unabated. That is why a national security policy must rely on a combination of modernization objectives, increasing the quality of life, setting up efficient systems of governance (not only the much-trumpeted “state power vertical”), and Russia’s further integration with the global market and world politics. These are the major parameters of the problem of Russia’s national security.

THE EXTERNAL ASPECT

It should be noted that the new Russian national security strategy tries to look at this phenomenon from a different – comprehensive – approach. It says much about the social and economic aspect of this notion and the need to ensure society’s consistent development.

Along with this the strategy gives extensive attention to the importance of defending Russia from external threats. If one considers the country’s entire history and its Cold War experience in particular, this is not a bit surprising.

On the one hand, Russia has a huge territory and a wealth of mineral resources that other countries have always perceived as a challenge. On the other hand, Russia cannot stop its ongoing demographic decline, which may result in an extremely low population density, especially in some parts of Siberia and the Far East. It is clear that the countries which view Russia’s resources as an important element of global development may develop an idea for the “redistribution” of territories some day. This has happened on many occasions in the past and there are no grounds to think that it will not happen again in the future.

It is clear, therefore, that the defense of territorial integrity becomes a constituent part of a national security strategy, since it is a component of fighting the permanent national crisis in Russia, while the country’s neighbors may harbor territorial claims against it. Yet the problem has one more aspect – How should it be settled?

One possible way is to use past experience and move along the “Fortress Russia” concept – that is, to erect massive barriers around the country using military preparations, struggle against foreign influence, hunt down spies and suppress intellectual dissent. This has happened many times in Russian history, although the country paid a heavy price for it each time; it remained impoverished and backward, lost competitiveness on the global market, turned into a pariah and became permanently dependent on exports of natural resources.

There is another way to resolve the problem that has been tried in the past as well. At the beginning of the 18th century, Peter the Great succeeded in ensuring – by opening a window to Europe and using very tough measures at times – that Russia, which looked pretty much like Turkey or Persia in the 17th century, made the governments of European countries take account of its interests and became a leading European power. There is no doubt that this method of ensuring national security bears a clear imprint of the leader’s personality, yet it also has the traits of other ways that were used by other countries, like Japan, to eliminate backwardness. These methods include assimilating the experience of other nations, educating young generations of the ruling class abroad and allowing the free inflow of foreign capital and experts (including foreigners as commanders of Russian Army regiments and ships).

If one translates Peter’s experience into modern terminology, one could say that his model of national security sought to get rid of fears about making Russia a full-fledged player in international politics and the world market at the expense of an inescapable infringement on the rights of Russia’s top feudalists (the boyars and upper bureaucracy) and by raising a new nobility and a merchant class. It was the solution of the latter task that would make Russian victories possible in the battles of Poltava, Gotland and Gangut. The pre-reform Russia would not have dared to even think about this. Russia’s breakthrough into the realm of the makers of European history became possible due to the efficacious use of foreign countries’ political, economic and technological experience.

Consequently, the essence of the external aspect of Russia’s national security is not ordering the security services to guarantee its solution. We need to closely scrutinize the experience of other countries (in fact, the Russian Academy of Sciences and a number of other agencies are studying it quite successfully), form national non-government and state-run mechanisms for assimilating this experience, and create a favorable external environment that would have no smaller interest in the strengthening of Russian security than the Russians themselves.

The Russians have a generally poor knowledge about the outside world and its real attitude towards their country, and this is one of the most deplorable impacts that the Cold War ideological standoff had on how Russians think. Hostility, mistrust, suspicion and mere aversion dominate the public consciousness, propaganda and even the mentality of some responsible politicians. That is why they often consider the fairly explicable measures taken by other countries to support their national security on the face of Russia’s still impressive military might and nuclear potential as tokens of malicious designs.

Moreover, there is a category of politicians and experts in the West whose origin (especially in case of Eastern Europe) or special circumstances have made them Russophobic (the same way that many Russians, and in particular those affiliated with radical nationalistic movements, dislike foreigners). It is their statements that Russian propagandists like to cite masochistically. But in the final run, it is not these people who determine the policies of developed and/or many developing nations towards Russia. There are plenty of competent leaders and specialists with a sense of duty there and they understand that Russia – as the world’s biggest country in territory and in the amount of natural and mineral resources, as well as the largest nuclear power – requires special attention and that it may become an invaluable asset in the current global system.

First of all, the nuclear sphere. One of the most dangerous topics in global politics in the early 1990s was the fear that Russia could lose control over Soviet nuclear arsenals. The ruling quarters in the U.S. and NATO did everything in their power to help Russia remain the sole owner of Soviet-era arsenals in the first place, and build an up-to-date system of storing and stockpiling nuclear warheads (the so-called Nunn-Lugar amendment). The soberly-minded Western political circles have a consistent and firm position on the issue, which suggests that Russia is the only country capable of ensuring efficient storage and utilization of Soviet nuclear arsenals, and an all-round assistance should be given to it in this sphere.

Another sphere is Russia’s resources. The acuteness of the problem of resource supply for the global economy is common knowledge. This is especially felt in the energy sector. However, the situation is no less dramatic in other sectors where dependence on resources is high. Given its mineral wealth, Russia is an important player on the global energy market as it ensures that the market is balanced; and, if one considers international politics, Russia also ensures a global balance. Any shifts or re-division of territories or wars related to them are completely inadmissible, as they might fuel a global crisis. Thus, a rational approach consists in supporting Russia on this issue and helping it maintain its territorial integrity.

This means that those politicians and economic experts who understand Russia’s importance for the global balance are its natural allies in ensuring its national security. In this light, identifying political and business groups that share Russia’s security concerns and who are ready to become its allies must become an important element of Moscow’s policy. This is a complicated process and the opponents of Russia’s active ties with foreign countries often play on its complexity. However, their efforts make its importance even more obvious: the solution of the problem of ensuring Russia’s national security lies in combining independent actions of its government, political parties and business quarters and the activity of its responsible foreign partners who share Russia’s concerns for security, albeit for their own reasons.

Compared with many other countries, national security has a double or even triple significance for Russia. It is not a problem for the Russian Federation alone. It embraces a much broader scope of countries whose destiny depends – to a different degree – on the course of events inside Russia. The bigger the country and the higher its position in the global hierarchy, the greater the significance that its national security has for the outside world. In this sense it is very easy to make a mistake if one does not fully understand to what extent the country should rely on its real global role in ensuring its national security.

The theory and history of international relations abounds in the misconception that the bigger a country, the greater its freedom of action. In reality, it is the other way around. Small countries have the prerogative to resolve problems relying on their capabilities. A large country is simply obliged to observe the rhythms and vectors of global politics to build an independent strategy of action. Otherwise it may easily become an object of apprehensions – well-grounded or not – that may force other countries to form coalitions against it. NATO’s expansion should have taught a good lesson to the Russian leadership in this sense.

The international community needs a stable and strong Russia that does not harbor hegemonic plans as the foundation for the functioning of a steady and dynamic system of international relations. In determining the priorities and structure of Russia’s national security, it is essential that its legitimate interests in building a modern nation correlate with the equally legitimate interests of other countries if they do not contradict Russian interests. This task may look simple, yet it is one of the most complex and hard-to-resolve tasks of Russian national security policy.