Following the September 11 events, the Russian leadership made a resolute turn toward cooperation with the West, which was confirmed many times during President Putin’s subsequent meetings with heads of Western states and strengthened by practical measures and supported by the majority of Russian citizens. However, their perception of some of Russia’s concrete steps on the international stage is far from unanimous. The Russians take quite a skeptical view of the U.S. response to the friendly policy of the Russian leadership.

Especially significant is the public’s response to actions involving the use of force on the international stage. In recent years, almost all of these actions have been closely related to U.S. global policy, and that country is associated in Russian society with the West as a whole. Any international action by the U.S. is perceived in Russia through the angle of a negative attitude to the U.S. claims to world hegemony. Hence the relatively small numbers of Russian citizens who accept the U.S. arguments and regard Iraq as an aggressive state, and, on the contrary, the existence of a group of people (which, incidentally, is not overly numerous either), who sympathize with the regime of Saddam Hussein. The attitude to the problem of Iraq is affected by the pacifism that characterizes Russian public opinion. The reasons for such pacifism are many, including the collective historical memory of the people whose scars from the Second World War have yet to heal, the violence of the Stalin regime, the Russian campaign in Afghanistan and the Soviet heritage of ostentatious peaceableness that presented all the general secretaries of the CPSU as “fiery fighters for peace.”

Citizens’ attitudes to specific foreign policy issues and to the geostrategy of the state as a whole are dictated by mass stereotypes, including images of states. As is demonstrated by a number of nationwide Russian opinion polls called “Geoproyekt,” conducted by the Public Opinion Foundation (POF) in 2001-2002 [1], about 38 percent of Russian citizens regard the countries covered by the polls as friendly to Russia.

Countries of the West were no exception: with many of them, the “friendliness” rating is substantially higher than average.

Assessments by Russian citizens of friendliness of world countries to Russia as % of the total number of respondents (POF polls of 2001)

The record for “friendliness” in Europe belongs to the Nordic countries – Finland, Sweden, and Norway. The views of Finland are clearly affected by the Soviet past – the “special relations” established by the USSR with its northern neighbor, a major trading partner, regarded to be a kind of not quite capitalist country. The Scandinavian countries became especially popular during perestroika, their model of social development regarded as exemplary and nearly truly socialist. This was, among other things, due to the similarity of natural conditions, the traditional perception of the Nordic countries as the most stable and well-to-do, and the absence (or failure to perceive) of threats to national security emanating from Northern Europe.

The collective consciousness now practically has no negative feelings in regard to Germany – the adversary of the USSR during the Second World War: Germany is regarded as a totally different country. Sixty-one percent of respondents regard it as a friendly state and only 20 percent as unfriendly. In September of the same year, after the September 11 events, already 64 percent of Russians said that Germans were likable as a people (19 percent held the opposite view and 17 percent had difficulty deciding).

Asked about “What comes to your mind first when hearing the word ‘Germany’?”, 29 percent answered – “a terrible war,” “invasion,” “occupation,” “concentration camps,” “Holocaust,” and “Nazism.” It is natural that the positive associations increase in the junior age strata (from 52 percent of those older than fifty up to 69 percent in the junior age group).

France causes stable positive emotions in practically all the respondents. That country, according to a colorful expression by Moscow University psychologists is “libidinously attractive” to the Russians. “Everything is beautiful in France,” the “people are well-behaved,” “beautiful women,” “honor and nobility,” a “happy-go-lucky country, a likable one,” a “leading country in Europe in culture and art,” “Paris is the capital of the world…” Contrary associations are very few (not more than 1 percent of respondents).

Portugal’s indicator of “friendliness” is slightly less than average simply because it is a small state at the other end of Europe and is relatively little known in Russia. In the notions of Russians, Canada turned out to be somewhat “akin” to the Nordic countries that generate great sympathy. On the whole, one can say that the Russians rely on a presumption of friendliness toward the European countries. Despite the Russians’ identity crisis and profound pessimism, they take a surprisingly good attitude toward the world around them, preferring to see friends there rather than enemies. This is also the effect of a natural friendly reaction to discovering the world after the collapse of the USSR, and of the traditional features of the Russian mentality – in the words of Dostoyevsky, the “worldwide responsiveness,” cultivated in Soviet time in the specific form of “proletarian internationalism.” Soviet propaganda always stressed that all peoples were “good” and only their “bourgeois” governments were bad. That is why the Russian consciousness practically has no perception of somebody’s collective guilt for historical offense [2]. It is characteristic that the friendly and favorable attitude toward Western countries is expressed most clearly by the younger population, adapted to the post-Soviet changes and educated.

The Russians’ “Westernism,” especially that of the young, is in part “consumerist.” The analysis of the Geoproyekt questions about the associations generated in the respondents by names of Western countries indicates that most of them have to do with the high level of economic development, quality of life and advanced technologies. The leading role in the assessments is played by factors other than foreign policy nuances or ideology. The West is perceived as the source of different benefits, an example to emulate, and an object to envy. The West is known through the goods, rarer – through culture and history, rather than through personal experience or ideological orientation; hence the desire to be friends with “this kind” of West – strong, well-to-do and technologically advanced.

There is, however, one but very important exception from the general positive perception of United States. However, the perceptions of the relations with the United States remain subject to abrupt fluctuations. Not long prior to September 11, the U.S. was regarded as a state hostile to Russia by about half of the respondents, and only one-third regarded it as friendly. After the terrorist attacks on U.S. cities, the situation changed – and most Russians deeply sympathized with the U.S. during the tragedy that befell them. In late December 2001, despite the fact that at that time the Russian mass media were actively discussing the U.S. unilateral withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, already 38 percent of respondents regarded the U.S. as a state friendly to Russia, while 44 percent still thought it was hostile. Almost half of Russians (44 percent) assumed that the September 11 terrorist acts produced a positive impact on Russian-U.S. relations and that Russia’s positions in the world strengthened.

The collective awareness has preserved a certain anti-American complex that has a Soviet genesis but it turns out to be quite stable in the post-Soviet period as well. One could find many reasons for that. In all probability there is a complex produced by the defeat in the Cold War, still experienced by Russians at the level of the subconscious. Also, new traumas were caused by U.S. attempts to directly or indirectly control Russian policy.

It is indicative that a shadow of mistrust for the U.S. has also affected in part Great Britain, perceived as its closest ally. Britain is considered to be friendly by less than half of Russians.

All this notwithstanding, it would be a great mistake to assert that anti-Americanism is a dominant feature of Russian public opinion. The Russians’ attitude to the U.S., and to the West for that matter, is on the whole one of duality: it contains both an emotional and a rational (pragmatic) component [3].

INDEX OF RUSSIAN POPULATION’S ATTITUDE TO THE U.S.

(positive assessments)-(negative assessments) as percentage of the number of respondents

The emotional component is due to post-war Russia’s painful search for a place in the modern world after the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War, collapse of the Warsaw Pact and then of the USSR itself, NATO’s expansion toward the Russian borders, and the growing U.S. hegemonism in the world. The Russians have developed a stable notion of the West's “non-love” for Russia, ever finding fresh proof of this.

The rational component is taking into account the real correlation of forces on the international stage and possibly using it in the interests of the country. Russian public opinion is perfectly aware of the hopelessness and riskiness of military-political confrontation with the U.S. and with the West as a whole. Most Russians combine the mistrust of the U.S. and the West with the need to cooperate with them. This perception is getting stronger in the public mind and it goes hand in hand with the weakening of both positive and negative emotions in regard to the Western countries, especially the U.S.. This is indicated by the fact that long before the U.S. tragedy, immediately in the wake of the events in Yugoslavia, when the regular upsurge of anti-American and anti-NATO sentiment was still very strong (72 percent of respondents said they did not like the United States), 59 percent of Russians nevertheless said they favored strengthening relations with the overseas superpower [4]. In March 2001 (before the U.S. tragedy), 83 percent of respondents favored partner relations with the European Union or the U.S., or with both. After the September 11 events the Russians also passionately wished to improve bilateral relations. In late October 2001, answering the POF question “Would you personally wish to see a rapprochement between Russia and the U.S.?,” 69 percent answered in the positive and only 17 percent in the negative, while 14 percent had difficulty deciding. It is clear that it makes no sense and is even dangerous to get close with an organically hostile state.

It is important to note that when the first emotional response to the terrorist attack against the United States had already subsided, in April 2002 [5], 74 percent of Russians still supported the alliance between Russia and the U.S. in the struggle against international terrorism (15 percent were against). The overwhelming majority of Russian citizens have no illusions about Russia’s place in the alliance with America: only 26 percent of the participants in that survey believe that Russia is an equal participant in the alliance while 35 percent believe that the U.S. imposes its policy on Russia and another 28 percent – that it is an artificial and short-lived alliance. The Russians also take quite a skeptical view of the motives officially used to justify the U.S. military presence in former Soviet Central Asia. Despite such a soberly-pessimistic view of the U.S. policy, Russians regard the rapprochement with the U.S. as an attempt to acquire protection and ensure stability in a dangerous world (according to statements by POF focus-group participants, “one has to be friends with strong countries,” “if we are friends, the danger of war between the U.S. and Russia will disappear” ). Russian public opinion regards union with the leading world powers – not only the U.S. but also China – as guarantee that the external risks would be diminishing.

Russian public opinion does not regard the U.S., and the West as a whole, through the prism of foreign policy. Its position on the current issues of foreign policy and its attitude to specific countries and peoples, to the Western economic, cultural and political model is quite clearly separated. The rational, cultural and economic components of the Russians’ attitude to the West are more stable than the emotional (political) one; in turn, it has many layers and is internally contradictory. The attitude of the Russians to the West has to do with the civilization choice – the cultural values and assessment of possible ways of development. It is characteristic that 48 percent of those polled regard the structure of the U.S. society as more just compared to the Russian one; only 17 percent hold the opposite opinion [6].

The now popular notion of the “civilized world” is associated in the minds of most Russians not only with economic development. Although important, the level of wellbeing is by far not the only criterion of “civilized” respectability: almost as many respondents believe that it comprises contribution to world culture, concern for science and education, democracy, and a developed rule-of-law state. In the opinion of the Russians, the list of “civilized countries” is led by the U.S.: 33 percent of respondents said this; the U.S. is followed by Germany and France (22 percent and 20 percent, respectively; and 26 percent could not give a single example of a “civilized country” ).

Russia and NATO. Russian public opinion sharply opposes any direct participation of Russia in armed conflicts in post-Soviet space and beyond. Russian citizens also categorically condemn military actions of other states, above all, the U.S.. The attitude to the U.S. bombing of Yugoslavia during the conflict in Kosovo (1999) demonstrated that the greatest difficulty is to destroy the “iron curtain” that divided Russia and Western Europe and even Central Europe from the West precisely in the mass consciousness. Russian citizens were practically unanimous in condemning the bombing of Yugoslavia (95 percent of respondents were against it), while around 60 percent of citizens of the European NATO countries, on the contrary, approved of the actions of the U.S. Administration (on average 61 percent in NATO countries) [7].

The only exception was the action of the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan, concerning the need for which the opinions of the Russians divided almost equally in April 2002: 44 percent unconditionally or partially approved it, while 40 percent unconditionally or partially condemned it.

Be that as it may, the protest against the U.S. military actions and its attempts to dominate the world, as well as the dual attitude to that country get clearly projected onto the image of NATO. Without a doubt, it is also the effect of the stable stereotypes of Soviet times which were constantly strengthened even after the collapse of the USSR, for instance, during the struggle against NATO’s expansion to the East.

But in addition to the old fears generated by NATO, new phobias are appearing, caused by the rapidly changing geopolitical situation: new forces have appeared in the world, posing a threat not only to Russia but also to NATO, which means we now have an area of common interests. In November 2001, soon after the September 11 events, 30 percent of Russians saw the external threat to the country from Muslim nations (13 percent still saw the danger in the U.S.). According to one participant in the focus-group of POF experts, “for a long time already, for 10-15 years, within the current context of world politics the interests of Russia and NATO do not drastically diverge while the long-term interests coincide. We are similarly concerned over the problems of our security. The threats to this security in Europe and in Russia emanate from one source – in a broad way, it is from South. This is not only a military threat, it is the threat of a hostile cultural penetration. It is an open secret that Muslims are absorbing our cultural values. It means drugs, and they come from South (they are not grown in Finland). These threats are very many. They come precisely from here and in this lies the commonality of our interests.” [8]

In the new circumstances, it follows from the statements of the respondents that Russia must decide as soon as possible where and with whom it wishes to be. The neo-Eurasianism as a political doctrine substantiating the union of Slavs and Turkic peoples, the Orthodox and the Muslims, today clearly looks “objectionable”: at the level of mass consciousness there dominates the desire to get separated by a strong barrier from the Islamic world and the perils emanating from it. However, one ought to stress that the Russian citizens do not at the same time accept also the unilateral Western policy, strongly associating it with the loss of initiative and independence on the international stage.

Mass assessments of Russia’s “new foreign policy.” What is the attitude of Russians to the resolute turn by the Russian leadership toward a rapprochement with the West following September 11? Back in 1997, 46 percent of respondents believed that the leaders of the state were betraying the national interests. Now the focus-groups participants say that, unlike Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin worthily represents Russia. The sociological surveys find that most Russians assess quite positively the nation’s foreign policy under Putin. A successful pursuit of foreign policy became a major element of his image. The so-called “high” geopolitics, developed by politicians, diplomats and experts in Russia is now being increasingly matched by the “low” geopolitics, meaning the notions forming in the minds of citizens concerning Russia’s place in the world, its potential and real allies and the sources of external threats. On the whole, the foreign policy coincides with the public expectations and the geopolitical picture of the world in the consciousness of citizens.

The re-activation of relations with the West as a whole and with individual Western countries, including with the U.S., does not cause rejection. Distinguishing “good” Western Europe from the United States that is not always “good” or not so good to all, the Russian citizens take an especially positive view of strengthening the European vector of Russian foreign policy. Russians positively respond to the strengthening, under President Putin, of relations with Germany, as objectively the strongest European partner possessing a powerful economy and ramified interests in Russia. The public expectations are quite matched by the diversification of Russia’s contacts with the West and the president’s visits to “friendly” European countries.

In this way, establishing priorities on the “West flank” in the first approximation in line with the public opinion looks correct. Numerous opinion polls find that extremes are alien to Russian public opinion on issues of foreign policy. By mid-1990s the toughly confrontational anti-Westernism and the clear pro-Western orientation became weaker in Russian society. Life itself rejected the extreme positions: it became obvious to all that Russia simply does not have the strength to engage in a confrontation with the West.

At the same time, it is not quite clear how closely this unanimous approval of Putin’s foreign policy is related to his generally high rating. Indeed, like in other countries, the majority of Russian citizens are concerned primarily with internal problems, while their notions of the outside world are sketchy and largely molded by the current reports of the mass media, especially TV programs. After September 11, however, certain foreign policy steps of the Russian leadership were assessed by the public opinion quite variously. Thus, questioned as to whether the Russian politicians displayed weakness by actually agreeing to the Baltic countries’ accession to NATO, the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, the U.S. military presence in Central Asia and Transcaucasia, as well as to the closure of military bases in Vietnam and Cuba, only 44 percent of respondents answered in the affirmative. Only 25 percent said that the leadership displayed wisdom and 31 percent had difficulty answering. Participants in the focus-group, convened in Moscow in late November 2001, described this step as “too luxurious a present to the Americans.” The negative attitude to deciding to dismantle the military bases in Vietnam and in Cuba was characteristic for its high emotional coloring: “We acted like always: we sank the Mir station, we abandoned the bases. We don’t need them!”

Individual participants said they were disappointed with Putin’s posture: “He has a double standard: talks of patriotism but surrenders bases in Cuba.” [9]

Neither is public opinion inclined to believe that the relations with the West constitute the main condition for Russia’s economic prosperity. According to VTsIOM findings in early November 2001, only 30 percent of respondents agreed with such an opinion. At the same time, 61 percent supported the allegation that “first it is necessary to ensure economic growth and only then to expand relations with the West.” Merely 9 percent had difficulty answering. Public opinion clearly describes Russia as the weak party in the partnership. And that is why in a situation of choosing an optimum model of relations with the West, public opinion gives preference to this formula: “First the strengthening of self, and then close cooperation with a strong partner [10].”Thus, the success (or failure) of Putin’s “new foreign policy” in the eyes of Russians depends first and foremost on the internal economic situation – to a much greater extent than on strengthening the foreign ties with the Western countries.

Considering that Russia indeed wishes to join the Big Eight, its foreign policy and especially the line of rapprochement with the West must be legitimized by public opinion. If the foreign policy does not get due support of the Russians or, conversely, it contributes to the division of society, this can lead to extremely negative consequences in the domestic policy. And there are certain risks here caused by our citizens’ differing attitudes to the West, especially to the U.S. and NATO. Our countrymen have clearly failed to espouse the official arguments of Russia to agree to the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Even identifying the struggle of the international community, led by the U.S., against terrorism on the one hand, and the Chechen war and the explosions of the apartment houses in Russian cities, on the other, was accepted by only about half of the respondents. And this was almost the strongest trump card in favor of Russia joining the anti-terrorist coalition. Many Russians believe that the U.S. has paid Russia for its support with “black ingratitude.” In addition, one cannot ignore the significant differences of opinion between the Slav and Muslim populations. These were discussed even in the dramatic days of September 2001 and the existence of differences was confirmed by opinion polls later. Thus only a quarter of the title population in Muslim countries approved of the U.S. military action, supported by Russia, against the Taliban.

At the same time, the strong pragmatic and “civilizational” components of the notions about the West can be translated into a real geo-strategy based on further rapprochement with the Western community. The nation’s leadership must doubtless strive to overcome the existing and potential gaps between the “high” and “low” geopolitics and find a compromise between popularity with one’s citizens and effectiveness of one’s steps in the international arena.

1 Geoproyekt is called upon to identify, according to a single methodology, the images and notions of a number of countries, the nature of their relations with Russia and the international problems connected with them. The opinion polls are conducted in accordance with a representative nationwide sampling of 1,500 respondents (for details concerning the composition of the sampling, see the POF site).

2 The World Through the Eyes of the Russians: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. Ed. by V.A. Kolosov, Moscow: FOM, 2002, (In Russian).

3 The “West” and Russian Society. (In Russian). Published on 12.07.2001. The topic: Russia and Countries of the World. Source and author: Diligensky G.G.

4 To Be Friends with America? (V. Putin's Foreign Policy and Public Opinion). (In Russian). Published on 06.12.2001. The topic: US -- Source or author: Diligensky G.G.

5 Here and after we give some findings of the survey conducted by the POF within the framework of the research project on the “Russian geopolitical culture and response to the terrorist attack of September 11,” supported by the US National Research Foundation. The project coordinators are O'Loughlin J., the Colorado University in Boulder, and V.A. Kolosov, the Institute of Geography of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Gerard Toal from Virginia Polytechnical Institute.

6 POF. Field of Opinions. Dominants. 2001. No. 019, May 31.

7 O'Loughlin J. and Kolossov V. Still not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier: the geopolitics of the Kosovo war 1999, Political Geography, 2002, volume 21, N 5, pp. 553-600.

8 Russia and NATO. Published on 11.10.2001. Topic: NATO — Source or author: Kachkin A.B.

9 Zudin A. A new system of coordinates. The West in the public opinion of the Russians before and after September 11. (In Russian).

10 Ibid.