Leading experts from various branches of goverment and research institutions participated in a situation analysis conducted under the chairmanship of Academician Evgeny PRIMAKOV, a member of the journal’s Editorial Board and an acknowledged authority in the field.

The crisis in Israeli-Palestinian relations was chosen as our first topic. And this is not accidental. The unsettled conflict has for decades been causing continuous tensions in the region and providing a breeding ground for the upsurge of international terrorism which is perpetrating bloody acts in the Middle East and far beyond.

Leading experts from various branches of goverment and research institutions participated in a situation analysis conducted under the chairmanship of Academician Evgeny PRIMAKOV, a member of the journal’s Editorial Board and an acknowledged authority in the field. In keeping with the prepared scenario three blocs of issues were considered. Their totality, the participants believed, defines the possibilities of and prospects for a political settlement in the Middle East. This includes the impact of the situation on the Israeli and Palestinian parties as well as the influence of “external factors,” i.e. the principal actors on the international scene and the Arab states.

The experts deemed it necessary to highlight the possible impact of developments around Iraq on the Mid-East settlement process.

The methodology of any situation analysis presumes the anonymity of statements made by experts who participate in the discussion in their personal capacity and do not express the opinion of their organizations and institutions.

Given below are the main conclusions of the discussion held by the Editorial Board in October 2002, i.e. before the government crisis in Israel, the announcement of early parliamentary polls and the election of Avoda and Likud leaders.

Israeli Position

Public opinion in Israel is rather fluid – a retrospective analysis shows that its vector may change. At the same time, the experts said, over the past two years Israeli public opinion has steadily been turning to the right, mainly because of the Palestinian terrorist acts committed in Israel proper. In 1999, as many as 67 percent of the Israelis believed that peace accords would put an end to the conflict, whereas in 2002 as few as 26 percent shared that view. This is why the rightists can afford not to hurry with a peace settlement. They hope that the destruction of the Palestinian Autonomy (PA) infrastructure will compel the Palestinian leaders to give up the idea of establishing a Palestinian state in the nearest future and accept the Israeli “interim plan.” They also pin hopes on the contemplated U.S. strike against Iraq, something which is backed by 58 percent of the Israelis polled.

Most participants in the situation analysis concurred that a rather tough attitude to a crisis settlement has actually taken root in Israeli society.

Shimon Peres is considered a perpetual political loser, whereas the new leader that has replaced him, former Defense Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, has not shown himself as a man capable of rallying the party. Ben-Eliezer once proposed his own settlement plan: a withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, including the dismantling of the Jewish settlements; a withdrawal from most of the West Bank and a transfer of part of Israeli territory proper to Palestinians in exchange for the existing settlements that will become sovereign Israeli territory; establishment of an independent body to administer the Temple Mount that houses the Judaic and Muslim holy sites. But given the prevailing moods in Israeli society today, these proposals, as they stand, will hardly be incorporated into Labor’s election platform.

In any case, Avoda’s election variant of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement will be tougher than the proposals made by ex-Prime Minister Ehud Barak and, most experts agreed, Avoda will not return to the 1993 Oslo accords.

At the same time, one may conclude that Ariel Sharon’s support (by at least 60 percent of the electorate according to recent polls) is not a “temporary upsurge.” His position is rather solid in the medium-term perspective. Inside the Labor Party, there has been a struggle between Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu, but Sharon’s chances are clearly bigger. This is because, first, his opponent’s reputation has slightly fallen (though Netanyahu is relatively young and can replace Sharon later on) and, second, most of the Israelis support the extreme anti-Palestinian actions by the Prime Minister in office.

This does not mean that Sharon can pin hopes on implementing a peace settlement plan which fully excludes the establishment of a Palestinian state. He has to reckon with the U.S. position and the opinion of his opponents inside Israel. The idea of a “two-state” settlement runs counter to Sharon’s and his supporters’ inner feelings, yet it is deeply rooted in Israeli society. This is augmented by the population’s concern over personal safety, something that cannot be guaranteed without an agreement with the Palestinians. As for the United States, from the very beginning it did not share Sharon’s negative attitude to the problem of a Palestinian state. (Some participants in the situation analysis said Sharon would have long deported Arafat, if it were not for the U.S. pressure.) Given all this, Sharon agreed to a three-stage settlement plan proposed by the four intermediaries – the United States, Russia, the EU, and the UN. Moreover, he even uttered the words “Palestinian state.” By doing so, he has lost part of his supporters amongst the ultras, but acquired new ones amidst the centrist and even leftist wings – those who accept the idea of Palestinian statehood but back up Sharon’s policy aimed at demolishing “the infrastructure of Palestinian terrorism” as a sine qua non for peace talks.

In the case that the peace process resumes under U.S. pressure, Sharon, it seems, will confine himself to offering the Palestinians the idea of “cantons” and a transfer of not more than 42 percent of the territory claimed by them for the establishment of their own state. Clearly, no Palestinian leader will accept this, in which case Sharon will find himself in a precarious position of a leader who has torpedoed a compromise solution.

But some participants voiced the idea that it is a rightist leader, such as Sharon, who may eventually make a turnabout towards a peace settlement (an analogy to Menahem Begin’s policies in the late 1970s suggests itself here). This may only happen if Sharon decides that the Palestinian extremist wing is not able to influence the Palestinian approach to the settlement problem.

Analyzing the impact of external forces on Israel’s policies, experts have stressed the following: Likud has succeeded in establishing cooperation with Washington. While extending general support for Sharon’s policies, the U.S. Administration is exerting a dosed pressure on Israel whenever it finds that Sharon has “overstepped the limits,” and this may explode the settlement process.

But this pressure is exerted behind the scenes and rather delicately so that the Israeli lobby in the United States is not given any pretext for accusing President Bush of a pro-Arab leaning. At the same time, the U.S. Administration is compelled to balance between the two parties not to scare away its Arab allies and partners – especially now that preparations for an Iraqi operation are underway.

EU influence on Israeli policies is insignificant. This is because both Israel’s political leaders and public are convinced that Western Europe has clearly taken a pro-Palestinian and pro-Arab stand. To be sure, there are serious reasons compelling the EU to criticize Israel’s policies as sharply as ever. These include the energy problem, making Western Europe maintain friendly relations with the oil-exporting Arab countries, and Europe’s “Muslim factor” (the 12 to 15 million Muslims currently living in the EU counties), i.e. the wish to calm the wave of anti-Muslim sentiments and not to antagonize the European Muslims whose clout is growing. The growth, in return, of anti-European sentiments in Israel does not allow the EU to play a substantive role in the settlement process. In this respect, the participation in the “quartet” is useful to the Europeans because it offers them an opportunity to affect that process.

The influence of the United Nations Organization on the Israeli government policies is extremely weak. The UN is traditionally considered in Israel an organization with pro-Arab leanings.

Israel’s attitude to Russia is changing for the better, thus increasing this country’s chances to affect Sharon’s government. This is facilitated by two factors: first, Russia itself faces the terrorist threat and, second, there are many Russian emigrants in Israel. It is indicative that Arafat’s blockade was lifted under pressure exerted on Sharon from two sides – the Russian and the American. But the “Russian factor” has not, and in the nearest future will hardly become dominant in shaping the Israeli conflict settlement policy. Sharon’s defiant visits to Moscow are designed to prop up his position in dealing with the U.S. and the EU.

The participants considered separately the limits for maneuver of the Likud-headed Israeli government in respect of peace settlement issues, such as establishment of a Palestinian state, delimitation of its borders, definition of the status of Jerusalem and a solution to the refugee problem.

In principle, Sharon and his associates reject the idea of Palestinian statehood, yet they are compelled to reckon with the fact that much headway has been made in that direction despite the actual fiasco of its concrete variant (the Oslo accords). At the same time, all alternatives to Palestinian statehood – from semi-autonomous Palestinian rule in the occupied territory to occupation lasting ad infinitum – have proved ineffective. Also important is the fact that the position of Washington, which is interested in stabilization, albeit for its own reasons, cannot be ignored. All these factors will most likely compel the Israeli government to eventually agree to an “asymmetrical compromise.”

The experts believed that with regard to the boundaries of the future Palestinian state the Israeli government might withdraw to a line close to the 1967 borders – but this would not happen overnight and would be done gradually, stage by stage. An adjustment of borders near Jerusalem and an exchange of territory are also likely. But Sharon, they said, will not give up the demand to demilitarize the Palestinian state and station troops along the Jordan River.

The experts assessed differently the limits for maneuver regarding the status of Jerusalem. Yet most of them concurred that, under strong pressure, Israel might agree to the following option: the Palestinian Authority will be headquartered in Abu-Dis, the Old City will be divided and the Temple Mount will be accorded a special status (the Western Wall being under Israeli jurisdiction). Moreover, the Likud-headed government will insist on preserving major Jewish settlements in the occupied territory and establishing guarded corridors between them and Israel proper.

Most participants noted that in regard to the Palestinian refugee problem any Israeli government would insist that a return of a considerable number of Palestinians to Israel is unacceptable, even on the basis of recognition of the principle of reunification of families.

The experts came to the following conclusion: insofar as the Likud will hardly be removed from power in the nearest future and its room for maneuver is rather limited by continued terrorist acts against peaceful citizens, it is hard to count on an active role of the Israeli factor in the peace settlement process.

Palestinian Position

Most experts agree that Arafat’s position is relatively firm despite numerous predictions. No one of his old-time associates challenges him, while the younger generation does not yet possess the resources to claim national leadership. There is no organized opposition to Arafat. Experts called Abu Mazen, Abu Ala and Saeb Erikat possible substitutes for Arafat should he suddenly step down, but none of these people has the charisma needed to lead people. Arafat retains control over financial resources coming from outside, which also allows him to influence the alignment of forces.

Generally, it seems a compromise in the settlement process is more likely with Arafat than without him. His authority might convince the Palestinians that a compromise solution is needed. Yet some experts believe that Arafat cannot ignore the fact that the extremists are breathing down his neck. Should Arafat want to toughen his stance on them, Sharon’s policies would put a spoke in his wheel. At the same time the Palestinian levers of the peaceful process are still in Arafat’s hands.

The participants held that Arafat would win the election of PA leader in early 2003, but at parliamentary and local elections the dominant position of his Fatah group would be challenged by the extreme-radical forces (more in the Gaza Strip than in the West Bank). This means that Arafat’s departure would open up a path to power for the radical wing of the Palestinian movement. Clearly, President Bush cannot ignore this fact, despite his anti-Arafat rhetoric.

Similarly to the Israelis, the Palestinians do not have expandable room for maneuver in matters concerning a peace settlement. Yet one can assume that a large segment of the Palestinian elite would agree to a longer, “stretched-out” variant of transition to Palestinian statehood. A compromise on the territorial and border issues is also possible. The experts believe that the Palestinians’ “flexibility” limit is agreement to 90 percent of the claimed territory and to the international status of the Old City, provided the Temple Mount is placed under Palestinian control. It will be extremely hard for the Palestinians to meet Israel half-way on the refugee issue, though they realize that its practical solution is rather conventional and even symbolic and that in reality most refugees will never come back under any conditions. Most likely, the Palestinians will continue pressing for recognition of the refugees’ right of return. Israel, as has been noted earlier, will try to evade even nominal recognition of this right. This may well be the main stumbling block at future talks.

In principle, the Palestinians will demand liquidation of all Jewish settlements in the territory of their state, but, experts say, a compromise is possible. The more so as this issue should naturally be tied in with economic relations, a problem vitally important for the Palestinians. This involves primarily preserving job opportunities in Israel that provide the means of subsistence for many Palestinians.

The problem of backing terrorist acts by the Palestinian leaders – and the PA elite in general – seems to be as important for peace settlement prospects as it is unclear. It is unknown to what extent the Arafat Administration controls the Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other organizations. It is equally unclear whether they will go on fighting should the Administration turn its back on them. Specifically, some experts said that today the main thing for the extremists was coming to power in the newly established Palestinian state, rather than liberating the Palestinian land occupied by Israel in 1967. In that event their conflict with Fatah is inevitable. Moreover, Sharon’s policy of using any pretext for perpetrating acts, such as the second siege and demolition of Arafat’s residence and the massacre in the Khan Yunis refugee camp, is actually playing into the extremists’ hands. Most experts hold that if Sharon continues pursuing such policies the spiral of violence will not be stopped. At the same time, they say, only talks – not kamikaze acts – can bring about an Israeli troop pullout, a halt to regular Israeli invasions and a restoration of state structures within the PA. Those Fatah moderates who are ready for a compromise will speak out at the talks on behalf of the Palestinians and in case of success they will become a ruling force in the Palestinian state.

Of course, outside forces – the Arab world, the United States, the UN, Russia and the EU – have an influence on the Palestinian position.

Generally, Arab governments wish to find a compromise solution to the Palestinian problem, but their approaches differ markedly. Egypt and Jordan are inclined against a continued Intifada. Syria treats the conflict from the viewpoint of returning the Golan Heights and backs up the Intifada. The situation with Saudi Arabia is more complex. It prefers to support both Arafat and his Islamist opponents because of the great influence of the ultra-Islamist policy advocates in that country. It shall be recalled that the Palestinians depend a great deal on the aid coming from the Arab world – the PA’s monthly budget totals $50 million, of which $30 million is financed by the Arab states.

Most experts believe that though the Arab countries do not see any alternative to Arafat, their attachment to him should not be overestimated. The Arab powers that be would be ready to cooperate with another Palestinian leader capable of reaching a settlement that would not lead to a new Arab-Israeli war and which would allow finding a solution acceptable to the Palestinians and preserving the dignity of the Arab world.

By all indications, the U.S. Administration does not see an alternative to a settlement on the “two-states” basis. Notwithstanding President Bush’s statements indicating that the White House no longer considers Arafat a participant in the settlement process, the Americans seem to have ignored Sharon’s arguments and have not yet discarded the Palestinian leader. At the same time they are groping for a stand-by variant – to push Arafat back in the shadow and compel him to be content with the role of a nominal Palestinian leader.

Some experts pointed out the duality of the Palestinian attitude to the United States. The radicals and Islamists consider the U.S. the principal enemy of Islam and the Arab nation. They hold the Americans fully accountable for Sharon’s actions. This view is also shared by ordinary Palestinians, but in contrast to the extremists they seem to have not lost the hope that the U.S. will eventually help the Palestinian people to pull out of the catastrophic situation they have found themselves in. Moreover, both ordinary Palestinians and the elite are ready to rapidly change their negative attitude to America if it shows a more balanced approach to the conflict parties.

Russia retains its influence on the Palestinians, yet at this particular stage it is not determinant. The UN’s influence is insignificant but it may be raised by the “quartet” that includes this organization as well.

The European Union backs Arafat and calls for the establishment of a Palestinian state. The Danish plan supported by the Palestinians has scored additional points for the Europeans in their dialog with the Palestinians.

Impact of Outside Factors

The experts have concluded that in the current setting the conflict parties do not have potential enough to bring about a settlement by themselves and that their room for maneuver is limited, so they suggested that special attention should be given to outside factors.

Analyzing the U.S. position, the experts noted the important, though not decisive, role of the oil factor. It is important for the Americans, first, to cut world oil prices and, second, to decrease their dependence on Mid-East oil imports. A solution to this problem is tied in with the rout of the Iraqi regime rather than with the outcome of an Israeli-Palestinian settlement.

The U.S. cannot ignore the position of the Arab states and give Israel carte blanche. But neither will it take a pro-Arab stand, though Israel’s value for the Americans is not as big as it was during the Cold War period. Its leaning towards the Arabs is hindered by the postulated need to ensure Israel’s security – one of the standing imperatives of U.S. foreign policy, as well as by pressure from the pro-Israeli lobby and the general cooling of the American public to the Arab world in the wake of the September 11th.

The influence of the pro-Israeli lobby on U.S. Middle East policies is important, yet its role should not be overestimated. By all indications, this lobby has realized that its opportunities are limited, a fact which arouses certain discontent in Israel. At the same time, at any critical moment the Jewish community in the United States backs Israel unconditionally and upholds the moves by the U.S. Administration aimed at weakening the anti-Israeli forces in the Middle East.

Given all these factors, the experts say, President Bush will not hurry with his moves, trying to bring pressure to bear on both parties to the conflict. One can expect mistakes and blunders from the Bush team, but it will not be easy to take advantage of them, given the current alignment of world forces. Yet the U.S. has a chance to “press home” both parties, but this may only happen if it acts within the framework of international efforts made by the “quartet,” rather than alone, something which resulted in a deadlock in the past.

The experts noted that following September 11, the U.S. Administration had been showing readiness to depart from one-sided moves and shift emphasis on collective efforts. This does not mean that Washington is ready to give up its leadership in the Arab-Israeli settlement process – this time it will be the leader within the “quartet” framework.

During the debate, the military operation against Iraq prepared by the United States was considered most seriously. All experts agree that the U.S. main aim is to topple Saddam Hussein and his regime, rather than to ascertain whether Iraq possesses mass destruction weapons or not. By this token the U.S. wants to tighten its control over the Middle East region and simultaneously to teach other countries, primarily Iran, a lesson.

The negative consequences for the U.S. include an inevitable upsurge in anti-American sentiments in the Arab world and elsewhere, a sharp weakening of the global anti-terrorist coalition, chances for a rather protracted military operation and a possible involvement of Israel in the war. Some experts do not exclude that at the very last moment Saddam Hussein may realize that he has nothing to lose and fire missiles carrying chemical and biological weapons at Israel, which will provoke this time (as distinct from 1991) an Israeli retaliation strike. Moreover, they say, in case of a big civilian death toll Israel may even resort to nuclear weapons. Other participants doubted Iraq’s ability to deliver a chemical or biological strike against Israel. Moreover, should it happen, Israel’s use of nuclear weapons in retaliation would be highly improbable, they held.

The following viewpoints were set forth regarding prospects for an Palestinian peace settlement in case of a U.S. military operation in Iraq. On the one hand, one can expect from Sharon more crushing strikes against the Palestinian movement and even attempts to oust a substantial number of Palestinians from the occupied territory to Jordan. On the other hand, the Palestinian extremists may take the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime as a signal for stepping up their terrorist acts. A different viewpoint boils down to this: the demise of the Baghdad ruler, who enjoys popularity among the Palestinians, will result in a psychological breakdown amidst the extremists. Many of them will be simply demoralized. The backing of the Palestinians by the Arab states will slacken. Regarding the U.S., a prognosis was made that most likely it will try to make up for its fallen authority in the Arab world by pushing a settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The experts also considered Russia’s possible role. A viewpoint was expressed that for Russia it would be most useful to stick to the “quartet” format and simultaneously maintain bilateral relations with Arab countries and Israel.

The “quartet” is working on a “road map,” i.e. mapping out a general route leading to peace. But it should not confine itself just to that. A substantive part of the settlement plan should also be elaborated through collective efforts within the “quartet” framework, after which vigorous pressure should be exerted on the two conflicting parties in order to force them to accept this plan.

Referring to the substantive part of the plan, the participants came to the conclusion that the proposals made in Taba (Egypt) on the eve of Sharon’s coming to power should be considered a starting point. But it will be much more difficult to implement these proposals today.

Characteristically, at the current stage it is still impossible to advance towards a settlement without persistent pressure from outside forces. In other words, the international community should look for a political solution to be forced upon the parties.