The Iranian issue has accumulated all of the immediate problems of international policy: combating terrorism and the states that are subsidizing it, WMD non-proliferation, the possible democratization of the Greater Middle East and of Islam. It also reflects a conflict within the global community – which approach should it take for resolving international crises: the use-of-force approach that is favored by a majority in the present U.S. administration, or the evolutionary method supported by most European countries and Russia. In fact, the situation around Iran embodies the essence of global challenges: its further development is likely to affect the future of this entire explosive region, extending from the Mediterranean Sea and far beyond.

ARC OF INSTABILITY

Most of the participants in this discussion agree that Iran is likely to become a major challenge to the regional and global security. This assumption rests on the following trends in Iran’s policies:

• orientation of the majority of the Iranian elite and the general public toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons;
• reluctance to fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and attempts to misinform the global community as regards Iran’s nuclear program;
• support for some Middle East organizations that have been recognized by the international community as terrorist groups; an open anti-Israeli policy;
• active support for Shiite groups in the neighboring countries with a view to attracting advocates of Shiite Islam;
• preservation of fundamentalist trends in its domestic policy;
• desire to gain the leading position in the region, holding back the global players.

An additional alarming factor is the overall poor situation in the region, where Iran is surrounded by failing or failed states. The situation is aggravated by the fact that the entire region has turned into a knot of contradictions and conflicting interests: the Middle East conflict; the settlement of the Iraqi and Afghan crises; Indo-Pakistani and Indo-Chinese clashes; the unsettled status of the Caspian Sea; the Caucasian ‘black hole;’ problems of Islamic fundamentalism, terrorism and drug trafficking. The arc of instability across the Greater Middle East makes it the main challenge to international security.

However, there are several positive tendencies at play in Iran itself that may work in favor of its development. Among the favorable factors is the rapid expansion of information technologies, mobile communication and the Internet in the country. The country’s demographic situation (Iranians aged 27 and under account for 60 percent of the population) may prove beneficial for the gradual transformation of the present regime. It is noteworthy that the efforts of the conservative circles to reverse the evolutionary processes in the country arouse large-scale public protests. The newly established electoral system creates the prerequisites for the appearance of new generations of Iranian policymakers.

There is also an obvious change in the moods among the political elite in favor of normal diplomatic and economic relations with the West. For instance, Iran has been demonstrating its readiness to open up its power engineering industry to Western companies, including French, British and, possibly even American ones, as well as Russian companies; this move may favorably affect both the development of the Iranian economy and its relations with the developed countries. As a result of international pressure, and in response to some friendly recommendations, Iran has agreed to open its nuclear program for a thorough inspection by the IAEA.

Finally, in some of the recent crisis situations, specifically around Afghanistan and Iraq, Teheran has played a rather positive role. The defeat of the Taliban and the overthrow of Hussein reduce Teheran’s fears of external threats; it provides Iran with new opportunities for concerted actions with Europe, Russia and even the United States. Unfortunately, a decrease of tension with the U.S. is hampered by continuous threats voiced by Washington: its repeated pronouncement about the need to replace the regime in Iran. This policy only irritates the Iranian public and consolidates the conservative forces of Iran.

At the same time, the participants in the discussion noted that any Iranian government, whether democratic or not, regardless of its composition and ideological beliefs, would see the acquisition of nuclear weapons as one of the key national priorities. This idea enjoys the active support of the Iranian people. Furthermore, the possession of nuclear weapons by some neighboring countries (India, Pakistan, Russia and especially Israel), and the general crisis of the WMD non-proliferation regime, are additional incentives for Iran to obtain a nuclear bomb. Also, Iran, as well as many other countries, has to respond to the tough offensive policy pursued by the United States, and its direct threats of military intervention.

POLICIES PURSUED BY KEY PLAYERS

The participants in the conference gave much consideration to the positions of the key players involved in the settlement of the Iranian problem – the United States, the European Union, and Russia. The conference concluded that the Iranian issue tests the ability of the developed countries to agree on a common strategy for overcoming the present crisis of global governance. A success in these efforts would help build a new system of global governance, whereas a failure would signal the international community’s weakness in countering the threats posed by the arc of instability.

The United States. In analyzing the U.S. position on the Iranian issue, the speakers noted the failures in the policy pursued by the Bush administration, which has been guided by the neoconservative ideology and internal political considerations. By proclaiming extreme goals and implementing a stick-and-no-carrot policy toward Teheran, the United States has limited the opportunities for a diplomatic solution. This policy provokes Iran to boost its nuclear program and reinforce subversive activities in the adjacent, already unstable states. Due to such an approach, the United States is gradually losing its allies; even Great Britain, a close partner of the United States, is now more inclined to share the position held by continental Europe.

 All of the speakers agreed that any military conflict between the United States and Iran is an unreasonable and unacceptable option. This lingering confrontation may spark the situation in the Greater Middle East and turn it into a hotbed of large-scale military conflict. Such developments may put an end to the coalition of the developed countries, formed to counter terrorism and the new challenges to international security. In the event of a U.S. military defeat, this would force it to abandon the region, would undermine Washington’s global leadership, bring about a power vacuum in the international system and eventually deal a catastrophic blow to international stability.

Some speakers described the U.S. approach toward Iran as counterproductive in essence. Rather than seeking to undermine the political regime in Iran and treating it as an enemy, the United States should have, at the very outset of the ‘war on terrorism,’ regarded it as a potential ally. Following the September 11th events, the United States should have amended its policy toward Iran which it has pursued for the last 20 years. The reasons for doing so are as follows: 1) Iran remains the only ‘non-failed’ state in the Middle East; 2) Teheran has supported the antiterrorist coalition in combating the Taliban movement and taken active steps to uproot the al-Qaeda offshoots in its territory. However, instead of taking advantage of Teheran’s stance following the September 11th events for amending its policy (with face saved), the United States ranked Iran among the “axis of evil” states, and declared the overthrow of the Iranian regime as its major goal.

The European Union. The participants in the discussion agreed that, although Europe shares many claims of the United States concerning Teheran, individual European countries have more in common as regards their positions on Iran than they have with the United States. Unlike the United States, Europe maintains that there is no evidence that Iran supports terrorism; Europe has stressed the need to broaden cooperation in combating terrorism, while calling on Teheran to actively work along this line. Moreover, the European countries and Iran effectively engage in trade.

According to the views of several speakers, the outwardly hostile policy of the United States toward Iran conceals its dog-in-the-manger strategy. That is, a desire to restrain access of its competitors to the Iranian market, especially since the United States is presently denied such access. At the same time, many U.S. politicians and businessmen favor the establishment of normal relations with Iran.

Another fundamental difference in the position of the United States and that of Europe concerns the assessment of the threat coming from Iran. For Washington, the very fact that there is such a strong player in the Greater Middle East as Iran is already a threat – it makes the region uncontrollable; and Iran’s obtaining nuclear weapons would be simply unacceptable to the U.S. The Europeans see the possible emergence of nuclear weapons in Iran as a danger rather than as a threat, since Iranian nuclear missiles would pose no threat to the European territory. What presents more of a threat for the Europeans is the instability that will arise should the U.S. launch an attack on Iran.

The imperatives of the U.S. and European policies differ respectively. For Europe, Iran is not a hostile state; coexistence with it is possible once an adequate policy has been carried out. For many Americans, the existence of Iran in its present form is unacceptable, and the only way to solve the problem is by Iran’s transformation.

At the same time, the participants in the discussion noted that Europe and the United States treat the use of military force differently and have different conceptions of what constitutes an optimal and successful policy. The Europeans seek to transfer the compromise principle, which has become a practice within the EU, to its relations abroad. Compromise, as an integral part of any political solution, differentiates the European approach from the American one. Consequently, Europe prefers to persuade the Iranian leadership, through diplomacy and a policy of involvement, alternating pressure with encouragement and offering conditional dividends, to suspend its nuclear program and subversive activities in the adjacent countries. If this policy fails, the Europeans will focus on the most optimal and secure model of coexistence with a new, nuclear-armed Iran. In either case, according to the EU, it is critical to avoid any open confrontation.

The speakers asked the question if Europe is capable, in principle, of initiating a course of its own, or whether its policy is limited to attempts at transforming the U.S. agenda concerning Iran. Some of the speakers suggested that Europe has no real effective instruments for influencing Iran, besides providing it with some economic and, to a lesser degree, political dividends. That is why Europe cannot offer an Iranian program of its own: its role consists in moderating the excessively rigid course of the United States.

Meanwhile, some seemingly independent steps taken by the Europeans, such as a joint visit by French, British and German foreign secretaries to Iran which was crowned by Teheran’s agreement to sign an additional protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, actually stem from U.S. policy. So there is a kind of ‘division of labor:’ whenever the United States is not prepared to escalate the conflict with Iran (in this particular case it was bogged down in Iraq, while entering a presidential election year), Europe revitalizes its political cooperation with Iran. Otherwise, as noted by some speakers, the United States is not interested in an active contribution by the Europeans. Moreover, while making advances to Europe, Teheran keeps a close watch on Washington’s reaction.

Russia’s position on Iran was described by the speakers as much more inconsistent than those of the United States and Europe. Russia is the only major player that considers itself to be ‘a friend’ of Iran and actually advocates Iranian interests. The importance for Russia to cooperate with Iran is motivated by two factors – economic benefits and geopolitical considerations.

The economic benefits for Russia include getting funds necessary to support its nuclear power engineering – one of the few high-tech industries that have survived the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, it is vital that Russia’s Atomic Energy Ministry earn money in order that it may implement programs for ensuring the safety of nuclear weapons, as well as the secure storage of nuclear material. U.S. assistance for Russia’s nuclear security programs is also beneficial, but relatively insignificant, and there has been no assistance coming from Europe. Nor has Europe responded to Russia’s proposals concerning its ‘peaceful atom’ cooperation with Iran.

In terms of geopolitics, Moscow views Iran as a stronghold of Russia’s influence in the Middle East. Its good relations with Iran are an important factor in strengthening Russia’s positions in the post-Soviet region of Central Asia. And Iran has proved to be a responsible partner during the Chechen and Tajik conflicts.

At the same time, Moscow is very concerned about the possibility of Iran possessing nuclear weapons: in such a scenario, it would be Russia, not the United States, which may find itself within the striking distance of Iranian missiles. Moreover, it is most likely that once Iran gets hold of nuclear weapons, its state policy will become more radical. Moscow has considered the possibility (not quite justifiably though) that while it is assisting Iran economically, and offering diplomatic support of Iran’s interests in multilateral institutions, it could have a positive influence on the Iranian leadership.

Although Russia’s foreign policy philosophy is closer to that of the U.S., and Russia regards the use of military force as a norm in international policy, in the long-term view its position toward Iran may appear closer to that of Europe. In fact, Russia should be more concerned than Europe about the catastrophic consequences of a possible war between the U.S. and Iran.

FORECAST FOR SITUATION DEVELOPMENT

Most experts agree that there are two possible scenarios: Scenario A (which should be put into effect in case Iran remains a non-nuclear state) and Scenario B (a response to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and, consequently, to the change in its status).

Scenario A.  In providing “carrots” and “sticks,” the primary focus should be given to the “carrots.” The West should be more attentive to Iran’s concerns for its security and refrain from exerting pressure and making ultimatums. Excessive pressure may lead to Iran becoming an active, rather than passive, proliferant of nuclear technologies, as well as a source of nuclear material and arms for terrorist groups worldwide. With this possibility in view, the participants did not support the idea of forming a “Northern Alliance” which would force Iran, through the application of strong pressure, to abandon its nuclear program.

According to the experts, the situation can be stabilized by establishing a viable system of regional security in the Middle East. However, in spite of the obvious advantages, this proposal is difficult to implement because of the lack of responsible players in the region. Still another reason derives from the weakness of the mechanisms of influence on the situation from the major world powers. Another idea voiced at the conference was that the United States should grant Iran formal guarantees of security, which could undermine its incentives to obtain nuclear weapons.

In the course of the discussion, an opinion was ventured that the United States’ policy toward Iran should follow the policy launched by President Nixon in 1972 toward China.

Some unconventional proposals were also made. One of these ideas involved Israel in settling the Iranian problem. Other participants did not find this idea realistic, given the history of stormy relations between Iran and Israel, as well as the anti-Israeli tendencies in Teheran’s policy. The Iranian leadership may regard such a step as a naked provocation, which would ultimately bring the negotiations to a deadlock. A different option looked more effective – work toward settling the Iranian problem at the same time as the U.S. exerts pressure on Israel.

Another alternative strategy is to recognize India and Pakistan as nuclear states in order to formalize their actual acquisition of nuclear weapons. This would make the overall situation less ambiguous. The proposal stems from the assumption that the recognition of these two nuclear states would help stabilize the situation in the region and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The WMD proliferation regime was addressed more than once during the discussion. It is not accidental that many speakers viewed the transformation of the regime as a key to resolving the Iranian problem, although options varied greatly – from transformation with due regard for the individual features of each state, to the old idea of general and complete nuclear disarmament.

One of the most popular ideas voiced during the discussion (presumably because of the particular membership of the conference) was that the European Union should play the leading role in settling the Iranian problem. However, this idea is not in tune with the broadly recognized fact that currently the EU has no effective instruments of influence on Iran. Most speakers supported the idea that the Iranian issue should be addressed through joint efforts by the EU, the United States and Russia, which can play different, yet coordinated roles, and exert not only complementary, but also a synergetic influence on Iran.

Agreement was reached on the fundamental issue concerning the change of the Iranian regime. According to the majority of the speakers, transformation of the regime should be left to the Iranians themselves, and democratization should not be imposed from the outside. At the same time, the experts agreed that the international community should remain committed to the policy of tension reduction and increased mutual openness; this approach proved to be effective when the West had to deal with the Soviet Union and it may prove to be helpful in case of Iran as well. In any case, it is expedient to expand the dialog with the Iranian elites.

Almost everybody highlighted the need for a new regional security system, with safeguards provided by the great powers. This measure would diminish Iran’s concern about its security, thereby reducing the incentives for obtaining nuclear weapons and unleashing a regional arms race. In this respect, it is also urgent to achieve a quick settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Scenario B. The experts did not support the idea of adopting a more rigid policy toward Iran through the exertion of increased pressure, even should it acquire nuclear weapons. There was common consent that the resolution of the problem by military force, as was the case in Iraq, “is by no means an option.” Some experts believe that the two scenarios are, in fact, identical. If Iran turns into a nuclear state (it is generally agreed that this could happen in 2007, or at a later date), the international community should not reverse its strategy and continue its adherence to Scenario A.

There was a general note of skepticism in the discussion: most likely, the international community will have to submit to Iran becoming, in the long run, a nuclear state with the regime remaining uncontrollable (marginal democracy) and the surrounding countries being unstable. According to the experts, the maximum to be sought by the world community is to take active efforts for suspending Iran’s acquisition of nuclear status until the year 2012, or possibly even later. This would be possible if Teheran further transforms its domestic policy and refuses to develop nuclear weapons, at the same time that the global community provides guarantees for Iran’s security. The resolution (at least partial) of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would serve as an additional external contributing factor for a positive outcome.

The Iranian problem can be resolved if addressed on a regional scale; any policy targeted exclusively at Iran, even one that combines pressure and encouragement, will fail. In order to reduce the threat posed by a nuclear and undemocratic Iran, it is critical that it become part of the regional security system and be bound by agreements of cooperation and commitments in this realm. This security system should consist of a number of complementary subsystems, with each of them involving the countries of the region and one or several influential international players – the United States, Russia, and European countries. This could guarantee Iran’s participation in all of the regional institutions and make it feel the region’s leader.

Obviously, the conditio sine qua non is stabilization of the participating states, such as Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Pakistan, as well as the Trans-Caucasian and Central Asian countries. A stable, democratic and, more importantly, controllable environment would make the export of Islamic fundamentalism by Iran unnecessary.

Any preemptive attacks that are intended to destroy the Iranian nuclear infrastructure can hardly be effective. Teheran has made the necessary provisions for such an option. Many of its production capacities will remain intact and survive to be twice as efficient. At the same time, some experts believe that it is not expedient to rule out a preemptive attack altogether. The potential threat of such an attack may only serve to strengthen the positions of those forces in Iran who believe that it would be imprudent to obtain nuclear weapons as early as possible. Finally, should a preemptive strike be ordered, it will only enhance Teheran’s political will to acquire nuclear weapons, and, at the same time, delay the time of their development.

Consistent comprehensive efforts should be made in order to liberalize the Iranian regime, advocate the values shared by the international community among the Iranian public and, in particular, among young people. A guarantee of Iran’s security is its integration into a regional security system that should involve both the Iranian leadership and society as a whole. In addition, a new concerted policy needs to be worked out as regards the phases of development of the Iranian nuclear power engineering. This could include the establishment of Russian-U.S.-European consortiums for the construction of nuclear reactors in exchange for Iran’s commitment to abandon its program for developing nuclear weapons. A similar multilateral consortium may be helpful in cooperating with Iran in the oil and gas industries.

To conclude, the Iranian problem again demonstrates that, first, it is necessary that the United States, the EU and Russia work out a single or at least an agreed strategy concerning the Greater Middle East; second, no leading world power can meet the challenges sent by the states of the Greater Middle East on its own. In fact, the region in question is a single integrated challenge, and we should address it this way, taking account of the entire region.

The participants in the discussion included: Jacque Betermier, Advisor to EADC CEOs; Carl Bildt, member of the Board of Trustees of the RAND Corporation (U.S.A.); Charles Grant, Director, Center for European Reform (London); Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief, Russia in Global Affairs; Ruslan Greenberg, Director, Institute of International Economic and Political Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences; Marta Dassu, Director of Political Programs, Aspen Institute (Rome); Sergei Karaganov, Chairman of the Presidium, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy; Andrew Kuchins, Director, Moscow Carnegie Center; Michael Clarke, Professor of Defence Studies, King’s College (London); Thierry de Montbrial, Director, IFRI (Paris); Alexander Muzykantsky, member of the Moscow Government; Stefano Silvestri, President, Institute of Foreign Affairs (Rome); Dmitry Trenin, Deputy Director for Science, Moscow Carnegie Center; Andrei Fedorov, Director for Political Programs, Council on Foreign and Defense Policy; Nikolai Shmelev, Director, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences.