The conflict on the Korean Peninsula has a long history. However, at this stage, marked by an aggravation of the confrontation, is unique: North Korea presently finds itself directly confronted by the United States. North Korea and the U.S. are the main parties to the conflict. A workshop, held in November 2003 at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations and chaired by Academician Yevgeny Primakov, analyzed what was behind North Korea’s decision to demonstratively resume its nuclear program, together with the position of the U.S. on this issue. The workshop also gave consideration to the interests and the ability of the “second tier” actors – China, South Korea, Japan and Russia – to influence the situation.

WHY NORTH KOREA ADOPTED A NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Military reasons. The North Korean leaders explain and justify their nuclear program by security considerations. The experts who took part in the workshop discussed three hypothetical scenarios: South Korea’s military actions against North Korea; a U.S. military invasion of North Korea; and North Korea’s military actions. The main points of the discussion considered the degree of probability of the above scenarios, and whether these threats are really behind Pyongyang’s desire to possess nuclear weapons.

South Korea has always believed that North Korea poses a threat to its regime, state system and territorial integrity. The present military potential and combat capability of the South Korean army are comparable to those of the North Korean army. The North Korean army’s superiority in troop strength is compensated on the South Korean side by their employment of more advanced weapon systems. South Korea’s defense spending exceeds that of its northern neighbor by over $10 billion. The might of the South Korean army is also enhanced by many factors, such as Seoul’s active military cooperation with the U.S., a strong U.S. military presence, its cooperation with Japan in defense, and joint large-scale military exercises with the U.S. and Japan.

At the same time, experts believe there is little chance that South Korea will begin military actions against North Korea. Their belief is based on the objectives of South Korea’s military doctrine, together with the ongoing normalization of relations between the two Korean states, which has improved in recent years. The 2002 joint declaration between North and South Korea is another factor that lessens the possibility of Seoul attacking North Korea.

The experts also point to the vulnerability of Seoul and other densely populated areas in South Korea: the North Korean army has over 12,000 artillery guns and over 750 missiles deployed on the 38th parallel. Another factor is the strong public sentiment in South Korea against any hostile actions with regard to their northern neighbor.

These arguments suggest that North Korea’s nuclear program was not intended as a counterbalance against a potential South Korean offensive.

As regards the probability of a U.S. military operation against Pyongyang, the experts agree that shortly after the George W. Bush administration came to power in Washington, the U.S. began to actively discuss probable military actions against North Korea with a view toward liquidating the nuclear “threat” it presented. However, the experts are presently divided over the degree of this probability. A minority of the experts maintain that the probability of a U.S. military intervention is very high. They rest their arguments on the operation against Iraq, which expressed the general line of the U.S. policy, and on the overwhelming U.S. military superiority over the North Korean armed forces. Other factors supporting the possibility of a U.S. military action against Pyongyang include the large-scale U.S. military presence in the region and new U.S. arms developments, including the program for developing “clean” low-yield nuclear weapons.

A majority of the participants in the discussion believe that there were no grounds to exaggerate the probability of a U.S. invasion of North Korea because the U.S. is now involved in two armed conflicts in different countries simultaneously (Iraq and Afghanistan). Besides, there is little chance for a blitzkrieg against North Korea, as U.S. manpower losses would then exceed those in the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts.

Therefore, the experts came to the conclusion that one of North Korea’s reasons for the resumption of its nuclear program might be Pyongyang’s wish to prevent U.S. military actions, which would include, of course, pinpoint air strikes.

Regarding the possibility of a military attack by North Korea, the experts point to the following factors. North Korea is a highly militarized country with a great military potential, and its military doctrine provides for offensive military actions against South Korea, as well as the U.S. troops stationed there. At the same time, it is highly improbable that Pyongyang will initiate military actions against Seoul. Despite its outwardly ideological approach, the North Korean leadership is realistic about a potential war on the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang is fully aware of the high fighting efficiency of the South Korean army, which is armed with modern control and weapon systems. The U.S. military presence in South Korea is another deterring factor: the U.S. is capable of stopping a North Korean offensive for as long as it is required for bringing in additional troops (according to some experts, a North Korean attack would inevitably lead to the full-scale involvement of the United States in the war and eventually to North Korea’s total military defeat).

Pyongyang might hope for Chinese military aid, but the 1961 North Korean-Chinese Treaty of Friendship provides for such aid only if North Korea is attacked by South Korea or the United States.

So the resumption of the North Korean nuclear program is not intended for attacking South Korea, nor initiating armed actions against the U.S. military base in that country.

Non-military reasons. According to the majority of experts, Pyongyang’s major goal now is the political and physical survival of the incumbent regime, and it is in this context that the non-military objectives of the North Korean nuclear programs should be considered. These objectives include overcoming the grave economic crisis (this can be achieved through humanitarian aid received in exchange for a decision to terminate the nuclear program), attracting investment into the country, and solving the energy shortage problem.

The North Korean leadership may also use the demonstrative resumption of the nuclear program to strengthen the ruling regime, as it can help mobilize society and ensure its loyalty for a long period of time. To this end, Pyongyang is creating an enemy image and maintaining the myth of “invincibility” of the North Korean armed forces.

CAN NORTH KOREA GIVE UP ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM?

The experts remain divided over one of the main questions: Will North Korea terminate its nuclear program if the U.S. meets its demands? Some of the experts said that this will never occur under the incumbent regime, and that Pyongyang has agreed to enter into negotiations only to win time and present the world with a fait accompli. Others, however, did not rule out the possibility that, under certain circumstances, North Korea may terminate or freeze its nuclear program.

The readiness to consider U.S. proposals on security guarantees, expressed by North Korea in October and early November 2003, showed that Pyongyang seeks the normalization of its relations with the U.S. but wants the latter to make concessions. A treaty sought by North Korea apparently will not be a non-aggression pact in its classical sense. North Korea’s position before the second round of negotiations is that it is prepared to accept that the U.S. only sign the document without its ratification by the Senate. The negotiating parties will face the difficult problem of “fitting” a U.S.-North Korean agreement into the context of arrangements between the six parties to the multilateral nuclear negotiations (the U.S., North Korea, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and China). On the one hand, that would run counter to Pyongyang’s wish to emphasize a bilateral nature of the agreement. On the other hand, written obligations by all the six parties without exception would be an additional guarantee for Pyongyang that the agreement would be observed. Therefore it is not ruled out that North Korea will ultimately agree on a compromise and that the treaty will be signed in the 2+4 format and will stipulate special commitments for the U.S.

A majority of the experts agree that a multilateral package agreement would be the only way to settle the crisis, as it would meet the interests of all the parties. A good example here is the 1994 precedent when Ukraine was guaranteed security after it had given up its nuclear weapons inventory and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty. So the Korean impasse can certainly be broken.

Another factor that may prompt Pyongyang to give up its nuclear program is its interest in reliable supplies of humanitarian aid which formerly had met 30 percent of the country’s requirements. The termination of humanitarian supplies put the North Korean population on the brink of catastrophe. North Korean thermal power plants also vitally need the fuel oil supplies stopped by the U.S. on November 14, 2002.

While discussing the provision of lightwater reactors for two nuclear power plants in North Korea under a project of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), several experts expressed their belief that this issue is not a top priority for North Korea at the present moment. Pyongyang’s reaction to the KEDO Executive Board’s November 5, 2003 decision to shelve plans for the development of the nuclear power plant was rather calm. In the future, the energy problem can be solved through broad international efforts.

Pyongyang may consider the solution of its economic problems as good compensation for the termination of its nuclear program. Some of the experts emphasize that North Korea’s move toward economic reforms is inevitable, as the country would not survive without them. The Vietnamese model of economic reforms may be the most probable one for North Korea, but the initial stage of any sort of reform would inevitably bring more hardships to the population. In order to guarantee its survival, the incumbent regime will need an additional “margin of safety” for the period of its reforms, which cannot be obtained without outside economic aid.

All-round consultations and negotiations between the six listed countries must convince Pyongyang to give up its nuclear program, and the international community to lift sanctions against North Korea and provide it with aid. These measures would ensure the observance of the arrangements by Pyongyang in the future and would make North Korea a recognized participant in international relations.

A majority of the participants in the workshop agreed that if the six negotiating countries meet military (non-aggression pact) and economic conditions, North Korea may officially relinquish its nuclear program. This does not mean, however, that Pyongyang may never resume it sometime in the future. Secret nuclear developments will hardly be possible since any agreement by North Korea to terminate its nuclear program would demand that it open itself up to rigid international control. However, future events will depend on political processes in that country, as well as on the positions of the second tier parties to the conflict.

AMERICAN STRATEGY

Changes in the U.S. position. Under the Clinton administration, the U.S. policy was aimed at normalizing relations with North Korea: suffice it to mention the 1994 framework agreement or the KEDO program. Washington sought to help North Korea solve its energy problem and to normalize political relations between the two countries through their mutual recognition. Although U.S. Democrats and Republicans differed on the Korean policy at that time, on the whole the U.S. pursued a policy of appeasement toward Pyongyang: Washington made systematic concessions, lifted some trade restrictions and resumed the negotiating process.

After the Republican administration occupied the White House, the U.S. position became more radical. Negotiations with North Korea were stopped. George W. Bush included North Korea in the so called axis of evil, which he said was threatening peace and security around the world. Bush seemed to be confident that the Kim Jong Il regime was weak and that it would inevitably accept U.S. terms “under the impression” of the U.S. military successes in Afghanistan and Iraq. It was at that time that North Korea toughened its position and declared it was withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and resuming its WMD program.

Meanwhile, the experts point to an evolution of the U.S. administration’s views on the confrontation with Pyongyang. Washington has given up its offensive rhetoric toward the North Korean leader, resumed the negotiating process and is seeking to ease tensions in its relations with North Korea. Characteristically, during South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun’s visit to the U.S., he was informed that the U.S. would not pull out its troops from the 38th parallel. Earlier, Washington had declared its plans to pull out from the demarcation line, which had been taken as a sign of preparations for a military operation against North Korea.

Whereas formerly the U.S. declined to give any security guarantees to Pyongyang in order not to bolster Kim Jong Il’s positions, now it has proposed that all the six parties to the negotiations provide written security guarantees to North Korea.

The experts explain this change in the U.S. position by several reasons: U.S. political setbacks in Afghanistan and Iraq; the lack of any immediate decisions there; the antiwar positions of many countries; the serious objections forwarded by Japan and South Korea – U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region – against a military solution to the Korean problem; and the coming presidential election in the U.S. Besides, Washington is not confident of an easy victory in a war against North Korea, especially since this would mean waging three wars simultaneously. All these factors have caused Washington to renounce the military option for settling the North Korean nuclear crisis. According to a majority of the experts, this is a rather firm decision owing to the long history of reasons supporting it.

The interests of the Bush administration. The experts differ on the Bush administration’s priorities. Some give top priority to geopolitical interests – Washington’s wish to consolidate its positions on the Korean Peninsula and in Japan, while avoiding tensions in its relations with China, especially considering the 1961 Chinese-North Korean treaty. The next priority for the U.S., the same experts state, is nuclear issues, above all the prevention of an extension of the nuclear zone to Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The third highest priority is preventing the consolidation of the Kim Jong Il regime, which would work toward a rapprochement between the two Koreas according to a plan that has not been crafted by the U.S.

Other experts believe that Washington’s main priorities are preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the consolidation of the North Korean regime. North Korea’s example could prompt a large number of ‘threshold’ and ‘pre-threshold’ states to develop their own nuclear programs, which could lead to their possession of nuclear weapons. Washington fears that North Korea may share its technologies and nuclear weapon components with other ‘problem states.’

Linking U.S. interests with the termination of the North Korean nuclear program, the experts express the view that the U.S. wil continue its policy toward a package solution provided Pyongyang does not decline it. The U.S. has begun to realize that the six-partite mechanism serves the interests of settling the conflict.

Some of the experts maintain that in order for North Korea to terminate its nuclear program, Washington may have to make additional concessions, such as recognizing North Korea’s sovereignty and lifting economic sanctions. One of the reasons for a possible recognition of North Korea’s sovereignty derives from Washington’s fear of North-South unification, which may have unfavorable consequences for the whole of the region and for U.S. interests in particular. Besides, the U.S. is unable to completely isolate North Korea from the rest of the world because of the special positions of China and South Korea. These nations may resort to unsanctioned fuel and food supplies to North Korea in order to prevent an inflow of North Korean refugees.

THE INTERESTS AND LEVERS OF INFLUENCE OF THE SECOND-TIER STATES

The interests of all the countries involved in the Korean conflict coincide on two major points: none of them wants a military clash between the U.S. and North Korea, or the development of a nuclear program by Pyongyang. This concurrence of interests helps the “second-tier” play a constructive role in settling the North Korean nuclear crisis.

There are many grounds for believing that China is very much concerned over the threat of nuclear proliferation in the region. It is particularly worried by the possibility of Japan or Taiwan acquiring such weapons – this may well happen if North Korea successfully fulfills its nuclear program. On the whole, China is interested in the conflict’s settlement. In January 2003, it supported the International Atomic Energy Agency’s resolution, placed pressure on Pyongyang to make it return to the 1994 framework agreements, and agreed to continue the negotiations in the six-partite format.

According to the experts, any military solution of the conflict would run counter to the interests of China which opposes the consolidation of U.S. positions in the region and fears the possible consequences of large-scale military actions on the Korean Peninsula: an inflow of refugees, together with ecological and humanitarian catastrophes.

China wants to be a major participant in the settlement of the conflict and in the negotiating process. Beijing really has a wide array of instruments for influencing the situation, and many potentialities for exerting influence on North Korea.

Japan is not interested in the unification of the two Koreas, nor does it want the emergence of an economically and militarily strong unified state. Japan opposes the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea. Tokyo is not at all interested in a military solution to the Korean problem, which may have ruinous consequences for Japan because of its close proximity to the Korean Peninsula. The United States has a great influence on Japan’s position, and this factor must be taken into consideration.

Japan’s Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has proposed extending a moratorium on North Korean ballistic missile launches, limiting spy activities by North Korean ships in Japan’s territorial waters, and permitting international inspectors into North Korea to verify whether Pyongyang has really frozen its nuclear program. Some of the experts suggest that these moves by the Japanese prime minister are prompted by his allied commitments to the U.S.

Japan’s ability to influence North Korea is outwardly limited: Pyongyang has even less respect for Japan than for any of the other second tier state, be it China, Russia or even South Korea, and it has repeatedly proposed excluding Tokyo from the negotiating process. Relations between Japan and North Korea have been aggravated by the kidnapping of Japanese nationals by North Korea’s special services, officially admitted by Pyongyang. Koizumi cannot ignore Japanese public opinion which has taken a very active position on this issue.

However, on September 17, 2002, there was held a rather sensational meeting of the two countries’ leaders, where Koizumi expressed Tokyo’s readiness to provide easy-term economic aid to Pyongyang as compensation for the termination of its nuclear program. This aid may reach an estimated U.S. $13 billion. Tokyo has also expressed its readiness to provide 400,000 tons of food aid to North Korea.

Some of the experts emphasized that North Korea holds its major financial assets in Japanese and Chinese banks. There is a large community of ethnic Koreans in Japan, and some of them remain loyal to North Korea. These factors should be taken into consideration in assessing the degree of Japan’s influence on Pyongyang.

Some of the experts note that Japan’s influence on the U.S. is not big, but a majority disagree, saying that Washington has to reckon with Japan’s position in pursuing its policy toward North Korea.

South Korea seeks to prevent the conflict over the North Korean nuclear program from evolving into an armed clash, as a war would result in humanitarian and ecological catastrophes for the peninsula. Possible unfavorable consequences of such a war, coupled with heavy material losses and instability, may bring about a grave economic crisis in South Korea. This is why Seoul is interested in relaxing tensions on the peninsula. A series of economic projects may help achieve this goal: they would help involve North Korea in closer cooperation and serve as a foundation for a more constructive dialog between the two Korean states.

South Korea is coming to realize that there are pan-Korean interests, primarily the peaceful coexistence of the two Koreas and their subsequent “soft” reunification into a confederation. Other issues of mutual interest include the reunion of Korean families separated as a result of the 1950-1953 war, the return of prisoners of war, as well as South Korean fishermen captured at sea by North Korean coast guards. However, the ideological differences, the unceasing informational confrontation, and the buildup by both Koreas of their military potentials, all stand in the way of a rapprochement. These factors reduce Seoul’s capabilities for influencing Pyongyang.

At the same time, the experts point out, South Korea does have certain capabilities for influencing the U.S., but these capabilities have been reduced by the two countries’ differences on some issues, specifically on the ways for solving the Korean conflict.

What are Russia’s interests on the Korean Peninsula? These are lasting peace in the region; a nuclear-free status of the peninsula; and a peaceful reunification of the two Korean states, provided that a united Korean state would be friendly toward Russia and other neighbors.

Also, Russia is interested in broadening its cooperation with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, as it seeks to boost its economic growth rates, develop East Siberia and the Far East, and attract investment into those areas. Moscow needs economic interaction in the region. Continued tensions on the Korean Peninsula would prevent it from achieving these goals.

Some of the experts believe that Russia’s influence on the situation on the Korean Peninsula is not great, largely owing to its weak economic presence in the region. Yet, this influence has been increasing to some extent owing to Russia’s political presence there. In particular, Russia acts as a motivator of the multilateral negotiating process. Other major factors include the Russian-North Korean Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighborly Relations and Cooperation, and personal contacts between the Russian president and the North Korean leader. Besides, North Korea itself is interested in Russia’s role in settling the conflict, as Pyongyang seeks to “balance” somewhat its relations with China.

Russia should now take an active part in the multilateral efforts in order to work out a single approach to the peaceful settlement of the Korean conflict. On the one hand, it should counter Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions, and on the other, offer to North Korea security guarantees and a concrete economic aid program if Pyongyang unconditionally terminates its nuclear program.

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR DEVELOPMENTS

Scenario 1. The nearest future will witness very slow negotiations, accompanied by the secret development of the North Korean nuclear program. Such a situation will most likely cause other countries to look for and use alternative levers to pressure North Korea. At the same time, neither China nor South Korea will allow Pyongyang’s complete isolation. Russia will not stand to gain from North Korea’s isolation, either.

The development of the situation according to this scenario would result in the softening of Pyongyang’s position and, in the long run, in the success of the negotiations. The experts agree that the negotiating process will be most effective if it involves the six negotiating countries. The European Union, too, can be involved in the discussions.

Scenario 2 (less probable). Already in the nearest future, Pyongyang will accept the package agreement, drafted with the participation of the United States, which gives top priority to the termination of the North Korean nuclear program under strict international control.

Scenario 3 (least probable). A military variant for the development of the situation. North Korea knows perfectly well that it would most likely suffer a defeat in a direct armed conflict. As a result, the incumbent ruling regime in Pyongyang would have to go. To the U.S., a military variant is undesirable, too, especially considering the difficulties it is now having in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover, a military variant would run counter to George W. Bush’s interests in view of the upcoming presidential election in the U.S. (the popularity ratings of the U.S. president and his administration have already gone sharply down following the developments in Iraq).

Considering various possible scenarios for developments on the Korean Peninsula, one should take into account possible changes in North Korea. These changes may be gradual, radical or evolutionary-radical (a rather long evolution with a radical outcome).

The experts agree that more probable are gradual evolutionary changes, which have already begun in the North Korean economy. However, if Pyongyang attempts to slow down these changes, one should not rule out an evolutionary-radical scenario, which is highly improbable, though. The experts rule out radical changes, considering the peculiarities of the North Korean regime and national traits of the people.

The participants in the situation analysis included Director of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations Anatoly Torkunov, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Professor Valery Denisov, as well as  post-graduate students of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.