Vladimir Putin’s presidency is being praised to the high heavens and certain individuals have been forwarding their programs for “restoring the ruined power.” Mikhail Leontyev’s article is remarkable in that respect, but not so much for its praising passages, but because it reflects the mindset of a certain part of the Russian political elite that would like to set the tune of Putin’s second term in office. It is surprising that the author (or authors), as if possessing a knowledge that is inaccessible to ordinary people, hints that Putin has no intention of following the political course he declared in his policy statement on February 12, 2004. In light of the unexpected – and obviously illogical – dismissal of Mikhail Kasyanov’s Cabinet of Ministers, Russian society has been speculating about what new turns will be made in the presidential course.

When Putin launched his election campaign, he made it unequivocally clear that he had chosen a liberal stance. “Only free people can ensure economic growth and prosperity for their nation,” he said. “In a nutshell, these are the pillars on which the success of economic development rests.” However, the ways of restoring the state that are discussed in Leontyev’s article prove that the authors are advising Putin on a different course of action and cherish the hope that they will be heeded. Their program for the so-called “civilized revenge,” actually appears to be a new version of authoritarian state policy. The methods used by the government during Putin’s first term in office have made evident at least one thing: there is a sharp contrast between Putin’s liberal policy statement and the actual political processes in the country. A natural question arises: Does this contradiction come from Putin’s apprehensions, or a desire to rectify the careen in Russian policies that has become evident since 2003?  Is it the President’s wish to calm the Russian liberal minority, not to mention the West, who are so concerned about the transformation of power in Russia? It could be argued that by dismissing the Cabinet, Putin made the decision to reaffirm his stated liberal-market political course.

ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CAUTIOUS USE OF FORCE

The recent presidential election in Russia did not only symbolize the automatic re-endorsement of Putin’s presidency; it signaled the end of a period in Russian history known as ‘post-Communist experiment.’ Putin has consolidated his political regime and now needs to cement the system that has taken shape in Russia. While preparing the cement mix for this purpose, he will have to measure the proportion of the ingredient ideas, such as strong statehood, patriotism, populism, and liberalism. What guideline will the President ultimately choose for Russia? I would rather agree that a return to “Yeltsinism,” in terms of an oligarchic method of rule, is hardly possible. At the same time, a repeat of Yeltsin’s methods of courting favorites, while putting together a new “Family,” cannot be ruled out either. I tend to share Leontyev’s thoughts concerning the chances of a leftist populist scenario in the near future. Even the staunch “patriots” in the circle that is close to the Kremlin realize the destructive nature of the anti-Western style of Vladimir Zhirinovsky or Dmitry Rogozin. On the face of it, the liberal alternative appears to have been discredited, and its proponents are demoralized. It is very doubtful that Putin will take up the ideas of a political force that has suffered defeat.

There are indications that the Russian political quarters are vigorously working to blend authoritarianism with economic reforms and an orientation toward a strong state. However, they do not want these attempts to frighten the West. In other words, a new type of traditionalism is taking shape that is free of the Communist shell. By “traditionalism” I mean that the accent is still being made on the leader’s personified and unlimited power in domestic policy, together with the use of force in foreign policy.

What do the new traditionalists propose and what do they object to? The emotion of Leontyev’s article suggests that they are enthusiastic about Putin’s decision to push the radical oppositionists out of the scene. This is a vain type of satisfaction, however, as the removal of all forces except bureaucracy from Russian politics fertilizes the soil for the growth of radicalism of all colors, ranging from liberalism to leftist nationalism. The appearance of Sergei Glazyev on Russia’s political stage as Putin’s main opponent perfectly illustrates this tendency. A political vacuum is always fraught with erratic and unpredictable developments. That is why the Western democracies cultivate a diversity of political approaches and, of course, opposition parties. In this way they try to preclude any quandaries for the state. In this sense, Leontyev’s acerbic remarks about the opposition being increasingly “Rybkinized” are premature. Shiftless opposition means trouble for Russia’s state power and a threat to its only political institution – the presidency.

As concerns the zealous proponents of full state authority and, at the same time, “full sovereignty” for Russia, this idea has long expired; a country’s membership in any international organization implies the voluntary restriction of its sovereign powers. Russia’s sovereignty will have to be limited, unless it fancies for itself the role of a global “outcast.” If Russia wants to remain on the side of the civilized world, it will have to adopt the rules exercised by the international community.

Presently, it seems that those who seek to become support pillars for Putin regard full sovereignty as the right to use force in the dimensions unlimited by legislation. This position may be viewed as a symmetric response to the policies of the U.S. neo-conservatives who also place the use of force above the law. However, the situation inside and outside Iraq has made it clear as daylight that the U.S. policy of force has provoked the most severe political crisis of the past decade. This policy has split the Western community and brought about a decline of support for the Republican Party amongst many Americans.

If Russia copies the U.S. model, a dialog with the West will hardly be possible. Moreover, an expansionist understanding of Russia’s sovereignty that fails to be supported by adequate resources threatens to make Russia nothing more than a source of ridicule.

WHAT TYPE OF STATE DOES RUSSIA NEED?

Let us now analyze the main thesis of the neo-traditionalists. It looks very simple: during his first term in office Putin began restoring the Russian state; during his second term, he will have an opportunity to use the state machinery for modernizing Russia and earning it a worthy place in the world.

That Russia stands in need of a strong state capable of guaranteeing social rights and civilized living conditions to its citizens is indisputable. It does need a modern bureaucracy, strong armed forces, and efficient special services to ensure national security. But this kind of state does not contradict the ideals of Western liberalism, and this is proved by the everyday practices of any developed society.

The liberal project does not demand that Russia simply observe all of the Western recipes. Russia’s past experience of cooperating with the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development suggests that it should take a cautious approach to the recommendations that it may get from the West; Russia may have interests that differ from those of the leading world powers. Western nations are split, and each of them has its own view of how the world should develop, which was graphically manifest by the recent Iraqi crisis.

The real question is hinged on whether we understand a “strong state” as one which establishes the rules of the game that are observed both by society and those in power. Or do we understand the state to be controlled by a handful of people in the Kremlin corridors of power who behave according to their own “perceptions of the game,” as opposed to the requirements of the law? The first type of a state is the one where the rules of the game are ensured by laws and independent institutions. The second type is one that is able to ensure only one thing – a society without rules.

Indeed, during his first term of presidency President Putin succeeded in dragging the country out of chaos; however, the state that has arisen as result of his presidency is basically identical to the one Russia had under Yeltsin – it continues to bypass laws without any principles. There is a slight difference, however: whereas the lawless state under Yeltsin was non-systemic, Putin has turned the “perceptions-driven” state machinery into a system. But what does this system rely on? It relies on the fact that the President must make up for the absence of law or the executive’s inability to implement law. For instance, he has to meet with the oligarchs at his dacha and lay out the rules of “equidistant alienation” for them. Or he must give personal guarantees to the Western state leaders and businessmen for foreign investment in Russia. It would be inconceivable in any normal democratic society when the country’s number one citizen has to work in substitution of the law. In Russia, however, life would be inconceivable without such a substitution. Putin chose to personally perform the functions of the law; this decision must have come from his lack of faith with the rules, together with the perception that his personal obligations and guarantees as a president are the more efficient ways of handling things.

Every time the President stands in substitution of the law or any of the branches of power, we are inclined to take it as a forced measure and believe that the rules will appear soon and work automatically. Nothing of the sort has happened so far, and we will not see this happen until the political class stops entrusting the President with the powers of an arbiter standing beyond society. Arbiters, too, can make mistakes and their obligations are not everlasting. When Putin moves out of the Kremlin, there will be no guarantees that the new leader will be committed to the old obligations. The very practice of living beyond rules brings about the omnipotent power favorites and a type of power succession that boils down to the denial of the previous chapters in the nation’s history. Yeltsin wiped out Gorbachev together with the country, Putin wiped out Yeltsin, together with his regime. What will Putin’s successor do?

The strengthening of authoritarianism, i.e. the President’s personal power, will have no dramatic effect on the situation if the state machinery continues “acting according to perceptions.” True, people are more apprehensive of an authoritarian leader, but life without rules will continue, with the stakes growing still higher.

Can a state living without rules and organized by the will of one person be economically efficient? The answer is definitely no. It cannot be predictable, because it can exist only in the absence of clear obligations before its citizens. In light of this, Leontyev’s assertion that the basis for modernization has been created in Russia is wishful thinking. The current state system is, in fact, a system of self-preservation and of status quo, but not of development. It can only guarantee to run around in a circle which must produce the illusion of movement.

If Putin is really determined to consolidate this type of state – and Leontyev believes that he is – then it means that in the short-term Russia is doomed to stagnation. And we should also bear in mind that a system designed along the principles of a “transmission belt” has no chance for managing crises: any blow will crush it like a sandcastle. Many of us remember only too well what happened to the “transmission belt-driven” systems. A glaring example is the collapse of the Soviet Union. Incidentally, it had much stronger life support systems than Russia presently possesses.

If Putin really plans to go on with the transformation, albeit in a more liberal and systemic way, then it remains unclear how he can succeed with the existing state system and political class which pushes him to replace the regular rules of the game with its own rules.

THE SYSTEM AGAINST PUTIN

Leontyev eagerly points to a ready-made enemy – the democratic opposition which is trying to bereave us of Putin. Now, where are these audacious terminators who are threatening the President? Are they in Garry Kasparov’s discussion club? Let us be serious; the President is in danger, but not because of the oppositional forces. The threat comes from the system that took shape under Yeltsin and was consolidated under Putin’s leadership. The political regime that he has built presently constrains him and makes him more vulnerable than Yeltsin was. There is an old truth: the more powers a leader has, the more he is compelled to share them with the suite. And the more he does so, the weaker he becomes. The impotence of omnipotence is an axiom, which was made evident during Yeltsin’s presidency, as well as by many rulers before him.

Putin has to carry alongside his ratings an awkward crowd of opportunists who have infested the agencies of the executive, the United Russia party and several organizations that the Kremlin has set up. All of these monsters do not help the President to broaden the base of his leadership. On the contrary, they enfeeble him by misusing his popularity.

By towering over society, the authorities are losing contact with reality. This situation generates the risk of inadequate decisions, especially as the legislative power and the judiciary have actually turned into departments of the presidential administration.

The nature of the state structure is such that the leader, even having immense powers, is unable to subjugate the mammoth machine that unavoidably strives to meet its own interests rather than fulfill the leader’s objectives. The further strengthening of such a state will make the President increasingly cornered by the demands of that state and its bureaucracy.

Already, it is obvious that the President has to satisfy the demands of his regime to the detriment of his own leadership, and this year’s election campaign, in which the Kremlin virtually ruled out any competition with Putin, provides a glaring proof. A question arises: What bugbear scared the guys at the top so much? Was it the phenomenon of the late General Alexander Lebed? But where was the candidate for that role? It is hard to believe that liberal Irina Khakamada, leftwing Sergei Glazyev or Communist Nikolai Kharitonov could have filled the void left by Lebed. Or maybe the President did not deign to compete with that handful of contenders? Then why did his team clean out the electoral field so heartily? By paving the road for Putin against possible contenders before the December 2003 election to the State Duma, the Kremlin devalued the significance of Putin’s victory in the March 2004 presidential election.

Another disservice of the authoritarian mindset was the apparent attempt to put an imperial gloss on Putin: dressed in a military uniform, he was led to a military exercise to watch a farce of missile launches. The launches failed, but they served to hold up Russia’s military to ridicule, while dealing a blow to the president’s dignity. Is it the Russian special way of eliminating “national humiliation?”

PRESIDENT FACING CHALLENGES

No doubt, people can extol Putin’s efforts to revive Russia, but all of the praise will not make it easier for him to find answers to the structural challenges that he obviously faces.

His primary challenge is to earn a full-fledged legitimacy of his own, not the one that was bestowed on him by his predecessor. Now that the role of violence has been limited, and all the previously known tools of legitimization of power have been exhausted, elections can be the only instrument for forming state power. However, the present electoral system is turning into just another time bomb for Russia. U.S.S.R. President Mikhail Gorbachev dreamt of elections becoming an instrument for renovating the Soviet state; instead, they caused its destruction. Today’s manipulations with the electoral system are “a tune from the same opera” – they are undermining Putin’s new leadership and the very foundations of the state.

The second most serious challenge is assuming responsibility, which is totally flouted in Russia since “no one is responsible for anything.” Despite the concentration of powers in the President’s hands, he bears no real responsibility for the country’s political course, government, law enforcement, or administrative resources since he has been placed beyond the reach of criticism. All of the other executives have no such powers to bear responsibility. In the meantime, the country’s modernization is impossible without clearly specified responsibility. Will Putin be able to summon the courage and break the vicious circle of the pervasive ‘I couldn’t care less’ attitude? As a first step, he should have attached some responsibility to the parliamentary majority (the United Russia party) for the Cabinet of Ministers and appointed Boris Gryzlov (its leader) prime minister. Of course, these moves would mean a certain loss of quality, but they would also mean the acquisition of principles. It is important that somebody bear responsibility for something in this country!

Challenge number three is the continuity of regime which can, to a great degree, predestine our future. Putin will have to decide on how he will ensure the continuity of power – by prolonging his stay in the Kremlin or by appointing a man to succeed him. He seems to be quite earnest when he says he will not change the Constitution to stay in the presidential office longer than prescribed by law, unless some dramatic circumstances compel him to do so. But if the crowd of activists feeding on his popularity ratings realizes that he is truly going, they will immediately rush to find him a successor. Then Putin is likely to become a lame duck, with great reforms dropping off his agenda. Regardless, Putin has just two years ahead of him to carry out his reforms, since a new cycle of power will begin in 2006, be it with Putin or without him.

The fourth challenge is to prevent deterioration in relations with the West. Putin has confirmed his existential pro-Western orientation, but his thesis that Russia must integrate into the family of developed Western democracies has never experienced a practical implementation. So today we have to think about how we can allay the Cold War syndrome. Why was our romance with the West so short-lived yet again? Briefly speaking, there were two factors. First, Russia failed to assimilate the liberal model and was unable to imitate it skillfully. Second, the Western community has been mired in its own problems and is unprepared to admit Russia into its orbit. It fails to understand that integration is a global priority of the same significance as fighting international terrorism or nuclear nonproliferation.

One way or another, Putin will have to think now about averting Russia’s drift to a new isolationism, to say nothing of a new confrontation.

PUTIN HAS DETERMINED THE VECTOR

Admittedly, I am not optimistic about the prospects for Russia’s modernization during Vladimir Putin’s second term of presidency. The political developments over the past few years have helped make his liberal election platform look like a “special operation” designed to calm the grumbling Russian liberals and Western politicians, who have suddenly developed a concern over the future of Russian democracy. If Putin really wants to make the liberal course a guideline for action during his second term in office (which means that all his activity in 2003 was but a “special operation”), two questions arise: Who will he rely on for carrying out his reformist agenda? How successful can a liberal course be if it is carried out by non-liberals?

 We will have to wait and see. President Putin has determined the vector to further development, and we will have an opportunity to judge his liberal course against the benchmarks that he has articulated in his policy statement.