How is it possible to unite the ultra-leftist, non-conformists, liberal “Westerners,” the ardent followers of the Communist idea, and the Chechen-loving champions of human rights? It may seem impossible, but it is the membership of a new radical opposition group that waves just one slogan: “Russia without Putin!” From the viewpoint of realistic prospects, this slogan reeks of utopia. However, it has a clear meaning, which is easy to understand at least in the genre of anti-utopian writings.

THE FIRST TERM

What great misdemeanors has the incumbent president committed to arouse such enmity among the radicals? First, he has pushed them to the side of the road of Russian politics. His first term in office was entirely devoted to laying out the elementary prerequisites for implementing his presidential task: the restoration and modernization of Russia. This is the essence of Russian politics today, and it is important to remember that when Putin was first elected president there were no such policy prerequisites.

What was Russia’s condition prior to the election of Putin? State institutions were on the point of collapse. This degradation had touched every part of government, including its only legitimate institution – the presidency. It would be unfair to suggest, however, that Boris Yeltsin was responsible for this deterioration. Russia’s catastrophic condition was the result of a systemic Soviet crisis: it was the Communists, not the pro-democratic reformers, who had destroyed the Soviet Union. Rats, flies and other creatures that thrive on rotting remnants arrived en masse only after the country’s body had already fallen to pieces. Yeltsin displayed much more aptitude than the more humanistic Russian elite in dealing with the situation. His objective role was “presiding over a slide into the abyss.” A realistic and positive program was unthinkable until the nation came to realize the scope of the catastrophe, stopped awaiting miracles from the market economy and humanitarian aid, and hit the bottom of that abyss.

The President’s first term in office began with a gradual and very cautious rehabilitation of the Russian state that started with its basic elements, without which it is impossible to make real advances. The first such step – whatever apprehensions this may have caused the radicals – was regaining control in the law enforcement agencies, and the repressive machine. Note: at that time we could only think of “controllability,” not “efficiency.” The very existence of a state is implausible if the repressive machinery is corrupted and manipulated by financial or criminal groups and clans, including several from abroad. In a genuine hierarchic system, orders from the top must be taken as directives for action rather than a topic for bargaining. This is the major prerequisite for rebuilding the state as a major player in domestic politics.

Furthermore, it was important to regenerate Russia’s vital interests in the territories around its borders. Without the neighboring countries located in the so-called post-Soviet space, Russia cannot be viewed as an economically and, moreover, politically self-sufficient sovereign state.

The latter means restoring the Russian state as a player in international politics, as well as maintaining its sovereignty. It should be noted that only a handful of contemporary countries enjoy genuine sovereignty; the others either lack the chances of becoming truly sovereign or delegate a part of their powers – more or less voluntarily – to some great power. Except for a few international outcasts, several countries have real sovereignty – the U.S., China, India and Russia. Germany, Britain or Japan, for example, cannot be categorized as truly sovereign nations.

For Russia, maintaining its role in international politics is vital not only in civilizational and cultural terms – it is important for its very survival. In comparison with Mexico or the Czech Republic, for example, Russia cannot exist as a part of some integrated project. If it forfeits its sovereignty, it will be torn apart economically, politically, and physically by new and old international players competing for influence on its territory. Imagining Russia as a quiet and comfortable satellite nation developing in some “normal way” amongst a variety of other liberal satellites, which are in turn under the patronage of great democratic powers, is either pure self deception or propagandist intrigue.

Four years is less than a second in historical terms, and gathering stones is a much more difficult activity than casting them. What has been accomplished over the past four years falls disappointingly short of our expectations, yet we have avoided gross errors at the same time; we did not lose any contests to anyone, nor quarrel. To rebuild the country, Russian policymakers had to act cautiously, and occasionally clandestinely. Today, the country has reached a level of its rehabilitation when it can afford to act openly. It is precisely that openness that infuriates and baffles the Russian catastrophe-phobic elite, who grew out of an ailing, despised and crumbling country. This group of individuals has swelled in wealth and influence by selling out what was left of the country.

“RUSSIA WITHOUT PUTIN.” ANTI-UTOPIA ONE

This liberal option is a way of action for coy opponents to President Putin and it implies a certain reversal of strategy. It means forgetting Putin like a nightmare as if he never existed. Or else, acting by the principle: “Let’s proceed like our predecessors did.” At first sight, it looks as if we have seen all of this before. It brings to mind the last years of Yeltsin’s presidency, with the oligarchs kicking in the doors of the Kremlin offices. It means the restoration of the oligarchies that lost their hold on power. Ironically, this is what makes all the difference. The phrase “Never again!” will become a popular motto for the elite of the 1990s that has somehow survived to our present times. The question is how that “Never again!” can be implemented.

At best, this is a return to 1991 – with larger hard currency reserves, but without the remainders of the Soviet infrastructure, humanistic-democratic illusions or the legitimacy based on such illusions in the face of an impoverished and brutalized country. (Recent public opinion polls show that 51 percent of the Russian constituency was prepared to vote against all the candidates in the March presidential election had Putin decided not to participate. Against this background, it does not take Solomon to figure out that 95 percent of voters would have definitely voted against the oligarchies).

In order for the oligarchs to realize their motto of “Putin never again,” they will require the support of external forces. The oligarchs will proceed to do what they have done in the past, that is, transfer Russia’s assets out of the country to the direct control of the U.S. administration; these activities were performed quietly, methodically and step by step, lest the populace become unnecessarily aroused. But the next time they are given the opportunity, this transfer of assets will occur rapidly and in huge volumes. In the political sphere, such moves will mean a rapid (and, most  likely, direct) return to the pro-Western diplomacy of former Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev. As for the economy, it will be left intact – there will always be enough of the “right” people around to manage it. An oligarchic restoration means a brief period of joyful plundering of the country, with all of the inevitable consequences such as heightened tensions, conflicts and the decay of the remaining state. But there is no external resource or helping hand that would support the treacherous elite in upholding power and order in a country like Russia. Nor is there an external force that would need it very much. Therefore, such a scenario will simply pave the way to Russia’s dismemberment.

Abstract utopias aside, a look at the real capabilities of this opposition suggests that an economic and political destabilization is its only instrument for affecting the strong position of the pro-Putin majority. The situation in Chechnya provides the only ‘fast-action’ possibility amongst the possible external and internal factors which could destabilize the Putin regime. As a tool of destabilization, Chechnya does not have anything to do with Chechen separatism, Islam or the Chechen people per se. It is related only to the struggle for power in Russia. These true motives give the “democratic” opposition, uniting under the slogan of “Russia without Putin,” a bloody and barbarous taint that is already easily discernable.

Interestingly, the attempts to pool a radical and democratic anti-Putin opposition have brought the Russian liberals to the margins of the political spectrum. Compared with this group, even the boisterous Soviet-era dissident Valeria Novodvorskaya resembles a serious politician with a profound ideology. Take, for example, the Election 2008 committee headed by Garry Kasparov, the international chess grand master. His fame probably does much to conceal the fact that, notwithstanding his remarkable abilities in abstract thinking, a chess master is essentially a sportsman, which makes his talent more comparable to a soccer player than an intellectual. In any case, an individual who ardently propagates the strange pseudo-historic theory of Anatoly Fomenko, which is based on a combination of wild guessing and obscure mathematics, can hardly aspire to the role of Russia’s savior. And giving the buffoon figure Ivan Rybkin a role in the whole scene could have raised a good laugh had he not been associated with the sinister web of Chechen terror.

“RUSSIA WITHOUT PUTIN.” ANTI-UTOPIA TWO

The second option represents the stance of the leftists, and seems to be even more utopian than the liberal one. Essentially, it calls for a radical overturn of power in the orthodox national-communist style. This leftist opposition exploits a range of complaints lodged against Putin: economic liberalism, surrendering positions to the U.S., integration with the West, and, generally, the “selling out of the homeland.” Nationalist populism in its bare form is a difficult thing to describe, largely due to its unpredictability. What is definite is that any significant departure from Putin’s policy of balancing on the edge in our relations with foreign partners (primarily the Americans) will bury all hope for maintaining Russia’s genuine sovereignty. Russia has not yet fully recovered, and its opportunities for pursuing an independent policy will be undermined by a different approach. The liberal option provides us with a pro-Western foreign policy that is styled after Kozyrev, while the second version presupposes a style much more abrupt than that of Yevgeny Primakov. What will transpire is something close to the style of Vladimir Zhirinovsky, when the country will become an outcast, and its relations with the outside world will fold up. Such an event is totally alien to the idea of Russia’s survival.

Simultaneously, such processes will occur inside the country as well. If someone successfully secures the victory of such a party, this will translate into a victory of revenge. And it will be a revenge that is quick and total. This is when the nationalist populists will have the chance to secure a certain level of legitimacy and support of the population. Fundamentally, this movement will by no means be Communism but, rather, Fascism in one form or another. All of this will be happening against the backdrop of individual revenge and individual terror on the part of the feebly controlled law enforcement agencies. It should be noted that, unlike Communism, Fascism has never rejected private property – it has always opposed the postulation of its inviolability. This new model of Fascism will be different from the old ones – it will have an incomparably greater share of criminality in it. Extremist criminality, in fact.

A CIVILIZED REVENGE

Russians have a huge desire to see a renaissance of their country, a restoration of its role, power, and national dignity. As underlined by all sociological studies – regardless of the differences in the assessments – these sentiments all point to the same fact: it is a demand for revenge. Putin as a political phenomenon was born out of that feeling of humiliated national dignity and the craving for a revenge. The challenge of his political course and his second term in office is that he must meet the revengeful aspirations of the public in a civilized, non-cataclysmic way. It means the rehabilitation and modernization of Russia in normal, civilized conditions that correspond with the outside world. Above all, it means maintaining adequate relations with the world’s power centers (in terms of tactics and strategy), no matter what attitude those centers may have toward Russia’s renaissance. Demagogical proclamations about a “national-socialist threat,” propelled by momentary objectives, ignore the fact that should Russia miss its chance to gain revenge in a civilized way, it will eventually be acquired by brutal methods.

In other words, the second option will be made possible not as a result of political games, but rather as a result of failure, i.e. if Putin’s modernization drive is disrupted or if it turns into another fly-by-night phase of a national catastrophe following the liberal option. Such a failure may lead to an oligarchic restoration followed by a criminal-fascist reaction that will end with Russia’s disintegration and eventual disappearance. Such is the full spectrum of the practical manifestations of the “Russia without Putin” slogan.

HOPING FOR A HELPING HAND FROM ABROAD

Russia is facing the colossal task of rebuilding its might amidst the overwhelming reluctance of key international players who would like to prevent such a scenario from happening. The President has no room for error, and that is the sole explanation for his being seemingly over-cautious. Surprisingly, this approach was enough to win over the hearts of the majority of Russians who plan to continue living in this country. On the other hand, it was enough for forming a systemic opposition – albeit on the fringes – to this wish of the politically immature masses of people. It is also quite natural that oppositionists of variegated colors are scheming beyond the borders of Russia.

Narrowly oriented and stubbornly entrenched demand has brought to life a phenomenon labeled “the united anti-Putin opposition.” Although its representatives come from different backgrounds, they do not have questions or claims against each other. In fact, they have just one claim, and it is directed against Putin: the claim argues against the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Since it is difficult to articulate any real sense to this claim, the radical opposition is being increasingly “Rybkinized,” that is, making buffoons of themselves. This association resembles the “Union of the Sword and the Plowshare” and the promise to provide it with a Parabellum [as described by the Soviet satirists Ilya Ilf and Yevgeny Petrov in their satire novel The Golden Calf in 1927. Its protagonist, a witty swindler, pools money from the surviving Russian nobility for their “early liberation from the hateful Soviet regime.” He promises one of them a Parabellum gun. – Ed.] The present situation would seem humorous if not for one thing: the Parabellum may exist in the form of some TNT planted by the Chechens, while the “milieu” from abroad will readily extend a helping hand, as soon as such an opportunity makes itself available.

We have not removed ourselves enough from a potential disaster, nor do we have any room to commit errors. We have no justifiable right to lose the battle.