RESISTANCE TO THE OCCUPATION

It would be erroneous for us to conclude that the armed resistance to the occupation regime is a struggle being waged by Saddam supporters. Contrary to Washington's expectations, Saddam's arrest has not reduced the resistance.

One center of resistance and extremism in Iraq is the so-called Sunni Triangle, an area populated largely by Iraqi Sunnis. It is a scene of the most frequent attacks on the U.S. military. The Saddam regime relied on the Sunnis, yet they are not an explicitly pro-Saddam force. Their resistance is rather explained by fears that the occupation regime, if it remains for long in Iraq, will reduce the Sunnis' status to a second-rate minority.

There is no Baathist resistance in Iraq that is organized as a pro-Saddam force. Some of Saddam supporters act on their own initiative. But on the whole, the Baath party cannot be considered an organized force opposing the occupation; it is more an organization capable of rallying various resistance groups. A similar conclusion can be made with regard to Saddam's army, the National Guard, the paramilitary Fedayeen Saddam (Saddam's "Men of Sacrifice") and police. None of these structures has become the nerve center of general resistance.

If the resistance to the occupation had been put up under pro-Saddam slogans, and involved members of the Saddam administration and groups of the population that the Saddam regime relied on, the U.S. could have hoped for serious international support, even from some Arab countries. However, the resistance has been increasingly involving broad segments of the population who were not comfortable under the overthrown regime.

Protests by the Shias are particularly sensitive for the U.S. Shia religious leaders, who have returned from their exile in Iran, are united in the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which for a long time was headed by Mohamad Baqir Al-Hakim. At first, the Council, which had a strong military force (the well-trained Badr Corps), did not conceal the fact that it wanted to establish an Islamic state in Iraq. At the same time, it maintained neutrality toward the U.S.-led occupation forces. Later, however, the influence in Iraq gradually passed to groups and organizations that opposed the coalition troops, most importantly, the Mahdi Army, which is controlled by Shia imam Muqtada Al-Sadr.

In early April, the Shias actually launched a national war of liberation. The Shias, who comprise over 60 percent of the Iraqi population, were discriminated against under Saddam. Therefore, when planning the operation in Iraq, the U.S. hoped for Shias' support in establishing a secular state in the country. As it turns out, the occupation troops are opposed by both the Sunnis and Shias. The Shias' struggle experiences many ups and downs, but if Iraq retains the present system of power (which a majority of the population regard as occupationist, even despite the formal handover of power to a national government) the resistance will involve an increasing number of Shias. Now they can no longer be described as U.S. allies or even fellow travelers.

There are several explanations for this trend. First, the Shias are very suspicious of the Americans. During the first Gulf war (1991), the Americans declined to support a Shia rebellion, and the latter was mercilessly quelled by Saddam. Second, when conducting operations against the radicals, the U.S. occupation troops made air and land attacks on two Shia religious centers, Najaf and Karabala, killing many civilians. Third, the Shias oppose U.S. plans for postwar Iraq. They insisted on direct elections before the June 30 transfer of power, which would have helped them to win a decisive majority in the legislature. Fourth, the Shia political movement is being overtaken by radicals who enjoy increasing support among the population. Fifth, there are signs of a possible convergence of the Shia and Sunni resistance movements.

Iraq's federalization, together with the formation of a Shia autonomous region within Iraq, would not solve the problem. Such a model can satisfy the Kurd population, but not the Shias, who populate not only south Iraq, but also Baghdad and other areas of the country. Besides, their goal is to seize central power.

The federalization of Iraq would bring the "Iran factor" into the foreground. Many of the Iraqi Shia leaders were in exile in Iran's religious center of Qum and have links with the Iranian Shias. The formation of a Shia autonomous region in Iraq would also have a negative impact on the situation in Iran, boosting extremist religious sentiments there. In turn, such developments would increase trends toward an Islamic state in Iraq. Shia autonomy is a more serious threat for the U.S. than a model in which the Shias would make the core of Iraq's government: even a predominance of Shias in the central bodies of the legislative and executive branches would be weakened by the influence of Sunni and Kurdish political groups. Kurds, for example, have already secured a provision in Iraq's interim Constitution (adopted on March 8, 2004) which grants them the power to veto any bill.

KURDS - RESERVE OF THE OCCUPATION FORCES?

When planning the operation against Iraq, the U.S. counted on the "Kurdish factor," hoping to manipulate the Kurds' hatred toward the Saddam regime and the differences between Kurds and Arabs in Iraq. Two issues stand out as top priorities for the Kurds: delimitation of control over the oil-rich areas of Kirkuk and Mosul, and the return of Kurds who were evicted in northern Iraq by the Saddam regime. The solution of these two problems in the Kurds favor would reinforce their positions, while removing from the agenda, at least for the near future, the issue of an independent Kurdish state. The Kurds already have autonomy in Iraq, which they received under Saddam.

But it would be very difficult, if not unfeasible, to solve the problem by incorporating Kirkuk and Mosul into the Kurdish Autonomous Region. It is possible that the Arabs would agree to joint control over the Kirkuk and Mosul oil fields, but the Kurds reject this proposal. Kirkuk is the oldest Kurdish town and was once the historical and religious center of the Kurdish civilization. But soon after rich oil fields were discovered in the area in the 1960s, the Iraqi regime began to Arabize those territories and evict some of the Kurdish settlements. Now the area is populated by many Arabs, and there are frequent armed clashes between them and the Kurds.

During the military campaign in the spring of 2003, groups of Kurdish peshmarga (suicide fighters) actively cooperated with the coalition forces. But now such cooperation will continue only if the U.S. takes the Kurds side in their conflict against the Arabs. However, such a move would seriously complicate Washington's relations with the Arabs, as both the Shias and Sunnis hold a common position on this issue. All of the Iraqi Arabs strongly protested the U.S. decision to include in Iraq's interim constitution (drafted under U.S. control) a provision giving the Kurds (who make up 10 percent of the Iraqi population) the right of veto, as this provision has placed Kurds on an equal footing with the Shias (60 percent of the population) and the Sunnis (30 percent).

The manipulation of the Kurdish factor by the Americans in postwar Iraq has been complicated also by the situation inside the Kurdish movement. The Kurdistan Democratic Party, led by Massoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, led by Jalal Talabani, are being challenged by the growing influence of the Ansar al-Islam movement, which has united radical Islamists from among the Iraqi Kurds. The movement is supposedly supported from Afghanistan.

Turkey is yet another factor that is limiting Washington's room for maneuver with the Kurds. Initially, Turkey opposed Kurdish autonomy in a federal Iraqi state. However, if the situation in Iraq deteriorates, Ankara may agree to autonomy for the Iraqi Kurds, but only if two conditions are met: Iraqi Kurds will not demand the formation of an independent state of their own, and the Kurdish autonomous region will not include Kirkuk and Mosul. Turkey fears that the inclusion of these two towns will give the Kurds more temptation to proclaim their autonomous territory an independent state.

Some analysts believe there is a real threat that Ankara may invade north Iraq if it finds a proposed model for settling the Kurdish issue unacceptable. This could happen if Turkey feels a threat to its own integrity. The Turkish population includes a large community of ethnic Kurds. The strengthening of Iraqi Kurds positions may provoke radical Kurds in Turkey into stepping up their activities. Oil is one more factor that is of much importance to Turkey.

THE IRAQI BATTLEFIELD AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

The U.S. administration has repeatedly said that Iraq's invasion by the coalition forces marked a new, important stage in the war against international terrorism. But the assertion that Saddam had given shelter to members of al Qaeda or other extremist Islamic groups was either misinformation or a mistake. Saddam is a strongly pronounced nationalist who mercilessly suppressed all attempts to propagate radical Islamism in Iraq. Moreover, a stronger influence of radical Islamists would inevitably mean an end to his dictatorial, yet secular regime.

After Saddam's overthrow, Iraq has become a magnet for international terrorists who are infiltrating the country and creating a bridgehead for new attacks. International terrorist groups, mainly al Qaeda, will seek to maintain extreme instability in Iraq for as long as possible in order to get a foothold on the territory. Iraq is more convenient as a terrorist center than Afghanistan: it is bordered by countries with strong extremist tendencies.

So, there are different groups among the forces of resistance to the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. Their motives are different, too, but the preservation of the occupation regime may force these groups closer together.

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS OF DEVELOPMENT

The most probable way for the situation in Iraq to develop is a division within Iraqi society. This may split into the collaborationists who are cooperating with the coalition forces and the government, and the anti-occupation forces. This division may become aggravated by other conflicts. The destruction of Saddam's regime has upset the balance between major ethnic and religious communities on which Iraq's unity and stability rested. The Shias, Sunnis and Kurds now seek to fill the power vacuum.

Despite the ongoing convergence of different groups of resistance, there remains the threat of an ethnic and religious division in the country. This would pose a serious danger after the occupation forcesХ pullout, and may even result in a civil war.

An analysis of the possible ways for achieving stabilization in post-Saddam Iraq suggests the following conclusions.
First, it is unlikely that stability could be achieved if Iraq became an Islamic state. If general elections are held, a majority in the legislature will go to the Shias who may create a political system similar to that in Iran. However, Iran's record shows that such a political system can ensure relative stability for only a short period of time. Besides, there are strong sentiments in Iraq against Islamic models for the state and society, thus imposing such models on the country by force would divide it. At the same time, the general tendency in the Arab world does not bolster state Islamism.

Second, there is little hope for achieving stabilization unless there is a sharp increase in the number of Iraqis ready to cooperate with the occupation authorities. This variant is possible, but only when an effective nationwide political force appears, which would cooperate with the U.S. Hypothetically, former members of the Baath party could be the core of such a force. Under the previous regime, a majority of the two-million-member party joined it for career rather than ideological considerations. Therefore, the party united the more active and effective segments of Iraqi society. The Americans made a mistake by outlawing the Baath party and not trying to attract its members whom they could use as political support.

From the outset, Iraq's interim Governing Council failed to win popular support. Now, the new Iraqi government, which was formed under U.S. control and has replaced the Council, is facing the same problem. As a result, it will take much time and money to create real prerequisites for stabilizing the situation in the country.

Third, the growth of resistance to the occupation troops is largely due to the lack of progress in rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure, soaring unemployment, and the inability of the occupation authorities to take effective security measures. Unless the authorities solve the unemployment problem and raise salaries, they will not be able to cope with the Iraqi population's animosity and resistance to the coalition forces.

Meanwhile, the country's social and economic problems are very difficult to solve. Iraq's revival as a major oil exporter is also unlikely to bring about an early stabilization. In order to increase oil output and export, control over the entire fuel and energy sector must be given to those who are interested in Iraq's restoration and who are aware of its present political tasks. The bulk of Iraq's oil reserves, however, are in Kirkuk, northern Iraq, and in the Shia-populated south. The recovery and development of the Iraqi oil industry requires much time and investment.

The situation has become even more difficult after Iraq ceased to receive humanitarian aid under the Oil-for-Food program following the lifting of sanctions against this country. Besides, Iraq can hardly expect large-scale foreign aid that is required for its revival.

Iraq's economic strategy, worked out by the Governing Council for the period until 2005, was intended to ensure economic growth through market-economy measures. These were intended to lift price controls, privatization, and reductions in subsidies for state-owned businesses. However, the strategy's authors hoped for revenues from oil exports and foreign aid, while the funds coming from both sources may prove much less than planned. The lack of stability and security may reduce economic activity still further. It may require five years before Iraq fully meets its requirements for basic goods and services.

SEEKING MORE ALLIES

The failure of Washington's policy for a unilateral settlement of the Iraqi crisis has caused it to seek a more active role for the United Nations in the stabilization process. Initially, President George W. Bush ruled out UN involvement, but now Washington views it as a means to silence international criticism of its military actions in Iraq as unlawful, and to win political and financial support from many UN member states. Cooperating with the UN is broadening the Bush administration's room for maneuver, which is especially vital now on the eve of presidential elections in the U.S., and amid growing anti-war sentiments among American citizens.

At the same time, the U.S. administration is unlikely to fully replace the occupation troops with a UN peacekeeping force. The replacement may be partial if hostilities increase and if an increasing number of casualties is inflicted on the coalition troops.

Replacing the coalition troops with a NATO force, or involving many more countries in the U.S.-led coalition, is also unlikely.
Moreover, the latest developments in Iraq (mass Shia protests, the aggravation of the situation in the Sunni Triangle and the hostage-taking of foreign nationals in Iraq) have caused U.S. allies in the anti-Saddam coalition to refrain from giving unconditional support to the U.S. administration. Some of the allies have reduced or even terminated their military presence in Iraq. At the same time, some of NATO's new member states, wishing to demonstrate their loyalty to Washington and seeking closer relations with it, may decide to send their troops to Iraq.

In June 2003, President Bush urged Arab countries to join the coalition forces. However, the Arab regimes fear that such a move would destabilize the situation in their countries, already swept by anti-American sentiments fueled by the U.S. position on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The U.S. may try to involve moderate Arab regimes in Iraq's postwar settlement, but this involvement would be reduced only to investment and supplies. Also, the U.S. administration may seek Arab support in forming Iraq's government structures.

LIMITS FOR CHANGE IN THE U.S. POLICY

The increased resistance in Iraq has already caused the U.S. to toughen its policy. If this move proves effective, the U.S. will hardly make further concessions to the international community. If not, Bush will have to seek more compromises.

The situation in Iraq is a major factor in the U.S. election campaign, although economic issues have always been a priority for U.S. society; the present economic growth and the decline in unemployment rates are expected to win many votes for Bush. Yet, even the economic achievements do not guarantee his re-election to a second term.

It is unlikely that Bush will withdraw his troops from Iraq before the presidential elections. The U.S. president stated that the aggravation of the situation in Iraq and the growing casualties will not make the U.S. pull out from Iraq. Apparently this statement reflects the real position of the White House. A U.S. pullout would be viewed as a defeat of Bush's policy and would reduce voters' support. Therefore, the appeals from some U.S. public figures to immediately leave Iraq will hardly be heeded in the next few months. According to public opinion polls conducted by authoritative organizations, even the scandalous failure of Washington's attempts to prove that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction brought about an insignificant (2-4 percent) and short-lived decline in Bush's popularity rating.

In a bid to win more votes, the Bush administration is expected not to change its position on Iraq but to employ some surprise moves. These may include a decrease in gasoline prices, which almost doubled recently, or the announcement of Osama bin Laden's arrest shortly before the elections.

RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE IRAQI SETTLEMENT

It goes without saying that Russia is interested in an early stabilization in Iraq, together with the handover of all power in Iraq to the Iraqis. However, these goals cannot be achieved by simply withdrawing the U.S. troops from Iraq without handing over the governing functions to a UN mission.
It would be in Russia's interests if Washington returns to the position of multilateral actions in crisis situations and gives up its unilateralist policy, graphically manifested vis-a-vis Iraq. However, considering the political situation in the U.S., the above changes can be achieved not through a U.S. defeat in Iraq, but through an evolutionary move in which the Bush administration begins to work with the UN. This turn has already begun, and Russia must support it and make it irreversible through its active and, at the same time, well-planned participation in the Iraqi settlement.

Above all, Russia should take avail of its good bilateral relations with various parties to the conflict, especially the friendly relations between the Russian and U.S. presidents.

Russia's relations with European countries may also play a major role in the Iraqi settlement. During the latest Iraqi crisis, Europe divided into opponents and supporters of the U.S. operation in Iraq. Attempts to play on these differences would be counter-productive. Russia should seek to influence the European Union member states, most importantly, Germany and France, to remain opposed to any unilateral approaches and the use of force against any state. It must strive for the support of collective actions through UN mechanisms for stabilizing the situation in Iraq. Such actions should not be anti-American; indeed, they should be worked out jointly with the U.S.

Another factor that may play a major role is Russia's traditionally good relations with the Arab countries, especially since their positions on the Iraqi crisis coincide with that of Russia. Involving Arab states in the peace settlement in Iraq would have a positive impact on the larger part of the Iraqi population.
Political forces in the Iraqi society, to which power could be turned over, must be identified through multilateral efforts. This may be done by an international conference on Iraq.

Such a consensus must be sought under the UN aegis, which would solve the problem of legitimacy and authority necessary for the efforts to rebuild Iraq.
Russia's potential is not reduced to negotiations and conferences. Russia can participate in Iraq's restoration, specifically through business contacts  especially in industries where Soviet and Russian specialists have worked.

Russia's military involvement in the efforts to settle the crisis in Iraq would be possible, but only if Russia has a UN Security Council mandate and if the UN takes over as the primary actor in the Iraqi settlement. But even then the deployment of Russian troops in Iraq would remain an open question.