The tenth anniversary of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, signed between Russia and the European Union on the island of Corfu, Greece, was celebrated this June. This document, which reflects the Parties’ ideas and expectations of ten years ago, remains the basis of Russia-EU relations. The PCA was ratified in 1997 for an initial period of ten years. The Agreement’s future is defined in Article 106: “The Agreement shall be automatically renewed year by year provided that neither Party gives the other Party written notice of denunciation of the Agreement at least six months before it expires.”

It is highly unlikely that either Party will give such notice to the other before 2007. Therefore, there are no grounds to worry about the PCA’s future, and when the time comes the Agreement will be automatically renewed. Yet, the content and effectiveness of the Agreement raise many questions.
Over the last ten years, Russia and the European Union, not to mention the entire world, have seen so many dramatic changes that the PCA has ceased to be an adequate political and legal foundation for Russia-EU relations. Thus, there is no use extending this document: with the passage of time, it will depart more and more from reality, from the content and forms of relations between the partners. The legal basis for these relations must be completely renewed.
First of all, the new document should receive a new name – a Strategic Partnership Agreement, for example, between the European Union and the Russian Federation.

The first argument in favor of a new agreement stems from the analysis of the PCA. The Agreement conformed to the initial phase in Russia-EU relations, which was the establishment of their partnership and cooperation. This phase has passed. As it stands, the PCA does not serve the task of consolidating and further developing these relations on the basis of a strategic partnership. The new stage in the development of Russia-EU relations needs a new legal foundation.

A more important argument is that a new agreement would give a powerful political impetus to Russia-EU cooperation. The EU itself took a similar approach when it developed from one stage to another, each based on a new agreement: the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), the treaties on the establishment of the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic Community (1957), the Single European Act (1986), and the EU treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice (1992, 1997, 2000). This experience has proven instructive as each time the European integration faces a crisis, the participating nations reassess the situation and amend their integration strategies.

A similar situation has arisen in relations between Russia and the EU. On the one hand, over the last three years it has entered a stage of practical cooperation. On the other hand, whenever the partners proceed from long-term goals and projects to urgent tasks requiring immediate decisions, their embraces give way to a standoff. Moscow and Brussels are bogged down in debates on vexed questions, while frequently engaged in mutual accusations. The range of differences between Russia and the EU is very wide – from accusing each other of trade protectionism, to mutually exclusive approaches on the settlement of conflicts in the former Soviet Union (Moldova and Georgia, not to mention Chechnya). The Parties are engaged in fierce bargaining on these issues, and mutually acceptable compromise solutions are achieved by the sweat of their brow.

It must have been the sentiments of dissatisfaction and concern that were behind the decision of the EU December 2003 summit to ask the Council of the European Union and the European Commission to assess all aspects of EU-Russia relations, and make proposals for cementing a strategic partnership and ensuring adherence to the values inherent to it. The assessments and recommendations were proposed in two documents – a Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on relations with Russia (February 9, 2004), and Conclusions of the Council of the European Union on relations with Russia (February 23, 2004). The documents reiterate that the EU views Russia as its strategic partner and that it is ready to create four ‘common spaces’ with it. The Parties’ next move could be establishing a High Level Group, together with special expert groups, with a view to drafting a new fundamental document – a Strategic Partnership Agreement.

So, the validity and expediency of a decision to replace the PCA with a new agreement seems obvious. However, there are lingering doubts that a new agreement will materialize for several reasons.

First of all, the partners are not prepared for such an idea. The documents of the European Commission and the Council of the European Union name the PCA as the basis of the Parties’ interaction. And although both documents are intended for the medium term, they do not raise the issue of the PCA’s future after it expires. Nor are there any signs that this issue is being discussed in the Russian government.

Another reason is the unfavorable climate in Russia-EU relations. The situation is not critical (as European and Russian media sometimes assert), yet the Parties’ mutual discontent and tensions in their relations are obvious. The atmosphere could improve through a major success, such as Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization on mutually acceptable terms. An even more attractive idea, perhaps, would be a ‘package’ solution of a range of outstanding problems through mutual concessions. The aforementioned documents, adopted at the first meeting of the Permanent Partnership Council, can be viewed as a step in this direction. So, removing obstructions to the development of cooperation is task number one.

Yet, this is not enough. Both Parties have grounds for not rushing to assume more challenging commitments than those stemming from the PCA. These are long-term brakes, so to speak.

Let’s start with Russia. Its first ‘brake’ involves the unresolved dilemma of choosing a strategic choice. President Vladimir Putin has singled out two priority fields in Russia’s foreign policy – strategic partnership with the EU, and the restoration of Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet space, specifically through the establishment of economic and political blocs under Russia’s leadership. The latest such move was the Agreement on the Creation of a Common Economic Space, signed by the presidents of Belarus, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation and Ukraine on September 19, 2003. There has been no official statement yet as to how these two fields can be combined. In principle, they can and must be combined, but this requires a finer tuning of the foreign-policy instruments than presently displayed by Moscow.

Meanwhile, it is widely believed among Russia’s political, business and intellectual circles that a policy toward integration with other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is incompatible with a policy toward a strategic partnership with the EU, toward integration into the Common European Economic Space and close coordination of foreign-policy and security activities. These circles will hardly cause the Russian president to give up his European policy, yet their efforts may prove enough for sinking the idea of concluding a new PCA.

Another ‘brake’ is the lack of clarity about Russia’s future gains and losses once the Common European Economic Space (CEES) is created. These gains and losses have never been calculated; moreover, calculations of this kind would be very approximate and unreliable, since it will take Russia 15 to 20 years to prepare for CEES membership, that is, provided economic reforms are conducted consistently and actively, and economic growth rates remain stable and high. In addition to the economic aspects, there is no real clarity on legal aspects, as well.

Europe already has the European Economic Area which comprises the EU states plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein. In the next ten years, it is expected to include another seven or eight countries. This space functions on the basis of acquis communautaire, as the entire body of European laws is known. The creation of the CEES will mean Russia’s actual integration into the European economic space, and there is no doubt that the EU will not change CEES standards for Russia’s sake. At the same time, even Russian proponents of the ‘European choice,’ together with its accession to the CEES, object to Russia’s full adoption of acquis communautaire.

The third ‘brake’ is the obvious wish of the European Union to increase its influence on the European and Transcaucasian members of the CIS, together with its negative attitude to any integration initiatives of Russia in the post-Soviet space – which some Western European countries interpret as a revival of Russia’s imperial ambitions. A CEES that includes Russia, but not Ukraine and Belarus, is an economic and political absurdity. Furthermore, it would probably be impossible to create a CEES in such a reduced format. This is why the future of the CEES largely depends on whether or not Russia and the EU are able to find common ground in their approaches to relations with the CIS European members.

The EU has barriers of its own, too. During the first few years after the PCA was concluded, its limited implementation was wholly attributed to the crisis in Russia. Now it has turned out that the EU’s cooperation potential is limited, too. When the EU made a series of strategic decisions in 1992-2000, it underestimated the difficulty of simultaneously implementing them. Actually, it is difficult to say in which area of strategic concern things are better now. Plans for the entry of Britain, Sweden and Denmark into the EU’s Economic and Monetary Union were ruined by the results of a referendum in Sweden, in which a majority of the population said “no” to their government’s proposal for introducing the euro in place of the Swedish crown. The outcome of the Swedish referendum caused London to postpone its plans to enter into the EMU. A terrorist act carried out by Islamic extremists in Spain put into question the future of the Schengen zone, not to mention a common space of freedom, security and justice, now being created in the EU.

The rift within the EU which has been caused by the different positions of EU member states on the U.S. military actions against Iraq shows how far away the EU is from adopting common foreign and defense policies. A program for building within a decade, “the world’s most competitive and sustainable dynamic knowledge-based economy,” a goal adopted at the EU March 2000 Lisbon summit, will obviously not be fulfilled within the planned period of time, and the economies of a majority of the EU member states, most notably Germany and France, are overcoming a period of stagnation with great difficulty.

Finally, the last but not the least important factor: the transformation of the EU-15 into EU-25 on May 1, 2004, has opened a new chapter in the EU. Its main efforts will be focused on completing the expansion process (presently, there are three more official and five potential candidates) and adapting new members into the EU’s single domestic market. This will also include the Economic and Monetary Union, legislation, and decision-making and enforcement mechanisms. These efforts will take at least 10 to 15 years to complete.

Considering the scope of political and economic difficulties, as well as the amount of spending involved in the above processes, the EU leadership may delay to replace the present PCA with a new agreement with Russia that would provide for the Parties’ broader mutual commitments. Another argument for the postponement may be the increased difficulty of establishing a common approach of the 25 EU member states in its relations with Russia. Each individual EU state has different interests in relations with Russia; the state of these relations differs with each EU state. The aforementioned Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on relations with Russia stresses the need for a “more coordinated EU policy” toward the European Union’s largest eastern neighbor. Finally, it is not ruled out that the opposition to the PCA’s renewal would come from the EU members which, like any other bureaucratic structure, tends to accumulate a certain degree of inertia.

Besides the more internal reasons, which will unlikely be made public, the European Union may have other arguments against revising the PCA, namely its critical assessment of some tendencies in Russia’s development – the growth of authoritarianism, human rights violations, encroachments on the freedom of mass media, etc. If Russia succeeds in maintaining its present economic growth rates, these tendencies will not stop the EU countries from boosting their trade with Russia or making investment in this country. The signing of a new PCA would be, above all, a political act testifying to a higher level of mutual trust and concord between Russia and the EU. However, if the above trends in Russia intensify, while evoking a negative public reaction in the EU countries, their governments will not agree to greater cooperation. Therefore, progress in building a rule-of-law state, consolidating democratic institutions, developing a civil society and ensuring human rights would be the best confirmation of Russia’s desire to build a strategic partnership with the EU. As the ancient Romans said, this is a sine qua non – an indispensable condition.

On the whole, Russia’s and the EU’s approaches to mutual cooperation have many nuances determined by domestic difficulties, persisting mutual mistrust and the unpredictable international situation. So the final choice has not yet been made. A decision to begin work on a Strategic Partnership Agreement, and create ‘common spaces’ between Russia and the EU, largely depends on whether or not the Parties display the political will.

Despite the abovementioned ‘brakes,’ the arguments for concluding such an agreement are much weightier. Although these arguments are well known, it would be helpful to remind ourselves of them again here.

1. The growing economic interdependence of Russia and the EU. Russia does not have an alternative trading partner that would be able to replace the integrated Europe. The EU countries have no alternative to Russian fuel supplies, particularly natural gas.

2. The mutual interest of Russia and the EU in social and political stability. In contemporary conditions, Russia and the EU, which are immediate neighbors, are much like communicating vessels. In other words, neither the Schengen agreement nor any other barriers can stop the virus of social disease, ethnic conflict, religious intolerance, crime and so forth spreading between their borders. Any efforts to counter these threats will be effective only if Russia and the EU establish very close cooperation.

3. The Parties’ common interest in ensuring security in Europe and adjacent regions. Security must cover all aspects, including the aforementioned social and political imperatives, the supply of energy and other resources. These security measures must also cover environmental protection, crisis management, not to mention the struggle against the new evil of the 21st century – international terrorism, which is threatening to plunge the entire international community into chaos.

4. Russia and the EU share similar positions on major issues pertaining to the formation of world law and order. This includes the need for a stable system of international relations, crisis management methods, not to mention the UN’s role in these efforts.

The influence of these factors on Russia-EU relations will keep growing. Actually, Russia and the EU member states have no alternative to their strategic partnership, but this does not necessarily mean that they cannot have other strategic partners. The peculiarity of the international situation that has taken shape after the breakup of the bipolar system is that each large and independent actor on the international stage has, or wishes to have, several strategic partners. Russia and the EU have such partners. Now the Parties should display their political will by establishing a strategic partnership between them, and a new Russia-EU agreement would be a convincing demonstration of such a will. As the first step toward such a decision, the Parties could set up a joint expert group to make an in-depth analysis of how the present PCA is being fulfilled, and to compare the PCA’s content with the accumulated experience of cooperation and challenges of the new century.

Structurally, a new agreement could be structured much the same as the present PCA, with a Preamble, a Cooperation Program, as well as Institutional, General and Final Provisions.

1. The new Preamble would contain all the provisions from the previous one that pertain to the Parties’ commitment to promote international peace and security, to cooperate in the framework of the United Nations and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), to implement all principles and provisions contained in the Final Act and other documents of the CSCE, to respect human rights, and to act in accordance with the principles of a market economy and democracy. Naturally, the matter at issue is not textual but conceptual identity, and the preservation of the PCA’s spirit rather than letter.

All other provisions of the new agreement must be formulated anew, taking into consideration all the changes that have taken place in Russia, Europe and the world, as well as the accumulated experience of Russia-EU cooperation. The new Preamble must include the following crucial provisions, stating:
– that Russia and the EU are establishing a strategic partnership;
– that the goals of this strategic partnership include the creation of four common spaces;
– that the creation of a new system of international relations requires the efforts of all the states acting in the framework of the UN, which must retain its role as the main integrator of these efforts;
– that one of the main goals of the Parties’ cooperation is countering all manifestations of racism, chauvinism and xenophobia, including all kinds of extremism, above all in Europe, no matter what ideological or religious disguise they may have;
– that Russia is a country with a market economy;
– that trade relations between the EU and Russia are based on the principles and standards of the World Trade Organization (which Russia will have joined by that time).

2. The Program for Russia-EU Cooperation would be better set out in four sections devoted to the construction of the four common spaces. This will require regrouping specific areas of cooperation, and as a result, the program would look more integral and harmonious.

A section devoted to the creation of the CEES should cover all the areas of economic cooperation, from trade and customs to the harmonization of economic legislation and the coordination of economic policies. It should also specify joint efforts to liberalize the movement of goods, services, capital and persons.

Another section, which could be named Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, would include areas of cooperation aimed at ensuring free movement of persons and their rights on the territories of the EU countries and Russia. This section would also cover issues pertaining to the application of the Schengen visa regime and the readmission agreement, as well as transition to a visa-free regime and the free movement of persons. The same section would cover cooperation in combating transborder crime, conducted under a recent agreement between Russia and the European Law Enforcement Organisation (Europol). It is more than probable that this section will include one more major area – cooperation in justice, specifically in such issues as the improvement of judicial legislation, the state of penitentiary institutions, and so on.

Finally, this section should include cooperation in developing public ties. This area of cooperation and a transition to the free movement of persons are interrelated: the freedom of movement, settlement and occupation is not an end in itself, but it helps to enhance labor efficiency and promotes better self-realization, people-to-people contacts, rapprochement between nations and, in the long run, the formation of a European identity.

The section Common Space of Cooperation in the Field of External Security would formulate a program for Russia-EU interaction in this field, specifying its main areas (the UN and general issues concerning the new world law and order; security and cooperation in Europe; regional conflicts and crisis management; peacemaking, rescue and humanitarian operations), as well as methods and mechanisms. The same section would be devoted to the struggle against international terrorism.

The section Common Space of Research, Education and Culture would take into consideration the experience gained by the EU and Russia in these fields over the last decade.

Apart from the four sections, the new agreement may retain the PCA’s introduction but under a different name: Common Principles and Goals. Consequently, it would be supplemented with new provisions.

3. The final section of the new agreement. Its first part, concerning the institutional system of Russia-EU cooperation, would be altered the most, because this system has changed since the PCA entered into force. In particular, the Cooperation Council should be changed for the Permanent Partnership Council. Furthermore, the functions of all joint institutions must be formulated to a higher degree. The new agreement should, perhaps, provide for the establishment of an EU-Russia Public Forum which could become a platform for regular meetings of the nongovernmental organizations. This would provide the venue for discussing vital issues of cooperation and working out recommendations for corresponding decision-making institutions of Russia and the European Union.