A Russian political insider was recently heard commenting: “Well, here we are! The whole system is being remodeled for just one goal – 2008. Everything: business, media, government, all basic decisions.” Another individual, who was equally well-connected, added: “Perish the thought of any breakthroughs before 2007.” After a pause, he said: “Or afterwards, for that matter.”

From these comments it would seem as if Putin were a lame duck president whose goal is to survive until the end of his second presidential term in order to earn two positions – the history books for himself and the Kremlin for his successor. Yet things are not at all that simple. Right before our eyes, “Operation Successor” in Ukraine has slid off its designated track. The incumbent Russian president has not yet put period to the formulation of his own course. He has constructed a regime, but not a course. Furthermore, the early start of “Operation Successor-2008” seems to indicate that the organizers have little confidence that they will eventually reach their goals. And there are two questions that still do not have clear answers: “Who will the leadership pass to?” and “What will be passed on to him?”

At first, the system repressed free thinking and free action, since these activities bordered on sacrilege. Freedom survived, however, but thinking and actions were eliminated. Then the system produced a series of androids and placed them in key positions, because it suspected the Homo sapiens and anthropoids that had occupied these positions previously of being unreliable or having oppositionist tendencies. The androids took the posts and said they were ready to serve fervently, but they needed managers to govern their motions. The governors’ typical comment was: “Well, what do you want from androids?” Soon, others wanted to govern the androids as well, not to mention the assets that had been placed under their control; but they did not know how to govern. They did not know how to put oil into the engine, what broken parts needed to be replaced, or when maintenance tests should be taken. The system was short of qualified operators to govern all the new android parties, and the performing operators came from different schools. As a result, the technology requirements for the workshops were eased and simpler operators were hired. The end product was expected to remain as sophisticated as before, however, and it was then that the system went faulty.

A RIGID CENTER MEANS CHAOS IN THE PROVINCES

The mode of governance set up over the past four years was from the very beginning aimed at maintaining a hierarchic subordination. This stands in contrast to self-regulation that permits a certain amount of internal freedom. This sort of freedom remained beyond the vision of the “regulators,” who interpreted governability as a meticulous control where all problems are duly kicked upstairs. This stirred memories of the Soviet era, when the Communist Party’s Central Committee and its Politburo supervised absolutely everything, from the personalities of television commentators to the appointment of directors of all, even small, manufacturing enterprises.

Where did this come from? Was it rooted in a mistrust of democratic institutions, embedded in the gene code of the elite, especially the one that came to power in 2000? Did it stem from the underdevelopment of civic society, which is desperately trying to hatch out of a conglomeration of social leeches that were denied a moral heritage from the past and the power to look into the future with confidence? Was it caused by a mistrust of the man on the street, who has for centuries been scorned by the authorities in this country? Did it grow from an overt revulsion of the oligarchs – the carryovers from the past who “lack the sense of social responsibility and political (moral) scruples?” Or was it the product of a homegrown myth that says people from among the closest associates can accomplish great missions with clean hands, cool heads, and enthusiastic hearts?

One way or another, it has happened – the country has been switched to a manual mode of operation. From the very beginning, the Russians were ready to sing – while substituting Lenin’s name for Putin’s – Soviet-era songs about “youth, revolution and spring.” Russia intuitively opted for “a strong arm” that would spare it the horrible responsibility for adapting to the “harsh times” associated with Freedom.

Many were glad to accept an “enlightened authoritarianism” that had nothing to do with authoritarianism, much in the same way it had nothing to do with a self-regulating democratic system. “Overt rigidity of the centralized mechanism of governance generates chaos in the provinces,” an architect of the regime confessed recently. In Russia, such a mechanism has always presupposed lawlessness in the regions, which the central government was always unable to control. Recall 19th century historian Nikolai Karamzin’s conclusion that “the toughness of Russian laws implies their optional observance.” The atmosphere of what a political technologist close to Putin has branded as “Totalitarianism Lite” has not changed anything in that Russian tradition.

POLITICAL IMPROMPTUS

The designers of the present regime did not have a systemic restructuring plan. In the initial phase, the intellectual and analytical bolstering of the future course was confined to the liberal economist German Gref’s program. Presently, Gref is the only remaining element of that project, and no one can tell how long he will be left untouched. The community of experts is complaining that its services are unneeded by the government and is sending appeals to people in the top government offices in variegated reports. But there is no reply. The authorities have dropped their former habit of asking the experts and researchers for any sort of analyses. The process resembles a street with one-way traffic, i.e., analytical reports are sent to the upper echelons and vanish there. The authorities either distrust the research community or they fear that the researchers may suspect something regarding their plans. The fear of information leaks is imbedded in their subconsciousness. As regards the net of political institutions, there is only the idea that they must be governable and capable of reacting to the challenges of our times, but their activity must not provoke too much criticism for being undemocratic.

The lack of a plan forced the authorities to improvise. They contemplated introducing the direct election of senators, something given much publicity recently. But they thought it over again and started appointing senators instead – and not the guys from your own neighborhood but strangers.

They pondered a de facto appointment of governors. But what’s the sense of it? Just because they got tired of propelling the regional elections? They entertained with the idea of federal districts. After just a few years it would become obvious that something was wrong with that concept.

A government formed by parties? But this idea apparently ran into the problem of assembling the cabinets and was shelved. How about a two-party or one-and-a-half-party system? In order to have an extra card up the sleeve, the masterminds bred a smaller Rodina (Homeland) party in addition to the major United Russia party. But how can you build a multiparty system if the upper echelons, or the elite, who are devoid of all ideas and principles, proved equally incapable of building a party as the grassroots? What is more, the architects themselves do not know yet what role or form a party must have, and they are unprepared to delegate whatever reasonable functions and responsibilities to it.

For instance, what role will the parties (or a specific party) have in nominating the Successor? Or in mapping out the government’s new platform? What if something goes wrong and the party breeds its own logic? What if it organizes primaries and elects a First Secretary who will then become a General Secretary? The thought of letting things slide sends chills down the spine, and that is why everything has been switched into the manual mode of operation.

“Indeed, Putin’s conduct is the one of an absolute monarch,” a top official from the Kremlin remarked frankly. “But you have to govern all that manually and on a daily basis if you want to keep it under control. Forget about any system in the next 20 to 30 years, until the time when people who are 18 to 20 years old today come to power.”

A few elements of that paradigm have been copied from the Russian Empress Catherine the Great, who introduced a clear administrative division of the country into provinces, but that was in the 18th century. Some of the initiatives have been borrowed from the times of Alexander II – trials by jury, army reform (conceived in the wake of the Crimean War, which has parallels in our days in the form of the Afghan and Chechen Wars). The system also carries indicative traces of Soviet power, as ‘telephone rule’ (i.e. the strength of private connections and personal agreements) dominates over formal legality which is democratic on paper. Even the American experience has proven to support our case – there, too, senators were not directly elected until 1912. Finally, Russian officials cited France when they mentioned the importance of setting up a Public Chamber.

Those constructs did not have an ideological backbone from the very start. “The consolidation of the vertical power structure” cannot be viewed as ideology, since it is a technological thing. Outside observers may get the impression that someone is trying to replace the farcical democracy of the 1990s with authoritarianism. If that is true, the latter also smells of a farce, while many political players acknowledge the presence of a restraining factor (and worse, a factor that is decomposing the system from within) – the absence of a new, non-Soviet ideology. The more aggressive the jingoistic rhetoric becomes, the more deceitful it sounds when aired by certain people in the midst of blossoming corruption. There is no nationalization of the economy, and apparently there never will be. Instead, there is a repartitioning of property in favor of those who were less lucky at the previous stages of privatization.

A CAR IN A SNOWDRIFT

Whether or not the goal of making Russia more governable existed in the beginning – including the use of traditional Russian tactics to scare the thievish elite – that plan has obviously flopped. The first sensations of fear have passed, largely because the system does not work. Difficult decisions were made, some initiatives followed, stinging statements full of metaphor were issued, but things failed to progress. The situation resembles a car stuck in a snowdrift, where the driver steps on the gas with all his might. The wheels are spinning, and the tires are giving off smoke, but the car is only digging deeper and deeper into the snow.

Those who should have been frightened have instead acquired the widespread conviction that it is possible to buy over the government for everything. The methods are simple and were already well-tested in the 1990s. First, there are kickbacks. The 10-percent standard of a decade ago is gone, as 20 percent has become the norm. Incredibly, it may go as high as even 50 percent, formerly unheard of. Then, if the deal is especially large, it has been reported that up to 80 percent of a cut is possible. Next, there are “voluntary” contributions to non-budgetary funds existing in virtually all government agencies, particularly within the law-enforcement agencies. This ensures a level of affluence for the top bureaucrats, which seriously reduces their interest in administrative reform.

“Desirable” programs get sponsors on orders from above. Corporations must include representatives of “shakedown” organizations in their boards of directors, or simply enter them into their payrolls. The institution of “assigned experts,” well-forgotten since the Soviet times, is rising from the ashes. “The state has ceased to exist as such,” says a Russian business magnate who espoused the ideas of liberal enthusiasm until fairly recently. “Law-enforcement officers are engaged in just two things – political hounding and economic racketeering. The so-called market of judiciary services – however insulting this term may sound to colleagues of Constitution Court Chairman Valery Zorkin – is thriving. I have ten cases in the Arbitration Court, and only one of them is outside the realm of judiciary services.”
The problem is not just that corruption has leached U.S. $30 billion to 40 billion out of the normal economy. The problem is that such “indulgences” have substituted for “political donations.” This perverse practice has a motto: “Grease where required and enjoy a sound sleep.” The huge group of people to whom “everything is allowed” has not vanished – there has simply been a change in its composition. Former fright has been replaced by a feeling of impunity of the money-grubbers who rush to “settle all their affairs before sunset.”

“Government as the main strategy planner must eliminate social stresses and it has a duty of thinking in strategic terms,” says a well-known Russian political functionary. But there is no such thinking now, he admits. Even the most cautious people in the Kremlin administration have stopped raising their eyes toward the ceiling and communicating silently with the aid of handwritten notes. Nor do they mince their words to describe what is happening. This is obviously the main achievement of the past few months, although a dubious one. Everyone has come to realize that neither fear of some anger from above, nor presidential ratings, are able to solve the country’s problems and make viable the system that is entirely grounded in those ratings.

CHANGING TEAM OR PONDERING THIRD TERM OF OFFICE

Immediately following the Beslan nightmare in early fall, experts and analysts wondered if that horrible moment would become an abrupt turning point in the present political system, beyond which it would be difficult to maintain political stability, high ratings, and a sense of awe before the power machinery that was oriented to them. Those assumptions are off the agenda now, as the Beslan wound is beginning to heal. However, the sense of stability will be getting increasingly weaker. People close to Putin say the hostage crisis dealt a huge blow to him, especially when he saw all of it with his own eyes.

None of the radical actions that his aides mulled over in the first few weeks after the crisis was ever initiated. The authorities did take some steps, but of a different nature. Commenting on the events in Beslan and on the President’s subsequent initiatives, a high-ranking government functionary said: “Such risks erode the government’s viability. The recurrence of similar crises subjects it to a test of strength which it may ultimately fail one day.” “The inactivity – mere words, menacing intonations or indecisiveness – wears out the supports of political stability and turns them into a construct made of tin: it may be glistening, but is very unstable.”
A leading political scientist who watched the Beslan tragedy, as well as the President’s initial reactions to it, pessimistically commented: “When you watched him speaking to the people responsible for resolving the crisis, you could read in the look of his eyes that the regime was almost crumbling.” But the expert was apparently too quick to bury the regime. Countries do not turn upside down and people do not change overnight, and no one is going to overturn or change them coercively. And yet the political tunes in the wake of Beslan contained some new notes. More importantly, the President himself was aware of those notes. He admitted the country had been unprepared for new challenges, the law-enforcement agencies and the judiciary were corrupt, and society required much work in order to make it more mature. Presently, there is no firm proof that the new tunes will eventually make up a well-composed melody, but the very fact that someone tried to produce them at all deserves notice.

“We’re past the point of no return,” goes one of the popular opinions. “We’re close to that point,” say others cautiously. But what is there after this? Many believe Putin has two options: to reshuffle his team radically or to begin preparations for a third term of office, since his present team will never let him abandon his post after a second term. “Putin can’t fire anyone,” said a highly placed politician, one of those always standing in public view. “The problem is he has no system. The reason is because formerly his closest allies and team members most commonly occupied only top positions. There was always a layer of inconspicuous people below, who made the system function somehow. But now the grouping of allies and team players has become so populous that they already occupy the second and third tiers of power, too. Their real skills are vague, however, and the system has begun faltering.”

Yet most experts agree that at this stage even those alarming tendencies do not pose a major threat to the regime. The situation in Russia does not remotely resemble what transpired in Georgia a year ago or in Ukraine now, although the Kremlin’s response to the events in Ukraine was grave. The threat of a different kind is looming over the regime – it may simply stop functioning. After all, weakness in power is never forgiven. “The weak are always beaten,” was one of Putin’s favorite sayings. Weakness is what he fears most of all.

This is a consequence of his unbearable loneliness borne out of an almost pathological mistrustfulness; a lonely person at the top. But such loneliness is suitable for a czar, a monarch who suddenly realizes that his suite consists of personalities of secondary importance who will never be his equal. In contrast, a person elected by the nation is not a hostage of nature, the state system or dynastic traditions. His strength lies in his team, the people he finds trustworthy and can rely on to a greater or smaller degree. He can treat some of his team members as his equals. That is why rotations occur, as people who did not live up to expectations are replaced. But what if there is only suspicion and loneliness instead of trust? Does it matter who surround the leader? That is how the vicious circle of loneliness appears – the absence of equals one can rely on, and the growing apprehensions that they may rise up one day (you never know who may have claims to the top position). Downstairs there exists unto itself a hybrid suite and team.

Putin places the blame for most dramas and misjudgments (or allows others to convince himself of it) on weakness. He then opts for a stronger stance and assumes an additional personal responsibility for it. Such escalations can be justified only if one’s subordinates are capable of fulfilling the tasks at a new, tougher level, thus helping the leader, and if their efficiency is not called into question. But this does not seem to be the case at the present time.

EVERLASTING POLITICAL OBEDIENCE?

As if trying to clear away the undergrowth that has filled the political arena, many government officials and their associates suggest that an adjustment of the system has already begun in the run-up to “Operation Successor-2008.”

Several years ago, a high-ranking Kremlin functionary, who ventured to expound on the government’s plans, produced more confusion than understanding, as his explanation seemed totally unrealistic. “How do you hope to achieve all that?” he was asked. He joked gloomily, saying: “Well, through bribing, blackmail and threats of murder, of course.” A few years have elapsed, and here we are: the methods he mentioned jokingly have been employed almost in full. The political system is tuned to a wartime mode during times of peace, but what if a really problematic situation should arise? What methods will be enacted in that case?

Government officials admit that the system is shaky and that the President’s rating remains the pillar of almost everything. “But while the ratings grow exponentially, they may fall overnight,” they must admit. Analysts fear that an unexpected dramatic event may play the role of a rock, into which the stability may suddenly disintegrate like a crystal vase. They have visions of a Russian Watergate that will catalyze the outburst of a spontaneous or accumulated disenchantment of different groups of the population. This situation will play into the hands of one or another part of the seemingly consolidated (but practically disunited) elite which may be discontent with the current scheme of things. Its claims may be variegated but they will add up to collective disdain, thus signaling an end to political obedience.

That is why the authorities are seeking to protect themselves against problems that may occur after 2007, rather than against ones that may possibly arise within the next three years – a period bearing no apparent menace. A system based on the condition of “suspended uncertainty” is being built with exactly that goal in mind. Uncertainty – primarily regarding the universal efficiency of manual governance – is the main condition the Kremlin political technologists aim to achieve as they lay the groundwork for a new political construction. Uncertainty gives rise to fear, and fear breeds a willingness to please. The latter must be done without realizing any particular goals, which are a matter of personal guesswork.

Total mistrust produces the desire to extend personal control over everything. In 1917, the Bolsheviks sought control over the postal services, telegraph and telephone networks, and bridges. Today, these are replaced by financial assets (revenue-generating industrial sectors and corporations), administrative resources (levers of power of different categories), the mass media, and last but not least, the institutions that may become channels of public sentiment. The latter group includes political parties, nongovernmental organizations, the election system in general, and those mediums that reflect singular instances of public approval or protest – meetings, manifestations, marches, etc. Furthermore, one must control appointments to all more or less crucial positions and business transactions. It seems as if the fears of the Yeltsin epoch, which have taken the form of obsessive nightmarish images of “anarchy, permissiveness, and the ruining of statehood,” have returned to haunt us; they are perceived as the main menace to the country and its future. However, “the rescue of statehood from ruin” cannot serve as a program of action for a long period of time. This policy is defensive in essence and not a creative one.

READINESS LINE-2008

The masterminds of “Operation Successor-2008” keep the focal point on the state system rather than society as such.

A system of layers.

The first layer consists of financial resources. They are plentiful, since nothing poses a danger to the global oil market at this time. Businessmen have finally been explained the ideology of communicating with the government. There is no faith, however, in the reliability of this layer, despite “pledges of commitment to the name of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs.” One manager from a resource corporation stated: “This means, in fact, that the government will be gradually taking over the key corporations and spheres of business so as to accumulate controlling stakes in them, or the most faithful people will be delegated to executive positions there.” These businesses include, first of all, the top revenue-earning companies, such as Gazprom and RAO UES, oil companies, defense manufacturers, and partly the machine manufacturers. Gazprom’s ongoing expansion into the oil sector, its merger with Rosneft and the takeover of YUKOS assets fall in line with that tendency.

The tendency of personal loyalty has become the main principle for selecting cadres to executive corporate positions, as opposed to professional skills. This tendency has a reverse side, too: it has an immediate impact on corporate efficiency which, at the very least, is not growing. Furthermore, tension between the government and big business spoils the economic climate in the country.

In 2004, business activity in Russia – primarily in the realm of investment – decreased against the background of a favorable world market situation. Investment in the oil sector fell 20 percent. The GDP grew a mere 6.7 percent versus the possible 9 percent – a realistic figure given the high crude prices. The stock market stagnated, as many blue chips slid to the status of trading instruments in the hands of speculators with access to the government’s insider information. “Scared money” continued to flee the country. Capital flight grew by a factor of several times to U.S. $8-9 billion. The problem concerning the legitimacy of privatization, far from being resolved, has deteriorated still further. The two cornerstones of any market economy – the effectiveness of contract law and guarantees for private property rights – are subject to permanent politically motivated manipulation. “I’m quick in thinking and will get even quicker,” a sophisticated Russian businessman said about whether or not the YUKOS scheme would be applied to other businesses. He also said many businesspeople are fervently attempting to answer the question concerning where they should live – in London, Paris or Zurich. Executives of medium-sized businesses are following in the oligarchs’ footsteps in that respect.

A federal minister said the other day: “It’s not YUKOS as such that worries the investors, it’s the changing vector of the government’s involvement in the economy.” He added after a pause: “The problem of how the political situation will develop is far more serious now than how the economy will develop.”

The second layer is the administrative resource. The reaction to Putin’s “September political revolution” was a far cry from a harmonious chorus of approval. Dissonance was heard for the first time since Putin became president – not so much in outward objections as in doubts expressed. The Kremlin even sent a weak signal that corrections to its proposals were possible. These corrections were included in the final draft of a bill on the “appointment/election” of governors. Sources close to the President said his allies had no unanimity on the feasibility of the September initiatives. What is more, the watershed line did not coincide with the former, habitual division between the Yeltsin Family and Putin’s St. Petersburg associates.

A reasonable question comes to mind: Will the state machinery be as monolithic in a couple of years from now as it seems to be today? People close to the Kremlin say that processes have begun in the presidential team, testifying to its non-uniformity. At this moment, they have the traits of “petty griping,” as one politician put it, but rumors are circulating that contentions, albeit practically imperceptible at the moment, have appeared among important players on the Russian political scene.
Putin’s closest aides have been showing signs of their displeasure with the president, namely with the absence of clear-cut decisions on his part. Add to this the fact that no one can be confident that the allies, now being largely placed to executive posts in various corporations, will not defend only their own interests when the zero hour arrives. Or that those interests will be in line with “the party line.”

The third layer is the mass media. The population is being entertained, attracted and instructed – but never really informed. Foreign news reports on television have been reduced to details about U.S. losses in Iraq and the retelling of marginal stories. The audience is not told about life abroad anymore, but about the pleasures of living here. Developments abroad are limited to explosions, fires, and floods. Developments here range from harvesting to the commissioning of new apartment blocks. They talk about the re-emergence of peaceful life and the construction of a water park in Chechnya. Or they broadcast a presidential meeting, a presidential visit, or someone giving accounts in front of the president. Also, there are concerts, quiz programs, and reality shows. On really big occasions, we will see Ukrainians (most commonly described as a “mob”) in orange scarves “destabilizing the already tense situation” instead of “working or continuing their studies.”

A new trend – presenting documentaries about the recent or distant past – has appeared on the federal television channels in the past few months. An outsider may get the impression that they are tapping historical fact in a search for foundations that can be turned into new symbols of a renewed country, thus helping to build bridges to the future. Back in the 19th century, philosophers would urge the Russians to look for their country’s future in its past, but this advice does not work well somehow. Either the researchers are ill-furnished, or their choice of past material is simply wrong.

The media are obedient to the degree of being sterile. This brings up a reasonable question: Will sterility be instrumental in performing key functions, like the promotion of the next successor? Sociologists have begun pointing to new tendencies in public opinion, however, proving that the sterile media have limited opportunities.

Public opinion researchers say in private that the voters have “grown somewhat tired” of their leader, and if the ratings were to become unstable, bringing a future successor into office would prove difficult since the slogan “Putin supports him” may not work then. These details may seem to have secondary importance, but they may grow over into a tendency. Let us recall that Putin failed to act as a pre-election enticement in both Abkhazia and in Ukraine. Moreover, the Putin factor had the opposite effect. This happened for the first time throughout the post-Soviet space, and it appears that the Kremlin political technologists have noticed it, too. That is why Putin is expected to address a major news conference in the Kremlin upon the outcome of the year, but there will be no nationwide online question-answer segment, when his communication with the people is broadcast on outdoor screens across the country. The people behind the Kremlin walls have apparently decided to be less obtrusive in communications: the President can answer any question, but people have realized that his answers are not always translated into life by his subordinates.

HERITAGE

Putin’s rule may go down in history as a time of lost opportunities or as a replica of the 1970s, a period of quiet and moderate affluence. In fact, those options are quite similar.

At present, there is no answer to the question “Who the successor will be?” More importantly, however, there is no answer to the question “What will he inherit?” The authorities have not offered a single nationwide program to date that could be hailed as a change of the economic structure and the very paradigm of life which still remains Soviet life in essence. To date, the basic reforms that the President made landmarks of both presidential terms have not acquired tangible forms. The political stability and high ratings mostly repose on high oil prices, which generate a consumer demand growth and a per capita income increase by six to eight percent a year. But this is largely due to imports. None of the key reforms launched after 1999 have reached a degree that would make it possible to show any concrete results to the voters.

The resource of global markets, together with Putin’s own popularity, may last until the end of Putin’s presidency, but economists suggest that the next leader will inherit a complex legacy: too many solutions are put off “until a suitable moment” for the sake of stability. Putin cannot but realize this, and this may predetermine the search for a successor along the following guidelines.

First, the successor must embody the continuity of course, on the one hand, and the guarantee that he will not change the elite abruptly, on the other.
Second, in the case that the political or economic systems should develop problems, the successor will have to refrain from blaming his predecessor and cope with them on his own. Attempting to choose a strong successor on the one hand, and an obedient successor on the other, may be Putin’s main dilemma.
The President and his associates may be unable to find a way out of that systemic trap, and many experts believe the presidential office will not let him go in that situation, insisting that “the gains made between 2000 through 2008” be defended. He will be forced to stay – perhaps, as the head of a government formed along the party principle, if not as president. In Ukraine, where “Operation Successor-2004” slid off the predetermined track, a similar decision has just been taken. But if Putin wants to leave the presidential post in a dignified way, he will have to change all his people in one stroke, like Yeltsin did in 1996, and take risks with totally different people – of a different mold, age, professional and mental orientation. “Putin won’t do it, though, he is not that type of a person,” said a well-known political analyst.
Meanwhile, most of the Russians who voted for him do not believe the stories about a naked king. They go on thinking that he is the person they need and that his weighty word will get into the annals of history. Some time in the future, surely.