The ongoing polemics between the proponents and opponents of President Vladimir Putin, which have intensified since the President began to initiate more resolute steps in September, is producing a rather confusing impression.

Personally, I agree with Putin’s chief aide Vladislav Surkov when he said that the staunch opponents of the regime, who pretend to hate Putin’s Russia, actually hate Russia per se. This certainly applies to the majority of our professional democrats and ardent champions of universal human values, as well as those who presently live in Russia (hopefully, they will not remain here for long).

The picture looks less cogent, however, if you take the views of the more moderate people who utter statements like, “I’m not a foe of Russia, I’m not against the Great Russia (this would be considered a taboo notion for the Russian “democrats,” who readily welcome, at the same time, the Great America). Or they say: “I have nothing against Putin as president but I really think that all his actions after Beslan are doing real harm to Russia.” But how should we consider those who sincerely believe that appointing regional governors is destructive for Russia, not so much because this move infringes on democracy, but because the Kremlin is simply unable to select worthy people for the posts (the last years of the Soviet Union provide a good example)? Or what should we make of those who oppose proportionate elections to the State Duma on the grounds that this measure is aimed at artificially forming an institution of political parties that is ostensibly alien to Russia? In other words, allowing another attempt to subject the nation to the prescriptions of radical liberals? Are those people Russia’s foes or not?

Since the President says we are at war, the people who are against us must be called foes, not opponents. However, listing individuals among the opponents is one thing and among the foes, quite another – even if such an act does not produce any “retribution measures.” Incidentally, these measures will immediately and quite naturally get on the agenda since it would be absurd for a country engaged in a war to tolerate its internal enemies (more figuratively referred to as the “fifth column”). So, if we rehabilitate the notion of “an internal enemy” – and life will surely force us to do so – we must have clear criteria for categorizing the disagreeing people into the foes and the opponents, many of whom are our friends harmlessly debating along the principle that says “Lovers’ tiffs are harmless.” It is essential that we spare the innocent and “not throw out the baby (that is, original opinions that are good for the country) with the bath water.”

WHERE IS THE WATERSHED?

The basic question is: Where is the watershed between the genuinely wholesome plurality of opinions – the only remedy to prevent stagnation – and the totally alien hostile ideas. In a country at war and under siege, such ideas must be removed, since they may evolve into a discussion of whether surrendering to the enemy would somehow make more sense. However, alien ideas must not be sanitized at the price of plunging into a dull mental uniformity, which paves the way to defeat.
Such problems are encountered by every nation that is not simply a mass of voters, and each nation provides its own answers to them. Take the U.S., for example. An American may believe that the U.S. should not export democracy to other countries, national minorities should not have social preferences, or that homosexuals should not be given employment at schools. These views actually contradict official U.S. policies and generally accepted viewpoints, and people will simply regard anybody holding such ideas as an eccentric extremist.

The same Americans, however, will treat as an enemy anybody who insists on liquidating the U.S. democratic system of government. They will brand a foe anybody who says national minorities should be driven onto reservations, and sexual minorities marooned in jails. This is not because such ideas run counter to the Constitution. As regards the ethnic minorities, U.S. constitutional provisions have changed several times; as for the sexual minorities, the Constitution does not mention them at all. If you take the UK, it has never had a Constitution, but the watershed separating opponents and foes also exists there, although it is different from that in the U.S. In both cases, however, anyone calling for capitulation to the enemy (or to Osama bin Laden) will certainly be labeled an outcast.

This watershed reflects the difference between society’s outlooks and values, that is, the difference between the changeable, passing ideas and the basic convictions. The system of values of every society at a given period of time is the cornerstone of its identity. It would be a different society without it, although it might be situated in the same place. That is why the person who is against those basic values is also against society as such, even though he or she may be saying the opposite. A set of those basic values makes up the national idea – something that Russia has been looking for over the past ten years at Boris Yeltsin’s original behest, yet looking in the wrong place, as is so often the case.

RUSSIAN NATIONAL IDEA

This brings us to the conclusion that reviving the notion of an internal enemy is possible if you have a fully conceived national idea; a foe is the one who transgresses this idea. A national idea does not come as a teaching, like Marxism-Leninism, that must be communicated to the whole world. Nor is it limited to characteristics of a given country that make it different from all other countries. On the contrary, the national ideas of various countries have a similar essence. A national idea cannot be bestowed on society from above or pushed through from below. It must inherently exist in the nation, although not in a fully conceived form. If it does, it can be formulated clearly, but only formulated.

A person has a chance to become a great politician if he is capable of trailing the society’s essence, gleaning it out of the ephemeral and nonessential, and then setting it out in plain terms. People who attempt to impose a certain ideology on the nation have no such chance. It is obvious for me that it makes no sense arguing about what concept must become the national idea; the debate should focus on what values Russia already possesses as the national idea.

1. Russia is a great state and must remain as such. This means that our existence as Russians inside Russia, not as nationals of a different country living in this country, however affluent and free it may be, is a value of the highest order. Another paramount value is that Russia must be a strong and powerful state, not a weak and dismal one. Its power should be greater than just the defense power that awes the whole world, although this is also a crucial factor. Power also implies advanced science and high education, two mandatory components of any civilization.

That is to say, all of us will prefer living, albeit less affluently, in a strong Russia, as opposed to a more affluent but weak and miserable Russia, or outside Russia for that matter. None of us will then capitulate to whatever enemy for whatever temptations.

2. Russia must remain a state where Russian Orthodoxy is the main creed. This means that the values and standards take their origin in the Russian nation and the Orthodox creed, which have a special status here, together with the Russian language. Developing and consolidating the Russian nation and Orthodoxy, and fostering their interests, which in fact are one and the same thing, constitute the major goal for Russia. It has greater significance for us than the interests of other peoples, or religions in Russia. The latter also have importance, and that is why all of Russia, and not only its constituent territory of North Ossetia, has a duty to defend the ethnic Ossetians living in Georgia.

In what concerns the interests of foreigners, they are irrelevant to us and should be taken into account only in the process of international bargaining of some sort. This does not mean, however, that we should discriminate against non-Russians or individuals who espouse creeds that are untraditional for Russia. Let us recall that Suleiman the Magnificent, the grand Ottoman sultan, had a devout religious Jew as a vizier, but the Ottoman Empire remained a Moslem state and a successor to the Caliphate. Russia can and must establish Russian ethnic and Orthodox religious feasts, but not the feasts of other ethnic groups and/or religions, as national holidays. Those who are discontent with such holidays may simply avoid celebrating them.

3. Russia must retain the status of an imperial country. The most commonly known definition of empire – that is, a state that unites under its sway other states which are currently or formerly independent – has long lost relevance. If this definition is applied to the U.S., an obviously imperial nation, it suggests that the U.S. is not an empire per se.

An empire is actually any state whose existence makes sense for reasons other than simply to be self-supporting. Russia cannot exist without sense. One does not have to be a wizard to grasp this sense – that it is important to build public life on the foundation of Jesus Christ’s commandments.

4. Russia must be a common home to all Russians who live here and abroad; the conditions of our compatriots in other countries is our concern. After all, close is the shirt but closer is the skin. This is a feature of human nature; we cannot simply ignore the plight of our kith and kin. So if we are unable to treat our fellow-Russians abroad as brothers, let us at least treat them as distant relatives. And let us sacrifice some of our interests and rights, besides the most fundamental, for common interests, especially in time of turmoil.

5. Russia is a free country and must remain as such. This means that we have particular rights and freedoms that we will never renounce on whatever considerations, otherwise we will lose the essence of ourselves. Those rights and freedoms may sometimes differ from Constitutional provisions and the plans of our incumbent authorities. For the time being, it is possible for us to drop the direct election of governors – or even that of the president, however menacing this may sound – but we cannot drop the principle of personal responsibility. We could drop ownership of mass media, but we cannot restrict free travel between different parts of the country. Private enterprise, too, must be regarded as an inalienable right rather than the government’s managerial benevolence.

This comprises the whole story. In light of it, the secret of President Putin’s unfading public ratings has a simple explanation – his words and general style mostly (although not always) correspond with the national idea that is cherished by the Russian people.

WHO’S THE FOE?

The gist of what has been said offers a plain criterion for separating the sheep from the wolves. Those people who call for talks with Maskhadov and his like (unless they wish to stipulate their capitulation), or argue that there was no need for an assault at the Dubrovka Theater or the Beslan school, should be considered foes.
The people who propose a repetition of the 1996 Khasavyurt deal with Chechen separatists, and listen to the songs of “Ichkerian fighters” at meetings are foes. Those who recommend Russia disband its Armed Forces under the pretext that the Great West is supporting peace on the planet are foes. The people who allege that Western countries and monetary funds of various colors offer the only right methods for building Russia’s national economy and policies are foes. Those who insist that the state has no right to introduce the basics of religion into school curricula on the basis of Orthodox teaching are foes (although they should not be confused with those who say the Church is unready for this task).

The people who shed tears over Gusinsky’s NTV channel and complain that a dictatorship has arrived because none of the channels launch broadside attacks at Russia are foes. Those who say that the billionaires who crave for power should not be jailed because it spoils the investment climate are foes. The same applies to the promoters of money and entertainment as the major values of life, since they dismiss all other values as fantasies of the Orthodox Church which cause Russia to drag behind the West or even the East.

By contrast, the people who find it necessary to revamp the secret services in order to make them a more deadly weapon against the enemy are not foes. Those who believe that we should cooperate with the Americans in Iraq if we can benefit from it are not foes. Those people who argue that regional governors should be elected rather than appointed in order to prevent unnecessary criticism of the federal center are not foes. Those who argue that the establishment of political parties as the key element of the political system has no future here are not foes.

Those who argue that managed democracy limits the opportunity to express dissatisfaction in a legitimate way and thus will reduce stability over the medium term are not foes. The people who believe that even if the government keeps control over political programs on television, the style of presentation should not resemble the sugary newscasts of Leonid Brezhnev’s era are not foes. Finally, those who think we must elect someone besides Putin or his successor in 2008 are not foes either.
Those people, whose opinions concerning the solution of specific issues differ from the views of the authorities or their associates, yet share all the basic values which comprise the Russian national idea, cannot be considered foes of Russia.

Russia is a great state and must remain as such. This means that our existence as Russians in Russia, and not the citizens of some other state, however affluent and free it may be, is the highest value.