This study analyzes the social identification of individuals in contemporary Russia according to their social environment (a community, system of groups and role functions) and behavioral types. Since the answers provided by the respondents cannot provide enough grounds for drawing a conclusion about their belonging to certain social groups or types, the meaning and significance of the respondents’ “confessions” was checked through an analysis of their real behavior.
 
A “SOVIET” OR A “RUSSIAN”?

Let us take the simplest – and most indicative – set of defining characteristics.

The first impression is that the “Soviet” identification has not only endured but has become even stronger (“in some cases”). However, the percentage of those who never consider themselves “Soviet” has also increased at the expense of those who were earlier undecided. The simultaneous growth of the “Russian” identification can be explained by changes in the official language, documents, etc.

Let’s have a closer look at the “Soviet” self-identification.
The youngest respondents less frequently ranked themselves among “Soviets;” more often they do not use such identification at all. In the upper-age group (55 years and older), “Soviet” identification has grown notably stronger. Similar processes have taken place in all education groups (the only exception is the decrease of “Soviet” self-identification among people with low educations). At the same time, all groups besides those of the elders have experienced a rise in the percentage of those who never identify themselves as “Soviets,” although in various degrees.

The above tendencies reveal a demonstrative nostalgia for the past. Meanwhile, the “Russian” self-identification, although becoming more and more common as an everyday or official “label,” does not mean a social identification yet; approximately two decades of change and upheaval have not yet created the foundation for such identification.

Let us now consider an ideologically dominant theme – the attitude toward the “Russia for Russians” slogan.
 A “Soviet” individual seems to be more connected to ideology (both positively and negatively) than the “Russians” with regard to the nationalistic system of values. But in both cases of self-identification the majority tends to support the above slogan wholeheartedly or with some reservation (“within reasonable limits”); a negative attitude prevails only among non-Russians.

Links between the “Soviet” and “Russian” self-identifications are rather intricate as the “Soviet” tag signifies not only the official terminology of the former state but also its “internal” characteristics (the social order, ideology, life habits, etc., as they have survived in public opinion). At the same time, the emotional and psychological content of the “Russian” tag is much weaker since it is practically devoid of connotation. That is why in most cases the “Russian” tag serves for the majority of the population only as a new shell of the old “Soviet” label which, on the whole, remains dominant. This assertion has two essential reservations. First, only in rare cases does a numerical predominance have a decisive significance; the influence of an active minority in most cases is much more important. Second, a demonstrative self-identification, as has already been mentioned above, is not the same as real identification within a certain group, system of values and type of conduct.
 

* “I do not care about it,” “I never thought about it;” the 2003 survey.

“FRIENDS” AND “FOES”:  LIMITS OF SELF-ASSERTION

From the wide range of problems related to a national self-appraisal, let’s consider only those that reveal a tendency toward self-assertion. This is not just self-identification as a means for distinguishing “friends” from “foes” but a search for a self-justification and substantiation of one’s own position. The need for self-assertion by an individual, a social community and a nation emerges mostly in unstable, transitional situations (for example, in the period of adolescence). For full-grown, “mature” organisms, including social ones, self-assertion is not a problem.

In this survey, self-assertion is best manifest in the respondents’ answers cocerning who they are “proud” of being.
 

- The question was not asked in this year.

The most significant form of a man’s “proud” self-assertion is own status of a father and/or mother. The status of being “children” (younger generation) has a notably weaker impact and is witnessed mostly among people aged 15 to 25 years. Another widespread factor of self-assertion comes from belonging to the “Russian people” (Point 10); almost equally significant is the status of “citizen of Russia” (Point 11). The significance of belonging to “Soviet” people decreased considerably by 1999 and has remained unchanged since then; this characteristic is important mostly to upper-age groups. The growth of self-assertion through pride in one’s native place (Point 4 – “local man,” citizen of one’s city; as well as Point 5 – “master in one’s own house”) is also significant as it corresponds to a widespread (43 percent in 2003) link between the notion of one’s people and the place of one’s birth. Pride in one’s homeland (Point 23) is now mentioned twice as seldom. More and more people take pride in their generation (Point 14) as a way of promoting their self-assertion; the percentage of these people is the highest among the youngest (33 percent among 15 to 25-year olds) and the oldest (29 percent). The low percentage of people who say the status of “veteran of World War II” promotes their self-assertion is explainable by natural reasons, while the small percentage with regard to the status of veterans of the Afghan and Chechen wars can be explained by a public re-assessment of the two conflicts.
Now let’s take a look at ethnic self-appraisals, which can be viewed from a certain angle as factors of self-assertion.

The constants which appear in this part of the survey – peacefulness, patience, self-dignity, readiness to help – are positive strong points indicative of the Russian people’s self-assertion (we do not discuss here as to what extent they are really justified). As for the obviously unsteady characteristics, they include rather notable pairs of seemingly interconnected polarities. One of them belongs to the “external” characteristics of a group’s position: love of freedom has become relatively more widespread (as compared with its decrease in 1999); at the same time, there has been an evident increase in the frequency of mentioning “timid and humble” qualities. Incidentally, 86 percent of those polled said that being “humble” was connected to “simplicity,” while 77 percent linked humbleness to patience.

Of special interest are pairs of features belonging to the “inner” characteristics of a group and to peculiarities of its behavior. Today, much fewer people mention diligence, while many lay emphasis on laziness. Interestingly, this quality is connected with being impractical and irresponsible, as well as “simple and open.” In general, this set of characteristics paints a social “self-portrait” of an individual who is simple and kind, lazy and irresponsible, impractical and constantly humiliated by somebody. In Russian, the word sovok is used to explain this type of ironic self-description. It is, simultaneously, a means of self-humiliation and self-justification or, to be more exact, a self-assertion through a demonstrative self-disparagement. Thus, people habitually set deliberately low levels of social aspiration, and refuse to orient themselves to higher, more civilized types (as Dostoevsky wrote, “try to love us when we are black,” which means that “we” love ourselves in this capacity and we are not going to transform into something different).
 
“GENERALIZED FOE”

In a situation where traditional barriers (social, cultural, state-imposed and everyday) between countries, peoples and groups increasingly erode, social identification often gives rise to attempts to build artificial obstacles at various levels, including inside the mass consciousness. These attempts are greeted with strong support from politicians, ideologists and advocates of patriotic isolationist doctrines.

The simplest and most common form of self-assertion in such conditions is to lower the perception of different cultures, traditions, orientations, etc. The “different” is portrayed as something alien and unacceptable as a universal model. Furthermore, as seen from the public opinion polls, the image of a “foe” is generalized, and includes competitors, enemies, breakers of the peace and traditions, etc. More importantly, this attitude is assumed to all “alien” phenomena. (It is worth remembering that the Greek word xenophobia literally means fear of foreigners or strangers.)

 At the end of 2002, following the terrorist attack at the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow, the attitudes toward representatives of various ethnic groups worsened. Following this tragedy, it is perhaps easy to understand why the percentage of the Russian population who felt irritation, dislike, distrust and fear toward the Chechen people increased from 53 percent (in 2000) to 66 percent. The same thing happened in people’s attitudes toward gypsies (from 43 to 52 percent), Azerbaijanis (from 29 to 39 percent), Americans (from 10 to 17 percent), Arabs (from 15 to 28 percent), Jews (from 12 to 15 percent), Germans (from 6 to 11 percent) and Japanese (from 5 to 9 percent). It is as though the experience of a sharp pain in one part of the body makes it feel as though the entire body is hurting. A year later, at the end of 2003, the intensity of the pain subsided somewhat, and the level of negative attitudes toward the above groups decreased [Public Opinion in 2003. Moscow: VTSIOM-A, 2003, pp. 65-66.]

Attitudes toward non-traditional groups reveal controversial dynamics.

The immediate cause of the striking public animosity toward religious sects is clear: the “friendly” patriarchal Orthodox Church is being granted state status in the country (which is admitted by mass media and public opinion), making other confessions (Catholics, sect members, members of the Hare Krishna movement, and others) “foes” and subjected to various restrictions. Although only 22 percent (against 50) want privileges for the “church of the majority,” up to 34 percent of this number support the “elimination” of sect members.

Similar changes have taken place in people’s attitudes, especially in large Russian cities, toward migrants from the North and South Caucasus, from the former Soviet Central Asia, and from the Far East. For the authorities and the common man, these peoples are “aliens,” dangerous and uncontrolled. That is why the prevalent reaction to migration remains in the form of prohibitions and barriers (which, however, are easily overcome by traditional bribes). According to the 2003 survey, 58 percent of those polled described irritation, dislike or fear toward “migrants from southern republics” living in their town or district. Sixty-six percent (against 22 percent) would accept restrictions against people of “non-Russian nationality” attempting to enter their country, while 58 percent (against 22 percent) would forbid “newcomers from the Caucasus” from remaining in their town or district.

There is yet another method of achieving self-assertion, proposed officially since Soviet times and largely accepted by public opinion, and that is by belittling the image of an external “enemy.” To justify its actions in Chechnya, the Russian government first used the traditional and ineffective slogan of “non-interference in its home affairs;” after 9/11, that rallying cry was replaced with a new and equally ineffective slogan of “anti-terrorist coalition.” Following the beginning of U.S. military operations in Iraq, especially after the aggravation of the situation there in the spring of 2004, Russia’s mass media showered the country with articles and commentaries intended to prove that the coalition forces were acting in the occupied country even more crudely and inefficiently than the Russian forces were in the Caucasus.

MAN AND THE STATE: A “SLY” SYMBIOSIS

Surveys of recent years, for example those conducted during the election campaigns of 2003 and 2004, invariably prove Russians’ strong trust in people in power. But the dynamics concerning the people’s “moral” link with the state reveal a completely different tendency.

There are almost no changes as regards “close relatives.” In all of the other cases the feeling of moral responsibility is now weaker than it was 15 years ago. This means that the authorities and the population are becoming more and more estranged from each other. This change is particularly manifest among the youngest citizens. In 2003, “absolute responsibility for their government’s action” was recognized by 13 percent of elderly people (55 years and older) and 9 percent of the youngest respondents. In 1989, the respective figures were 22 and 11 percent. Twenty-six percent of elderly people now deny their responsibility for developments in the country (as compared with 14 percent in 1989); for young people, this figure stands at 36 percent (22 percent in 1989).

Hence the justification of the population’s sly “game” with the state: the ever-growing number of Russian people considers it rightful not to fulfill their responsibilities to the state. According to the 1999 survey, 48 percent of those polled saw nothing or almost nothing reprehensible in dodging military service; in 2003, the same opinion was shared by 52 percent. In 1999, 58 percent (64 percent in 2003) did not censure the act of riding without ticket on municipal transport, while the concealment of income so as to avoid paying taxes was defended by 42 percent in 1999 and 46 percent in 2003.

As before, people’s mischievous “games” with the state inevitably go hand in hand with the mischievous “games” they play with themselves – deals with one’s own conscience, deliberately sinful deeds.

To sum up, the twenty years that have passed since the start of reforms in Russian society have not resulted in the emergence of a “new” (contemporary, European, democratic, civic) base for self-identification, to say nothing of the self-assertion, of the Russian people. That is why characteristics of the Soviet man remain the real reference point. This tendency is supported by an official search for a “Soviet” legitimization through the symbols, style and governmental methods of the Soviet era. Simultaneously, features of different periods are combined: victorious wartime marches and the stability of the “stagnation” period, administrative reshuffles in the Khrushchev style and the arbitrariness of the perestroika years, etc. Still relevant is the mechanism of “negative” self-assertion, typical of the Soviet times, through the belittlement of the “enemy” or “generalized foe.” However, the mass consciousness is becoming increasingly alienated from the government and the state, while attempts to identify with their values uncover mischievousness and ambiguity amongst the populace. It seems that the Russian people need the protection of the state but they do not want to serve it.