When we look at Russia as a “decaying empire,” many peculiarities of its development – including ethno-political ones – can be more readily explained.
As it is with former empires, the main imperial function (geopolitical expansion) becomes redundant as the landmass begins to atrophy noticeably. A decaying empire seeks only to preserve itself – above all, its imperial body. The present political project of the Russian regime can be described as an attempt to reanimate the empire, and I will attempt to show in the following pages that this project is utopian by nature and any attempt to implement it may destabilize the ethno-political situation in the country.

EMPIRE INSIDE ITSELF

Once an empire shows signs of decay, its positive potential comes to an end and is replaced by negative manifestations; these pose an even greater threat to the empire itself than to the outer world. The inherently imperialistic tendencies that seem to go hand-in-hand with power in Russia predetermined its “catch-up modernization:” since the first quarter of the 19th century, this country has been reformed only in an authoritarian way, that is, “from above.” This sort of modernization did not permit Russia to break out of specific frameworks of catch-up development because its leaders have always halted the renovation process once the country had ensured its self-preservation under various changing conditions. At this point, the reforms were cut short.

Modernization has never been supported by the bulk of the Russian population which has traditionally viewed this process as something external, alien and foreign. This is why modernization has always triggered outbursts of traditionalism, occasionally in the more extreme form known as fundamentalism. And since attempts at modernization in Russia are never fully accepted, there is a rather similar reoccurrence of events throughout Russian history. Reforms have always alternated with counter-reforms: the reformer Alexander I was succeeded by the counter-reformer Nicholas I; then came the reformer Alexander II, who was succeeded by the counter-reformers Alexander III and Nicholas II (for the larger part of his rule). Russia’s recent history has also had its share of reformers (Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin) and counter-reformers. In each such cycle, the goals of progress (for example, “We shall catch and overtake the West”) were replaced with goals of traditionalism (“We shall retire into ourselves” or “We shall find the Golden Age in our past”).

The reader may be asking why I have chosen to use the term “empire” instead of “monarchy,” for example, or “authoritarian regime.” The answer is because the continuing legacy of authoritarianism in Russia is largely explained by ‘imperial syndrome,’ which makes it possible to regenerate the old empire if at least some of its parts have survived. The imperial syndrome, or imperial system, includes several basic elements.

The first element comprises the “imperial body,” that is, those territories that have retained the scars of colonial conquests. This is not just those areas of compact settlement of the colonized ethnic communities, but all territorial entities which are opposed to being part of the empire, but are kept within a single state. The imperial principle calls for the ‘retention of territories (opposite to the principle of ‘voluntary and interested integration’) and has been assimilated into Russia’s policy. In his address to the Federal Assembly, Russian President Vladimir Putin described the “retention of the state on a vast area” as Russia’s thousand-year project.
The second element is the ‘imperial consciousness.’ This is made up of an intricate set of traditional stereotypes, such as imperial ambitions, a servile mentality (such as the continuing hopes for a “wise czar” and a “strong arm”) and the idea of hierarchy among the peoples of Russia, which are divided between the main state-forming “Big Brother” and all the other “younger brothers.”

The third element is imperial power, or imperial order. This is a supranational regime that is estranged from society and which views it, if not as a subjugated population, then at least as an obedient manpower resource and raw material for political manipulations.

The historically established mechanisms for reproducing the imperial syndrome at each cycle of the counter-reforms are deliberately repeated and reanimated by the authorities. Predictably, the reform process, when it occurs, is viewed as disorder and chaos, and gives rise to fears that Russia may further atrophy or even completely disintegrate.

For as long as the imperial body continues to exist, there remain fears of its possible destruction. These fears have essentially increased following the breakup of the Soviet Union, which the majority of Russians describe as the main event, and most painful event, in the last 20 years of Russian history, according to sociological studies conducted by the Yuri Levada Center. Vladimir Putin came to power playing on these sentiments, promising to pacify Chechnya, “take out terrorists even in the toilet” and put an end to separatism.

For as long as fears of the empire’s disintegration persist, there remain hopes for a “strong arm” and a “wise czar.” These stereotypes, in turn, are used to restore and strengthen centralization. The incumbent regime used the slogan of combating separatism to justify its basic reforms: from the introduction of federal districts to the replacement of elected governors with appointed ones.

The growth of an imperial consciousness is also caused by many other factors, among them is the perception that the Yeltsin era – a period of liberal reforms – was characterized by dismal setbacks and even “national disgrace.” Russians remember this period as a time when their country lost its geopolitical role in the world. Finally, there is the painful perception by the ethnic majority of a demographic crisis which has reduced the total number of ethnic Russians nationwide, as well as their proportion of the total population. And yet, the increasing hope for a “strong arm” and the traditionalization of the Russian consciousness are, in my view, connected primarily with the Chechen war, which is a product of imperial policy and, at the same time, a major factor in its escalation.

The Chechen war has largely determined the approach to and the set of instruments for the solution of the entire range of regional and ethnic problems, as well as the new style and methods of Russian policy. Above all, these include a method of pressure (not necessarily military in nature, yet firm) for keeping the regional leaders obedient to the Kremlin. The recent law On the Formation of State Power Bodies in the Entities of the Russian Federation pursues the same goal. The Chechen war has stimulated the present reform of regional policy and provided a moral legitimization of it. Thus, it was only logical that the boundaries of the federal districts – the first element of this reform – coincided with those of military districts: five out of the first seven envoys of the president to those districts were generals and the other two (Kazantsev and Pulikovsky) had taken part in the Chechen war. Since we are presently engaged in two counterterrorist operations – one in Chechnya and the other across the whole of Russia, it is only natural that the same figures may be involved in both campaigns. On the whole, the war has brought about an unprecedented increase in the influence of the security agencies within the political spectrum. In comparison with Yeltsin’s epoch, for example, the percentage of scientists in the incumbent power structures has decreased by almost threefold, while the percentage of military personnel has increased by the same amount.
As we can see, the basic mechanisms of the imperial system have been activated, but will they make the governance of Russia any more effective?

STABLE INSTABILITY

The “war against terrorism” being waged on Chechen battlefields has only caused terrorism to spill over from that embattled region into the whole of Russia. Neighboring Ingushetia has been a permanent front of the Chechen war since 2004. Other neighbors of Chechnya – Dagestan, Karachai-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria – are increasingly becoming battlefields in the struggle against armed terrorism.

The “war against terrorism,” and the consequential state reforms it has prompted, has not brought any more order to Russia. The Kremlin has made its choice – instead of authoritative but inconvenient regional leaders, it has begun to place them with weak but obedient ones. However, such leaders cannot ensure stability in their regions. This has been proven by numerous excesses connected with various attempts by the security agencies to liquidate groups of radical Islamists in Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachai-Cherkessia. The network of armed fundamentalist organizations has acquired an unprecedented scope.
Most of the unrest mentioned above is occurring in Russia’s periphery populated by ethnic minorities. At the same time, however, the rest of the country is experiencing little ethno-political stabilization as well. What is usually taken for stability in reality is only a continuously changing form of instability. In the early 1990s, ethno-political activity was demonstrated mostly by ethnic minorities. Suffice it to recall the “parade of sovereignties” in the numerous ethnic republics of the Russian Federation. Since the end of the 1990s, however, this activity and anxiety has largely been manifested by representatives of Russia’s ethnic majority. The number of members of extremist organizations, for example, that support slogans such as “Russia for Russians” has dramatically increased over the last ten years. According to official estimates by law-enforcement agencies, these organizations now have over 30,000 members, while independent experts put their numbers at 50,000 to 60,000. An even more alarming sign is that the above slogan is supported, in one way or another, by almost 60 percent of Russia’s population.

The persistent myth about the present stability is largely due to the changing face of ethno-political activity: Russian extremists are not recognized as such by ethnic Russians, while the authorities and the general public take no notice of them (“How can you call them extremists? They are Russian fellows, our defenders!”).
In the 1990s, nationalist movements were more politicized than ethnicized, and their leaders during the “parade of sovereignties” voiced their complaints against the authorities, rather than people of a different nationality. Today, however, it is more often the people of a different nationality rather than the authorities who are labeled as the “enemy.”

The authorities of some territories in southern Russia, above all, in the Krasnodar Region, actively exploit the ethnicization of social and political problems: they have borrowed nationalistic slogans from organizations like the Russian National Unity to win political support by displacing discontent to “internal” and “external” enemies. The growth of social and economic problems in the country will almost inevitably make the federal authorities more inclined to use this simple method of shunting responsibility.

NATIONALISM AS A LAST RESORT

Initially, the reanimation of the empire was void of any ethnic coloring and rested on the slogan: “The authorities are the only Europeans in Russia, so don’t hinder their efforts to make you happy.” Surprisingly, however, it rather quickly turned out that the newly built power vertical not only was unable to solve old problems, but it also generated new ones. The arbitrariness of the officials increased, as did popular discontent. Pensioners were the first to take to the streets to protest against the ill-prepared reform which replaced non-monetary social benefits with cash payments. The senior citizens proved to be not only the most destitute, but also the most fearless part of the population. The pensioners’ protests may soon be joined by other, less fearless groups of society, including businesspeople who are increasingly suffering from the arbitrariness of officials. Yet, this does not mean that the myth about a “good empire” is no longer applicable. Most likely, it will only be modified by providing it with an ethnic tinge.

An ethnic version of the “good-czar, good-boyars” model, expressed by the formula: “Power will immediately become people’s power as soon as it is made Russian” is more attractive emotionally and less vulnerable logically than a non-ethnic version. Today’s Russia is completely dominated by a primordial understanding of ethnicity as a natural, almost racial, feature – representatives of one or another ethnos are “bad” or “good” due simply to their nature. Rational reasoning is powerless against such views; that is why there is a high probability for the implementation of the second model – ethnicized, national-imperial or national-statist – of strengthening the power vertical in Russia.

The ethnicization of the imperial model may cause a shift of accents in building an image of “ethnic aliens.” The authorities cannot encourage anti-Chechen sentiments in society and, at the same time, drag Chechnya into Russia. The authorities will not gain from the growth of anti-Islamic sentiments, since Muslims make up a majority in several constituent republics of the Russian Federation. This factor may alter patterns of xenophobia and – most importantly – spark a growth of anti-Semitism. This is the oldest and most traditional image of an enemy; moreover, it is a convenient outgrowth as the empire is grappling with crisis: the kindling of anti-Semitism will not provoke a growth of separatism as there are no compact settlements of Jews in Russia; this includes Birobidzhan, the administrative center of the formal Jewish Autonomous Republic. Furthermore, anti-Semitism does not split various nationalistic movements; on the contrary, it serves to consolidate them. Anti-Semitism in Islamic fundamentalism is no weaker than in Russian fundamentalism. Finally, and most importantly, anti-Semitism corresponds with the anti-oligarchic sentiments of the majority of the population.

There are other forms of ethnic nationalism that are quite harmless to the imperial order and actually serve to strengthen it for some time. This may surface for example, as mistrust – and other forms of negative attitudes – toward foreigners whose governments have assumed a policy of integration into the European Community. Sociological studies conducted in the last few months have revealed an increase in phobias toward Ukrainians, Georgians and Moldovans.
The political exploitation of mass ethnic prejudices can become an instrument for transforming the existing political regime. There are at least two possible scenarios for Russia’s transformation into a national-imperial system. According to the first variant, the incumbent authorities will be partially renewed through the infiltration of political figures with strongly pronounced national-imperial views. The ruling regime will then discard the remainder of its liberal drapery and start building, with an ever-increasing zeal, the power vertical, relying on anti-oligarchic and statist rhetoric.

Under the second variant, the present regime will be replaced by radical Russian nationalists who have already drawn up and widely publicized their program for restoring the Russian Empire in order to “regenerate the Russian nation.” Their leaders call themselves “the third force” which will replace Communists and democrats (they assign the incumbent regime to the second category). Nationalists also describe the present federal authorities as anti-national, but they understand this not as the regime’s estrangement from the nation as a civil society, but as “racial defects” of some members of the government. Such an interpretation meets with much more understanding and approval of the population than discussions about a civil nation. Whereas the ethnic nationalism of minorities is, as a rule, of an anti-imperial nature, the ethno-nationalism of the majority can be used for the restoration of the imperial system, as it was used in Germany’s Third Reich. The theorists of Russian national imperialism now use that experience. The present power vertical is not enough for them; they want to combine it with a vertical of peoples, ruled by a state-forming people (like the “true Aryans” in the Third Reich). Incidentally, if there emerges a new, racist empire in Russia, it will be the third one to have existed – after the czarist and Soviet empires.

A WHEEL WITHOUT A RIM

How stable would such an empire be today? It may last long enough to let everyone plumb the depths of misfortune and further trim the already tiny sprouts of liberal opposition. On a historical scale, however, such an empire would be doomed to an early death. In the first of the above variants, it would decay slowly and bloodlessly. In the second variant, it would die fast and, most likely, with many victims. But in any case, not a single political force in Russia now has enough instruments or resources to marshal the society and lead it toward one or another goal. Fear, as a mobilization resource, was exhausted way back in the 1960s, as was demonstrated by the events in Novocherkassk [a workers’ uprising in 1962 in protest against price hikes. The uprising was brutally suppressed by the authorities. – Ed.]. The recent pensioner protests came as one more proof that society has lost its fear.

There has been yet another change of late reflected by the bureaucrats – the main executor of the imperial project. In the Stalin era, proprietors were fought by social groups from the opposite class. Today, bureaucrats no longer combat private property; they fight for its redistribution in their own favor. The modernization of Chile during the times of Pinochet cannot serve as an example for Russia. In Chile, generals of bourgeois origin fought against the leftists. In Russia, generals of leftist origin fight against the bourgeoisie. Russian officialdom is being degenerated by corruption as if it were afflicted with leprosy. Some officials manage to combine nationalistic ideas with pragmatic cupidity. For example, the level of xenophobia among the police is higher than among other social groups; this factor, however, does not prevent the police from providing protection to ethnic criminal groups and covering up illegal migration.

The servile mentality of the Russian people, although still relevant, has been strongly reduced. People still readily believe that “the state must care about us,” but they no longer want to be in the service of the state and the sovereign. They still have ambitions of citizens of a “great power,” but they no longer wish to make any effort to achieve them – especially at the cost of their life.

Empires can break up without obvious signs of separatism in their provinces. Most of the former Soviet republics showed no sign of separatism, yet the Soviet Union collapsed. Empires resemble a wheel without a rim. All parts of this structure are held together only through the center, and any overload there will cause the entire structure to come apart.

Russia is not doomed to disintegration. Yet, its preservation requires federalization, which, in turn, will take extraordinary political efforts of all anti-imperial forces. Also, there must emerge new remarkable figures and fresh ideas among those forces. For the time being, however, such developments seem highly unlikely.

* * *

I am becoming increasingly convinced that the peculiarities of Russia’s transformation and the essence of its unique development can be best understood from the position of its imperial past and present. Judging by the experience of the East European countries, the motivation to “escape from the empire” was one of the main reasons for their success with democracy and modernization. It has helped them survive shock-therapy reforms and prevented the very possibility of reviving Communist ideas there. In contrast, Russia has no such natural barrier to the revival of imperial traditionalism. The larger part of its territory is the former metropolitan country, in which the entire set of imperial sentiments can easily revive: from the perception of the country as a superpower to hopes for imperial order.
Russia cannot run away from the empire as it would from an external enemy; the empire complex can only be removed through its own efforts. In my view, this process will proceed slowly in Russia – until all hopes for a “strong arm” and a “wise czar” die a natural death.