The tumultuous changes that are occurring in the post-Soviet space – a zone where Moscow’s traditional influence has never been challenged – present Russia’s ruling authorities and society with an identity problem. “One of the weaknesses of our society and state,” according to Andrei Kokoshin, Russian analyst and State Duma deputy, “is that not only the nation, but even the intellectual, political, and business elite lack a clear understanding as to the exact identity of our people and society.”

The ideological confusion that characterized Russia’s elite following the collapse of the Soviet system, together with the bitter disappointment that accompanied the post-Soviet liberal model, highlight the need to explore the fundamental characteristics of Russian civilization. Unless Russia takes into account the national characteristics that to a very large degree shaped the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation today, it will be impossible to devise a new model necessary for adjusting to the realities of the modern world.

What, then, are the core characteristics of the traditional Russian mentality?

THINKING RUSSIAN

According to the sociologist Igor Yakovenko, the Russian mentality possesses several distinguishing features: syncretism, Manicheanism, insularism, and a split cultural identity.

Syncretism (syncresis) is a state of society and culture that is characterized by the fusion and blending of their elements. A primitive society may be described as one where neither social roles nor professions are separated, and institutions such as the family or private property do not exist. In a syncretic society, knowledge about the world – the norms of behavior, literature, religion, abilities and skills – exist in an aggregate, non-discrete form. The entire history of mankind is a continual process that works toward the fragmentation of primary syncretism. It is noteworthy that this process advanced faster and more vigorously in the West than in the East, where it was checked or impeded by culture.

One fundamental feature of the Russian mentality is that it fixes the level that has been achieved in the fragmentation of syncretism as final, obstructing its further fragmentation. Moreover, it views a return to its primary state as the ultimate ideal. If forced to choose, a Russian traditionalist will predictably opt for a model that is characterized by a higher level of syncretism. This explains why the idea of universal equality is so popular in Russia, while the ideal society – i.e., Communist – set forth in Soviet ideology obliterates the opposition between town and countryside, manual labor and brainwork, and presents a utopian plan for the eventual merging of socialist nations; this plan includes the evolution of a new community of people which would eliminate the division between rich and poor. It is not difficult to see that this ideology has similarities not only with Christian ideas of Heaven, but also with the popular vision of an ideal kingdom that is embodied in numerous folk tales and legends.

Not surprisingly, at the height of their influence Communist ideas quickly gained a wide following in Russia. The other side of the coin is that the evolution of a civil society is now progressing very slowly. The development of civil society is, in fact, the replacement of a limited number of rigid, vertically integrated political and social structures with a diversity of self-governing entities that have a complex interaction with each other, as well as with the ruling authorities. Thus, civil society is characterized by a higher degree of syncretic fragmentation.

Manichaeism. The doctrine of Manichaeism pertains to the Persian religious reformer Mani (3rd century A.D.) who reviewed and summarized the dramatic process that followed the disintegration of primitive mythological/ritualistic syncretism. The diversification of human activity and worldview resulted in the emergence of culture and a fundamental watershed between good and evil. Manichaeism sees the world as an arena of the eternal struggle between two forces – light and darkness, good and evil. In this struggle there are “them” and “us.” “Us” are always on the side of light, while “them” are on the side of darkness. A Manichee always needs an “enemy,” real or imaginary. Anyone can serve as an enemy – the man next door, a foreigner, and a person of another faith. Enemies may also be ideological opponents or business competitors. In the context of interstate relations, stereotypical enemies of the Manichean type are: a hostile environment, imperialist circles, backstage intrigues or simply “forces of darkness” that are out to “destroy, dismember, or take control of everything.”

Insularism posits that the real world wallows in vice, while all attempts to rectify and improve the situation are doomed to failure. The ideas of insularism are deeply ingrained in Russian traditions: For example, they are related to monasticism, non-acquisitiveness, and modern varieties of a “who cares” attitude. Insularism generates a great diversity of asocial complexes – from decadence, depression and hopelessness to justification in the mass consciousness of any idea or initiative that fails in practice (from building socialism to democratization to the monetization of in-kind welfare benefits, for example), the basic reasoning being: Nothing will work anyway since the world is hopeless.

Split cultural identity. Briefly, this specific feature of the Russian mentality can be described as the existence in society of two polar opinions on any matter of consequence. They arise from different systems of values, concepts and arguments, as well as methods of their verbal expression. There can be no dialog between proponents of these positions. Instead there is a system of monologs. Furthermore, opponents are also affected by purely Manichean complexes in relation to each other. In this situation the predominant aspiration is to suppress or, if possible, destroy an opponent. Yet another outcome of this standoff is the ineptness of the decisions made, which is due not to the inability to formulate ideas, but to deeply ingrained cultural stereotypes.

The aforementioned elements comprise the core of Russia’s cultural and mental continuum. (The cultural core is an integrated system: Said elements are not isolated or separated from each other but are systemically interconnected. They support and complement each other, and therein are found an important source of their stability.) Among other components, it is essential to note the sacral image of the ruling establishment – on all levels (in the eyes of the majority of Russians, the state has always been the Ultimate Entity, always opposed to its subjects, with any supreme leader invariably grasping a problem faster and fathoming it more profoundly than any expert or specialist in the field). An essential factor here is the “primacy of expansionism” which has always been related to violence (against nature, people or neighboring countries) because new resources cannot be introduced without coercion.

The Russian mentality is also characterized by the squandering of resources, including human resources – a condition that arises from the primacy of expansionism and the sacredness of power.

It should be noted that traditional Russian culture, which evolved simultaneously with the Russian centralized state in the 13th-16th centuries, was (and still is) considerably exposed to the trends of modernization, thus assimilating new ideas and features. At the same time, traditional characteristics were not degraded or destroyed; they were simply sidelined, oftentimes operating on the purely subconscious level.

Nonetheless, even though they exist on the subconscious level, these fundamental cultural elements influence intellectual, spiritual, public and political life in all of its manifestations and on all levels – from everyday life to the halls of power. These “civilizational specifics” also predictably impact on the course of foreign policy.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND CRUSHING OF SYNCRETISM

A person who is guided, perhaps subconsciously, by the core values of Russian civilization is, of course, better off and more comfortable living in a “correctly” organized world – for example, a world that is divided into political blocs by oppositional alliances. It is preferable that two blocs exist – for instance, the Entente and the Alliance of Central Powers or the Warsaw Pact and NATO. In such a situation, everything is understandable and logical, and it is clear who is “friend” and who is “foe.” Furthermore, a “friend” is always right, and “friends” are never betrayed. In its desire to defend “friendly” Serbia in 1914, Russia took the risk of being dragged into a European war (which is in fact what happened). Likewise, by defending “friendly” Cuba in 1962, Moscow ignored the potential danger of a nuclear missile conflict with the United States (which, fortunately, was avoided at the last moment). The Soviet Union assisted its allies from the socialist camp, providing them with colossal amounts of funds.

In this setup, every country must be classified as either “friend” or “foe.” If, for example, Egypt and Syria are considered to be  “friends,” they must be supplied with billions of dollars worth of arms even though it is obvious that these arms will never be paid for or even used properly. By contrast, Israel is a “foe;” so, first, it must be denounced as a conduit of reactionary Zionist ideology; second, all relations with it must be discontinued; and third, Soviet Jews must be thoroughly discouraged from emigrating to Israel; it does not really matter that this course effectively pits the country against the rest of the world.

Also indicative is the swift transformation of some “friends” into “foes.” Thus, in 1948 Josip Broz Tito went from a national hero into a “Nazi stooge” practically overnight. More recently, we witnessed Victor Yushchenko suddenly emerge from a pragmatic, cooperative politician into “a person who has conducted a lavish election campaign paid for with other people’s money, sold out his independence, and is now ready to sell the independence of Ukraine” (as taken from an election campaign leaflet signed by Victor Khristenko, deputy chairman of the Association of Ukrainian Communities in the Russian Federation). “As pro-Russian as Moldova’s new president – the Russian Communist Voronin – seemed to be, now he is apparently pro-Western and pro-U.S.,” as Andrei Piontkovsky, a Russian political scientist, quipped, highlighting this trend.

Meanwhile, the concept of “correctly” organized international relations is rapidly losing ground in the modern world. The explosive growth in the number of new states makes the principal mechanism of international relations, adapted to the world’s bloc-based structures, ineffectual and unmanageable.

The need for global coordination in the second half of the 20th century brought about new mechanisms, as well as new international organizations. According to some sources, by the mid-1980s there were 365 intergovernmental and 4,615 non-governmental international organizations – twice as many as in the early 1970s. This is where the focus has shifted in the decision-making process on matters of international coordination and cooperation.

This is in fact the “crushing of syncretism in the making,” with regard to the system of international relations. The “simple and understandable” structure, where all connections are predicated on a dozen or so treaties and where it is clear who is “friend” and who is “foe,” is being replaced by a complex scheme of interaction where everything is interconnected by an intricate, multitiered system of agreements and protocols and where there are no friends or foes but rather partners formulating and upholding their own interests. In other words, a rigid hierarchical structure is giving way to a flexible and mobile network structure, and herein is to be found the essence of the current phase of historical evolution.

Similar processes are also occurring within the internal structure of international terrorism – a highly relevant development for Russia. International terrorism is a mobile and flexible network of interacting but essentially autonomous structures that do not have a single command and control center. Therein is its strength, making it especially difficult to fight. Thus, it would be mere fantasy to assume that terrorism will be eradicated once the antiterrorist coalition captures the semi-mythical Osama bin Laden, or destroys the mythical al Qaeda headquarters. Network beats hierarchy.

Reflecting on three centuries of Russian politics (from the Time of Troubles until 1917), Alexander Solzhenitsyn talks about the “missed opportunities for internal development and the extravagant wasting of human resources on external objectives that were unnecessary for Russia: They were more concerned about European interests than their own people.” Now, what about the country’s foreign policy after 1917? First, there was the preparation of a world revolution, then fraternal assistance to countries of the socialist camp, as well as countries “taking the path of non-capitalist development.” Finally, in the modern era, there has been assistance to the former fraternal republics that have now become independent sovereign states. What are all of these examples if not foolishly wasted efforts?

Thus, despite the different historical circumstances and conditions, similar foreign policy paradigms and mechanisms are being reproduced. In some way or other, they reflect the fundamental characteristics of core cultural values that influence the formulation of doctrinal foreign policy concepts. For Russia, the philosophy of syncretism plays a decisive role and manifests itself by a tendency to reduce the entire range of international relations to a confrontation between a small number of alliances or blocs, identifying the “poles” of influence and staking out the zones of special interests.

MENTALITY AND “GLOBABILITY”

Like any theory, the concept of Russia’s civilizational specifics, while addressing a number of problems, raises many new questions. The main question is, perhaps, how the known mechanisms of civilizational specifics correlate with the development strategy of modernization.

Complaints are frequently made about the “hangover” of the Russian mentality that is hindering the country’s integration into the world economy, international labor markets and modern international relations. First, no development strategy can ignore civilizational specifics as a fundamental objective factor. Of course, it is perfectly reasonable to seek a target-specific adjustment of a nation’s specific features which impede modernization. But in any case this is a prolonged and painful process.

Second, the following question is also perfectly valid: Are the fundamental characteristics of the Russian mentality really an impediment to any modernization projects in the country and, therefore, subject to elimination? Or perhaps there are some positive Russian characteristics that, on the contrary, could be successfully called upon for the modernization process?

There certainly are; the ability of Russian culture, for example, to assimilate different features from other cultures, as well as other cultural identities, without jeopardizing its intrinsic nature. This particular feature, which also arises from the Russian proclivity to syncretism, was noted long ago by Fyodor Dostoevsky: “It was not with hostility (as might have been expected) but with friendliness and great affection that we accepted geniuses from other nations to our hearts, knowing instinctively how to recognize, forgive, and reconcile differences, thus expressing our readiness and proclivity for mankind’s global reunification.” (Incidentally, Dostoevsky presaged the evaluation of Russia’s policy that was offered by Alexander Solzhenitsyn 100 years later: “What has Russia been doing with its policy during the last two centuries if not serving Europe, probably far more than serving itself? I do not think this was only due to the ineptitude of our politicians.”) Thus, a commitment to syncretism can play a positive role. This is especially important in the age of globalization, when a country’s “globability” – that is, its ability to respond to the challenge of globalization – plays an increasingly significant role. 

Here is another example. In 1945, the U.S. military occupation administration, led by Gen. Douglas MacArthur, set out to turn Japan into a country committed to democratic and free-market values. Many experts warned, however, that Japan’s traditional adherence to communal values would become a natural impediment to this mission. Yet, 30 years later, Vladimir Tsvetov, one of the best Soviet experts on Japan, in studying the mechanism of the Japanese “economic miracle,” quoted the CEO of a major Japanese shipbuilding company: “We were lucky. Communal relations had prevailed in Japan up until 1945, and during the relatively short spell of confusion following the end of the war, the communal spirit did not disappear.”

There are two important aspects here. First, this “representative of monopoly capital,” as Tsvetov describes him, states that, contrary to predictions by American experts, communal relations, far from becoming an impediment, proved an essential engine of Japanese economic modernization. More importantly, this period following the end of the war – when the U.S. administration was pursuing the most radical transformations affecting all spheres of life in Japanese society – was described as a brief “spell of confusion.” During this period, Japan experienced democratic elections, the adoption of a new Constitution, and the imposition of checks on military-industrial corporations. Furthermore, Shintoism was stripped of its status as a state religion, thus causing Emperor Hirohito to lose his divinity status. Finally, there was the free distribution of 10 million copies of the Bible, the expurgation of school textbooks, etc.

MacArthur recalled that he had been granted absolute power to control the life of 80 million people and rebuild their nation, which included the need to fill the political, economic, and spiritual vacuum that had come about following the war. Three decades later, however, this feverish activity was effectively dismissed as a “short spell of confusion;” and what Gen. MacArthur only saw as different types of “vacuum” in fact turned out to be a repository for the core elements of culture which subsequently ensured the spectacular and dynamic rise of Japanese society.

Here is yet another example, borrowed from Alexei Zudin, a Russian political scientist. In the 1950s, many authors attributed the economic stagnation of Southeast Asia to Confucian ethics: After all, Confucians are oriented toward contemplation, introspection, passivity, etc. Twenty years later, however, these regions became economic growth areas, producing the proverbial “Asian Tigers.” Today, experts argue that Confucian ethics was a principal factor in this success story: the philosophy orients the individual toward self-discipline and concentration, and as soon as favorable opportunities arise, an individual releases his energy.

At the same time, society’s historical transformation may be accompanied by a revision of basic attitudes and values. The deep changes that occurred in Turkey in the 1920s, for example, were related not just to the form of governance but affected the attitude to religion and the empire. The revolution that was carried out by the Young Turks and led by Turkey’s first president, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, changed the core elements of culture, effectively forming a new nation.

The modern world dictates its own requirements. Nevertheless, the possibility for a transformation that ensures the vital evolutionary dynamism is obviously limited by the systemic characteristics of culture. Thus, a carefully planned, target-specific adjustment of social traits is becoming a historical imperative.

“CHAOS THEORY”

Russia’s history shows that forcible methods of changing its national mentality – by adjusting it from above, for example – are counterproductive. The only possible strategic course that can produce a positive result within a relatively short time is the modernization of the national education system. The wide array of social disciplines from the Soviet system of higher education borrowed many of the traditional elements unique to the Russian mentality. A modern liberal-arts education, however, does not provide answers to questions related to a nation’s identity. Meanwhile, these questions cannot even be formulated properly outside the broad global context whose understanding presupposes the inclusion into the humanities of such obligatory systemic, fundamental courses as the history of culture and the history of religion. Sufficient knowledge has already been accumulated for developing training courses that could conveniently be described as the theory of civilizations or civilizational analysis.

The acquisition of analytical skills is especially important for liberal-arts students. Analysis is, in a certain sense, the opposite of syncretism. The Russian traditionalist perceives a syncretically fragmented world as a daunting chaos. He believes that chaos can be overcome by simplifying the situation and enforcing order – via economic regulation, the vertical chain of command in society, and a new multipolar world order.

Meanwhile, complex-system modeling has long been a subject of analysis. Today, there exists a special branch of mathematics known as “chaos theory.” Any student of the humanities must understand that there is an adequate mathematical apparatus for modeling random network structures and analyzing the processes occurring within them. Generally speaking, it is vital for liberal-arts students to study mathematics in order to build mathematical models to analyze the current status of objects or phenomena, as well as forecast prospects for their development. Liberal-arts students also need the ability to operate in the modern information space. To make effective decisions in our increasingly complex world, already at the project feasibility stage, it is necessary to analyze the complex and diverse connections of an object or phenomenon and to assess the possible consequences of a particular scenario. This kind of analysis cannot be carried out without tapping and processing a huge volume of informational resources. And, of course, comprehensive problems cannot be resolved without a coherent strategy or its in-depth discussion in society. And this involves, importantly, a review of the core elements of cultural values.