© "Russia in Global Affairs". № 3, July - September 2005

This article is an account of a workshop held in January 2005 and entitled Russia-EU Relations: The Contemporary Situation and Prospects for the Future. The workshop, headed by Sergei Karaganov, involved Russian experts in Russia-EU relations and representatives of Russian ministries, government agencies and major companies. The workshop was organized by the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Editorial Board of Russia in Global Affairs, the Aeroflot Joint Stock Company, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and the Institute of Strategic Studies and Analysis.

Of Russia’s many international allies, relations with the European Union hold a unique place. The EU is Russia’s largest trading partner, while the EU member states account for an essential part of all humanitarian and people-to-people contacts of Russian citizens abroad. Yet, despite an extensive program of cooperation aimed at bringing Russia closer to Europe’s regulatory standards and rules, the two parties have fundamental differences in the political sphere which continue to increase, as does the economic rivalry between them. The elite of Russia and the European Union barely understand each other, and this lack of mutual comprehension is only increasing. Does Russia’s EU policy have a well-formulated goal? How will Russia-EU relations develop in the future? And what cooperation model is the most advantageous to them? This workshop tried to find answers to these questions.

RUSSIA-EU RELATIONS

Despite the long and active dialog between Russia and the European Union, which includes a well-developed system of bilateral ties at various levels and a solid legal base, relations between Russia and the EU remain in a state of uncertainty. The parties lack a shared understanding of the phrase “strategic partnership,” although this has been used to officially summarize the nature of their relations. Both Russia and the EU are becoming disillusioned with each other, and this feeling often gives way to irritation. This has resulted in the fact that the agenda of bilateral summits, together with the meaningful content of their drafted agreements, have been coming up short. Both parties lack a strategic understanding of how their mutual relations should develop.

At the same time, the European Union is becoming increasingly aggressive toward Russia. Most importantly, this refers to the situation in the post-Soviet space and to competition for markets and economic channels of the future. The personal relationships forged between the Russian president and the leaders of the EU’s major countries in 2000-2002, are beginning to lose their effectiveness. As the Western leaders must reckon with the influence of public opinion in their own countries, an increasing number are beginning to question the efficiency of the Kremlin’s domestic policy. Another factor concerning the change in the European Union’s policy line toward Moscow involves the EU’s new member states which joined the Union in the spring of 2004. These countries have taken a tough stance toward Russia and seek a major role in mapping out the EU’s Russia policy.

Today, the EU accounts for 48.6 percent of Russia’s foreign trade. Russia’s exports to the EU include mostly fossil-fuel energy supplies and primary processed goods. This structure of exports reflects the level of the real competitive ability of Russian products. Oil and gas exports presently serve as a kind of “airbag” that guarantees against unpredictable complications in political relations. Yet this is obviously not enough to further develop mutual ties. Russia requires not a lesser EU role in its foreign trade but a diversification of its exports and the development of trade with other actors, specifically by exporting its traditional raw goods to other regions as well.

Meanwhile, the EU countries themselves do not display any special interest in a broader range of imports from Russia. Indeed, they seem to view this country rather as a source of energy resources. (Russia accounts for 7.6 percent of the EU’s aggregate imports and 4.4 percent of the EU’s aggregate exports.) Concurrently, the European Union is searching for new resource suppliers in order to secure itself against possible cataclysms in Russia, as well as to deny Moscow even a theoretical possibility of using its energy supplies as an instrument of political pressure.

Russia can increase its competitiveness by developing a transcontinental transport infrastructure which would offer the most convenient and safest route between Europe and Asia. In this respect, Russia must revise its approach to transit issues, which now links the state of this infrastructure primarily to the issue of national security. The construction of new railroads, air navigation and air traffic control systems and the modernization of existing ones, together with the construction of modern transit airports (which include payments for non-stop flights along the trans-Siberian route) have been important steps in this direction.

The European Union understands the importance of Russia’s transport potential and seeks to increase its presence on Russian transit routes; this would include, primarily, flight routes. To this end, the Commission of the European Communities (CEC) insists that European airlines be exempted from compensatory payments for flights through the trans-Siberian corridor, and suggests that Russia adopt an “open sky” policy. If Brussels persuades Russia to implement such steps, this would represent a major precedent. Essentially, it would permit the EU countries to increase their supplies across Russia, thus effectively sidelining Russian airlines without compensating their financial losses.

Russia’s integration into the global economy could also be promoted by railroad supplies between Europe and Asia; this potential, however, has not been sufficiently tapped.

The experts disagreed on their assessment of the terms on which Russia and the EU signed a protocol on Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization. It was unanimously agreed, however, that the very fact of the protocol’s signing was a positive gesture as it has removed one source of mutual irritation – disagreements over the terms for Russia’s accession to the WTO. However, the concessions that Moscow has had to make under EU pressure may inflict great damage on the Russian economy as a whole, as well as on its individual corporations, such as Aeroflot, Gazprom, and Russian Railroads. It also remains unclear what the balance of benefits and losses will be for Russia now that it has ratified the Kyoto Protocol.

Earlier, the need to sign the WTO protocol forced Russia to make concessions to the EU which occasionally linked one issue to another, including the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol with the WTO accession issue. Now that this sword of Damocles has been removed, Russian negotiators have gained more freedom of action. An overwhelming majority of the participants present at the workshop agreed that maintaining the status quo in Russian-European relations, preserving the present model of cooperation, and trying to overcome the latent crisis by letting things run their natural course would be unacceptable. The experts emphasized that Russia must clearly formulate a strategic goal for creating a concrete model of interaction with Europe. But if Russia tries building its relations with the EU without having such a goal in mind, it will have to make ever new unilateral concessions. This will create a situation in which Russia’s role will be reduced to merely reacting to the EU’s initiatives.

THE LEGAL BASE OF RUSSIA-EU RELATIONS AND THE “FOUR COMMON SPACES”

The legal base of Russia-EU relations has become outdated; moreover, it has been inadequate from the very beginning. The parties fail to completely fulfill the terms of their Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), concluded in 1994, and most of its key elements will no longer have any relevance after Russia joins the WTO. Furthermore, neither Russia nor the EU is preparing an adequate substitute for the PCA, which expires in 2007. Instead – partly due to administrative inertia, partly due to the fear that a pause in the dialog would increase the atmosphere of negativity – the parties are continuing to work out new mechanisms of cooperation within the framework of the Russia-EU project known as “four common spaces.”

The experts agreed, however, that this concept cannot serve as a replacement for the PCA. From a legal point of view, the concept of “four common spaces” is beyond the juridical conceptual vocabulary. From the point of view of political relations, the content of Russia’s and the European Union’s joint “road maps” actually puts Russia on an equal level with other EU neighbors. The implementation of the “four spaces” concept will not help the parties to overcome the present crisis in their relations but will only create an outward impression of progress, which later will inevitably bring about a new wave of disillusionment.

By making Russia pressed for time, the CEC will, most likely, try to fix Moscow’s unilateral concessions through formal agreements. The weakness of Russia’s negotiating positions is largely due to the lack of coordination among different government agencies and to the inadequate involvement of businesspeople in the negotiating process. This factor enables the EU to impose its own agenda and initiatives on Moscow and push through decisions that are often aimed at receiving unilateral advantages by the EU.

An absolute majority of the experts who participated in the discussion argued that Russia should refrain from signing any binding agreements with the European Union for the next two to three years. If, however, Russia does decide to sign documents with the EU, these should be limited to “agreements on strategic intent.” The experts believe the work on the “common spaces” should be re-oriented to the preparation of a new “major” treaty between Russia and the EU, which must replace the PCA, and specific agreements on individual areas of interaction.

Russia should draw up and propose its own document drafts; otherwise it will be forced, yet again, to be bound by CEC-proposed drafts. Furthermore, it must find an internal working mechanism for preparing a Russian proposal for a new fundamental treaty with the European Union for the period after 2007.

The experts emphasized that the content and nature of a new treaty must be determined not by the need for “rapprochement” (which can simply be a consequence of administrative inertia), but by Russia’s final objective in its relations with the EU. Since the drafting of the treaty must be preceded by a definition of Russia’s intended goal, and not vice versa, it is the final goal that will determine the nature of the new treaty – whether it will be, for example, a treaty of association or, conversely, a less significant agreement that will not provide for any serious integration.

STRATEGIC GOAL

The participants of the workshop unanimously agreed that the main problem of Russia’s EU policy is the absence of a strategic vision concerning Russia’s place in the pan-European context. The experts argue there are only two possible models: 1) Russia’s strategic goal with regard to the EU is gradual integration, which may culminate in its accession to a new European Union; 2) cooperation between the two friendly yet independent centers of power will not strive for formal integration, including the harmonization of their respective legislation.

Presently, the only clearly formulated point concerning Russia’s policy toward the European Union is its assertion that “Russia does not seek EU membership.” Representatives of both the EU and Russia emphasize the “special Russian mentality,” as well as Russia’s huge size and relative economic backwardness when speaking about the hypothetical impossibility of Russia integrating itself into the European Union. At the same time, several participants argued there are candidates for EU accession that are less economically developed than Russia, or have a mentality that differs significantly from the “Central European mentality” (for example, Turkey). When speaking about the size of Russia as an argument against EU integration, this seems to lack real validity in our modern era of communication; moreover, it may be balanced by Russia’s rich natural resources.

More than two-thirds of the experts agreed that in the long term (after 15 to 20 years) the issue of Russia’s accession to the European Union could be raised. In this time, much will depend on what path the EU and Russia take. The EU may transform into a quasi-federation with strong supranational governing bodies, or a socio-economic union, whose members may share some aspects of their foreign and defense policies. Russia may become an idle and weak authoritarian state or a developed democratic country. Russia’s integration with a quasi-federative state is much less probable than its integration with a union of a more or less free configuration.

Russia is prompted to make the “European choice” by several objective factors.

First, Russia’s acute demographic crisis, together with its increasing lag behind the advanced countries in terms of technological progress, will inevitably reduce its role as an independent global center of power. In the future, not only will Russia find it difficult to successfully develop on its own, but even simple survival will be a problem.

Second, among Russia’s foreign-policy partners and neighbors, the European Union is the most predictable, civilized and attractive. The regions to the south of Russia are growing increasingly unstable, yet a close union with China is hardly possible. The EU’s zone of attraction covers most, if not all, of the former Soviet republics west and south-west of Russia. As for Russia itself, its cultural traditions undoubtedly make it part of Europe.

Third, from an economic perspective Russia is greatly dependent on the European Union.

Therefore, according to some of the experts, Russia’s most rational, pragmatic and successful decision would be to end its unrealistic claims of being an absolutely independent “pole” and assume a steady rapprochement with the European Union. Several of the participants said Moscow must enter into negotiations with Brussels in order to replace the PCA with a more advanced agreement – a Treaty of Association.

However, a majority of the experts who share the view that the most advantageous policy for Russia would be to nurture its relations with the EU, believe that it would be too early to begin drafting a Treaty of Association at this time because Russia-EU relations have been hit by a crisis of confidence and systemic differences.

The transition to more advanced relations was proposed to be accomplished in two stages. First, the parties should work to “cool down” their relations a bit. This would guard them against excessive expectations and, therefore, disappointments. Furthermore, it is necessary to revise the entire sphere of EU-Russian relations in order to bring the formal framework of their cooperation into line with the political and economic realities. Perhaps it would make sense to give up the idea of the “four common spaces,” or to partially adopt it in a general and non-binding way.

In any case, any reference to integration must be temporarily removed from Russia-EU relations, in particular those references that demand the extension of EU legislation to Russian soil. Russia’s priority must be its adaptation to international, as opposed to European, legislation. Once Russia’s legal norms are brought into line with international standards, it will be able to raise its relations with the EU to a higher integration level.

Russia and the EU must draft a new treaty that would provide for close economic and political relations between two mutually independent economic and political actors of the world stage. The new political and legislative basis for this mutual relationship (to replace the PCA which expires in 2007) must start to be built now.

Finally, relations with the European Union, which now dominate Russia’s foreign policy agenda, must be temporarily given a less significant place in the hierarchy of Russia’s foreign-policy priorities. This will help Russia and the European Union to achieve a higher level of integration in the future, as they will proceed not from the present negative state of affairs in their mutual relations but from a relatively clean sheet.

Some of the workshop participants insisted that lessening the significance of Russia-EU relations, together with the removal of integration references, must mark a final, rather than intermediary, chapter of these relations. These experts argued that full-scale EU membership (even if it evolves toward a “common market plus” model) would damage the long-term interests of Russia as a nation of global significance. They noted that Russia and the EU are rivals in some areas of global politics, such as the future of the post-Soviet space, and relations with the United States. Finally, Russia’s mentality and political culture prevent it from accepting the idea of being “one of numerous leaders” inside the European Union.

However, the experts expressing this point of view were in the minority; the majority of the experts believe that in the medium term and, particularly, in the long term, Russia will not be able to handle the task of becoming an independent center of power in the global system, while siding with other centers of power (for example, China) would be either unrealistic or simply dangerous.

TOWARD A “RUSSIAN MODEL” OF RELATIONS WITH THE EU

Before Russia can successfully integrate into the European Union it will have to adopt a model of economic and social development, not to mention democracy, which would be similar with that of the EU, or at least compatible with it. But given the conditions of the present situation, when the elites of Russia and the European Union have different values and views, attempts to borrow individual elements of integration can only serve to aggravate the negative atmosphere.

Of the various models of relations which the EU builds with its external partners, the least advantageous for Russia would be “integration without membership.” Such a model would provide for the harmonization of Russian and EU legislation, but would deny Russia the right to participate in the drafting process of EU legislation.

The participants in the workshop recommended studying thoroughly all existing models and borrowing only those that would meet Russia’s interests. The same relates to EU legislation – only its advantageous elements can be transferred onto Russian soil, including those that are advantageous for the development of relations with the EU. Some of the experts believe, however, that a selective adoption of individual elements of EU legislation by the EU’s partners is unlikely because of the specific nature of the European Union.

When building a “Russian model,” Moscow must not only be guided by what is advantageous to it, but also take into account objective limitations on the part of the European Union. These limitations are due to the following features of European integration:

 the European Union is characterized by a constant tendency to enforce its own legislation and standards on third countries as a condition for cooperation;

 the integrationist nature of the EU does not allow it to depart from the set of common standards and rules for fear of its own disintegration;

 the internal agenda of the European Union is connected with the need to adapt its new member countries.

Russia can soften the effect of these limiting factors if it adapts to international legislation and standards in the economic, judicial and other spheres.

THE QUALITY OF WORK WITH “EURO-BUREAUCRACY”

Russia’s administrative machinery is not prepared for the tasks set down by its EU policy. The structures that are responsible for interaction with the European Union are organizationally disunited, and the number of qualified personnel is insufficient to carry out real productive work with the powerful bureaucratic machinery of Brussels.

Individual Russian agencies specialize in their areas of cooperation with the EU and interact with their counterparts in CEC subdivisions and other EU bodies; however, they fail to coordinate their efforts between themselves. In contrast, the individual agencies and departments of the European Union are highly coordinated.

The number of people in Russia’s policy-forming class and bureaucratic apparatus who are well informed about the inner workings of the EU is very small (estimated in tens), and over the past few years their numbers have not increased. Any growth in the number of qualified personnel in the state organizations is immediately offset by their peers leaving for the world of business.

Russia often lacks the people and time to prepare its own drafts for joint documents, thus, the CEC officials take this process under their control. The representation of Russian business interests in Brussels is extremely weak or practically non-existent, and only a few Russian companies have lobbyists and legal staff there. The increase in the number of Russia’s permanent representation to the European Union has been a positive move, yet the lobbying potential remains largely untapped.

In the unanimous opinion of the workshop participants, Russia’s official bodies engaged in routine interaction with the EU need to seriously improve their work. This can be done by increasing their personnel and funds, improving the personnel’s professional skills, implementing structural changes, and better coordinating Russia’s EU policy. Several experts proposed consolidating negotiation resources in one of the existing agencies or – in the long term – within the framework of a special agency on EU affairs.

This move would help remove many of the problems aggravated by the need to coordinate Russia’s negotiating position. Also, it would deny the CEC the possibility to push through its decisions due to the lack of coordination among various Russian agencies.

The experts proposed Russia’s Foreign Ministry to be a coordinating agency for the transition period; this ministry, with its highly skilled negotiators, boasts rich experience in conducting multilateral negotiations. At the same time, there must be a role for other Russian ministries that are now engaged in dialog with the EU. Their representatives must be involved in the coordination of positions within the frameworks of interdepartmental committees and in ad hoc working groups. The establishment of such groups was mentioned as a possible intermediate form of interaction. The experts spoke highly of the U.S. experience in this field, which implies strict subordination of such a group to a higher governmental official with a sufficient scope of powers. The experts expressed doubts, however, that this system would work in Russia, given the present quality of the work and administrative culture of the state apparatus.

Russia must give priority to the establishment of a special agency that would coordinate efforts to implement and advance a single Russian position on all aspects of relations with the European Union. This agency should actively pool the expertise of the Russian expert community. In particular, the experts advanced the idea of creating a broad public consultative council on Russia-EU relations, which would assess their current relationship and introduce new initiatives for furthering rapprochement with the European Union. Taking into account the increasing role of the European Parliament, it is important for Russia to strengthen ties at the level of inter-parliamentary structures, public organizations and business associations. It is time for Russia to have permanent representation in the European Parliament in order to further its interests there. The experts also proposed establishing committees (subcommittees) on Russia-EU relations at Russia’s Federal Assembly.

Considering that Russia’s development greatly depends on its relations with the EU, the acute shortage of specialists threatens the key interests of the country. The participants spoke in favor of introducing special bonuses to encourage such specialists to work for state bodies.

INCREASING THE ROLE OF PRIVATE BUSINESSES

Presently, there are no mechanisms for protecting the interests of Russian private businesses at the level of Russia-EU relations. Russian businesses, with rare exception, are not ready to make serious investments in the creation of a lobbying infrastructure. Furthermore, the extremely complicated relationship between business and government in Russia is not conducive to protecting the interests of Russian entrepreneurs abroad. This is a major reason why the negotiating process remains non-transparent for the business community and why its interests are not duly taken into consideration by the Russian authorities. Another problem is that Russia consults the business community only at the early stage of its negotiating process with Brussels. In order to solve political problems, Russian officials sacrifice the material interests of businesses – even the largest corporations. The CEC, however, acts exactly in the opposite way – it meticulously bargains even on minor issues in the interests of European economic actors.

The participants in the workshop unanimously favored to strengthen the participation of Russia’s business circles in implementing practical moves with regard to the European Union and in protecting Russia’s economic interests in Brussels. Mechanisms for such a proposal must be created on the basis of coordination and mutual support of private and state structures. This can be achieved through the following moves:

  more active interaction between the business community and official Russian bodies at the European Union (representation);

  more active involvement of EU legal structures by Russian businesses, and the creation of their own infrastructure for influencing the decision-making process in the European Union;

  broader use of the Russian expert community in this field and its consolidation by Russian business and state organizations. To this end, the workshop participants proposed that Russian businesses invest in efforts to improve the quality of knowledge about the European Union in Russia. The Russian business community must increase its efforts for developing representation with a powerful analytical and legal potential in Brussels.

IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE EU

The participants in the workshop unanimously agreed that Russia must urgently adopt a state program for studying the European Union and training experts in EU affairs. Emphasis in these efforts must be made not on purely theoretical studies (as is done in academic institutes or institutions of higher education specializing in the history of the European Union and its institutions), but on the study of all practical EU mechanisms – most importantly, the practice of applying European law. Applied knowledge of this kind will help Russian representatives to defend and promote their interests and positions in a competent and qualified way.

The experts supported the idea for the establishment of a European College at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, but agreed that this proposal is insufficient for achieving the above goals. Another possibility is the mass education of Russian students and young specialists at European colleges and universities, as well as the establishment of specialized courses in Russia, involving Russian professors. The program of training young specialists in EU affairs could become the subject of a special agreement with the European Union. Russia and the EU might jointly allocate funds for this purpose.

The training of Russian specialists at educational institutions and government agencies of the European Union would provide them with unique knowledge and experience. It would provide them an opportunity to understand how it feels to be in the shoes of a European bureaucrat, while enabling them to establish personal contacts with officials of the CEC and other European bodies.