February 7, 2005 marked the date of a major landmark moment in the history of Russian-Japanese relations: 150 years ago, Russian Admiral Yevfimy Putyatin’s mission established official relations between the two countries. Undoubtedly, this anniversary will spark a new round of discussions about a peace treaty between Moscow and Tokyo which was never signed after World War II. A few months before the anniversary, various kinds of proposals and conjectures with regard to the sensitive “Northern Territories” issue began to make the rounds in the two countries.

In early November 2004, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in a televised interview that Russia was ready to fulfill its commitments stated in the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration and hand over to Japan the southern Kuril Islands of Habomai and Shikotan. This would be done, Lavrov said, on condition that Tokyo finally signs a peace treaty with Moscow. Shortly thereafter, Russian President Vladimir Putin reiterated this readiness at a meeting with Cabinet members, saying that “Russia is ready to fulfill its agreements with Japan to the degree that is understood by our partners.”

However, at a forum of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Santiago, Chile, following Putin’s comments, Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi rejected Russia’s proposal and emphasized Japan’s determination to get all four disputed Kuril Islands from Russia. The statement played the role of a sobering shower for all the participants in the peace negotiations.

Nonetheless, Vladimir Putins’s visit to Japan will take place – either on the eve or immediately after the APEC summit due in November 2005. There is no doubt that a dozen important documents will be signed, yet one should hardly expect any breakthrough in the territorial dispute.

This is evidenced by two abortive attempts by the Foreign Ministers of Russia and Japan to tentatively find a way out from the political stalemate – during Sergei Lavrov’s visit to Tokyo in late May and his meeting with Nobutaka Motimura in Brussels in June. Russia’s disappointment over this failure was openly expressed by Mayor of Moscow Yuri Luzhkov at a forum of the 21st Century Russian Committee and Russia-Japan Society held in Moscow to discuss the 1956 Joint Declaration: “Russia seeks to conclude a peace treaty with Japan and cooperate with it on a mutually advantageous basis. However, the situation over this issue is sweepingly progressing toward deadlock.”    

Russia attempted to display its goodwill with the proposal of a compromise but was snubbed; Japan obviously does not wish to avail itself of a real opportunity of receiving territorial concessions. What a skillfully played gambit, it could be argued!

On the one hand, there is an impression that Putin is ready to cut the Gordian knot and return to Japan the so-called Northern Territories, that is, the southern Kurils. Analysts reason that because Putin received such strong support in the latest presidential elections, he can allow himself to swim against the current and make an unpopular decision in order to finally resolve this sore issue. Moreover, the remarkable anniversary of the establishment of Russian-Japanese relations may inspire the president to make a grand gesture.

On the other hand, even before the statements of Russia’s foreign minister and president had been made, there had appeared articles in the press asking whether Russia really needs a peace treaty with Japan. The same articles provided a negative answer to this question. One Russian state-controlled television channel, for example, showed a documentary about inhuman medical “experiments” conducted by Detachment 731 of Japan’s Kwantung Army during World War II. It seems that influential groups who are opposed to any discussions on the territorial issue are stepping up their efforts.

STRUGGLING BETWEEN TWO OPTIONS

Academic and political circles are now divided over the territorial issue. An increasing number of their members argue that the absence of internationally recognized borders, as well as a peace treaty with Japan, is not natural. Moreover, many politicians and experts say that the islands must be returned to Japan unconditionally and immediately because they were “stolen.”

Russia cannot agree with this point of view because the lands at issue were not stolen: Japan lost the four southernmost Kuril islands as a result of its defeat in war. Similarly, Mexico lost its northern territories (now the U.S. states of Texas, New Mexico and California) in 1848, which, however, does not prevent it from maintaining close relations with the United States and participating with it in integration processes within the framework of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

Imagine Tokyo’s reaction had Moscow demanded back the southern half of the Sakhalin Island, which it was forced to surrender in accordance with the Treaty of Portsmouth following Russia’s defeat by Japan in 1905. The situation with the Kurils and southern Sakhalin are not entirely identical, of course, yet their essence is the same: the loss of territory was the result of defeat in war. In the middle of the 20th century, the international community proclaimed a principle of “non-accretion of territory” as a result of war, but numerous violations of international law committed since then by major world powers and smaller countries have made this principle seem a bit hypocritical.

The opposite point of view is: “We will not surrender a single inch of Russian land.” This position rests on patriotic sentiments that have been roused by painful reminiscences in connection with territories lost since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This point of view has influential supporters from among federal and regional politicians. One of them, Sakhalin Governor Ivan Malakhov, has made his position explicitly clear: “For us such an issue does not exist… For us the Kuril Islands are part of the Sakhalin Region.” He is partly right: after all, people who were born on the islands have the right to consider them their native land. Meanwhile, some politicians believe that territorial concessions would be tantamount to the loss of national dignity.

There are also reasons of a political and economic nature for defending Russia’s claims to the Kurils. Many Russian experts resort to historical arguments in a bid to consolidate Moscow’s positions in the territorial dispute. They spend much time and energy studying rare diplomatic documents and maps and seem to have left no stone unturned! But such a way of thinking and acting only serves to plunge Russian-Japanese relations into a state of political malaise.

Indeed, both points of view lead to an impasse. The truth seems to lie somewhere in the middle, so the parties should look for a civilized compromise. The presence of the territorial dispute is not only Japan’s problem; it is also Russia’s headache.  

Tokyo’s approach to solving the territorial problem is characterized by two basic lines. On the one side are those who hold maximum goals: they do not want any compromises and advocate the unconditional return of all four islands to Japan. The supporters of the second viewpoint agree to a step-by-step approach to solving the territorial problem and argue that Japan should first content itself with the return of Shikotan and Habomai. Thereafter, it should develop, in every way possible, economic cooperation with Russia, and only then raise the issue of the other two islands. Experience suggests that any attempt to have the islands returned at once stand very little chance of success.

IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS, YET COMPLETE STRANGERS

The opinion is generally held in both Russia and Japan that the main reason for strained relations between Moscow and Tokyo is the long-standing territorial dispute. The real reason, however, lies much deeper: relations between the two countries rest on a mutual mistrust that has been inherited from previous generations. Japan’s historical memory remembers the threat of the late 19th century when Russia dominated in Manchuria.

Russian-Japanese relations have experienced several crises, as a result of which Japan forfeited its claims to the Liaodong Peninsula [Japan had received it after the 1894-1895 war with China; later, Russia, Germany and France demanded that Japan be denied the right to own the peninsula under the pretext of preserving China’s “territorial inviolability” – Ed.]. Later, Japan saw Russia’s construction of the Chinese Eastern Railroad in northeast China in 1897-1903 as a serious threat [after the Russo-Japanese War in 1904-1905, the railroad’s southern leg became the property of Japan, which it named the Southern Manchurian Railroad – Ed.].  

Other factors that contributed to Japan’s growing suspicions of Russia included the lease of Port Arthur by Russia, as well as the activation of Russian troops in Manchuria in 1900 during the 1899-1901 anti-Western uprising of peasants and poor town-dwellers in north China [known in the West as the Boxer Rebellion. The uprising was initiated by a secret religious society called Yihequan [Righteous and Harmonious Fists – Ed.].

The Soviet Union’s decision to join in the war against Japan in August 1945 – which the Japanese emphasize it did in violation of a treaty of neutrality – seriously hurt their national pride. Furthermore, the imprisonment of more than 600,000 Japanese prisoners of war in Siberia delivered a crushing blow to relations between the two countries. On the whole, the Japanese viewed their Communist neighbor as a “giant bear,” occasionally tossing and turning in his lair. Many Japanese still share this view. Japan’s perception of Russia as a large unpredictable state which may one day “roll over” and crush the tiny country only adds to the Japanese people’s apprehensions concerning Russia. Until quite recently, Russia was considered to be among the potential enemies of the Land of the Rising Sun.  

Although both countries adjoin each other in Northeast Asia, the Japanese view Russia more of a European (that is, faraway) state. In the Japanese language there is even a special term for Japan’s territories facing Russia – ura-no Nihon, that is, “the reverse side of Japan.” This can be translated to mean that Japan is facing the United States and has turned its back on Russia.

Meanwhile, Moscow has invariably viewed Japan as part of the Far Eastern region – this is probably because that country is so psychologically “distant” from us. Moreover, it is perceived as a source of danger. Russians still remember the military defeat they experienced in 1905, the atrocities of Japanese troops that invaded Russia’s Far East in 1918 in the course of the Civil War in Russia, and military provocations near Lake Khasan (1938) and on the Khalkin Gol River (1939). Finally, decades of Communist indoctrination of the Russian population had a definite effect. Stalin’s propaganda, together with the provocative actions of the Japanese army, provided the motivation for the Soviet Union to join in the war against Japan. The word “Samurai” still evokes negative feelings amongst the Russian people.  

According to public opinion polls, an absolute majority of the Russian population does not know that the disputed territories never belonged to Russia or the Soviet Union before 1945. We are now witnessing a geographical, or rather psychological, watershed: for Russians, Sakhalin and the Kurils are their “farthest East,” whereas Japan, as part of the American “security system,” is the “farthest West.” Meanwhile, these islands are only a narrow strait apart from each other. The international experience of the last few decades suggests that such a refracted perception of the problem must be overcome.

It is now obvious that the Japanese want to turn and face Russia’s Far East and find an acceptable solution to the territorial dispute. There is the impression, however, that this issue is being deliberately exploited by part of Japan’s political establishment that is oriented to the U.S. Furthermore, Japanese society generally views Russia as a country with innate “complexes” which it will be hard pressed to get rid of. The Japanese consciousness is having trouble getting over stereotypes that are based on emotional perception, a trait characteristic of the nation.  

Yet, emotions are gradually giving way to pragmatic approaches in Japan. At the same time, it would be too early to say that the atmosphere of mistrust between Japan and Russia has disappeared. The negative tendencies, which have arisen in the course of Russia’s economic reforms, have evoked apprehensions among the Japanese. This sharply reduces any chances for the signing of a peace treaty.  

EXAMPLES TO FOLLOW

International experience may prove useful for solving the problems between Russia and Japan. Suffice it to recall the classical example of Israel returning the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in 1982. The peninsula’s area exceeds that of the southern Kurils and even Israel itself (the total area of the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup is 5,036 square kilometers, i.e., 0.029 percent of the entire territory of Russia). Psychologically, it was rather difficult for the Israelis to return the peninsula because it contains one of the holiest places in Judaism, Mount Sinai, where Moses received the Ten Commandments from God. Yet, Israel relinquished the territory in exchange for peace – and won: the peace between Israel and Egypt proved to be durable, and the formula of territorial settlement for the sake of political stability fruitful.  

Another interesting example is when the United States returned the Ryukyu archipelago, including the island of Okinawa, to Japan. This happened in 1972, twenty years after Washington concluded a security treaty with Tokyo, which made the two countries close military and political allies. Yet, U.S. military bases still occupy a large part of the islands. A similar agreement could help to reach a demarcation formula that would be acceptable to both Russia and Japan. The problem is that Tokyo will not conclude any agreement until it has firm guarantees from Russia that the territorial issue will be settled. From Japan’s point of view, the conclusion of a treaty would considerably reduce their chances for having the islands returned. The Japanese leaders are interested in preserving effective levers of pressure on Russia.

Throughout Russian history there have also been examples of ceding territory. In 1867, for example, the czarist government sold Alaska to the United States for a token sum when it realized that exercising real control over that remote territory would be too heavy a burden for Russia.  

Or take the Crimean Peninsula, which Russia “granted” to Ukraine. In the context of its own territorial problem, Japan’s political elite views the problem of the Crimea from a special perspective. In the opinion of Tokyo experts, Russia ceded the peninsula to Ukraine with surprising ease, although “historically and from the point of view of Russia’s security, as well as for the Russian citizens’ hearts, the Crimea is a region of major importance which is incommensurable with the significance of the northern islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashir and Iturup” (Landmarks on the Way to a Peace Treaty Between Japan and Russia. Eighty-Eight Questions from Russian Citizens (Translated from Japanese). Moscow: Materik, 2000, p. 105). Moscow’s complaisance on this issue inspired hope in Japan that the return of the southern Kurils would be equally painless for the Russians. Indeed, if the territorial dispute with Japan had as much influence on Russia’s strategic priorities as the “Crimean issue” (and in the case with the Crimea Russia’s stake was very high: Ukraine’s withdrawal from Russia’s sphere of influence could have unbalanced the entire system of international relations in Europe), it would be settled much quicker.

Still greater – yet hopeless – expectations were aroused in Japan by Russia’s handover of border islands on the Amur and Argun rivers to China (without going into detail let us note that the roots of the disputes in both cases differed fundamentally).   

Today, however, the atmosphere around the territorial problem remains very strained. As Japanese professor Akihiro Iwashita put it, “the sensation-hungry media and some self-styled ‘specialists in the territorial issue’ turn any serious attempts to find a solution to the territorial problem into a sensation or scandal.” No progress should be expected for achieving a peace treaty unless the tone of Russian-Japanese relations changes.

PEACE TREATY THROUGH ECONOMIC COOPERATION?  

It is generally believed that economic cooperation between Russia and Japan can be one of the most effective ways to accelerate the conclusion of a peace treaty. The Japanese are, on the whole, skeptical about using economic levers and are not inclined to make the settlement of the territorial problem dependent on the establishment of closer economic ties with Russia.

The present level of economic relations between the two countries is not high. Professor Shigeki Hakamada, an outstanding Japanese expert in Russian politics, has written an article with a rather expressive title – The Russian Crisis and Fragility of the Society of Low Confidence. In it, he wrote: “The true reason behind the political and economic setbacks in Russia is the lack of basic principles of civil society, based on mutual confidence, which is valued very highly in Japanese society. If there is no confidence, there can be no business. The displacement of capital for use in speculative operations and tax evasion considerably impedes the country’s transition to a market economy.”  

Hakamada says that, unlike the Japanese whose national psychology is characterized by a devotion to order, Russians gravitate more toward spontaneity. Spontaneity, as the antipode of order, scares the Japanese away. Here is a very typical example: an “average” Japanese businessman has decided to obey the rules of the game in Russia, but he does not know whom to bribe, since many Russian officials willingly take bribes but do nothing in return. Such conduct puzzles Japanese businesspeople, who are also annoyed by the absence of elementary production discipline at Russian industrial enterprises.

The Japanese business community is particularly irritated by the absence of legal guarantees in Russia, or rather, by the instability in this sphere. Many Japanese view “business Russian style” as a game totally without rules, or as a game with rules that constantly and unexpectedly change. Japanese companies would have hardly refrained from investing in Russia if their investment brought them “normal” dividends, with the certainty that they were protected against racketeering and not dependent on the arbitrariness of the bureaucrats. Japanese businesspeople are very apprehensive about crime in Russia and they have a tendency to overdramatize the situation.  

In Russia, according to opinion polls conducted by the Russian business community, there is no stable and, more importantly, active interest in Japanese investment. Russian businessmen, of course, are interested in making money, but they do not display enough responsibility or desire to duly fulfill their obligations. The Japanese are baffled and dispirited by the “laziness” and passiveness they witness in some of their Russian partners.

Thus, there are no influential social or lobby groups in Russia or Japan which are interested enough in finding a resolution to the territorial dispute (on the basis of a reasonable compromise) that they would petition their governments on the issue. In fact, this conflict is not the main obstacle, and certainly not the only obstacle, to improving economic relations between the two countries.

Nevertheless, there are grounds for hope. In April 2004, Moscow hosted a meeting of the Russian-Japanese Council of Wise Men, co-chaired by Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and Japan’s ex-prime minister Yoshiro Mori. The council was set up to add new life to the Russian-Japanese negotiations (as a rule, these negotiations, first viewed as “historic,” would later bring about profound disillusionment in Japan. Following the 1997 meeting between Boris Yeltsin and Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto in Krasnoyarsk, for example, the Russian president promised to conclude a peace treaty with Japan before 2000). The public expects new and substantial ideas from the Council of Wise Men, a nongovernmental organization. A notable idea came at the council’s April meeting, when the Moscow mayor proposed launching economic cooperation between the two countries on the southern Kurils.  

The last few years have seen the emergence of a new factor in the development of bilateral ties: high oil prices on the world market. This factor can provide a boost to the joint efforts of concluding a peace treaty. If oil prices continue to increase, the Japanese economy may be hit by a major crisis and experience a decline similar to that of the 1970s. Moreover, the escalation of tensions in the Middle East has increased the demand for crude oil in Asian countries.

These factors have prompted the Japanese authorities to diversify their sources of fuel supplies. They view Russia and, to a lesser extent, West Africa and Iran as the main alternative suppliers. The Japanese have demonstrated high interest in the construction of an Angarsk-Nakhodka pipeline, as well as participating in geological surveys. They have shown an interest in oil and gas extraction projects in Russia, in particular in the Irkutsk Region. Clearly, the threat of economic crisis is causing the Japanese politicians to step up their cooperation with Russia.

WILL THERE BE AN END TO THE TUG OF WAR? 

Naturally, the Russian leadership would like to get rid of the territorial “headache” and find an acceptable solution to the problem. After all, Russia needs internationally recognized borders in the Far East. At the same time, however, Moscow does not want to return the islands.

Is Putin capable of cutting the Gordian knot? Theoretically, the answer is yes, but practically speaking, it will prove to be a difficult task. This is particularly the case when we consider that he would have to make this painful move against the background of other unpopular measures, such as the recent decision to replace social benefits for low income people with cash payments. There were also reform initiatives for housing and public utilities, not to mention within the pension system. Obviously, there can be no simple and quick solution to this problem.  

There is no doubt that the Japanese leadership would also like to settle the territorial dispute and heal Japan’s wounded national pride. But at the same time, it is also not ready to make sacrifices and compromises.  

The solution of the territorial problem between Russia and Japan requires meaningful and consistent efforts to reach a compromise because neither country is going to surrender its positions. At the end of 2004, President Putin (at an annual grand press conference) and Prime Minister Koizumi (in a later reply) exchanged sharp statements on the issue.

Now Russia and Japan have two options: they can either halt their talks, or they can continue their negotiations on a territorial demarcation, despite the previous setbacks. When two states really seek to settle their differences, they can surely achieve this goal.  

At the present stage, however, there is an impression that Russia is more interested in a compromise than Japan, as Tokyo keeps turning down Moscow’s proposals. Nevertheless, changes are already taking place in the foreign-policy mentality of Japanese and Russian societies. More and more Japanese want to see their homeland not as a great military and political power, but as a cozy “Asian Switzerland” – an ecologically clean country providing social guarantees for its citizens. This means that they may moderate their political ambitions.  

Furthermore, the Japanese are growing more and more discontent with the role assumed by the United States in the world and in Japan, in particular. According to some Japanese political scientists, the term ‘globalization’ is now often used to mean ‘Americanization,’ because “the United States, as the only superpower, is advancing only its own interests under the guise of globalization.”

All these factors give grounds to believe that Russian-Japanese relations may soon develop in a somewhat different context and according to scenarios that now seem unlikely.