Any sustained discussion with Russian officials about the prevailing situation in the Baltic States leads to an evaluation of the events of 1939-1940, 1944-1945 and thereafter. Russia’s interpretation of what happened in these periods differs profoundly from that of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These differences influence the present relationship between Russia and the Baltic States.

 In the time when I dealt with Baltic-Russian relations (1991-1998), Russian politicians and diplomats liked to point out that Russia “gave” the Baltic States their independence in 1991, referring to the fact that Russian recognition was decisive in making other countries recognize them. This was true. They also recalled the close cooperation that existed between Baltic and Russian democrats during the last years of the Soviet Union. They were right in doing so. Russian representatives also used to point to Boris Yeltsin’s trip to Tallinn on January 13, 1991, just hours after the massacre at the TV-tower in Vilnius, and they underlined how decisive that visit was for the Baltic peoples’ struggle for independence. Again, they had a point.

But following independence, argues Russia, the Baltic countries failed to acknowledge Russia’s generosity; instead they turned to Western organizations like the EU and NATO. Furthermore, Estonia and Latvia refused to grant all ethnic Russians living in their countries automatic citizenship.

In 1992-1994, during the protracted negotiations concerning the Russian troop withdrawal – which I followed closely when I worked at the Swedish prime minister’s office – Russian officials insisted, with genuine conviction, that the Baltic States should be grateful that the withdrawal was taking place at all.

Russian sentiment was understandable in some ways. Many Russians, and not only red-brown Soviet nostalgics, were disappointed and even personally insulted by many Baltic policies after 1991. Additionally, it is a fact that Estonia and Latvia (with the exception of the prewar independence period) had been part of Russia since the early 1700s; Lithuania (with the exception of Memel-Klaipeda) had been Russian since 1795.

Such feelings, however, are irrelevant from the perspective of international law. And from the perspective of the Baltic peoples, to hear the Russian view that they should be grateful for their freedom is incomprehensible – even outrageous and politically unseemly. I used to point out to Russian diplomats that Baltic independence is a right, not a favor. What is a right cannot be given as a gift, by Russia or anybody else. One may rejoice that an aggression has ceased, but should not also have to thank the offender that it has stopped. 

Another argument frequently heard from the Russian side was that the Baltic States should be grateful for the material progress that was achieved during Soviet rule. They should appreciate that it was the Soviet Union that built the New Harbor in Tallinn, Estonia; the oil terminal in Ventspils, Latvia; and the motorway from Vilnius to Klaipeda in Lithuania.

On February 1, 1999, the Speaker of the Russian Duma, Gennady Seleznev, remarked at a press conference: “I do not know where Latvia would be now, in what backwoods of Europe, if the whole of the Soviet Union had not helped Latvia and Estonia develop.”

That the living standards of the subject peoples were raised during foreign rule is an argument that has always been used to justify imperialism. That does not make it any more valid. In the case of the Baltic States, the argument is easy to refute since there are statistics concerning their living standards in the interwar years. It shows, for example, that in 1938 Estonia had about the same living standards as Finland. That was, to put it mildly, no longer the case by 1991. No one denies that some material progress was made during Soviet rule – it would have been strange indeed had there not been any – but the important point of principle is that the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians would have liked to make the decision to build – or not build – the various ports and motorways on their own initiatives. And in point of fact, aside from some still useful infrastructural projects, Soviet rule in the Baltic States resulted in mind-boggling environmental damage; a huge destruction of capital in the countryside due to collectivization; and a systematic attack on Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian culture.

HAS THE PACT BEEN CONDEMNED?

It is often said that the People’s Congress of the Soviet Union condemned not only the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, which ultimately led to the Baltic States’ losing their independence, but also the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States in 1940.

It is correct that in December 1989 the People’s Congress debated the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the secret protocols. A commission led by Alexander Yakovlev – then one of Gorbachev’s closest advisors – reported to a plenary session about its investigations on the matter. The main issue was whether the protocols had existed or the persistent rumors about them were merely an “anti-Soviet plot.”

Yakovlev’s commission reported that the originals of the protocols had not been found in the Soviet archives; nevertheless, a number of factors indicated that the copies the commission did have in its possession were genuine. The Congress adopted a resolution in which it concluded that the protocols had been in contravention of international law. It condemned them and declared them “illegal and invalid from their signing.” The People’s Congress also stated that since the protocols were secret and had never been referred to parliament for ratification by the Soviet citizens, they did not “in any way reflect the will of the Soviet people who do not bear any responsibility for this plot.”

But the People’s Congress never linked the protocols to the annexation of the Baltic countries. This was because its mandate only concerned the year 1939, while the stipulations of the protocols were fully implemented with regard to the Baltic countries only in 1940, that is, when these states were occupied. Deputies from the Baltic States suggested that a new commission be formed to investigate the events of 1940-1941, but this proposal did not gain support.

Thus, the Soviet People’s Congress condemned the secret protocols, but it did not express any opinion about their consequences. Nor has the new Russia been able to bring itself to do so. Instead, even as this is being written in 2005, the official Russian line is to deny that the Baltic countries were ever occupied. Instead, the official Russian view is that they were incorporated in the U.S.S.R. “in accordance with agreements,” implying that their adherence to the Soviet Union was voluntary and legal.

MASTERING THE PAST

Presently, nothing indicates that Russia is coming to terms with its own history concerning the Baltic States, or anywhere else for that matter. Like other large countries, Russia finds it difficult to understand the perspective of the smaller ones.

It is worth pondering why the new Russia is unable to admit the Soviet occupation of the Baltic States. Russia, after all, claims to have broken with the evil traditions of the Soviet Union. It should not then be difficult for Russia to condemn, or at least to recognize, what happened in the Baltic countries more than half a century ago.

One probable reason why Russia still has not done so is that it is simply very difficult and painful to confront the past, especially the Soviet past. 

What then connects the former Soviet Union with today’s Russia – a country that has emerged from the remnants of the U.S.S.R. and refuted (at least in its early years) the entire system represented by the Soviet empire? Is Russia responsible for the past actions of the Soviet Union in the Baltic States? The question is complex – legally, morally and psychologically; but some things are undeniable.

To begin with, it is impossible to deny the fact that the Bolshevik coup d’état of 1917 happened in Russia (even though it was a Russia very different from that of today). Second, it is a fact that in many cases (not all, of course, but only when it suits it) Russia regards itself as the legal successor of the Soviet Union. For the people who were ravaged by the Soviet Union there is a psychological link between the U.S.S.R. and today’s Russia, a link so strong that it has become a political fact. Furthermore, the Soviet Union was Russian in the sense that it was ruled by Russians, or by representatives of other peoples whose thinking was Russian (such as Stalin’s). Russians were placed in positions of authority in the Communist parties of all Soviet republics; Russians dominated the armed forces; and the Russian language and Russian culture were favored all over the Soviet Union, threatening to sweep aside those of the occupied states.

In the case of Germany, no one denies there is such a link, least of all the Germans themselves. Today’s Germany is a democratic state that has nothing at all in common with Hitler’s Germany. Yet, the Federal Republic of Germany has spent many years and billions of D-marks to indemnify, and in some cases, reconcile with, nations devastated by Nazism.

One reason this happened is that the international community clearly demanded that postwar Germany come to terms with its own history. The world asks the same thing of Japan. But for some reason such claims are seldom directed at Russia, except by the Baltic States. At the very least, we should ask Russia not to deny its own history. To admit facts is not necessarily to assume guilt. Today’s Russians are not responsible for the crimes of their forefathers. But if and when they deny the truth they assume a co-responsibility.

That official Russia has refused to admit the facts about Soviet rule in the Baltic States can hardly be interpreted as anything else but an implicit recognition that Moscow actually believes there is a link and a responsibility. Facts for which one is not responsible should not be hard to admit.

Coming to terms with the past which I have in mind is what Germans call Vergangenheitsbewältigung (“mastering the past”). This can be done in many different ways – from explicit statements of political leaders to silent gestures. Russia, in fact, did both during its first years, if on a minor scale. This concerned Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia (still a single nation at the time). There were even some gestures made toward the Baltic States.

In the preamble to the treaty of July 29, 1991, in which Lithuania and the Soviet Russian Republic (a not yet independent Russia) recognized each other, there was a reference to the Soviet Union’s “annexation in 1940 which infringed on Lithuania’s sovereignty.” In an article by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev published in the International Herald Tribune (14-15 August, 1993) there was also a mention of “Stalin's crimes” and “the secret protocols which in 1939 laid a foundation for Stalin and Hitler to decide the destiny of the Baltic States.”

When on April 30, 1994 Boris Yeltsin signed the troop withdrawal agreement with Latvia, he made a short speech mentioning “the repressions in Latvia” and the “violent expulsion to Siberia of a not insignificant part of its inhabitants.” But he also hastened to deny that Russia or the Russian people carried any responsibility for what had happened. And on February 25 this year, during a visit to Slovakia, President Putin said: “We respect the opinion of those people in the Baltics who consider that the tragedy of the Baltic States’ loss of independence was connected to the end of the World War II.” 

These  statements – and similar ones made by Mr. Putin around May 9, 2005 – are the only ones of regret or recognition that have so far been made by official Russia concerning the Soviet Union’s past in the Baltics (at least that I know of).  It really isn’t much.

Today, few Vergangenheitsbewältigung efforts are made in Russia, but in the long run they are inevitable. These will be difficult and heavy steps to take, but to ask for them is not to demand too much from a great nation. At some point in the future Russian leaders will have to explain to their own people the damage the Soviet Union did to the peoples of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, their cultures, economies and environments. Until that happens, relations between them and Russia will never be completely normal. Russia must at least show that it understands what took place there under Soviet rule. 

Single gestures or statements will not suffice. Some things will have to be said and written many times, over many years. Consider how long it has taken Germany to normalize its relations with Poland, France, Norway – and Russia.

Russia’s mastering of the past is also necessary to clear the air between the native inhabitants of the Baltic countries and the Russian-speaking part of their populations. That would help the Baltic peoples to accept the place of Russian culture and the Russian language in their countries. 

Perhaps even more importantly, Russian Vergangenheitsbewältigung is necessary with regard to Russia itself. Russia cannot become a normal European country without admitting the immense crimes that Communism committed against the Russians themselves.

The task of mastering the past is Russia’s, and only to a very small extent can it be influenced from the outside. But it is important, not least for our self-respect – that outsiders do what little we can, that is, to never let the current Russian view of history stand unopposed.

These questions are painful for many Russians, not only for the official representatives of Russian policies, but also for average citizens. Discussions about them easily become heated. But to shy away from the debate would be mistaken: the one thing at which Russian representatives are masters is to scent weakness; it is scorned in Russia as much as toughness is respected.

Russians must learn to live with their past while the Balts must learn to live with their present. Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian politicians, for their part, should give the democrats in Moscow and St. Petersburg a clearer appreciation for the support they received from them in the pre-1991 period. Estonians and Latvians should also recognize the important role that Russian culture has played in their countries in the past and will play in the future.

In any case, relations will not normalize of themselves. How could Baltic leaders trust a neighbor who refuses to admit that the annexation was an annexation and nothing else?  

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania must critically examine their pasts as well. The authoritarian regimes – of Päts, Ulmanis and Smetona – during the 1920s and 1930s are obvious objects for such scrutiny.

Baltic leaders have taken positive steps in recent years to confront the truth about local complicity in the Nazi extermination of particularly Latvian and Lithuanian Jewry. But there are probably more bitter truths to confront on that issue.

Difficult questions must also be asked about the cooperation that the Soviet Union received from a number of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians after the occupation. For most people there was, of course, no other choice but to cooperate. The Baltic States were constituent parts of the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet system pervaded every part of society. Up to a point, cooperation was to the benefit of Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. It mitigated the effects of Moscow’s rule and it preserved memories, cultural sites and environments that would perhaps otherwise have been destroyed, and the sheer existence of which later – during the independence movement of the late 1980s – were crucial sources of mental and political sustenance.

 The first stages of the struggle for freedom were carried out almost solely within Soviet structures. Some local Communist leaders in the Baltic countries deserve respect for their contributions to that struggle. Seen in this way, both collaborators and dissidents were necessary for the survival of the small Baltic nations. But it is equally true that there was a limit beyond which cooperation with the Soviet system became a betrayal of one’s own culture, language and history – and a betrayal against fellow Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians.

With regard to these questions, an outside observer finds himself in territory where he does not have the right to judge – especially someone who, like the author of this paper, grew up in secure Sweden.