Politicians and international officials continue to make assurances that the efforts and investments that have been made in the Middle East over the past 50 years are so enormous that the region should long have become a center of a thriving elite and affluent public. Nothing of the sort, however, exists in the monarchies, autocracies and republics of the region.

Politically correct liberal analysts are prone to criticize Samuel Huntington for his ill-timed prediction concerning a clash of civilizations unfolding right before their eyes, while their conservative opponents are bolstering military operations by bold proclamations of forthcoming Middle-Eastern democracy. On the face of it, the crisis in this basically Islamic territory stretching from the Atlantic to the borders of the Indian subcontinent has become permanent. The Middle East countries that became independent during the second half of the 20th century failed to organize their internal political, humanitarian and economic structures, nor have they been able to create a stable system of external relations. Their border problems, derived from the liberties taken by French, British and Russian cartographers, do not bode well for their future.

Over the more than three decades that have elapsed since the monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula invented the “petroleum weapon,” they have accumulated more than enough money for solving their regional problems. Time was on their side, as well. During the same period, the Europeans cleared away the remaining rubble of World War II and built the European Union, a bloc of 25 nations which is powerful enough to give the U.S. strong economic competition. The Middle Eastern countries, however, compare quite well to their Western counterparts in terms of the amount of political tools at their disposal, and especially so if their impressive representation in international organizations, including the UN, is taken into account. They use those tools expertly, for example, when it comes to blocking Israel’s integration into the global system of humanitarian organizations.

The region received, apart from many other things, a lion’s share of international aid, including that which was allocated to accommodating refugees. It enjoys discounted supplies and loans from both East and West for the resolution of its internal conflicts. Since it is considered “a zone of strategic interests,” it receives outside military contingents, with a size and cost second only to what the West keeps for its own defense. Despite all of these seeming advantages, the prospects for the region’s development remain as dim as ever.

The engagement of external powers in the Middle East has failed to resolve any of the conflicts now tearing the region apart; the problems have been driven into the corner and may flare up again anytime after external pressures are gone. This is equally true of minor and major sources of tensions regardless of whether their roots go back centuries or result from recent contentions. UN peacekeeping activity in the Middle East is no less a disaster than in Africa, whereas numerous Islamic or pan-Arabic initiatives meet with success only following a protracted occupation. This equally concerns Western initiatives, despite the rhetoric of the politicians and mass media covering the operations of the French Foreign Legion or U.S. Marines.

As the 21st century set in, the standoff between Christianity and Islam has resulted in victory for the latter. The Christian population of the region is rapidly shrinking, including in those places where local dictators would have – until recently – bolstered the wealthy Christian neighborhoods as counterweights to impoverished Islamic townships. Democratization in the Middle East means the expulsion or destruction of minorities rather than respect for their human rights. This concerns Christians in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon and Sudan. Iranian and Syrian Christians feel more or less secure only while the incumbent regimes are standing at the helm of power. As for the Christians in Israel and Palestine – where the Palestinians have been building their “national homeland” for the past 10 years – if the Jewish state defends the rights of the Christian population and does not leave them at the mercy of Islamic fundamentalists, then they will survive.

Slavery – the eradication of which international humanitarian organizations have sensationalized since the 1960s – persists in the region in covert as much as overt classical forms. Mauritania and Sudan are just two good examples where the slave trade is flourishing with total neglect from the global community.

Political fundamentalism as the most effective means of opposing the authorities – oftentimes in the form of guerilla warfare and terrorism – has become commonplace. Algeria and Egypt have pushed the fundamentalist forces into the background by flexing the muscle of their armed forces and heavily limiting democracy, and yet there is no guarantee that the results will be long-lasting; moreover, fundamentalism is gaining momentum in the neighboring countries. Morocco, a country viewed for decades as a zone of cooperation between Ulemas and the monarchy, is now witnessing the killing of foreigners and the destruction of Jewish community buildings, which sends a disturbing signal. Add to this the powder keg of Western Sahara where a peace settlement seems as remote now as it did 25 years ago.

Millions of people from Algeria and Morocco are now emigrating to aging Europe. These countries are the source of the new European political Islam that is closely linked to international organizations of all colors – including terrorist organizations. Their leaders made perfect use of the electorate with their roots in the Maghreb and utilized the loopholes in the European Union’s liberal system. This was proven when they tested the durability of the European political system in a series of railway station bombings, the most dramatic of which occurred in Madrid on March 11, 2004. In the aftermath of those deadly bombings, the Spanish government capitulated to the terrorists. Against this background, the possible termination of the Arab-Berber conflict (a possible breakthrough arose when the Algerian government made symbolic steps toward the Berbers after ten years of continuous fighting against them and Islamic extremists) is poor consolation.

The transfer of power which aggravates the stability of the ruling regimes presents yet another headache for the region. The paradox is that under a “republican monarchy” the handing down of power within a ruling family, against the backdrop of democratic formalities – like in Syria or Azerbaijan – may actually provide the Middle East with a redeeming alternative to putsches, civil wars or Islamic revolutions. The elderly leaders of Libya and Egypt, for example, apparently find the legitimate transfer of power exclusively important. The question, however, is whether or not their successors will be able to hold onto power.

Egypt, the key country of the region, is experiencing a skyrocketing population growth rate. Furthermore, it is home to the region’s most potent Islamic opposition with a record of fighting against the government. No one can rule out a situation where the pressure on the economy and ecology will become so overwhelming – when the country moves over the threshold of a 100 million people – that it will be forced to launch an external expansion in a bid to avoid an Algerian-type civil war. In such a scenario, Sudan will be the most likely target, especially considering the fact that it may cease to exist as a single country in the next 10 to 15 years. It may break up – through a referendum or without it – into the Islamic North and Christian/animistic South. The Egyptian-Sudanese union has deep roots and may turn into a dangerous neighbor for Israel: its leaders may eventually reach the conclusion that a clash with the Israelis is justified from both ideological and domestic perspectives.

There is also the possibility that a hypothetical Egyptian-Sudanese union may unite with Saudi Arabia should the Islamic radicals from among “the Afghan Arabs” succeed in overthrowing the ruling Saudi dynasty. The new Caliphate that would most likely arise from such unification would certainly pose a serious economic, military, demographic and geopolitical challenge. As for Israel, it seems that a clash with such a Caliphate would be almost inevitable. The likelihood increases when we consider that the deterring factor of Israel’s nuclear weapons is losing force in view of the Arab world’s assuredness that the West will never allow the Israelis to use nukes even as a “weapon of last resort.”

Are alternative scenarios possible for the Arabian Peninsula? One scenario, which has a less likely chance of materializing, is the rise to power of Islamic radicals and the imposition of a regime in the style of Iranian ayatollahs. However, a more likely scenario is the arrival of the Talibs. How things develop afterwards will depend on whether the West decides to interfere or avoid the situation. A Sunni Islamic republic, following the Iranian model, will have a lasting opportunity to exploit contradictions between the leading Western powers until it evolves into the New Caliphate, unless a personality akin to Osama bin Laden takes over the reins of the process from the very start. Should this occur – or if the Islamic radicals take hostile actions against the U.S. similar to 9/11, then the probability of a U.S. or NATO-led military operation resulting in the partitioning of Saudi Arabia is very high. The zones of partitioning may look as follows: the province of Hijaz with the Islamic shrines that will be placed under the control of friendly Arab regimes (like the Jordanian dynasty), Ash Sharqiyah (Eastern) Province with its oilfields, the Yemeni Asir, and the Wahhabi-dominated Najd. The Americans will benefit greatly in such a situation from their experience of governing Iraq, split de facto into ethnic-religious zones.

The destiny of lesser monarchies of the Persian Gulf will depend to a huge degree on the strength of U.S. and British positions in the region. Aside from Oman, those countries are unable to rebuff radicals on their own. As for Oman, its stability is pegged on Sultan Qaboos bin Said’s ability to arrange a hand-over of power in the absence of an heir apparent to the throne.

Yemen is overstocked with weapons and the central government there remains feeble. Moreover, a crisis tantamount to an ecological disaster may hit the country within the next 10 years due to the increasing scarcity of fresh water. These developments heighten the probability of a clash between Yemen and Saudi Arabia in the future. The prospects for the solution of Yemeni problems without such a conflict are unclear, but in the event of war the consequences will prove no less catastrophic than the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990.

Yemen’s neighbors across the Bab el Mandeb Strait – Somalia, Eritrea and Djibouti – will remain entangled in the mess accompanying the collapse of the former Ethiopian Empire with consequent border clashes, religious and tribal carnage, epidemics and famine. The possible disintegration of Sudan, together with the first continental ‘mega-war’ that experts on Africa are apprehensive about, will further aggravate the situation. Such a war may include the majority of countries of the Sahel (i.e. a broad corridor from the Sahara toward the West-African savannas) and the Great African Lakes region.

Afghanistan – located to the east of the Arab world – continues to be partly controlled by NATO occupational forces. The country is not really governed by anyone, however, which is witnessed by the growing output of the narcotics trade. This production has partly fallen into the hands of the Talibs, whose ostensible defeat was grossly overblown by Western media. The processes now unfolding in Afghanistan pose a mortal threat to stability in Pakistan, whose collapse is not off the cards in the short term largely because of its entanglement in the Afghan misadventure. The sad reality is that the central government of Pakistan, a country with its own nuclear weapons and a powerful pro-radical terrorist-connected lobby throughout its national elite, is losing control over developments in the border areas.

Iran, which is close to implementing a nuclear program for its energy needs, which may also entail a military nuclear program, remains the central element of the “axis of evil” construed by the U.S. The revolutionary Islamic republic is experiencing an evolution which the Soviet Union witnessed a few decades before it. Iran promotes regional stability by remaining on the sidelines of most conflicts or by playing a constructive role in them. And yet its own conflict with the West, primarily with the U.S. and Israel, may produce a disastrous destabilization in the Middle East, the Caspian littoral area and the Gulf. The Americans will try to avoid a direct standoff with Teheran, but they will do strive to provoke a confrontation between the Iranians and Israelis by instigating an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. This possibility has not been ruled out in the wake of a recent surge of anti-Israeli terrorist activity on the part of Lebanese Shiites. Moreover, Israeli leaders may need “a little victorious war” to defuse the unprecedented tensions now existing amongst Jewish society over the pullout of Israeli settlements from the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Iraq will remain a zone of civil war, with radical Islamists from across the world flocking to the country since they view Iraq as a testing ground for Jihad. The recent parliamentary elections failed to satisfy both the Sunnis and the Christians. The Sunnis who made up the core of Saddam’s administration, police and armed forces, actually did not participate in the election, while the Christians are emigrating en masse. Iraq’s disintegration looks quite possible and should it materialize, not only the first ever Shiite Arab state, but also the first independent Kurdish state may emerge. With regard to a possible Kurdish state, this would confirm a promise the League of Nations issued to the Kurds between the two world wars. It will also mean, however, the danger of Turkey’s breakup since its rapidly increasing Kurdish population is seasoned with traditions of armed separatism.

This risk has cooled relations between Turkey and the U.S., as the Turkish government rejected the request of its chief partner to use the country’s territory for an attack on Saddam. As a result, Turkey lost several billion U.S. dollars and a significant part of its relationship with the Americans. Meanwhile, Ankara’s move to join the European Union under the condition of resolving the Northern Cyprus problem, may become a convenient alternative to preventing the EU’s transformation into another Maghreb and/or to an upsurge of Islamic trends inside Kemalist Turkey if it drifts away from the U.S.

The crisis in Lebanon after the assassination of its former Prime Minister, Rafiq al-Hariri, will most likely speed up the withdrawal of Syrian troops and catalyze a new round of civil war in that country, given the fact that foreign military contingents were the only instrument of scaling down the conflicts between ethnic/religious militias which destroyed Lebanese society. Simultaneously, Syrian President Bashar Assad may lose power in his country despite his great efforts. Following the loss of control over Lebanon, his downfall may be arranged by the national establishment that he controls – and incidentally, controls to a much lesser degree than his father did. The U.S. may also fuel Assad’s ouster in a bid to round off the Iraqi adventure with the capitulation of Syria. As a result, Syria may be spiraling for a series of pre-Assad putsches and Latin-American-style juntas that will be unable, however, to play any significant role in the region.

The knot of Israeli-Palestinian challenges loosened somewhat after the death of the Palestinian Ra’is (the Arabic for “head”) Yasser Arafat. It is not clear yet to what measure his successor, Mahmoud Abbas, will be able to control paramilitary organizations and maintain power. There continues to be a standoff with radicals at the municipal level, especially in the Gaza Strip, where radical elements have a grip on local rule. In the short time, a civil war cannot be ruled out in Palestine. In such an event, the territory will break up into enclaves reporting to local leaders, each building relations with Jordan, Egypt and Israel of his own accord.

The Jewish settlers’ removal from parts of the West Bank and Gaza has split Israeli society. Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, a politician who considers his international image no less than his family’s safety after his retirement, has practically driven the country to the verge of another “orange revolution.” His actions show that Israel’s former pride in its democratic institutions actually veiled traditions of clan authoritarianism that are quite a match for the neighboring Arab states, which the Israelis hold in disrepute as “dictatorships.” Considering the vacuum of power, together with the public’s conviction that the left-wing and right-wing establishment has fused into a group of corrupt leaders may drive Israeli society to a standoff or cause irreversible changes to its internal political body. Experts surmise that Israel may soon turn into a presidential republic. Furthermore, there may be a greater political role for the Israeli Armed Forces while, at the same time, its Arab population [those who recognized the State of Israel and were its loyal citizens – Ed.] may get pushed out of the political national consensus, as their refashioning into Palestinians became an accomplished fact in the 1990s.

In general, the short-term projections for the Middle East suggest the flare up of old hotspots, together with the emergence of new ones outside its sphere, such as the ongoing power struggle between the U.S. and the EU, not to mention China, and the collapse of a coherent system of state borders.

With the increase of instability in the region and beyond, the prospects for the Middle East indeed seem gloomy.