In order to understand the controversies unveiled by the process of globalization, as well as to see Russia’s actual place within these processes, we must first recognize two fundamental truths. First, competition between the two differing global projects has been unfolding within Eurasia since before the invention of writing. Second, it is important to discern the specific nature of the current moment apart from the hitherto unknown influences that have come into play today.

A look at inscriptions left behind by the first small lords who ruled in Mesopotamia 5,000 years ago suggests they proudly called themselves the rulers of all four sides of the world. They were the first ones to make claims to global domination; sometime later, the tendency repeated itself in China.

These historical truths reveal several important facts. First, the Oriental vector of globalization is antecedent to the Western vector and, second, it is soaked in ideology since its aspiration for standing at the helm of the world has no resources to draw upon.

The European model, on the contrary, has never, even in much later epochs – in ancient Greece, despite the fact that they viewed the rest of the world as barbarians, and in Rome in the first few centuries of its history – focused on ideology. Alexander the Great set out for the Orient only after two massive Persian interventions in the Balkans and a multitude of cases of repression against the Greeks. Even then, his purpose for going to war was mainly to recover lost spoils. The official slogan of that campaign was to win back the desecrated shrines or, simply speaking, precious utensils and decorations that the Medes had taken out of continental Greece.

The Macedonian Military Council insisted that Alexander, their ruler, take hold – with a full measure of responsibility – of the huge amount of defenseless power lying prostrate before him only after he had defeated the Persian king Darius, whose armies had finally run away and dispersed, for a third time.

One possible conclusion from the above is that the Western geopolitical project has a secondary role compared with the Oriental project; it actually responds to the Oriental challenge and its basic difference lies in its pragmatism. It develops an imperial mindset only after it acquires the resources for implementing it.

A similar thing happened to the Quirites. Early in their history, they twice dealt crushing blows to Carthage on their own territory (first at a request from Greece and second while defending Rome from Hannibal). They achieved a third such victory in Africa, which made them conclude – only after victory – that they had responsibility for the entire Mediterranean region, although Conservatives in the Senate tried to block the people’s willingness to take care of anything more than their own land. As for the Latin world’s ideology, which was the first global power to embrace the whole civilized world, that appears much later than the events herein describe.

Byzantine, if viewed from the angle of this opposition, continued the political traditions of the Western model, while the Franks – who admired Byzantine on the one hand, and wished to destroy it on the other because it was the heir apparent to the Roman Empire – realized that perfectly well. Let us recall, however, that the Byzantine system had parties, municipalities, a parliament, and philosophy at a time when the West lacked anything similar, even in its basic outlines.

Democratic institutions and self-government were primarily revived in the West in the cities that provisionally returned to the rule of Constantinople from the Goths – Venice, Florence and Genoa. They influenced the rise of parliaments in England and Iceland at a much later epoch. Interestingly, the fall of Byzantium, which signaled the end to the first stage of the Western global political project, coincided with a prelude to its transition to the second stage, manifest by the colonial system of European kingdoms through their great geographic discoveries.

As colonialism fell, neo-colonialism, economic transnationalization and finally, contemporary economic globalization as an offspring of its predecessor, rose up before our eyes. This means that the Western global project has proven to be successful and uninterrupted over a period of over two thousand years.

In the meantime, quite the opposite has transpired with its Oriental antipode, which arose much earlier than the Western project and ignited the latter’s activity, but it has never come to maturity. The Arab Caliphate drew close to the might of Rome only in terms of territory, and that is why today’s Arab extremists regularly evoke its power. It existed as a single organism for just a few decades and did not leave behind any successors that could compare with it in the scale and reach.

China of the Han era eventually collapsed as well, while external aggressors held it together. In later epochs, new aggressors – the Mongols and the Manchus – pulled it together once again. The same function was performed by an imported ideology in the 20th century.

The Ottoman Empire never enjoyed global power either – it had looser controls than the Caliphate, while large European colonial empires fringed its borders. Moreover, the whole notion of ‘the civilized world’ had changed by that time.

Thus, the Oriental project proved to be impracticable and infected with a virus of internal collapse.
It appears then that pragmatism is a stabilizing force, while ideologized projects, even derivations witnessed in Rome, Byzantium or the colonial networks, are not. What I am speaking about here is political models and their ability – or inability – to retain their main essence in the process of transformation and adapt to new circumstances. I am not speaking about individual examples of those models, since we know perfectly well that Western empires fell apart as well.
However, if we look at the cultural aspect of history in its traditional sense, the picture is entirely different.

The Orient spreads its cultural influences right into the heart of the Occident. The tendency is traced everywhere, from the Roman cults of Cybele and Isis to Christianity and later to Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism. In contrast, after the colonizers relinquished political control over different parts of Asia, Christianity – eagerly assimilated by the Europeans – failed to take root throughout Asia, unlike its native Islam. The Philippines seems to be an exception in this case rather than the rule.
The legend about the Rape of Europa offers the best metaphor for the real situation with regard to many basic cultural skills and knowledge. In light of this, the Americans should not have been so astonished by the turn of events, since globalization is a two-way street – they somehow overlooked the fact that this has always been so.

This opposite movement provides an explanation for the tense standoff evidenced in the situation. While one project is seeking to add its cultural preferences to political dominance, the other project is thrusting forward political ideas as an appendage to cultural dominance. However, Nature hates excessive uniformity, since uniformity is the soul of emptiness.

Now we must ask what part Russia plays in all of this. One of the theories popular inside and outside the country is that Russia has always been an Oriental satrapy. This is wrong, and there are many ways to prove it.

Varangians founded Russia, which built all of its contacts before the Mongol conquest and afterwards with the Europeans. Russia’s dynastic bonds with Europe were abundant. The Golden Horde’s control over Russia’s principalities was purely formal already 80 years after the conquest, and the bows of respect Moscow Prince Ivan the Moneybag made at the khan’s court were very pragmatic. Traditions of democracy in northwest Russia and generally among tradesmen are fairly well known.
Ivan the Terrible fell formally into the Oriental format with a project proclaiming Moscow to be the ‘Third Rome,’ but instead of waging war against Constantinople or the Western Christians, which he should have been expected to launch, he fought for control over Astrakhan and Kazan, the Tatar fortresses that blocked lucrative trade routes. As for Latin Christians, he voluntarily met with some of them on one occasion while searching for ice-free ports to trade with the Hanseatic cities, Holland and England. This act, however, was sheer pragmatism.

Another popular example is Peter the Great. We know quite well he did not introduce dramatic novelties into the policy of the early Romanovs, except for eccentricity and new resources, although he did enhance his measures with a strong new impulse. It was thanks to Peter that Russia gained membership within the European family of nations.

Russia began its first Oriental project in 1917. This was to be a global and permanent revolution, the logical extension of which was a global republic of Soviets. There was a great lack of resources, as the Russian Social-Democratic and workers’ movement lacked the unity to implement their grandiose plans. The money was in short supply, too: the Bolsheviks had to become traitors in order to get the necessary funds for a revolution even in one country. The aid did not produce the desired effect, however limited (geographically) the actual use of the money was in reality.

The paradox is that Russia continued to implement Western-style initiatives in the East. Industrialization, its policies in Central Asia and in the Caucasus, in Afghanistan and in Chechnya – these were instances of Westernization, in terms of reproduced matrixes, not methods.

Since the Oriental project contains an inherent mechanism for self-destruction, the Warsaw Pact fell apart. The Soviet Union, which Gorbachev had failed to bring to the West, was the next to collapse. Other Communist federations – Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia – collapsed, too. The Oriental mechanism is the root-cause of problems in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova with their quasi-autonomous regions; it explains the feeble cohesion within the Commonwealth of Independent States. Finally, it explains Russia’s threat of disintegration as well.

Unless Russia works toward change, the threat of disintegration will be great. The belief that one’s country is a great power without due care for its real dignity is nothing more than downright ideology. Become a great power if you can, and everyone will agree with you. This is how it happened with the U.S. in the 20th century after it got control of key international transport, energy, financial and information arteries. That was a pragmatic approach.

To avoid the worst, Russia must look westwards. Russia’s readiness to join the West’s two major structures, NATO and the European Union, will attest to its earnest intentions. Since joining the EU would inevitably be a dragged-out process for many reasons, NATO remains the only choice, at least its political wing.

Joining this organization does not menace our sovereignty in any way. The forty-year-long instance set by France, and the NATO members’ refusal to send a collective contingent to Iraq, proves that the bloc offers a broad road for freedom. Nor should we demonize the procedure of decision-making within NATO, since cooperativeness and diktat are quite different things.

Frankly speaking, NATO does not yearn to embrace Russia, but there was a time when it did. In the early 1990s, I personally held consultations on this subject with NATO Secretary General Manfred W?rner and Ambassador Amedeo de Franchis. Then there was an unsuccessful attempt in 2001. Russia’s best opportunity to forward its application for membership was on May 9, Victory Day. Sixty years ago, Russia and Europe confronted a common enemy and we united into a coalition. Today, we confront another common enemy, so why should we not be members of the same alliance?

Naturally, President Vladimir Putin will have to discuss the idea via telephone with key figures to avoid another flop, but I feel optimistic about the chances. Why? The West is beginning to develop a realization of the Chinese threat now, which it did not have immediately following the events of Sept. 11.

What does this mean for Russia? First, applying for NATO membership would be a patriotic move, as it will help to maintain our territorial integrity. Second, through our membership in the most powerful defense organization of the northern hemisphere, Russia will get an extra layer of protection in addition to our own forces. Third, we will drop at least one – Western – vector of the three existing vectors of rebuffing the external threat. Consequently, we will gain the freedom of maneuverability, a chance to reorient investment to fundamental research and development, including research in defense technologies that lie within our domain of responsibility. Opportunities for other forms of cooperation will also broaden. Finally, the doors to the defense sector markets may open for Russian and European technologies that are presently closed.

The West has its interest, too. In the first place, it will acquire a predictable ally. Second, Russia’s membership will round out the Euro-Atlantic security system in the northern quarter of the globe in the Pacific, thus making the system complete and logical. Finally, the Western political project will regain its inborn pragmatism.
America’s impetuous drive to democratize the East has thrust that project into a political heresy, as the Western powers idolize just one version of democracy, and this idolization does not bring the much-desired dividends. More importantly, it creates ever-greater economic problems. Coupled with the West’s internal disorder and its incompatibility with the Oriental models of conduct, it places itself as much at risk of disintegration as Russia.

In the meantime, Russia’s accession to NATO might generate a number of purely practical tasks, the solution of which will be essential for keeping up the bloc’s stability after this giant country joins its ranks. There will be no time for fantasies then, and the balance will be restored. What seemed to be a drawback until fairly recently will turn into an asset.

One more point. If Russia makes a clear and unequivocal decision in favor of NATO, which will presume a radical change in its current course, then the drive for accession may get backing from some multinational corporations. These economic entities, that wish to buy property in Russia and have influence with governments, are disappointed by certain obstacles in their economic path and by Russia’s sudden about-face move toward China. Presently, they are not particularly well disposed toward us.

To make a long story short, Russia’s move toward the West would be a lucrative decision, as well as nicely matching the psychological orientations of those individuals who cherish the idea of Russia’s great mission. By going West again, we will rescue the entire European project and ourselves. More importantly, our possession of universal knowledge will make us its central think-tank – a position much more serious than even that of the grand masters of hi-tech. Is this not a worthwhile project?

Finally, we will play the role as a unification force in the CIS, where many member-nations are pushing for NATO membership. However, our present opposition to such a move obstructs their vision of how to carry out these dreams. Russia may open the door for them, while walking in the vanguard of the column.

Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush have a space of three years to implement this unique opportunity. They can secure the most prestigious place in history for themselves as great national and world leaders; men who ventured to step over provincial egotism on a large scale.

Unfortunately, however, Russia and the U.S. are merely trying to outpace each other by making under-handed arrangements with China. They are proceeding in vain, however, because the history of the standoff between the global projects precludes such arrangements. Furthermore, the degenerating Western versions are incongruent with the Oriental model. However, China, a nation that always developed in the format of that model, is congruent with it, and will therefore outmaneuver all of us.

It will simply refrain from coming to terms with anyone now seeking its favors. The Chinese view the Americans and Europeans as overseas goblins, a devilish force in the most literal sense. As for the Russians, the Chinese feel a mixture of delight, envy and contempt toward us. Such presentiments rule out any enduring commitment to agreements.

But why should China feel bound to any external powers? Contrary to Western hopes, it will never join the pragmatic Western project.
Culture in general and Chinese culture in particular, due to its unique antiquity, demands that nothing is forgotten or jettisoned. Chinese culture stipulates its solitary ability to rule the world. For the rest of the world, their duty is to be content with the status of provinces and servants of the Celestial Empire.

Beijing has drawn in huge investment and seized consumer markets for goods and electronics. It is buying industries the world over and supporting the huaqiao business. It is engulfing the entire consumer economy, without which the Western community could not imagine their present level of comfort. China is pursuing its objective step by step, and is not far from reaching it.

China’s anti-Japanese gymnastics is also quite illustrative. Beijing keeps reminding to the Land of the Rising Sun that it is a younger civilization who learned everything from China.

This brings up yet another reason why NATO should unite with Russia. The options are quite straightforward: we either save ourselves together or perish together. Just look at China’s defense achievements.

In conclusion, let us look at the re-emerging efforts of European and American analysts who attempt to predict the scenarios of Russia’s disintegration. These predictions should not be looked at either too nervously or too placidly, while condemning them as part of another plot against Russia would be very irrational.
I find the whole case to be much simpler and deeper at the same time. The West realizes the self-destruction logic of the Oriental project that we are presently experiencing and it is preparing for a possible landslide, trying to predict what the self-destruction will look like in a nuclear country. That is not the only reason, though. The worst scenario, the Western analysts fear, is if sprawling Russia collapses and they are unprepared. Hence, their policy of befriending neighboring countries along our borders as an additional safety belt to protect the Western body against the approaching avalanche.

Of course, some people hope that during the long period of our disintegration, which may take several decades and may also require certain pragmatic demands, they will be able to find a loophole for themselves for the next 25 years. We will let others scratch their heads over these questions. The problem is that, unlike the deeply hidden codes of civilization, the technological solutions that the West takes pride in  do not work if these solutions do not rely on broad cultural foundations, an asset that Russia has.

Unfortunately, our leaders have oriented their principal cooperation programs to the East; they will have to reconsider this trend, otherwise, the country will collapse. Since the current programs are embedded in the Oriental project – contrary to the perestroika episode or the first years of Boris Yeltsin’s administration – that collapse will unavoidably be a bloody one.

It is time for Russia and the West to stop their mutual fear mongering. It is time the West stops fanning the flames of Russia’s collapse, while we stop looking to China. Let us heed sober voices. The games of patriots of every color will only serve to make the world more feverish. This may eventually land us trouble, since the time left for calm and rational thinking is running out.

The Kremlin may miss its window of opportunities. Western partners will eventually decide that is it worthwhile just to wait for our controllable disintegration, at which point they will buy Russia up piecemeal. Ironically, some Russians have adopted this logic of European and American scenarios and are acting on it as if it were a user’s guide.

These individuals prepare the material and psychological groundwork for carving the country up into pieces, but can anyone prove that attuning the nation to a collapse is an easier task than to cure a limited group of politicians of their anti-Western syndrome?