What are the prospects for Russia’s partnership with the West in countering security threats at the beginning of the 21st century? What still remains from the strategic legacy of the Soviet Union and what has been created in new Russia? Answers to these questions are key in preserving and modernizing this legacy and taking further steps in building a new partnership capability.

Before tackling this problem, however, it is essential to address the definition of ‘partnership’ since this term is often used too loosely. Thus, Global Partnership, an action plan adopted at the G-8 Evian Summit in 2003, provides for $20-billion aid to Russia for eliminating its stockpiles of chemical weapons, scrapping decommissioned nuclear submarines, improving the safety of its nuclear installations, etc. At the same time, the aid is to be provided not only by G-8 members, but also by at least other 13 countries, in particular Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea.

Although Russia agreed to allocate $200 million annually for these programs, this partnership still resembles “cooperation” between a sick patient hooked up to an IV and a team of doctors fussing around his bed. Thus, it is important that we discuss a partnership that is more or less on equal terms.

EQUAL PARTNERSHIP: A VIABLE PROPOSITION?

There is no immediate threat of direct aggression against Russia on the part of specific states or their coalitions in the foreseeable future. However, other threats to the country’s military security have increased. International terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are modern realities that are eroding the security of practically every civilized state. These threats are particularly dangerous to Russia due to its geo-strategic position and insufficiently protected borders.

Moreover, the outbreak and escalation of large-scale regional armed conflicts near Russia’s borders, possibly involving the use of nuclear weapons, cannot be ruled out. Such a possible scenario demands special deterrence action by the Russian Armed Forces.

Furthermore, there is a need to protect Russian installations and facilities that are situated in the oceans and space infrastructure abroad, as well as facilities related to shipping, commercial and other types of activity in littoral areas and remote oceanic zones.

This proves that, far from diminishing, military force continues to play an increasing role at the beginning of the 21st century. However, the transborder nature of practically all of the aforementioned threats and challenges, coupled with an insufficient resource base even in the most powerful states (Russia not being among them yet), requires close international cooperation. This is why Russia needs military structures capable of smooth, hassle-free interaction with analogous structures in other countries. Cooperation on such a level demands at least two provisos: interoperability of structures between Russia and its allies and our partners’ comparable contribution to addressing these shared threats.

At first glance it may appear that such a partnership is already in place – under the auspices of the Russia-NATO Council which provides guidance and recommendations for more than 20 joint working groups, the conduct of joint military exercises, peacekeeping operations, and other activities with the participation of Russian and NATO forces. It also provides the basis for the implementation of military-technical cooperation programs.

Yet there is little evidence of equal partnership, especially full-fledged participation in coalition forces dealing with regional armed conflicts, peacekeeping operations, WMD and other nonproliferation activities. This requires a high level of structural, operational, and technological interoperability between Russian and NATO military units, as well as comparable professional, legal, and humanitarian personnel training standards.

Meanwhile, the Russian military, which is the poor man’s answer to the Soviet military, is not ready for such partnership. The Russian Armed Forces have emerged from unjustified shakeups and reorganizations in recent years and are now an essentially obsolete structure, not speaking about the command and control structure. Nor has the progressive deterioration of arms and military equipment been halted: the obsolescence and wear and tear of the basic assets of the military-industrial complex presently stands at 80 percent – a very critical level. Meanwhile, the country continues to lose key technologies that are crucial for its defense. The technological gap between the Russian and U.S. (NATO) armed forces in intelligence, communication, command and control, and precision-guided weapons continues to widen.

To bridge this gap, it will not be sufficient just to modernize the military-industrial complex, create joint commands of compact mixed-arms forces and assets, introduce effective procedures and methods for conducting operations with the use of integrated intelligence, command and control and communication systems, together with air, ground and sea-based precision guided weapons. All of this already exists in the U.S. military and to a certain degree in the most developed European NATO member countries. So while (and if) Russia moves in the same direction, the Western-leaning nations will only increase their lead, thus broadening the gap.

For these reasons, no direct and equal military partnership between Russia and the West can be expected in the foreseeable future. At the same time, supplies of arms and military equipment to government forces in Afghanistan, for example, which are mainly trained to handle Soviet weapons, is an example of indirect partnership in the military sphere. Certain structures of the Russian Armed Forces can also be involved in auxiliary operations, such as, e.g., making available their military bases, providing transport support, constructing pontoon ferries, etc.

ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Other security spheres have the potential for full-fledged cooperation – partly as Soviet legacy and partly as input by new Russia. This involves, in particular, stopping the proliferation of missiles and missile technology, and building missile defense systems.

Yet how relevant is this line in dealing with new threats? After all, on the one hand, the missiles in the majority of countries with authoritarian regimes do not pose a serious danger unless they are armed with nuclear warheads. On the other hand, it is not difficult to secretly deliver nuclear explosive devices or nuclear warheads to big cities either complete or piecemeal with their subsequent assembly on the ground. This danger is more real than the possible use of missiles.

Furthermore, the rapid spread of new technology (including satellite navigation) makes it possible within a relatively short time span to convert ballistic missiles with conventional warheads into precision-guided weapons. Such missiles can be extremely dangerous if they hit nuclear power plants, installations or depots with radioactive materials, chemical or other substances, while hundreds of such installations and facilities can be found in any megalopolis. Second, many hundreds of ballistic missiles are deployed in countries with unstable political regimes, and should even a small part of these weapons be armed with nuclear charges, this will become a substantially more serious threat compared to other options for the delivery of such warheads. This is why cooperation in countering the further proliferation of missile systems is such a high priority.

By the mid-1980s, the Soviet Union had completed the construction and modernization of the ground-based component of the missile attack warning system (MAWS, which began in the late 1950s), comprised of eight radar stations along the border perimeter. These systems were built in Murmansk, Pechora, Skrunde, Mukachevo, Sevastopol, Gabala, Balkhash, and Irkutsk. The Daryal-type radars found in Gabala and Pechora are still believed to have an unmatched capability for detecting ballistic targets in their areas of responsibility.

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, five of the eight MAWS radar systems ended up outside Russia. The Dnepr radar at Skrunde was dismantled. After that, its functions were partially performed by the Dunai-3U radar of the Moscow Region’s ABM Defense System; eventually, this system was displaced by the new Volga radar based in the Baranovichi area, which was put into operation in 2003.

The main purpose of MAWS has always been to ensure the early detection of single, multiple and massive launches of U.S., British, French and Chinese ground- and sea-based ballistic missiles. Data received from MAWS systems are designed to serve as a basis for decisions to retaliate (such decisions are made within a space of just a few minutes by the country’s top leadership) with a counter missile strike so as to protect own missiles from a disabling first strike.

The expediency of such plans for the use of strategic nuclear forces in a basically different military-political environment merits a separate analysis. It will only be noted here that in the prevailing situation, the fact that Russia and the United States have abandoned plans to withdraw their missiles to avoid attack – that is plans for retaliatory strikes – far from diminishing the role of MAWS, actually gives it a greater role in meeting new threats since these systems help rule out an inadequate, disproportionate response to provocative missile strikes by countries with unpredictable regimes, ensuring credible instrumental control over the proliferation of missiles and missile technology.

This is, in fact, an area of cooperation where Russia could play a leading role, principally because the Russian MAWS radars deployed in the south of the country possess a unique capability to monitor the southeastern, southern, and southwestern regions where the danger of a missile launch exists. These capabilities substantially exceed those of the United States or other Western partners. This technology could be made more effective with the joint operation of Russian and U.S. early warning systems. This view is shared by leading U.S. experts in the field. Thus, a study involving the imitation of missile launches from many countries – from the Middle East to Europe – against different targets and with different flight paths, showed that (according to Dr. Bruce Blair, president of the Washington-based Center for Defense Information) a joint MAWS system is 20 percent to 70 percent more effective than a separate early warning system.

A very important step in this direction was made in September 1998, when the Russian and U.S. presidents decided to set up a Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) in Moscow to share information on ballistic missile and space launches. Pursuant to that decision, a corresponding memorandum was signed in June 2000. The JDEC is designed not only to ensure against accidental missile launches in either country, but also to monitor missile launches of third parties, including sea-based (submerged) launches. The two sides chose the location for the JDEC, developed a table of organization, defined staff functions, the type of equipment, etc. Under the memorandum, which went into effect upon signing, the Center was to have gone into operation a year later – that is no later than July 2001.

The project was considered at that time to be a breakthrough in strengthening mutual trust and proof of real partnership. Nevertheless, to date the project remains frozen, although it is ready on both the organizational and technical level: thus, in their declaration signed simultaneously with the U.S.–Russian Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow, 2002), the two sides pledged to do what it takes to put the Center into operation.

There are many petty red-tape, bureaucratic impediments to this process, including, government officials say, the issue of covering civil liability for any possible damage. Yet with mutual political will, this problem can be resolved very quickly since with the JDEC in place, potential damage will be negligible.

In addition to enhancing the effectiveness of missile launch oversight, close partnership between Moscow and Washington will help expand the JDEC’s role by getting many other countries involved. This will lay the groundwork for a multilateral missile technology control and multilateral notification regime for missile launches, thus creating additional effective instrumental and legal safeguards against the proliferation of missiles and missile technology in the world.

While the fate of the early warning radar stations in Belarus and Kazakhstan is not as yet cause for serious concern, this does not hold true for the two radar stations in Ukraine and one in Azerbaijan.

Baku’s drift toward Washington is quite discernible, as can be seen from, among other things, the heightened military cooperation between the two countries and the involvement of Azerbaijani troops in operations led by coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Thus, the future status of the Russian military base in Azerbaijan (the Gabala MAWS radar station) remains uncertain.

Nor does the situation with the two Russian MAWS radars in Ukraine provide much cause for optimism in the foreseeable future, due to Kiev’s persistent striving to join NATO, which can happen fairly soon. This could cause, among other things, purely legal problems linked to the presence in Ukraine of foreign military bases maintained by countries that are not part of the North Atlantic alliance.

What policy should Russia adhere to in these conditions? Stopping the decline of Russian influence, not only in Azerbaijan and Ukraine but also in the entire post-Soviet area, is obviously crucial. This remains, however, a very bleak prospect: too much time has been lost and too many serious political mistakes have been made. To rectify them, it is necessary not only to build a politically and economically attractive country with stable democratic structures. It is also critical to overcome some glaring contradictions with regard to NATO: on the one hand, developing a partnership within the Russia-NATO Council, while on the other, setting the Russian Armed Forces the priority task of repulsing an air (space) attack that no other force but NATO can carry out. Yet, at the same time, Russia’s best possible policy in the face of mounting global security threats would be a de facto, as well as de jure, merging with NATO.

In the interest of preserving Russia’s partnership potential for countering the proliferation of WMD-capable missiles, it would be essential, above all, to “unfreeze” the JDEC and subsequently expand its functions toward full-fledged international cooperation. Then not only the United States but the entire West would see to it that radar stations based outside Russia do not drop from the MAWS network.

A GLOBAL ABM NETWORK

Prospects for partnership in building a global ABM system look increasingly more encouraging. It would seem that in this field Russia has actually taken the lead since it is the only country with a credible strategic ABM system (the Moscow Region ABM system). However, neither Russia’s experience in building such a system nor the underlying technology is of much interest to the United States or European countries. First, because Russia’s system is based on the use of nuclear technology to intercept attacking missiles, and since they bear no indication as to what type of warhead is used – nuclear, chemical or conventional – retaliation to even a dummy launch can result in a nuclear fireworks display over Moscow with all the ensuing consequences. Second, the United States deployed an almost identical ABM system but it was dismantled exactly 30 years ago by Senate ruling.

At present, joint Russian-U.S. computer-assisted ABM theater exercises, staged alternately in Colorado Springs and Moscow, have been proceeding for several years now. These exercises have the makings for full-scale Russian-Western cooperation in building ABM systems on different levels. These exercises have been used, in particular, to rehearse the interoperability and coordination of such systems as the S-300 and Patriot in repulsing tactical ballistic missile attacks against theater targets. In 2004, a war game of this kind was held for the first time between Russia and NATO at Colorado Springs.

One distinguishing feature of the U.S. ABM system is that it is probably one of the first large-scale military programs not designed to avert missile threats coming from specific adversaries, but developed in accordance with the “capabilities-based approach.” This principle fits into the national security strategy that must take into account the unprecedented unpredictability of the military-political situation in the world following the breakup of the bipolar system, especially since the U.S. intelligence community, in 1999 and 2000, considered scenarios in which Russia acted as a U.S. ally and adversary. On the other hand, in the wake of September 11, it has become non-PC to refer to Russia, which fully supported Washington in its antiterror efforts, as a possible adversary. U.S. administration officials continue to repeat that the U.S. ABM program is not aimed against Russia’s nuclear deterrence capability.

A CIA report released several years ago said that missile threats to U.S. territory from ‘rogue states’ could not realistically emerge before 2015, which almost completely coincided with Russian expert estimates. That forecast, however, did not suit all interests in the United States, and so a special commission under Donald Rumsfeld brought the threats forward a decade, “setting” them for 2005. This prediction became a strong argument for the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty (a decision opposed by Russia) and launch full-scale preparations for the deployment of a national ABM system. Today, no credible missile threat for U.S. security is expected: after all, ‘rogue states’ need considerable time to carry out test flights, which is impossible to do covertly.
Leaving aside for a moment the problems of Russian-U.S. cooperation in the ABM sphere, related to the lingering distrust on both sides, bureaucratic impediments, concerns over sensitive technology transfers, and so forth, there is good cause to say that the feasibility and expediency of this cooperation at the present stage is contingent on the status of the U.S. ABM program.

The work on a strategic ABM system in the United States has been proceeding continuously for several decades, but it received a particular impetus in the early 1980s. The perception that the Star Wars Program was never designed for practical implementation, but merely aimed to undermine the Soviet economy, is hardly consistent with reality. It will be recalled here that back in 1983, former U.S. President Ronald Reagan said it was an extensive program that would not be carried out in the 20th century.

An analysis of the U.S. ABM elements that are currently being tested shows that participation by Russian designers in these programs is difficult if only because Russian sensors, elemental-base, and other technologies are not attractive to the Americans.

At the same time, the United States’ development of an intercept system that is meant to destroy ballistic missiles at their boost-phase has a host of shortfalls complicating their effective use. This conclusion was made, in particular, in a report by an American Physical Society (APS) study group entitled, On Boost-Phase Intercept Systems for National Missile Defense (July 2003).

Analysts from the study group showed that missiles could only be intercepted with speeds considerably higher than what has been achieved to date. Without this, missiles launched from inland areas by potential adversaries cannot be intercepted. In this context, cooperation with Russia, whose design organizations have the technology to create high-speed interceptor missiles and solid propellants, which are ahead of U.S. technology by at least a decade, could be extremely effective in building new-generation ABM systems to effectively engage all types of missiles at the boost phase.

This one area, however, does not exhaust the prospects for Russian-U.S. cooperation. Ground-, space- and sea-based information and reconnaissance capabilities are the keys to the success of missile defense systems.

The unique capabilities of Russian MAWS radar systems, especially if integrated into a joint ABM data exchange facility, were mentioned earlier.
There are equally good prospects for cooperation in deploying a low-orbit satellite target designation system (STDS), which considerably enhances the capabilities of the ABM system. STDS spacecraft, about 650 kg each, with IR and visible-band sensors, are to be put into circular orbits of 1,350 km to 1,400 km with a 60 to 70 degree inclination. Heavy defense-conversion (non-military) rockets, developed under the Russian-Ukrainian Dnepr Project, could be used to put them into orbit. During the strategic arms race, the rocket’s output performance specifications were the world’s highest in its class.

Several such rockets, converted from RS-20 ICBMs decommissioned at the end of their service life, showed an extremely high degree of reliability in commercial satellite launches for foreign companies.

Such a rocket with a boost stage and several restartable engines can simultaneously place two STDS spacecraft into circular orbits of up to 1,400 km with the required inclination degree. This makes it possible to deploy a low-orbit data support constellation for a global ABM system at a considerably smaller cost.
   
THE EUROPEAN VECTOR

Russia’s cooperation with European countries in the ABM sphere is hardly feasible without U.S. participation. European states can apparently be counted on to make a technological contribution to a global ABM system, as well as make their territory available for the deployment of new U.S. ABM facilities, which, judging by media reports, is a subject of ongoing debate with the newly admitted NATO member states from Eastern Europe.

The perception that Moscow’s proposals for a European ABM system are primarily a crude attempt to divide the EU and the United States is hardly justified. After all, in 2000, then Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev submitted detailed proposals for a European ABM system not to the Europeans but to NATO Secretary General George Robertson. At that time, they only involved theater missile defense, as the ABM Treaty’s limitations were still in effect and there was still hope that the Russian-U.S. agreement on the discrimination of strategic ABM and non-strategic ABM as part of a package to extend the START II Treaty would enter into force.
Yet under the new conditions, Moscow’s offer to cooperate with Europe on non-strategic ABM alone appears anachronistic. This also applies to joint computer-assisted war games with the United States and NATO, confined only to theater ABM.

At the same time, the U.S. “capabilities-based approach” outside possible missile threats for the majority of European states will doubtfully be greeted with enthusiasm. Therefore, Europe will have to make preliminary analysis of such threats, taking into account missile technology transfers between North Korea and Iran, where the Shehab-5 missile, with a range of about 3,500 km, is being developed on the Taphodon-2 medium range ballistic missile platform. There are also missile technology transfers between China and Saudi Arabia (Dunfan-3 missiles with a range of more than 2,600 km).

Attempts by the European countries to stop the further widening of the technological gap with the United States can also provide a good incentive for European participation in such a large-scale program.

Thus, Russia’s cooperation with the EU needs to be seen in the context of building a global ABM system which could in the long term effectively defend U.S., Russian and EU territory against missile attack since separate cooperation with the EU or EU states is evidently unrealistic for military-political and technological reasons.
Furthermore, other areas of cooperation with the United States that could be tapped for a European ABM program include advanced Russian radar technology, state-of-the-art software to detect early missile launches, the identification of warheads amid decoys and jamming devices, and other R&D projects. Russia also has developed test infrastructures, featuring a network of radar, optical electronic and telemetric stations.

* * *

There are still good prospects for Russian-Western partnership in countering proliferation threats, together with the construction of a global ABM system. In the foreseeable future, this could be the only sphere of relatively equal military and military-technical cooperation.

Not only Russia, but also the West, is interested in preserving this partnership potential. It is important to face up to this need and deploy joint efforts as soon as possible. After all, as Russia’s influence in the post-Soviet area progressively declines, it could be faced with the formidable problem of keeping all of its foreign-based radar stations within a single MAWS framework. At that point, global monitoring of missile proliferation would prove all but impossible.

Russian-U.S.-European cooperation in R&D programs, and in deploying combat and information support ABM systems, is equally important.
If the decision to work together in this area is made in the foreseeable future, it will open unique opportunities for cooperation between the military-industrial structures of Russia, the United States, and the leading European states.

It will be essential to work not only on the joint development of a global ABM system but also share its information components. This would be the most convincing evidence that the end of confrontation in any form is irreversible. It would also be a major step toward a genuine strategic partnership.

For more than three decades, missile attack warning systems have been major spheres of strategic rivalry in relations between the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States. In a new environment, with enough common sense and political will, they could become a no less important factor in the consolidation of efforts to meet global security challenges.