My Perception of Russia

21 november 2005

© "Russia in Global Affairs". № 4, October - December 2005

Author served as Swedish Ambassador in the Russian Federation 1994-2004. This article is based on his lecture at MGIMO (Moscow State Institute for International Relations) given April, 11, 2005.

 

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My Perception of Russia
In Russia the State is the strongest concept, the Holy Russian State, whose main task is to defend the Russian nation and Russianness. Society in Russia is a much weaker notion as a consequence of the strong State. Russia has no long tradition of strong, well-developed non-government organizations.
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Resume: In Russia the State is the strongest concept, the Holy Russian State, whose main task is to defend the Russian nation and Russianness. Society in Russia is a much weaker notion as a consequence of the strong State. Russia has no long tradition of strong, well-developed non-government organizations.

 

I do certainly not claim to understand everything about Russia. However, I have devoted myself to Russia since 1958, and I have lived in Russia for two periods of altogether 12 years: 1964 – 1966 and 1994 – 2004. Unfortunately, I miss the period 1987 – 1992 which so strongly impacted on the life of all Russians living today.

 

Two books have taught me something about Russia: Russia Under the Old Regime by American Professor Pipes, and Natasha`s Dance, a Cultural History of Russia by British Professor Figes.

 

To me, Russia is foremost an old European nation state, an intrinsic part of European history and culture. I stress European, not West European. There are substantial historical differences between Russia and Western Europe:

 

The Tartar Yoke versus the Renaissance,

The Orthodox church versus Protestant reform,

The 75 years of totalitarian society.

 

With democratic freedoms in Russia, globalization, information technology and international travel, these differences between Russian and Western societies are gradually disappearing, and Russia is becoming more transparent to its citizens and to foreigners. Transparency breeds democracy.

If I compare my Soviet and Russian periods, a few things stand out:

 

Fear, and cautiousness in the exchange with foreigners, are gone;

The freedom to travel – one of the most important democratic rights;

The new materialistic, consumer-oriented way of life in Russia.

 

One strong factor remains, though, and makes Russia different from the rest of Europe. That is the role of the State, which has grown in recent years, and the correspondingly weak role of non-state society.

 

Let us look at the three notions of the State, Society, and Motherland in Russia and in Sweden, and we will see substantial differences.

In Sweden, the State is a rather amorphous notion, associated with high taxes, the capital Stockholm, a few state agencies, the Prime and Finance ministers. The strongest notion in Sweden is Society, which encompasses everything: the welfare society, local authorities, the media, trade unions, traditional Swedish values. Motherland is a non-articulated notion of history as well as something that is defined negatively as opposed to the EU or to immigrants.

 

In Russia, it is the other way round. The State is the strongest concept, the Holy Russian State, whose main task is to defend the Russian nation and Russianness. This goes back in history to the czars’ owning the land and everything on it. The State should be respected but also feared, having precedence before the interests of the individual. Represented by the President and the Kremlin, it provides legitimacy to the bureaucracy.

 

Society in Russia is a much weaker notion as a consequence of the strong State. Russia has no long tradition of strong, well-developed non-government organizations. On the other hand, the personal networks of the individual Russian are by necessity much more developed than those of the individual Swede.

 

Motherland is a much stronger value in Russia than in Sweden. This has to do with all the sufferings that the Russian people have lived through over the centuries, threatened by annilation on at least three instances: the Tartar invasion in the 13th century, the Polish invasion in the early 17th century, and Hitler in the 20th century. Historical consciousness and knowledge are very strong in Russia, which I regard as a very positive factor that brings people together. Interestingly enough, when in 1991 the International Organization of Migration in the wake of the collapse of the Iron Curtain made a study of the propensity of various East European peoples to leave their country, 50 percent of the Albanians said yes against     2 percent of the Russians.

 

Furthermore, the bureaucracy works differently in Russia and in, say, Sweden, partly because of the the strong State concept. What strikes me in Russia is the verticality of all State institutions with bosses deciding everything and subordinates waiting for directives, anxious not to commit any formal mistakes. Horizontal cooperation is not very well developed, which sometimes creates problems, for instance in crisis management and in unforeseen situations.

Another striking factor, rooted in Russian history, is the uniformity and universality of Russian culture. People everywhere know Pushkin and speak the same way with almost no dialectical differences all over the Russian Federation. This is very similar to the situation in France, which is also an old centralized nation-state, but different from Britain, Germany and Sweden.

 

While the role of the State is strong in Russia, in economic terms the public sector is much smaller in Russia than in most European states. This leaves a great deal of room for dynamic entrepreneurship in Russia – both of positive and negative kind. What really impresses me most in Russia is that after a long period of Communist stagnation when everything turned upside down, there appeared people – the entrepreneurs – who saw the new possibilities much faster than the rest ot us. The same was partly true after the economic “revolution” in 1998. Generally, in comparison with Western practices, I have found that the time spans for economic and commercial decisions in Russia are often much shorter, which sometimes causes problems and misunderstandings.

 

Over the years I have served in Russia I have seen many factors at play. There have been several political and economic crises, many of them serious, sharp and deep, but  not long-lasting. I am saying this under the influence of living for four years in China during the 1970s. With respect to Russia, I see the following long-term positive changes which move the country forward:

 

the openness to the outer world and the globalization process;

generational change – in 10 years the people born since 1980, that is, after Communism, will be in charge;

the still high educational standards and the eagerness to adopt new knowledge, particularly among the young;

the vast natural resources, which will remain in high demand on the world market. I for one do not believe that the oil price will drop below 20 USD/barrel  for a long period;

a sensible economic policy after the ”best” thing that happened to Russia in the 1990s – the economic crisis of 17 August 1998 – instilled a strong measure of realism in Russian economic affairs.

 

I have travelled extensively in Russia over the last ten years and visited about half the Federation entities. What impresses me most is not just the extraordinary boom in Moscow but the economic and other progress in most of Russia’s regional capitals with 0,5–1,5 million inhabitants. Although uneven, the modernization process affects the whole of Russia. The spread of mobile phones epitomizes this. Last summer I visited the Novosibirsk, Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk regions. The rich natural resources, the introduction of new technologies and the quality of the hands-on political and economic managers should contribute to substantial growth in these regions.

 

One sad factor in Russian public life, to which I have devoted considerable attention, is the demographic situation. Two aspects stand out. One is the incomprehensible and depressingly low average life expectancy of Russian males – only about 60 years. The other is the fact that Russia’s population diminishes by about 800,000 people a year, of which about one-fourth, that is, 200,000 people – die from unnatural causes – murder, traffic incidents, fires, drowning, suicide, alcoholic and narcotic poisoning.

 

Turning to foreign affairs, I see Russia as a traditional European nation-state trying to find its new place in the changing environment. What Mr Primakov said in his Gorchakov lecture in 1996 still holds true, namely that Russia must first of all build up its domestic economic and political strength to be able to play a respected role on the world arena. A lot has been achieved in this respect during the last five years, and Russia is now again taking a more active role in world politics. Importantly, Russia has learnt the lesson after the Kosovo crisis in 1998 that Russia must not be isolated in world affairs but be a real participant.

 

I firmly believe in the strength and tenacity of the Russian nation and the Russian people. The richness and warmth of its culture has made a strong impact on me. Over 40 years, I have seen Russia change for the better and become an open society, which has very much to give to the rest of the world.

Much remains, however, to be done. The disgraceful war in Chechnya must be brought to a decent end, ensuring that Chechens enjoy a normal life within the Russian Federation. The rule of law must be further developed, and the courts become independent from the political tutelage of the State and other powers that be. Excessive centralization should be restrained, and bureaucratic interference in business reduced. State owned television channels should regain more freedom and independence in their news coverage and commentaries. The economic and social reforms should continue in order to reach the two goals set by President Putin – double GDP and reduce poverty. I believe Russia is set on this course and I look with optimism to Russia’s future, which is very much in the hands of the Russian people itself.

Last updated 21 november 2005, 18:52

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