The recent series of ‘colored’ revolutions in several post-Soviet states has dramatically altered Russia’s immediate neighborhood as it has created a fundamentally new geopolitical reality. Unfortunately, the Kremlin has not attempted to amend its foreign or domestic policies to meet the new challenges; moreover, it has failed to rethink the scale of the changes.

THE ‘BIG SWAP’ PRINCIPLE

An analysis of Moscow’s foreign-policy moves during the first five years of Vladimir Putin’s presidency makes it seem that the Kremlin has been renouncing the possibility of influencing countries beyond the former Soviet Union. This policy includes Russia’s withdrawal from strategic military bases in Lourdes, Cuba, and Cam Ranh, Vietnam, its conditional position in international organizations, and the writing-off of colossal debts owed to Russia, which still could be instruments of influence even though there was no hope the debts would be returned. The latter move has turned Russia, which does not exactly qualify as a prosperous country, into a major donor to the third world.

The general trend and specific shortcomings of Russia’s foreign policy in the last few years have been motivated not so much by ideological precepts as by the wish to interact with developed countries – above all the United States. The so-called “big swap” principle motivated these moves. The Kremlin has been pursuing a specific goal of swapping the remainder of its influence in regions outside the former Soviet Union (which the Kremlin inherited from the Soviet Union but which it does not really know how to use) for the recognition by developed countries of its dominant role in the post-Soviet space. This would exclude the Baltic States, which have been absorbed by the European Union.

Naturally, the lack of specialized structures in Russia that are capable of guiding its foreign policy and coordinating it with domestic agencies and foreign states has had an impact on the quality of Moscow’s foreign-policy moves. After all, even the famous “situational reaction” strategy will be unsuccessful without some general paradigm. Actually, the policy itself may be only half shaped, but a majority of the participants in the foreign-policy process must at least understand it.

Overall, the “big swap” principle did work. Throughout the “orange revolution” in Ukraine, for example, U.S. officials were uncommonly neutral: they did not oppose a possible victory of Victor Yanukovich, or the potential implementation of tougher scenarios that could later be supported by Russian officials.

In Georgia, where many believe that Western foundations have played a major role, a significant part of the revolutionary tasks at the first – and most important – stage was actually the work of Russian actors who sought an early solution to several specific problems. Their goals included, among others, the termination of flights by AWACS planes along Russia’s southern border, and the organization of joint patrols along the Russia-Georgia border. As for the “tulip revolution” in Kyrgyzstan in late March-early April 2005, this event came as a complete surprise to the developed countries.

The West, it seems, was ready – until the last moment – to turn over to the Russian authorities the global responsibility for overseeing the relatively insignificant yet potentially dangerous post-Soviet space. In the end, however, the plan collapsed. This was due to its unilateral violation by the Russian officials who demonstrated, once again, their inability to manage anything. Another reason for the plan’s collapse was the notorious administrative reform that paralyzed the state machinery. This was made all the more obvious by the inefficiency of the bureaucratic mechanisms, which are now void of any public control.

THE MEANING OF POST-SOVIET INTEGRATION

Following the fashions set by some Russian politicians, the Commonwealth of Independent States is now universally known as a “liquidation firm” intended to ensure a “civilized divorce” between the post-Soviet countries and alleviate Russia’s “imperial phantom-limb pains.” If the meaning of the CIS has come to be interpreted in such a narrow sense, then it is obvious that its mission is really over. It has fulfilled its mission and, therefore, it must be reorganized into a club of regional leaders who would occasionally meet to discuss non-binding solutions and joint humanitarian programs.

The aim of post-Soviet integration as such, however, is not only for the past but also for the future. For the relatively undeveloped countries, regional integration is the only way to survive amidst the increasing international competition prompted by globalization. Russia’s need for post-Soviet integration is purely practical: the Soviet Union, however heterogeneous its territories were, was a single living organism, all parts of which were dependent upon each other. It has been 14 years since the breakup of the Soviet Union into independent states. Since then, many of the economic, political and interpersonal ties that linked the former Soviet republics into a single body have been disrupted.

The CIS countries have failed to create the appropriate conditions for their successful evolution. Moreover, despite some individual achievements, none of these countries displays an ability to develop independently and, therefore, to function normally in the future. (Russia may be the only exception among them – with very serious reservations.)

The ease with which Poland, Finland and the Baltic States seceded from the Russian Empire after the 1917 Bolshevik revolution was largely due to the empire’s approach to those territories: before granting them their independence, it had developed them to a level that later enabled them to exist independently in Europe. One of the basic distinctions between the Russian Empire and the Western variety is that the latter often granted independence to nations that were unprepared for independent development. This state of affairs often brought about social cataclysms and abject degradation – the very plague now ravaging a majority of states in contemporary Africa. The breakup of the Soviet Union was dreadful not per se, but because so many nations achieved their independence despite the fact that they were not ready for it – they were simply not mature enough to shape their own destinies. When Russia declined to provide further assistance to these states, it displayed culpable irresponsibility and ultimately brought innumerable misfortunes to the peoples it allegedly liberated.

Throughout the post-Soviet states, bureaucracies took over the power of the state; these mechanisms, however, are never able to ensure efficient governance in general. None of these former Soviet states is economically independent and capable of developing on its own (even relatively rich Ukraine meets its needs by stealing Russian gas). None of the CIS countries (besides the Baltic States, which were immediately brought under the wing of the European Union) has managed to achieve even the minimal standards of living, not to mention those they enjoyed in Soviet times. These difficulties stem

not only from the totalitarian regime with its “corrupting influence,” they also result from objective economic processes.

Thus, Russia now finds itself half-surrounded by territories that are unable to develop on their own. These states require outside support in many realms, including financial, political, organizational and moral. In fact, the post-Soviet countries, most of which have witnessed the mass expatriation of ethnic Russians (which in fact is a form of ethnic cleansing), together with the mass emigration of specialists, are facing the unenviable task of rebuilding their societies anew.

The developed countries, however, have undertaken to lend their assistance to the most civilized part of the post-Soviet space – the Baltic States. Even the most optimistic forecasts rule out the possibility that the developed countries will assume responsibility for the remaining states – except, perhaps, in tiny Moldova. (China, as a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, is displaying much interest in the stabilization of Central Asia, but it would be unable – and would hardly wish – to pursue this challenge without the help of Russia.)

The remaining post-Soviet countries will have to either develop with Russia’s effective assistance, or not develop at all, thus continuing their slide into degradation. The disintegration of the post-Soviet space would bring about a level of chaos that would threaten Russia as well. Fighting against chaos in the post-Soviet countries would be more effective and less costly for Russia than combating chaos at home.

In other words, if the Kremlin does not want to see another million Azerbaijanis, for example, in Moscow, reluctant to integrate with the Muscovites, it must make efforts to normalize Azerbaijan’s development and steadily raise the living standards of its population. If Russia wants to stop the pandemic of drug addiction, it must boost Tajikistan’s economic development to a level that would enable its population to earn their livelihood by working, rather than by trafficking heroin from Afghanistan.

In short, the process of post-Soviet integration must be steadily intensified. Obviously, these efforts will take a long time and prove successful only if they provide mutual advantages, as well as deliver commercial benefits to non-state actors, both in Russia and abroad. Russia’s reasonable approach to its immediate territory, not to mention its own products and labor markets, could underlie its policy toward the newly independent countries from among the former Soviet republics.

The post-Soviet states take it for granted that they enjoy access to Russia’s domestic market and can ship their goods across the vast country in transit. Meanwhile, mere respect for their sovereignty requires treating them as equal and, therefore, separate agents of international life – which also concerns their access to Russian markets and territories.

This does not mean Russia’s return to isolationism; rather, Russia must simply start treating its possessions in a proprietary manner. In particular, it must view its markets and territory as its own, rather than as someone else’s or as freely accessible to all. Within the framework of this paradigm, it would be logical for Russia to view access to its market and territory as a service implying reciprocal services from other countries. This would include providing Russian capital the preferential right to purchase property, as well as granting Russian citizens a special status on the territories of those countries. Such reciprocal services would exist as a kind of “payment for development.”

COOPERATION WITH UKRAINE

There is no doubt now that the “orange revolution” in Ukraine has ruined all hopes for integration in the CIS – at least in its present form. Indeed, only Russian bureaucrats, with their habit of staunchly ignoring the reality, can pretend that the strong pro-European orientation of the incumbent Ukrainian leadership does not undermine the idea of a Common Economic Space between the two countries. Although the European Union does not wish to talk about Ukraine’s possible integration into the EU, this does not mean that Kiev cannot make unilateral steps that would rule out its further integration with Russia and bring about the inevitable disintegration of the two economies.

For example, Ukraine is planning to reduce import duties for European foodstuffs (whose producers are best subsidized in the world) from the present prohibitive rate to 10-20 percent. Apparently, this move will cause Russia to introduce tough new limitations with regard to Kiev in order to prevent the collapse of its agriculture. This, in turn, will severely complicate the negotiation process for Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization. Furthermore, it will strain Russia’s relations with the developed countries, and aggravate Moscow’s relations with Kiev.

Meanwhile, in a bid to meet Western interests, Ukraine is cutting down its defense industry, including enterprises vital to Russia’s defense sector. There is also a possibility that this military change in Ukraine – supported by U.S. money or, at least, U.S. promises – will even create complications for the strategic aspects of Russia’s defense capability.

The next few years may bring into the foreground the issue of Russian property in Ukraine, above all, real estate in the Crimea belonging to Russian citizens. At the same time, Ukraine will most likely become a haven for Russian businesspersons, primarily medium and small-scale proprietors seeking protection from the “security oligarchs” (the term used to describe the dominant social group in Russia, linked with state structures and using – or threatening to use – violence in the name of the Russian state and for personal enrichment).

Traditional differences between Russia and Ukraine will intensify. The list of grievances include the charges Moscow must pay to Kiev to transport its gas supplies, the “unsanctioned tapping” of Russian gas by Kiev, and the cost of Russian and Turkmen gas – a very sensitive issue for Ukraine. Finally, efforts by the Ukrainian leadership to curb oil product prices can potentially hurt Russian oil companies. (These efforts can also affect the “security oligarchs,” with whom Russian oil companies operating in Ukraine have to share a considerable part of their incomes. Since the “security oligarchy” plays a decisive role in mapping out Russian policy, one can expect essential political steps, although asymmetrical ones.)

The Russian leadership has not yet worked out its attitude toward the aforementioned problems, which means they will become more aggravated. Moreover, over time, the problems will become increasingly internal, as opposed to external.

THE ONSET OF ISLAM

The primary threat of Russian destabilization stems from the rapid expansion of radical Islamism. Contrary to popular belief, the proliferation of Islamist sentiments in the post-Soviet states derives not so much from external as by internal factors: the social, economic and administrative policies conducted by the governments of those states and supported by Russia make Islam the only generally available instrument for achieving the people’s natural hope for justice.

Islam, which teaches social justice, is making new gains everywhere. In the post-Soviet space, this tendency is particularly manifest due to the sharp decrease in the living standards in the post-Soviet years, together with the general feeling of despair. Owing to its social nature, contemporary Islam is actually taking the place of the discredited Communist ideology. (Interestingly, the Hizb ut-Tahreer party, which has a ramified network across Russian territory, seeks to build a global Islamic state, starting with individual countries, including Russia.)

The uprising in Kyrgyzstan, for example, found its roots in the unbearable living conditions for the majority of the country’s population. Similar problems exist in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The Kyrgyz revolution has brought to power representatives of the so-called southern clans, which traditionally harbored members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan – despite harsh measures of President Askar Akayev. Many of these groups are allegedly linked to the drug mafia.

Another Central Asian uprising, this one in Uzbekistan’s eastern city of Andijan, was harshly suppressed by the Islam Karimov regime. This outcome, however, is not strategically significant since it has not removed the main causes of the uprising: mass poverty and despair. Nor did it confront the “subjective factor” of the future revolution: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. In light of these ongoing factors, toughening of repressions will only provoke further protests against the ruling regime.

The overthrow of Karimov seems to be an inevitable conclusion. Meanwhile, those forces linked with radical Islamists usually reap the fruits of popular uprisings in the Islamic countries. The revolution in Kyrgyzstan is no exception. It will inevitably boost the activities of radical Islamist organizations and possibly bring about the formation of an Islamic state, at least in the Fergana Valley. This hypothetical state would largely exist on revenues from drug trafficking. In this way, it will be similar to Afghanistan in the days of the Taliban – only this time it will be a thousand kilometers closer to Russia.

Therefore, Moscow must make every effort to prevent such developments from happening. Above all, it must convince the Kyrgyz leadership to change its

social and economic policies; this is the only way to prevent mass disorder in the country. The Russian bureaucracy, however, is unlikely to cope with this task due to its ineffectiveness and traditional disregard for the social interests of ordinary citizens even in Russia, let alone other countries. If things develop according to this scenario, there will be quite predictable consequences: the further advance of radical Islamism, the division of Russian society into two separate communities, a rise in acts of terror and an expansion of the drug-trafficking pandemic.

‘COLORED’ REVOLUTIONS AND RUSSIA

Russia’s weakening influence on the post-Soviet countries has given rise to new problems that it is unable to solve. This scenario can add to the destabilization of Russian society, as well as increase the probability of revolutionary developments.

For all their national specificities, the ‘colored’ revolutions have common generic features. These include, above all, forced takeovers organized by small groups of energetic people, carried out under the cover of democratic procedures and slogans. The Kyrgyz experience has shown that a revolution does not necessarily require a strong and well-organized opposition, let alone popular and effective leaders. What is most important is the mass nature of discontent (among the elite, as well) with the ruling regime, and the latter’s inability to prevent a revolution by meeting, at least, the most acute needs of society.

The latter prerequisite has already surfaced in contemporary Russia. According to sociological studies of the Yuri Levada Center, 85 percent of the Russian population is low-income (that is, people who cannot afford to buy even basic household products). This group, already hit by the monetization of benefits, is mistrustful of the forthcoming reform of the public utilities sector. Under Russia’s present political system, both the state and the bureaucrats serving it are free of any responsibility to the population. The bureaucracy, who demonstrates its formal loyalty to the supreme authority, has received complete freedom of arbitrariness, while democracy, as an institution for compelling the state to bear responsibility to society, no longer really exists.

The ruling bureaucracy has managed to turn the most significant “groups of influence” in Russian politics against itself. Regional elites have been deprived

of political rights without any compensation. Even the security agencies – the buttress of the ruling bureaucracy – have been seriously humiliated through the monetization of benefits program. More importantly, there is frustration with the obvious inability of the government to defend the country’s interests; this includes the Kremlin’s setbacks in the post-Soviet space, which the security agencies regard as Russia’s “backyard.”

Russia’s present economic model is not capable of self-development. It represents an increasing symbiosis between liberal fundamentalists who, on the one hand, rob the people in favor of businesses in the course of pseudo-liberal reforms, and the so-called “security oligarchs,” on the other hand, who rob businesses for non-productive consumption. The growing appetite of the security oligarchs prohibits any normal development for the majority of businesses. In 2004, the security oligarchs owned an estimated 25 percent of the turnover of several large commercial enterprises.

These factors attach special importance not just to the issue of a power takeover, but also to the type of takeover model.

Obviously, the Russian variant will differ from the Ukrainian one. In Russia, one can expect a different degree of public rage, as well as the presence of the Islamic factor (Islamic communities are presently not represented at the federal level). Furthermore, there could be a real influence on the situation from international – rather than only Chechen or Dagestani – terrorism.

Should such a situation arise, there will be differences from the Kyrgyz model as well. Since Russian society has no attachment to tribal clans, Russian “revolutionaries” will have to rely not on “people of their own kin,” but rather on attractive and well-planned ideas. At the same time, there is no doubt the Russian authorities will put up serious resistance to any such moves. This will bring to life reliable and effective leaders from among the presently unstructured opposition.

To sum up, the instability in some of the CIS countries has been brought about by the failure of the post-Soviet integration process, which in turn was due to the insufficient actions of the present Russian bureaucracy. This scenario may serve as a catalyst for dramatically improving Russia’s political system. A new generation of politicians must come to power that would be responsible to their country and capable of modernizing Russia and, finally, carrying out post-Soviet integration.