Alexei Malashenko is Vice-President of the Academic Council of the Moscow Carnegie Center, and professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. This article has been published in Russian in the Vremya Novostei newspaper.

It has become rather fashionable today to give particular attention, as well as multiple definitions, to the various religious groupings now dotting the globe. Fundamentalism, neofundamentalism, Wahhabism, neo-Wahhabism, Islamism, integrism – these are just a few examples.

Occasionally, discussions over these kinds of terms become theological in nature, and the secular scholars must quote ayats from the Holy Koran and the Hadis to support their statements. No doubt, people do need to exercise their intellects, but they sometimes overdo it and invent different kinds of definitions for one and the same phenomenon.

Russians of the older generation may still remember a speaker at the 26th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party telling his amazed audience: “The struggle for liberation may be launched under the banner of Islam, as shown by early and late history. But that same history also teaches us that Islamic slogans can be used by reactionary forces stirring up counter-revolutionary revolts.” What a universal guide to action for Vladimir Putin, Aslan Maskhadov, Islam Karimov, and Dzhuma Namangani (if he is still alive, of course)!

Much water has flowed under the bridge since then, but the deep inner link between religion and politics has remained unchanged. Secularism is now interpreted in a much more “diplomatic” way, while religion is already perceived as a normal “factor” of the secular political world and public life in general.

These changes are particularly manifest in the Muslim world where all political forces appeal to Islam. It is common these days for a pro-reform president and a fierce opponent from among orthodox Islamists to begin their speeches with “Bismillah” (“In the name of Allah”). Central Asia is no exception – and in a sense, the rule.

Riddles Of The Islamic “Threat”

The actual power of the Islamists, and the degree of their influence upon an individual society, is difficult to judge, despite an avalanche of articles on this issue. An overwhelming majority of these articles stem from ‘information’ regularly leaked to the press by various sources. The allegedly ‘official’ statements which derive from the secret services, ambitious ‘spiritual leaders,’ and opportunistic politicians and analysts serve to cloud the facts. The existence of radical Islam has long become an instrument actively used by secular leaders for achieving their goals. Similarly, it is used by power agencies which exploit the ‘Islamic threat’ to pump funds out of the national budget.

In the past, the experts sometimes portrayed the Islamists (or whatever other titles they may go by) as the only effective oppositional force. And in some countries – Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – they really were. In other places they enjoyed varying degrees of success: in Kyrgyzstan, they played a minor role in the political processes, whereas in Kazakhstan, the Islamic forces found themselves cast along the roadside of political life. And in Turkmenistan they simply do not exist as an organized movement. One must not rule out, however, the emergence of Muslim opposition in the land of the new Turkmen ‘Gospel’ – Rukhnama – written by Saparmurat Niyazov, the proclaimed “President-for-Life” of Turkmenistan, otherwise known as Turkmenbashi, “Father of all Turkmen.”

At various national and regional levels, double standards are widely used with regard to Islamic movements. The ‘Islamic threat’ never stops making the headlines of government-controlled publications and is a dominant theme of political statements. But if you ask a well-informed official in a private conversation how real this ‘threat’ is, he may merely shrug his shoulders. Some highly placed politicians in Central Asia know nothing at all about the existence of Islamist organizations in their countries, not to mention their leaders’ names.

At the same time, it is generally believed that if chaos begins to run rampant throughout the economy, and the gap between the rich and the poor continues to increase together with blatant corruption, “they will make us suffer the consequences.” “They” are perceived as some sort of a surrealist force which is everywhere, yet nowhere. “They” are mighty, of course, but their actual rise to power seems as unrealistic as the end of the world.

It may be helpful at this time to outline specific periods of Islamic activity in Central Asia which are common to all the countries of the former Soviet Union. Our chronology of events, as is typical with any broad analysis, may lack full synchronization of events. Furthermore, one may find many exceptions to these stages; nevertheless, they will help us identify distinct landmarks in history.

The first stage continued from the late 1980s to the early 1990s. The landmark date in this stage was 1990: in that year the all-Union Islamic Party of Revival (IPR) was established in Astrakhan, Russia. Naturally, there had existed independent Islamic structures in Central Asia before, but they were small and amorphous organizations without any ambitious goals. The IPR had numerous branches in the country, which promoted the establishment of other parties and groups, large or small.

The year 1991 saw the establishment of the famous Adolat party in Uzbekistan, a kind of synthesis of the Soviet Union’s voluntary people’s patrols and moral police. This party was preceded by Hezbollah and the long-forgotten Islamic Party of Turkestan. In the same years, the Alash National Freedom Party was founded in Kazakhstan, and four Islamist groups emerged in Azerbaijan. In November 1991, the Islamic Revival Party (IRP) was officially registered in Tajikistan. The Muslim revival movement was “raging like high water.”

But the “Islamic Renaissance” proved to be short-lived. In December 1991, following the first election in newly independent Tajikistan, the IRP entered into confrontation with the People’s Front. In 1992, the Uzbek government began to suppress the Adolat party. Finally, Kazakhstan’s President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, refused to conduct negotiations with Alashists whom he had labeled “fascists” in a fit of emotion.

Grapes Of Wrath

The years 1992-1993 marked the beginning of the second stage, in which the suppression of political Islam intensified. At first, a few dozen opposition mosques were shut down, and soon the doors of hundreds of opposition mosques were closed; rebellious Muslim politicians and clergymen were sent off to prison.

Islamists who appeal to the Moslem religion in pursuing their objectives went into deep opposition, and more often resorted to military activities to achieve their political goals. In Central Asia and the North Caucasus there emerged special training camps for Islamic fighters. Tajikistan was torn by a civil war. Nationalistic Islamic movements – “the grapes of wrath” – ripened in Russia’s Tatarstan region. The first president of the breakaway Republic of Chechnya, Air Force Major-General Dzhokhar Dudayev, declared a jihad (religious war) against Russia.

By the mid-1990s, Islamic radicalism became an ordinary political force in the former states of the Soviet Union. The main success of the Islamist movement was a peace agreement signed in 1996 by the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and the government of Tajikistan; this led to the subsequent establishment of a real government coalition (however, UTO members reportedly do not feel at home in Dushanbe’s corridors of power to this day).

The developments in Tajikistan demonstrated that the use of force alone against radical Islamists may have tragic and unexpected consequences. It is possible to reach an accord with them, thus turning enemies into partners, however difficult the working relationship may be.

At the same time, the civil war in Tajikistan, which took a heavy toll on human lives (tens of thousands of people were killed), came as an important trump card for all the Central Asian presidents. They blamed the outburst of Civil War on their bloodstained neighbor, whose weak political power had prevented it from preserving stability, thus forcing it into concessions with the “children of Shaitan” – fundamentalists.

Some analysts argue that another big achievement of the radical Islamists was the 1996 Khasavyurt agreement, signed in Moscow. However, this agreement did not increase the chances for a peace settlement in Chechnya and was eventually repudiated. Although some circles described it as a victory for the militant Islamists, one should not forget that Aslan Maskhadov, who signed the agreement on Chechnya’s behalf, always opposed Chechnya’s “Islamization” and the foundation of an Islamic state there. The Khasavyurt agreement heralded the victory of the Chechen separatist movement, not Islamism.

The Taliban As An Ideal

The beginning of the third stage can be dated to 1996. At this juncture, the Taliban rose to political power in Afghanistan. In Turkey, the leader of the Refah (Welfare) Party, Necmettin Erbakan, became prime minister. This first victory for the Turkish Islamists (the second came last year) was a momentous event. If such outcomes are possible in Turkey (a would-be member of the European Union), one should not be surprised when and if they happen in Central Asia.

By that time, Islamists had become more consolidated and organized, as well as more experienced, in opposing a government that totally rejected all compromises. The radical Islamists now had a territory under their control, which made them less vulnerable in their struggle against secular authorities. Afghanistan became an international transfer point for arms traffickers, and an area where Islamic extremists and their allies from various countries could freely meet and share their experience with each other. (In those years, Russian newspapers and television considered it to be good policy to regularly frighten their audiences by suggesting “a Taliban invasion of Kazan” or “an Islamic parade through Red Square.”) Contacts between Islamists in Central Asia and the Chechen fighters became more and more obvious. Russian troops identified Uzbeks among the Chechen fighters taken prisoner, while many Chechens were apprehended in Uzbekistan’s Fergana Valley.

The establishment of a Taliban regime in Afghanistan had an immense demonstrative effect on Central Asians: “Look, those people have been able to establish a truly Islamic regime! Why not build such a state right here?” Needless to say, an overwhelming majority of Central Asians, even in the Islamist-dominated Fergana Valley, would not have been able to live even ten minutes under a real government of the Taliban, who threw television sets out of windows and closed down the public baths.

Yet, the myth of the Taliban regime’s justness kept spreading. People, especially the poor, tend to always believe in a better future. This belief was strengthened by accounts of those who had visited Afghanistan during the reign of the Taliban. Many of them reported a decrease in corruption in that country, an evil that remains widespread among its northern neighbors.

In 1996, the strengthened Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan began to make regular raids in the Fergana Valley, fighting against Uzbek and Kyrgyz regular troops. The Kyrgyz town of Batken became a local “Battle of Stalingrad” in the war against Islamic fighters. Finally, in 1999, in a climax to the tensions, the ‘legendary’ assassination attempt on Uzbek leader Islam Karimov was made. Even if we agree with those who are confident that the explosions in Tashkent had no relation to the Islamic opposition and were organized by other forces, we cannot fail to notice that the terrorist act coincided in time with the intensification of the opposition’s activity.

Another important political force in Central Asia is the Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Party of Islamic Liberation), which has become a favorite subject for reporters. Indeed, Hizb-ut-Tahrir members make an essential difference from the more traditional “Islamic fighters.” They declared their devotion to nonviolent activities and launched a propaganda campaign among the population by spreading leaflets and culturing people about the ideas and rules of Islam.

Eventually, the Uzbek authorities launched a crackdown on the Hizb-ut-Tahrir members. Kyrgyzstan displayed more tolerance for them: they were arrested and then released; if they were placed on trial, the sentences were not very severe. In Kyrgyzstan, Hizb-ut-Tahrir members reminded one of the Maquisards (members of the French underground resistance movement during World War II), who fought Nazis out in the open and were not particularly keen on secrecy rules.

September 11. Intermission

The slow, grueling struggle for a caliphate and Islamic justice, marked by seasonal upsurges of military activities, continued until September 11, 2001. That day marked the beginning of a new, fourth stage in the history of the Islamic movement in Central Asia, as well as the whole world. It can be described as an intermission in the noisy religious and political performance.

The fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, together with the large-scale offensive against al-Qaeda, placed the Central Asian radicals in a difficult position. Their flow of financial support began to dry up, together with the support they had once enjoyed from their Afghan allies. Finally, they lost many valuable fighters in Afghanistan as well: the Uzbek Islamists were known to be among the fiercest fighters in the Taliban forces. Finally, no one knows the fate of the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Dzhuma Namangani, who has gone missing.

A year after September 11, the ‘Islamic threat’ to the ruling regimes in Central Asia was nonexistent. At this critical juncture, the Islamists are not ready to take risks; and an intermission has settled in the region. However, the grounds for radical Islamic protests still exist. There also remains the possibility that the existing Islamic organizations will survive, while new ones could emerge.

In the North Caucasus, the post-September intermission is long over. In a sense, the continuation of the Chechen conflict proves its special autonomy from bin Laden and his people. The Middle East has seen no intermission at all. The war there continues despite the strikes against international terrorism.

Attitudes to people considering social changes in the context of Islam may differ, yet these people have a right to have views of their own, even though their views may be utopian. The significance of an Islamic alternative for Central Asia should be neither underestimated nor exaggerated. The authors and followers of such ideas are unable to stir up society on their own, but they have good chances to promote their ideas fast (and without any bin Laden) if the general situation in their countries becomes more aggravated. One must be constantly ready for such a turn of events everywhere: be it democratic Kyrgyzstan or authoritarian Uzbekistan, that is, in every country where the government is unable to markedly raise the standards of living, and to bring the population above the poverty line. Islamists may well establish cooperation with other political forces that are not “pure Islam.”

Like the Chechen separatists, some members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan like to compare themselves to wolves. Most likely, they (and we too) do not realize how true this comparison is: both forces attack “sick” and socially vulnerable state systems, and really resemble wolves who perform “sanitary functions” in the wild by killing the weak and sick animals. One gets the impression that Central Asia is awaiting the fifth stage in Islamic political activity. And no one can say when and how this fifth stage will begin.