Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia and Ukraine were confronted with the pressing problem of what to do with the Black Sea Fleet; the issue took eight long years to resolve. Finally, it seemed that the crisis was confined to the pages of history. However, some forces in Kiev, under various pretexts, are again calling into question the agreement that settled the conflict between the two states.

Given this latest turn of events, it would be helpful to recollect exactly how the unprecedented diplomatic marathon, which was full of dramatic twists and turns, helped to untie one of the most complicated knots that Russia and Ukraine inherited from the Soviet period.

BOLD MOVE BY KIEV

On April 5, 1992, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk signed a decree entitled, On Urgent Measures to Build the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The decree placed the Black Sea Fleet of the former Soviet Union under Kiev’s jurisdiction and ordered that a Ukrainian Navy be immediately built on the basis of the fleet’s forces deployed on the Ukrainian territory (this actually meant the entire Black Sea Fleet). However, Kiev had no grounds to make such a move. Moreover, at that time, the Black Sea Fleet was part of the United Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and part of the CIS Navy, commanded by Admiral Vladimir Chernavin.

Moscow’s reaction was immediate: on April 7, the president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, issued a decree that placed the Black Sea Fleet under Russia’s jurisdiction. To resolve the crisis, the Kremlin proposed holding negotiations and suspending the two conflicting decrees for the period of the negotiations.

FIRST CONTACT

On April 16, first deputy commander-in-chief of the CIS Navy, Felix Gromov, and I traveled to Kiev to make preparations for the negotiations. Yeltsin’s instructions were very short and concise: “The final agreement with Ukraine must include, on an interrelated basis, principles and specific parameters for the handover of part of the Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine, as well as accords on terms for the basing of, and support for, the Black Sea Fleet of the United Armed Forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States.” In short, the solution of the Black Sea Fleet problem was to include the solution of the problem of its basing.

My Ukrainian counterpart was Anton Buteiko, adviser to the president of Ukraine and head of the presidential International Affairs Service. The essence of his demand was very simple: the Black Sea Fleet must be Ukrainian. This demand, however, was not backed by any serious arguments. In response, we proposed relying on several earlier concluded CIS agreements, in particular the Minsk and Alma-Ata accords, which had a direct bearing on the Black Sea Fleet. I attached particular importance to the protocol of a working meeting of the CIS heads of state on naval symbols, which was signed in Moscow at the summit level on January 16, 1992. The protocol stated that the Navy of the former Soviet Union was part of the CIS Strategic Armed Forces; also it included a specification that was very important for the solution of the fleet problem. It stated, in part: “… except for the part of the Black Sea Fleet which will join the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk wrote down this phrase in the document with his own hand. Then followed a provision stating that the handover of part of the Black Sea Fleet to Ukraine must be resolved on the basis of an agreement between Russia and Ukraine. So the discrepancy between the claim to the whole of the Black Sea Fleet, and what the Ukrainian president had written in the protocol, was striking.

We continued to raise the issue of the basing of the Black Sea Fleet, but the Ukrainian officials avoided discussing it. The issue remained unresolved even after I referred to the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States of December 8, 1991, which was signed by the president of Ukraine. The agreement said: “The member states of the Commonwealth… shall jointly guarantee necessary conditions for the deployment, functioning, and material and social support of the Strategic Armed Forces.” This had a direct bearing on the Black Sea Fleet. However, references to the CIS documents only drew a negative reaction from our partners.

Finally it was agreed to hold negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet and set the starting date of the talks. The first meetings showed, however, that Moscow and Kiev approached the negotiations from directly opposite positions.

In the meantime, the situation in the Black Sea Fleet became increasingly aggravated due to the unilateral actions of Kiev, which exerted pressure on the fleet personnel in a bid to cause the sailors to take the Ukrainian military oath and thus de facto “Ukrainianize” the fleet. The fleet, commanded at the time by Admiral Igor Kasatonov, did not yield to the pressure; nevertheless, the political problem remained very acute.

On April 29-30, state delegations from Russia and Ukraine met in Odessa for their first official meeting on the Black Sea Fleet. The delegations were headed by vice chairmen of the two countries’ Supreme Soviets (parliaments) – Yuri Yarov of Russia and Vassily Durdinets of Ukraine. The parties agreed only on the introduction of a moratorium on unilateral actions with regard to the Black Sea Fleet, which Ukraine did not observe. The meeting failed to introduce any prospects for solving the issue, while the Ukrainian side displayed no interest in a settlement on mutually acceptable terms.

THE CONCEPT OF A POLITICAL TREATY

The aggravation of the entire range of Russian-Ukrainian relations necessitated their discussion at summit level. On Russia’s initiative, the leaders of the two countries met in Dagomys, a suburb of the Russian city of Sochi, in June 1992. I was instructed to prepare proposals on the political concept of the negotiations.

I proceeded from the following premise. The liquidation of the Soviet Union brought about many moot points and even conflicts between Russia and Ukraine. Progress in resolving them was slow or failed to make any headway at all. This created the impression that relations between the two countries were troubled and had no future. I was confident that such a dire situation did not meet the vital interests either of Russia, or Ukraine.

The Black Sea Fleet problem was particularly acute. The obvious differences in the countries’ approaches to its solution were augmented, while extreme nationalist forces in Ukraine aggravated and even stirred up problems. These forces would have gladly reduced relations between the two countries to those difficulties, thereby making them hostages to the conflict over the Black Sea Fleet. Of course, such a scenario would have had serious international consequences.

Kiev was reluctant to solve the fleet problem on a mutually acceptable basis, apparently in the belief that time was on its side. At the same time, Moscow, despite its legally correct position during the Black Sea Fleet negotiations, and its readiness for a balanced decision, did not have a negotiating resource that could interest Kiev.

Moscow needed to unite all of the main problems into one package, formulate the concept of its relations with Ukraine, determine a vector for their development, and enter the Black Sea Fleet problem into this context. I turned to Russia’s diplomatic experience of the past when this country invigorated relations with major states. Those efforts were based on the interplay of the following key elements: the broadening of contacts at all levels, together with regular summit meetings; the extension of the contractual basis of bilateral relations and the creation of necessary negotiating mechanisms to this end; combination of efforts in various fields of interstate relations; etc.

The conclusion of a general political treaty was set as the main goal of the initial stage for building Russian-Ukrainian relations. This goal, quite natural for building relations with any other state, in this case acquired special meaning. This was because historically Ukraine did not have formal borders, and the need to formalize them was obvious and pressing. This factor inspired hope for Kiev’s special interest in concluding a political treaty with Russia as an important step in fixing Ukraine’s territorial status internationally.

Naturally, Russia was interested in normalizing relations with its largest neighbor in Europe, as well as determining the nature of those relations. More importantly was that the preparation of a general political treaty could be combined with negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet. Then Russia would possess the diplomatic resource to find a solution to the Black Sea Fleet problem. I believed this to be the only hope for a mutually acceptable settlement, and the Russian leadership eventually approved these considerations.

On June 23, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine, together with parliament chairmen, heads of government, and ministers, met in Dagomys. The main results of the negotiations were fixed in an agreement on the further development of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

President Yeltsin proposed to the Ukrainian party a plan to work out a full-scale political treaty that would reflect the new quality of relations between Russia and Ukraine. The Ukrainian guests accepted the proposal. The very first provision of the agreement signed in Dagomys was to immediately begin preparations for such a document.

The agreement contained the following phrase: “In view of the creation of their own Armed Forces, the Parties have reiterated the importance for continuing the negotiations on the creation… of the Navy of Russia and the Navy of Ukraine on the basis of the Black Sea Fleet.” And further on: “They [Russia and Ukraine – Yu.D.] have agreed to use the existing system of the basing and material and technical support on a contractual basis.” After Dagomys, this accord became fundamental in other negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet.

However, even after the Dagomys summit, it proved impossible to speed up the solution of the Black Sea Fleet problem. So, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine, at their meeting in Yalta on August 3, 1992, agreed to postpone the settlement until the end of 1995. Meanwhile, the Black Sea Fleet was withdrawn from the structure of the CIS United Armed Forces and subordinated directly to the heads of both states. A year later, on June 17, 1993, at a meeting in Zavidovo, near Moscow, the two presidents agreed to accelerate the division of the naval fleet on a fifty-fifty basis. Yet the agreement signed in Zavidovo was never ratified.

In September 1993, yet another Russian-Ukrainian summit took place in Massandra, in the Crimea. There, the presidents signed a protocol on the settlement of the Black Sea Fleet issue, which stated that “the state delegations of the Russian Federation and Ukraine shall within a month work over all the issues pertaining to the drafting of the Agreement, according to which the whole of the Black Sea Fleet with all its infrastructure in the Crimea will be used by Russia and will bear Russia’s symbols on the understanding that the Russian party will make corresponding payment for the half of the Black Sea Fleet, including infrastructure, which was to become Ukrainian under the previous accords.”

I was appointed to head the state delegation of the Russian Federation at the negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet problem. Boris Tarasyuk headed the Ukrainian delegation.

The difficult negotiating process was complicated still further by a hostile act on the part of Ukraine. On April 8, 1994, the Ukrainian military made a bold attempt in the port of Odessa to detain the Cheleken hydrographic vessel, which was conducting routine assignment to service navigational equipment. On the night from April 10 to April 11, about 120 Ukrainian troops seized the 318th battalion of the Black Sea Fleet reserve ships, together with a coastal base, a communication center, property and armaments. The coastal base personnel were taken to the village of Chebanka, 10 kilometers from Odessa. The move sparked a crisis situation. I was sent on urgent orders to Kiev to discuss the situation with the president of Ukraine, and we were able to reach a verbal understanding concerning the basing of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol.

AMBAGES

On April 15, 1994, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine met in Moscow and signed an agreement on a stage-by-stage settlement of the Black Sea Fleet imbroglio. The agreement provided, in particular, that Ukraine would have 15 to 20 percent of the fleet’s ships and that the Russian and Ukrainian fleets would be based separately.

The defense ministers of Russia and Ukraine, Pavel Grachev and Vitaly Radetsky, met in Sevastopol on April 21 to discuss mechanisms for fulfilling the agreement. There, the ministers were able to reach a mutual consensus with regard to the division of Black Sea Fleet ships between Russia and Ukraine. However, Radetsky, breaching the verbal understanding that had been previously reached with then President of Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk, disrupted the question over basing rights of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.

By July 1994, when the presidency in Ukraine passed to Leonid Kuchma, a solution to the fleet problem had still not been found. It became increasingly obvious that this lingering question needed to be linked to the conclusion of a political treaty between Russia and Ukraine. However, Ukraine sought to avoid such a bilateral declaration and conclude a political treaty, while leaving the Black Sea Fleet problem hanging in midair. Kiev made every effort to have Yeltsin pay an official visit to Ukraine, but Moscow insisted that such a visit should take place only after the preparation of a political treaty was completed and the Black Sea Fleet problem was solved.

On August 11, 1994, preparations began on the draft of a general political treaty between Russia and Ukraine. I headed the Russian delegation, and Alexander Chaly was the head of the Ukrainian delegation. By the end of autumn, the delegations had three meetings and there was general agreement on the text of the document, which was entitled, Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. On Russia’s initiative, the draft treaty was supplemented with a provision that both countries, as friendly powers, would base their mutual relations on strategic partnership and cooperation. Both sides pledged to refrain from any actions that were harmful to the interests of the other side, nor to use their territories in such a way that could be detrimental to each other’s security. The document emphasized the need for a common economic space between the two countries. On the whole, the draft treaty laid the legal groundwork for developing friendly relations between Russia and Ukraine, provided both nations showed respect for each other’s territorial integrity and reiterated the inviolability of the borders that existed between them.

The work on the draft treaty proceeded very rapidly; yet, it was far from complete when Leonid Kuchma essentially raised the status of the Ukrainian delegation: Chaly, as the head of the delegation, was replaced by Vice Premier Yevgeny Marchuk, one of the most influential and rising Ukrainian statesmen at the time, who would later become prime minister. I, in turn, was appointed deputy foreign minister.

When Marchuk arrived in Moscow for the negotiations, he conveyed to me President Kuchma’s wish that the draft treaty be initialed. Obviously, Kiev wanted the initialing procedure to be followed by Yeltsin’s official visit to Ukraine and the signing of the treaty. I replied that we could not do that until work on the draft treaty was complete and the Black Sea Fleet problem was solved. Kiev was not happy with that response.

On January 24, 1995, Kuchma arrived in Moscow and asked Yeltsin to appoint Oleg Soskovets, Russia’s first deputy prime minister who was quickly gaining prestige in federal and political life, as the head of the Russian negotiating delegation. Soskovets was immediately summoned to the Kremlin where he was given corresponding instructions in Kuchma’s presence. Simultaneously, it was decided that I would be his deputy at the negotiations.

The newly composed delegations met in Kiev where the negotiations began with opening statements by Marchuk and Soskovets. The latter concluded his speech on a bit of a strange note: “Diplomats are accustomed to conduct negotiations for the sake of negotiations; the very process is the most important thing to them. We have arrived to achieve solutions,” he said with emphasis, half turning to me and smiling. Later, our delegation had a meeting with President Kuchma; negotiations were held on the text of the treaty, which we failed to fully agree on; and, finally, a conversation on the Black Sea Fleet took place, which showed the total unwillingness of the Ukrainian party to move forward. Then Marchuk and Soskovets met tête-à-tête, after which Soskovets summoned the delegation and declared that he was prepared to immediately initial the political treaty.

That news came as a bolt from the blue. Russia’s strategic line at the negotiations with Ukraine could be ruined since the linkage of the two issues – the political treaty and the Black Sea Fleet – would be disrupted, and the future of the Black Sea Fleet and chances for its basing in Sevastopol would remain obscure. That was unacceptable to Moscow.

 “If we initial the treaty now,” I exclaimed, “the Ukrainians will not care a damn about the negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet!”

That was a genuine cry from the heart. But it was all in vain. An hour later, the initialing ceremony took place – and with much pomp.

The Ukrainian delegation was in a state of euphoria: the treaty had been initialed, the Black Sea Fleet question remained hanging in midair, while Russia now depended on Kiev’s will. The Ukrainians believed the way to President Yeltsin’s visit to Kiev was now open. Kuchma hurried to declare that the visit would take place in early March 1995.

Meanwhile, the media both in Russia and Ukraine flew into a rage. Russia’s Segodnya newspaper of February 18 carried an article under the bitter headline: “Sailors Believe They Were Sold for a Song.” The description of the events, provided by the article, was very close to the original: “On the eve of the latest round of negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet, recently held in Kiev, the composition of the Russian delegation was essentially changed. The group of diplomats, who had for several years been working under the direction of ambassador at large Yuri Dubinin, received a new head – Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, whose scope had never included naval affairs. Rumor has it that it was the head of the Ukrainian delegation, Vice Premier and influential policymaker Yevgeny Marchuk, who insisted on this replacement in Moscow. Marchuk wanted to negotiate with his peer. The subsequent events showed that Mr. Marchuk made the right choice: he received from the hands of Mr. Soskovets what he had been unable to get from Moscow for three years. ‘Unlike Dubinin, Soskovets is a man one can do business with,’ Mr. Marchuk said in a brief comment on his achievement. ‘This is a victory of Ukrainian diplomacy!’ Ukrainian Foreign Minister Mr. Gennady Udovenko said with pleasure.”

In an open letter to President Yeltsin, the officers of the Black Sea Fleet expressed their discontent. The commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Eduard Baltin, issued a harshly critical statement. Meanwhile, Russia’s Foreign Ministry was in a state of bewilderment: How could the treaty be initialed without its corresponding approval?

On February 24, the Embassy of Ukraine in Moscow conveyed to Russia’s Foreign Ministry a letter from Leonid Kuchma to the Russian president. The letter, full of flagrant contradictions, made no mention of the Black Sea Fleet – despite the numerous negotiations! At the same time, it said: “Let me express once again my satisfaction with the results of the Kiev round of negotiations between the state delegations of Ukraine and Russia, whose major result was the initialing of the text of a major Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership. In this connection, I have the pleasure to invite you, Mr. President, to pay a state visit to our country at any time that is convenient for you.” Further on, Kuchma expressed his wish that the visit take place before March 12, that is, as soon as possible.

On February 28, Yeltsin sent a brief yet succinct reply: “Thank you for your letter of February 17, 1995, and for the reiterated invitation to pay an official visit to Ukraine, to which I assign exceptional importance… In our view, the draft of the political treaty should be further worked on in strict compliance with the Memorandum on Guarantees of the Security of Ukraine, which we together signed in Budapest late last year. The Declaration on the Black Sea Fleet problem, which we are going to sign, must ensure, immediately after the visit, implementation of all measures to be taken during the first stage of this problem’s settlement without any additional negotiations. It is also important to prepare by the time of my visit an agreement on the rescheduling of Ukraine’s state debt on loans provided by Russia. I am confident that there will be no difficulties in setting a specific date for the visit.” Of course, Kiev had expected a different answer.

On April 18, President Yeltsin received Marchuk, who by that time had become Ukraine’s prime minister, in Moscow. As Yeltsin aide Dmitry Ryurikov said in an interview with the ITAR-TASS news agency, the conversation proceeded in an atmosphere of “utter frankness.” In the language of diplomacy this means that the conversation was far from smooth.

According to Ryurikov, Yeltsin was straightforward about the Ukrainian side’s approaches to the Black Sea Fleet issue: “Because of your position, we now agree, now disagree; now make a decision, now go back on it. Friends and neighbors do not behave like that; one must respect one’s partner.” Yeltsin described the situation when Kiev, having signed an agreement on the rescheduling of Ukraine’s debts, refused to take a constructive approach to Russia’s proposals concerning the Black Sea Fleet, as “an attempt to outwit Russia.” Yeltsin remained unsatisfied with the proposals on the Black Sea Fleet, which Marchuk brought to Moscow, and said, “Russia’s position, fixed in the previous accords on the Black Sea Fleet, is fair, objective and moral. Russia will not depart from those accords. There have been concluded enough agreements on the fleet; there have been numerous meetings of experts; yet no progress has been made.” Yeltsin suggested that the Ukrainian side draw its conclusions.

Marchuk was taught an object lesson: sophisticated ruses and empty promises are not the best way to conduct serious negotiations. Such methods can only complicate relations between states, not to mention with one’s negotiating partner, whose confidence has been undermined.

On May 22, Kuchma sent a letter to Yeltsin, which was fully devoted to the Black Sea Fleet problem; a draft agreement was enclosed with it. As the documents came from the president of Ukraine himself, the Russian leader ordered that they be scrupulously analyzed. Upon analysis, all interested ministries and government agencies drew a unanimous conclusion: the proposals not only failed to settle the problem, but they also negated many of the previous accords. Yeltsin decided to respond to the Ukrainian president’s proposals during their private meeting on May 26 in Minsk where both leaders were scheduled to meet for a CIS summit. At this point, tensions over the Black Sea Fleet problem had come to a head.

TURNING POINT

In Minsk, Yeltsin and Kuchma agreed to hold a special meeting on June 9 in Sochi and devote it largely to the Black Sea Fleet issue. On June 6, the Ukrainians handed over to us their draft of a final document – a joint statement, whose subtitle specified that it was only a communiqué. Kiev sought to attach a less binding agreement to the results of the Sochi meeting, compared with the earlier approved Russian-Ukrainian documents on the Black Sea Fleet. Actually, the draft reflected the content of Kuchma’s May 22 letter to Yeltsin.

In the opinion of the Russian experts, approval of Kiev’s approach would mean the termination of any legal basis for Russia’s naval presence in Ukraine. The Ukrainian proposals did not even mention that the headquarters of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet must be based in Sevastopol. I proposed presenting the main results of the negotiations in Sochi as an agreement between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Black Sea Fleet, making the document as binding as possible. Moscow agreed with this proposal.

The negotiations in Sochi began with a private conversation between the two presidents. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Foreign Minister Gennady Udovenko and I were responsible for coordinating the text of the draft agreement. The instructions given to me were brief: do not insist that Russia would use all naval facilities in Sevastopol, and that the agreement shall specify the location of the Ukrainian Navy headquarters, leaving this issue to Kiev’s discretion. There was also a strong request to prepare the text as quickly as possible. Udovenko and I worked very hard and finally the document was ready. The presidents approved it unamended and immediately signed it.

The agreement, the result of years of intensive joint research, produced a mutually acceptable balance of interests for both countries. In particular, the agreement specified that “the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation and its headquarters shall be based in Sevastopol.” Further on it stated: “The Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation shall use facilities of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and other basing facilities and home stations of ships, aircraft and coastal defense troops, and facilities of operational, combat, technical and logistic support in the Crimea.”

Yeltsin was very pleased. At a specially convened press conference, the Russian president described the signing of the agreement as a “historic event” which opened the way to further development of relations between Russia and Ukraine on the basis of a strategic partnership, mutual respect and trust. Yeltsin said that he and Kuchma had settled all the issues concerning the Black Sea Fleet that had hampered relations between the two countries, and solved the fleet problem “once and for all.”

Kuchma, who spoke next, was more reserved in assessing the accords, saying: “We have made one more step forward” and: “We have untied the knot.” Also, he did not fail to mention problems that remained unresolved.

The presidents not only commented on the agreement, but also spoke about their plans for the future. Undoubtedly, there was still much work to be done, and Kuchma’s views seemed to be more realistic than Yeltsin’s. Yet, generally speaking, it was the president of Russia who was right after all: the Sochi Agreement solved the Black Sea Fleet problem, and on May 28, 1997, the process was completed with the signing of three more major agreements on the fleet: on the status of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation and terms for its stay on the territory of Ukraine; on parameters involving the division of the fleet; and on mutual settlements with regard to the division of the Russian fleet, together with the basing of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in Ukraine.

Making the settlement more binding required ratification of the agreements by the legislatures of Russia and Ukraine. Passions over the future of the Black Sea Fleet were still running high in Russia, and ratification of the agreements was necessary to achieve accord throughout society. It was also necessary to avoid pitfalls posed by the parliament of Ukraine. The ratification process could continue indefinitely and, most importantly, it could fail to produce a positive result, as had already happened to the agreement signed in Zavidovo. Under such a scenario, the situation in the Black Sea Fleet would continue hanging in midair as before.

To avoid such a threat, I proposed using a provision of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed in 1969, according to which a treaty subject to ratification can be applied provisionally upon signing if the negotiating states have so agreed. It was implied that the ratification process would take place at a later date. The proposal was accepted.

Our draft agreements were handed over personally to Kuchma, whereupon the experts began to ponder over them. However, Kiev still wanted Yeltsin to visit Ukraine where they would conclude a general political treaty, without signing basic agreements on the Black Sea Fleet. There were several such attempts, and one of them had good chances for success.

It happened in 1997. At that time, I was Russia’s ambassador to Ukraine in the rank of deputy foreign minister. Kuchma met with Yeltsin in Moscow, and upon his return home announced sensational news: the presidents had agreed that Boris Yeltsin would come to Kiev to sign a general political treaty, while the work on the Black Sea Fleet problem would continue. The Russian president had proclaimed a similar statement.

Udovenko and other Ukrainian officials triumphed: the connection between Yeltsin’s visit and the signing of agreements on the Black Sea Fleet was finally broken.

Since I was staying in Kiev, I did not know what exactly was happening in the Russian capital. Soon I was summoned to Moscow where Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin convened a special meeting to discuss the situation. We met in the Russian White House where there were assembled the top executives of all interested ministries and government agencies of Russia. The Foreign Ministry officials present at the meeting included First Deputy Minister Boris Pastukhov and myself.

Chernomyrdin announced that he had invited us together in order to discuss our thoughts about a presidential visit to Kiev for the signing of a major treaty with Ukraine at a time when agreements on the Black Sea Fleet were still not ready.

The assembled officials were unanimous in the conviction that before the president pays a visit to Kiev, the two countries must complete an agreement on the Black Sea Fleet and sign it simultaneously with the major treaty – or even earlier. Russia’s top leadership agreed with this position.

Chernomyrdin’s deputy, Valery Serov, a prominent politician who in Soviet times headed the State Construction Committee, was the head of Russia’s delegation at the final stage of the negotiations on the Black Sea Fleet. It was Serov who conveyed our position to Leonid Kuchma.

Later, Serov said his conversation with Kuchma was not smooth, as the Ukrainian president continued to make references to previous statements on the issue. However, Serov explained how things stood at the moment and emphasized the need to expedite negotiations on still unresolved problems. And so this was done. The new commander of the Black Sea Fleet, Admiral Victor Kravchenko, played a major role at that stage.

Finally, on May 28, 1997, Victor Chernomyrdin arrived in Kiev. He and the prime minister of Ukraine signed the three basic agreements on the Black Sea Fleet, which immediately went into effect. Thus, the prerequisites for a state visit by President Yeltsin to Ukraine were achieved. During that visit, on May 31, the heads of both states signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

THE LAST ROUND

Thus, the basic agreements on the Black Sea Fleet came into effect. Did this mean that the problem was finally solved? Not at all, since the agreements were applied on a provisional basis. At the same time, however, many high-ranking officials in Moscow believed that status to be quite sufficient. But to hold such an opinion proved to be a big mistake: before documents are ratified and instruments of ratification are exchanged, agreements are not considered to be in effect – with all of the ensuing consequences.

The political forces in Ukraine that had failed to thwart the accords understood the situation very well. Now they decided to wage a new, no less important battle – this time against the ratification of the Black Sea Fleet agreements. Their plan was the same as before: to ratify the major treaty separately from the ratification of the accords on the Black Sea Fleet.

There was also a group of deputies in Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada (parliament) who were opposed to ratification of the major treaty. They did not understand the importance of good relations with Russia, or even the state interests of their own country. But that group was small and did not have much influence.

The Verkhovna Rada ratified the treaty by an overwhelming majority of votes. Meanwhile, the accords on the Black Sea Fleet were rather forgotten, although they had been signed even earlier than the treaty. When we asked Kiev why it did not ratify the accords, we were told that the accords needed to be studied by commissions, that Kiev wanted to ratify the accords at the “right” time so as not to agitate public opinion, and so on and so forth.

In the meantime, the process of ratifying the major treaty began in Russia, too. These deliberations triggered heated debates – perhaps, even more heated than in Ukraine. Representatives of the executive made great efforts to win the deputies’ support, above all, in the State Duma (the lower house). Then suddenly the government submitted for ratification only the major treaty. Just like in Kiev.

“What about the Black Sea Fleet accords?” many deputies asked.

“Why, the Black Sea Fleet has already been settled; there are no problems there,” high-ranking representatives of the executive answered.

What exactly was behind those answers? Negligence, ignorance, or perhaps delusions – it was not clear. Yet, on December 25, 1998, the State Duma voted for the Law On the Ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine without linking it with Ukraine’s ratification of the Black Sea Fleet accords. A paradoxical situation!

Anti-Russian forces in Ukraine applauded such a turn of events. Now they were absolutely sure that they would be able to avoid ratifying the accords on the Black Sea Fleet, which would thus never enter into force. Boris Kozhin, the first Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Navy and now a deputy, told me this triumphantly when he met me in the Verkhovna Rada.

Such a state of affairs alarmed me. I took note of a public statement by President Kuchma that stated, in effect, that Russia could find a way to link its ratification of the major treaty to ratification by Ukraine of the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet. I immediately sent a telegram to Moscow in the hope that it would think of a way to do exactly that.

The next stage in the ratification of the major treaty was its  consideration by the Federal Council (the upper house). The treaty provoked even more questions in the upper house than it did in the State Duma. Senators also heatedly debated the Black Sea Fleet issue, and Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov played an active role in the discussions.

Staying in Kiev, I did not rule out the possibility that, considering the critical situation that had taken shape in Moscow, a proposal by the executive branch to ratify the major treaty could be rejected. Obviously, the consequences of such a turn of events would be extremely negative for the general state of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

In the heat of the debates in the Federation Council, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov took the floor. He said that the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership should be ratified; yet, the completion of the ratification process must be conditioned on ratification by Ukraine of the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet.

Primakov proposed the following. The Law On the Ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine must be approved and submitted to the president for signature. At the same time, the Federation Council’s resolution must include the following provision: “The instruments of ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine shall be exchanged after ratification by Ukraine of the agreements between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the status of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation and terms for its stay on the territory of Ukraine; on parameters of the division of the Black Sea Fleet; and on mutual settlements with regard to the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the stay of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Federation in Ukraine, signed on May 28, 1997.”

An exquisite move, and it changed the mood of the senators. The Federation Council accepted Primakov’s proposal. On February 17, 1999, the Council approved the law on ratification and submitted it to the president for signature. On March 2, the head of state put his signature on the law and thus completed the ratification of the treaty. Simultaneously, he told the Foreign Ministry to prepare an instrument of ratification of the treaty “after the Ukrainian party ratifies the Russian-Ukrainian agreements on the Black Sea Fleet.”

Thus, Russia showed maximum good will, displaying its aspiration for friendship and cooperation with Ukraine. Now the ball was in Kiev’s court.

In my comments from Kiev on what had happened, I wrote with great satisfaction that an international problem had moved from the plane of intra-Russian debates into a natural plane of interstate dialog.

Aside from the outcries of spiteful critics, the reaction of the Verkhovna Rada proved to be realistic and reasonable. The Ukrainian deputies, in a businesslike manner, at once set to work and soon completed the process of ratifying the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet. The agreements will remain in effect until 2017 and can be automatically extended. On April 1, 1999, the presidents of Russia and Ukraine met in Moscow to exchange instruments of ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership, and on that very day the treaty entered into force.

The ceremony concluded years of strenuous efforts made by both countries. Sergei Usov, an outstanding researcher of the Black Sea Fleet issues, wrote: “The solution of the Black Sea Fleet problem became possible only simultaneously with the settlement of interstate relations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine through the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership in a ‘package’ with the basic agreements on the Black Sea Fleet.”

The coming into effect of the Treaty of Friendship and the agreements on the Black Sea Fleet marked the end of the first, very important period in building relations between Russia and Ukraine as sovereign, independent states. These accords, together with Ukraine’s accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty, helped to prevent crisis situations breaking out into open clashes between the two largest countries in the post-Soviet space. The possible consequences of such clashes would have been difficult to predict not only for the two states but also for the entire geopolitical region.

But the main result was that the accords helped to build a legal basis for the future of Russian-Ukrainian relations – a platform on which these relations could develop for the benefit of the two nations. It also marked a new chapter for peace, stability and cooperation in Europe. Thus, a new stage of bilateral interaction began between Russia and Ukraine.

This historic landmark was not easy to achieve. The success of the difficult negotiations, which was full of emotional outbursts, unexpected turns and slumps, was due to the fact that the leaders of Russia and Ukraine, together with their negotiating teams, paid heed to the respective will of their people who demanded friendship and cooperation.