When the Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova (CPRM) scored a sensational victory during parliamentary elections in 2001, winning 71 out of the 101 seats, there were no signs of a possible crisis in Russian-Moldovan relations.

Indeed, relations between Moscow and Chisinau increasingly strengthened. In the period from 2001 to 2003, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Moldovan counterpart, Vladimir Voronin, met on 24 separate occasions. The two leaders discussed economic and political problems, among them the state of trade and economic relations between their countries, prospects for Russian business in Moldova, gas prices and, of course, the problem of the Transdnestr Moldovan Republic [a breakaway region of Moldova that declared its independence from Moldova on September 2, 1990 – Ed.]. Both Moscow and Chisinau delivered optimistic forecasts for the future.

COMMUNISM, MOLDOVAN-STYLE

Many politicians in Moldova and beyond, however, were not so sanguine about the rapid rapprochement between Russia and Moldova. The West took a very cautious stand with regard to Voronin and the Moldovan Communist Party, while all programs for providing financial support to Moldova via international organizations were suspended for an indefinite time.

In February-March 2002, the Moldovan opposition launched a massive offensive against the ruling Communist Party: rallies were staged on consecutive occasions, and the opposition camped out in tents on Chisinau’s central square. One might say that the protests were a first rehearsal of a “colored revolution” in the former Soviet Union. On several occasions, the crowd, manipulated by the opposition leaders, became so rowdy that it managed to break through riot police cordons and enter the parliament building. The protesters, however, realizing that if they were the first to initiate “military actions” the authorities would have all legal grounds to reciprocate, called off their actions at the last moment.

Meanwhile, the president and his team gave a strict order to the Interior Ministry not to use force under any circumstances, so fortunately there were no broken noses, not to mention more serious injuries. The police that manned the cordons were unarmed and did not even carry batons. When the crowd went into frenzy, the officers simply stepped aside and allowed the crowd the freedom of action.

By March, the protests began to subside. Then, early one morning, the oppositional tent camp was awoken by the boisterous voice of a man who was walking between the tents. He kept repeating: “Hey, wake up, it’s time for work. Now say it all together: ‘Down with the Communists!’ ‘Down with Voronin!’” The sleepy protesters did not immediately realize that the man really was President Voronin, who decided to see the conditions in which the protesters lived. In the afternoon, the people in the camp were served soup delivered directly from the presidential canteen.

Thus, the Moldovan Communists not only rebuffed the oppositional attacks, but they remained in power without resorting to violence. They strengthened their authority in the country and showed to the whole world that they did not intend to go back into the past and, most importantly, that they were not going to diverge from the path of democracy. Interestingly, Moldova is the only country in the Commonwealth of Independent States to have three presidents replaced in democratic elections. Moreover, all of the major political groups have been elected to power in that country: National Democrats, Agrarians, and Communists (Mircea Snegur, Petru Lucinschi, and Vladimir Voronin, respectively). Moldova is, perhaps, the most democratic of the CIS countries in this respect.

Despite appeals from the orthodox wing in the CPRM, the Moldovan authorities opted not to abolish private ownership and launch nationalization. They set out to establish order in the economy and put an end to the embezzlement of public funds.

By that time, the national economy was in a state of ruin. In the previous 10 years, the GDP had plummeted by 68 percent (compared with a 40-percent decrease following World War II). The much-publicized “Earth” program for reforming the agrarian sector had delivered a devastating blow at the agricultural sector: Land had been shared among peasants, but private owners had been unable to cultivate it. Meanwhile, wage, pension and allowance arrears continued to grow; in 2001, for example, people were just receiving their wages and pensions for the period 1995-1997. The population became accustomed to living without electricity, heating and gas. In just one decade, Moldova had gone from being a prosperous Soviet republic, once described as a “showcase of socialism,” into one of the most backward countries in Europe.

In 2001, the situation in Moldova began to improve. The annual GDP growth rate reached 6 to 7 percent. The basic sectors of the Moldovan agriculture – winegrowing, farming, and animal husbandry – were gradually reanimated. The financial system was stabilized. Under the Communists, for the first time since Moldova gained independence, budget revenues began to be planned without depending on foreign loans. The infrastructure began to improve: rolling blackouts became a thing of the past, while the problem of supplying the population with natural gas was solved. People began to receive their wages and pensions on time. Apart from addressing urgent social and economic problems, the authorities found the time and money to renovate old monuments – and even build new monuments – to the many soldiers killed in World War II (no other former Soviet republic, besides Russia, performs this act).

A YEAR OF UNFULFILLED HOPES

This was all well and good. However, Chisinau’s main problem continued to be the Transdnestr settlement. In 2003, presidents Putin and Voronin agreed to put an end to the confrontation on the basis of compromise on both sides. Dmitry Kozak, an active member of the Russian presidential team, was instructed to draft an agreement.

The success of the agreement seemed to be very close at hand, and Chisinau expressed its readiness to make concessions. Under pressure from Moscow, Tiraspol, the capital of Transdnestr, also had to take a realistic position. Kozak shuttled continuously between Moscow, Chisinau and Tiraspol, and spent hundreds of hours in negotiations. Finally, an agreement was 90 percent ready, with only a few points open for debate.

The authorities of Bendery [the second largest city in Transdnestr – Ed.] hastily prepared everything for the signing ceremony: the administration building was given a fresh coat of paint, new furniture was purchased, and formal red carpets were laid. On November 24, a so-called “vanguard” aircraft of the Russian delegation arrived at the airport. The city waited in great expectation for the Russian president.

That evening, Voronin looked through the final variant of the memorandum and, much to his surprise, saw that the document did not contain amendments promised to him earlier. In particular, a provision regarding the Russian military base remained unchanged, while Transdnestr was awarded too much power in the planned future federation, which enabled it to secede from the federation at any moment on the slightest pretext.

Kozak tried to convince Voronin that the absence of the amendments was an insignificant issue. But the fact was that Moldova had been offered to sign a document with unacceptable terms. There followed a telephone conversation between Voronin and Putin, a cancellation of the Russian president’s visit to Moldova, and Kozak’s departure.

According to Moscow’s reading of the matter, the failure was due to last-minute interference by the Americans and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. They did not want to yield the palm in the settlement efforts to Russia, exerted pressure on Chisinau and forced Voronin not to sign the document.

Anyway, it was haste that played the fatal role. The memorandum fell victim to the parties’ desire to expedite the solution of the difficult Transdnestr problem. Too many important issues were left to be decided later and were “sort of” agreed on and “sort of” adopted. When these “sort ofs” reached a critical mass, everything fell to pieces.

Moldova and Transdnestr missed a great opportunity to reach an accord; while for Moscow, the failure represented a serious foreign-policy setback. Had the memorandum-based settlement plan been adopted and signed, that would have been the first real example of conflict settlement with Moscow’s assistance. Thus a real mechanism would have been set in place for reconciling conflicting parties. It would have set a precedent that could be applied with regard to other conflicts – Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia – under Russia’s aegis.

A success in Transdnestr would have demonstrated that it could handle a situation that was beyond the powers of the peacemakers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe. U.S. diplomats would have found themselves on the sidelines, while the CIS would have new life breathed into it. However, the reality was just the opposite.

PEACE OR WAR?

After November 2003, Russia’s policy toward Moldova radically changed. Throughout 2004, economic ties between the two countries gradually declined. In 2005, Moscow banned the import of Moldovan fruit and vegetables. The next year, the ban was extended to Moldovan wines and brandy. That represented a serious blow to the economy of Moldova, as wine exports make up an important part of the country’s income.

Apart from economic sanctions, Russia started to support the Moldovan opposition. Its members began to pay frequent visits to Moscow and promised to the Kremlin their full loyalty and concessions on all issues. These events attracted some Russian politicians and security officials who had close connections with the Transdnestrian regime. Actually, it attracted their attention so much that they overlooked some important points.

First, the opposition leaders – Serafim Urechean, Dumitru Braghis, Nikolae Andronik, and others – were well known in Moldova as nationalists, famous for their anti-Russian statements and actions. The news about their sudden “pro-Russian orientation” perplexed ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers in Moldova.

Second, in the 1990s many of these individuals were involved in various shady dealings, possibly of a criminal nature. So they were very vulnerable in this respect. Finally, it was clear that the opposition had very little chance for success in the struggle for power. So the money spent on their support was actually cast to the wind.

The parliamentary elections in Moldova, held in February 2005, confirmed this conclusion. Despite the impressive support from Russia, the oppositional Democratic Moldova bloc (led by Urechean, Braghis, Dumitru Diacov, Oleg Serebrian, and Veaceslav Untila) failed to offer strong competition to the Communist Party. The Communists again won the majority in parliament, which elected Voronin president for the second time.

The aggravation of Russian-Moldovan relations has not brought any benefits to either country. Moscow’s economic sanctions cost Moldova about 200 million dollars in 2006. The sanctions hit hard Moldovan wineries (ironically, they are owned largely by Russian companies), as well as Russian consumers: along with fake wine, the ban has removed from the store shelves relatively cheap high-quality wine. Finally, Russia’s prestige has sharply decreased among the Moldovan population because of its support for the nationalist opposition. The only party that has gained from all of this is the leadership of the unrecognized Transdnestr Republic.

THE TRANSDNESTRIAN KNOT

For 15 years, a political group led by Igor Smirnov has ruled Transdnestr (on December 10, Smirnov was re-elected for his fourth term). Throughout this time, the Transdnestrian leadership has been rejecting all proposals from intermediaries, and especially from Russia, for the settlement of the conflict. Every time the negotiating process was about to produce some real result (e.g. when Russia’s special envoy for the settlement was Yevgeny Primakov, or later Kozak), Tiraspol launched rash efforts to thwart any chance for a compromise. The main goal of the Transdnestrian leadership is official recognition of Transdnestr independence.

Proceeding from the Kosovo precedent (which still looks obscure), Russia’s State Duma and political analysts have been actively discussing proposals to officially recognize the self-proclaimed states of Transdnestr, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and, less frequently, Nagorno-Karabakh. The official recognition of these states by Russia would obviously cause great exultation in Tiraspol, Tskhinvali, Sukhumi and Stepanakert. But what would such an acknowledgement give Russia? Has anyone calmly figured out all of the possible consequences of such a move? It seems that someone is trying to involve Russia into a dangerous, reckless scheme, which may complicate or even put an end to its economic and political revival.

The four abovementioned unrecognized states provide a good analogy to the situation in Serbia in 1914. The belligerence, pertinacity and 19th-century mentality of these four territories can unleash armed conflicts again. Clearly, Russia would be inevitably involved in those conflicts.

Moscow is dedicated to maintaining its peacemaking forces in the conflict zones; it has been waging years-long diplomatic battles. However, it is continuously accused and attacked from all sides – in spite of the fact that due to its efforts the conflicting parties are refraining from resuming military actions.

Tiraspol’s unwillingness to compromise has put Russia into a difficult and no-win situation. Russia is now confronted with a unified position of Moldova, Ukraine, the United States, the OSCE and the EU. These parties are in support of a plan proposed by Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko [an early withdrawal of the Russian peacemaking forces from the conflict zone; demilitarization of the region; and giving Transdnestr the status of an autonomy within Moldova]. Also, they demand that the peacemaking operation’s format and the structure of peacemaking forces in Transdnestr be changed, and seek to deliver democracy to Transdnestr.

Meanwhile, Russia’s position in the Transdnestr settlement, which can be described as “defense on the Dniestr,” has no chances for success, as political resources for preserving the status quo are limited. This is not just due to Russia pledging to withdraw its military forces from Transdnestr during a summit in Istanbul in 1999. Preservation of the status quo, sought only by Tiraspol and to some extent by Moscow, is against the plans of all the other interested parties: Moldova, Ukraine, the U.S., the EU and the OSCE. In 2007, after Romania joins the EU, Moldova will share a border with the European Union, and Bucharest will constantly raise the Transdnestr issue before its European partners. So the West will only step up its efforts to solve the Transdnestr problem, to undermine the Smirnov regime in Transdnestr, and to weaken Russia’s positions in the region.

PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIA

To improve the state of affairs, Russia must thoroughly analyze the real situation in the region and revise its strategy and tactics with regard to the Transdnestrian settlement and Moldova as a whole. First, it must proceed from the fact that Voronin will remain president of Moldova until 2009. The Moldovan opposition has no chances to come to power during this period. The Moldovan Communists will stay in power even if the Russian sanctions worsen the social and economic situation in Moldova.

The anti-Moldovan measures are disadvantageous first of all to Russia. This approach will only result in the complete loss of Moscow’s political influence in the region, not to mention economic losses for Russia, considering heavy investments by Russian businesses in the wine-making, brandy-making and tobacco industries of Moldova. Lastly, sanctions may spoil Russia’s plans for energy expansion to the Balkans.

Russia’s policy of supporting the Moldovan opposition and the Smirnov regime is advantageous, above all, to the West and Ukraine. It has enabled Russia’s opponents to gain the initiative in the Transdnestrian settlement. Since 2004, they have changed the format of the negotiations, started monitoring the Ukrainian-Transdnestrian border, and insisted on inspecting defense-industry enterprises in Transdnestr. Finally, they are conducting an active PR campaign in the mass media, presenting in an unfavorable light Russia’s position as “support of the Smirnov regime for the sake of meeting the selfish interests of individual groups in the Russian leadership.” Against these dynamic actions, Russia’s position really looks like stubborn support of the Smirnov regime, without any clear goals and prospects.

Moscow must make moves that would make it again a major factor in the Transdnestrian settlement. These moves are as follows:

• proposing a new plan for the settlement;
• proposing several variants for settling the military issues (the location and prospects of the Russian military force and the arms depot near the town of Ribnita), while using the status of the radar station in Azerbaijan’s Gabala as a possible example to follow;
• joining in the monitoring of the border, the mission to assess the level of democracy in Transdnestr, and other measures taken by Western powers in the region;
• appointing a new active and energetic envoy of Russia for the settlement of the conflict, who would enjoy broad powers;
• lifting economic sanctions and restoring trade and economic relations with Moldova (by the way, Moldova has no debt to Russia for its energy supplies).

By revising its policy toward Moldova, Russia could regain a leading role in the settlement of the Transdnestrian conflict and its position as the main intermediary at the negotiating table. Also, it could possibly prepare a settlement agreement once again. In this case, the West would most likely reorient itself to the opposition, which remains absolutely without influence to pose any threat to the Moldovan authorities.

The restoration of normal and mutually advantageous relations with Moldova will help Russia preserve its political, economic and, for some time, military presence in the region. The first step toward this normalization may have already been made: after a meeting between Putin and Voronin during the CIS summit in Minsk, it was announced that Moscow would lift the ban on imports of Moldovan wine to Russia.

Both Moscow and Chisinau seem to have come to this realization. In any case, in late 2006 the first step was made toward the normalization of their bilateral relations: following a meeting between Putin and Voronin during the CIS summit in Minsk, it was announced that Moscow would lift the ban on the import of Moldovan wine to Russia.

Today, the two countries have resumed intensive dialog, and are searching for solutions to the basic problems that hinder their bilateral relations. Meanwhile, negotiations over the question of Transdnestr may soon be stepped up, as well.

Thus, there are grounds for cautious optimism and hope that this time nothing will prevent Russia and Moldova from reaching agreement and restoring mutual relations to their fullest capacities.