In the early 19th century, within a space of just eight years, two perspicacious Frenchmen – Alexis de Tocqueville and Astolphe de Custine – traveled to what were then two distant territories of Europe. They shared their impressions in two books that made a substantial impact on the educated Europeans. Until the end of the century, Democracy in America and Russia in 1839 were regarded as the main socio-philosophical works about the system of governance in the United States and the Russian Empire – two European powers outreaching the geographic boundaries of Western Europe.

At that time, America and Russia were in fact the only outskirts of Europe. The East was regarded as utterly alien, while the colonies were not taken into account. At the same time, the United States was often considered as a more perfect social system, whereas Russia was associated with a kind of backward system. It seemed that the “outskirts” were as different from the “center” as they could possibly be. But the next 150 years would upset that view.

In the early 20th century, the United States made a dramatic breakthrough, emerging as the world’s most advanced economy and a “promised land” for millions of European immigrants. Soon after that, a revolution took place in Russia, causing millions of people to focus their attention on the Soviet Union. Within the space of just three decades, America and Russia twice dragged Europe out from the bloody wars into which it had plunged itself. As a result, the new geopolitical rivals effectively divided the continent between themselves. In the middle of the century, both superpowers easily overtook the Old World in the technological sphere – first, by creating nuclear weapons and then by traveling into outer space. Perceptions about the “center” and the “outskirts” were changing rapidly, and they were destined to change even more.

The end of the 20th century was as rich in events as it was at the beginning. The Soviet Union, which had laid claim to economic leadership, and had declared the creation of a “new historical communality of people,” succumbed to a relentless arms race that peaked just as the prices of raw materials collapsed. The Communist empire eventually disintegrated along the borderlines between its national republics. As a result, the new Russia immediately lost its former weight in international affairs, while its citizens started to plunder the formerly “public” wealth by hook or by crook. Taking advantage of the situation, the United States gave free rein to its imperial aspirations, its geopolitical perceptions differing little from those that had existed in Europe shortly before World War I. Today, just a decade after America emerged victorious from the Cold War, it finds itself involved in a conflict with almost the entire Muslim world, which, incidentally, is rather characteristic of the United States in terms of its blind religiosity and tunnel vision. The outcome of this confrontation is far from clear yet.

Meanwhile, the Europeans, unlike their neighbors, avoided any rash moves. Yet in the 1990s their integration project produced the best possible results: the EEC transformed into the European Union, the euro was introduced, while the number of EU members more than doubled from 12 to 25. Europe was freed from the danger from the Soviet Union, and, at the same time, overcame its slavish dependence on the United States. As a result, the world of the second half of the 20th century, which was comprised of “two Europes and one West,” became history. It was replaced by the world of the 21st century with “one Europe and two Wests.” The Europeans looked once again at their continent if not as a military-political powerhouse then at least as a region that generates the boldest social innovations. New books about an early and imminent triumph of the European Dream over the American Dream filled bookstore shelves to overflowing.

As for the Russian Dream, it is practically invisible; the country has yet to recover from the intellectual stupor into which it fell in the early 1990s. Not even the radical change of the economic and political climate at the start of the 21st century has caused any serious changes in the mentality of the Russian political class. Domestic thinkers continue to insist: “We must remain different from everyone else.” Proponents of “Eurasianism” and “sobornost” [a notion used to describe society as a body, organically gathered around a common culture, heritage and belief – Ed.] act on the assumption that Russia is different from all other societies, although they would do better to prove this thesis, not take it for granted. This postulate seems erroneous to me, while this article is an attempt to argue that Russia is not unique, or in other words, that as one of Europe’s outskirts it is not more unique than its other outskirt – the United States. Today, Russia and America are very much alike. At the same time, they dramatically differ from Europe, which had an enormous historical impact on them. This is a very difficult argument to prove, so I would just like to point to some similarities, while avoiding the philosophical rhetoric. How substantial are these similarities I will leave up to the reader to judge.

“SENSE OF A NATION”

The first thing that strikes the eye when making a comparison between the United States and Russia is their remarkable similarity as very special people – “chosen” and “messianic.” Of course, the majority of European nations also have their own perceptions of their historic role and mission, which are not always very modest or even tenable. But there is good reason to say that all great European nations base their unique identity on their history and tradition, drawing on them as a source of inspiration and confidence in the future. The European concept of the nation, built on a common history, ethnic origin and language traditions, evolved as early as the 18th-19th centuries. To date, it remains an undisputed concept in the Old World.

Ideological or religious views bear no relation to “Europeanness.” Winston Churchill was among the first people to formulate this idea in a pointedly polemical form. Addressing the House of Commons in 1940, he slammed a move to ban the Communist Party of Great Britain, stressing that there were no convictions that could make a Briton “un-British.” European tolerance, which sometimes appears excessive, arises from this orientation toward past and present values, but not toward the illusions of the future. And that is unlikely to change any time soon.

The United States is organized differently. Ever since the 17th century, when the first European settlers started to conceive of themselves as a nation, they have regarded themselves as the “best,” “God’s chosen,” who are destined to build a “new Promised Land” across the ocean, a “City upon a hill,” and a second Jerusalem, from where the light of the divine truth would spread throughout the world.

This is hardly surprising. The new nation could not have looked for its own unique identity in history (which did not exist), nor could it avoid to set ambitious goals (because such goals were set by all individuals it was comprised of). Throughout the first 150 years of its history, the United States remained a settler society that was in a constant state of mobilization, which also created a sense of mission and chosenness. At the same time, America successfully played on its “opposition” to Europe. Whereas the Europeans sought to “civilize” the world, wasting substantial resources in the effort, the Americans were disingenuously “cleansing” vast tracts of land on their continent from the natives and using them to their own ends. Whereas the Europeans were losing hundreds of thousands of their fellow citizens in colonial wars or emigration, the Americans were evolving as a powerful nation with a massive inflow of new colonists. This path of development  topped out in the 20th century, when by the end of World War I the United States had emerged as the world’s biggest economic powerhouse, and after World War II as the world’s sole military superpower. All of this strengthened the Americans’ belief in their nation’s mission.

While recognizing the outstanding qualities of the Americans as a nation, it is difficult to shake off the impression that they owe their main successes to the others’ faults rather than to their own achievements.

America forgot that it was not the one to invent the universal principles that it was supposed to bring to the world. Rather, it was a bare offshoot of European civilization. Over time the Americans developed a strong “natural” sense of responsibility for the world: today this is all the more surprising considering that the United States has for 30 years been dependent on the willingness of other countries to invest substantial resources into its economy and supply it with goods in exchange for cheapening greenbacks. The path the country is following is extremely dangerous, but it arises from the Americans’ confidence that they will succeed.

Russia also represents an offshoot of European civilization. Its history is no less remarkable than American history, but at the same time is quite similar to it. Russia was twice Europeanized. This happened first in the 9th-11th centuries, when the eastern version of Christianity was adopted as a dominant religion (which put the Russians into the Byzantine “zone of influence”). In the 13th century, Byzantium and Rus (ancient Russia) almost simultaneously underwent trying ordeals (which started in 1204 and 1237, respectively). Importantly, Byzantium did not survive the ordeals, whereas Muscovy, which had acquired the Byzantine tradition of a secular power’s  domination over religious authority, identified itself as a “third Rome” – that is, almost a direct successor to the ancient civilization.

Russia turned to Europe for a second time when it was clearly lagging behind the main centers of Western civilization, paradoxically attempting to use European practices to defend itself against the Europeans. The results were quite impressive: Russia emerged as the leading power in the Old World, strengthening its “Eurasian” identity through eastward expansion and once again seeing itself as the divine “savior” of Europe – this time not only from the fierce Mongolian hordes but also from Bonaparte the usurper.

By the late 19th century, Russia had become formally a European country, but remained “outside” Europe in terms of its territory and population. Its people were affected by their self-perception as unique (“Eurasian”) and “God’s chosen” – a perception that, just like in America, obviously had a religious basis. Russia, just like the United States, was a European and at the same time non-European country. Looking back over the years, one is amazed to see that our two countries abolished serfdom and slavery almost simultaneously (but retained social inequality for a long time) and that their search for identity and a role in the world was also very similar (consider the lively debate between the Slavophiles and Westerners in Russia, and the isolationists and expansionists in the U.S.). Everything changed, however, after World War I. At that time, the United States and Russia, which emerged from the 1917-22 upheavals as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, showed their global historic aims and prospects.

For the greater part of the 20th century, the essential similarities between the Soviet Union and the United States were not yet clearly understood. The two great ideological powers, resolved to accomplish their historic missions, were the only countries in the world whose names did not contain the slightest indication as to their historical and ethnic roots (the U.S.S.R even surpassed the U.S. in that respect by removing any reference to geographic identity, although we may recall Leon Trotsky’s proposal that the new Communist state should be called the “Union of Soviet Republics of Europe and Asia”). Both powers were equally obsessed with the ideas of a classless and supra-national society (the concept of the middle class in the United States and ‘elimination of class-based differences’ in the Soviet Union; the ‘melting pot’ in the United States and the ‘new historical communality’ in the Soviet Union). They were more or less equally attracted by the power of universal ideas (freedom and democracy in the United States and the elimination of exploitation and the assertion of social justice in the Soviet Union). They were almost equally enthralled by the opportunities opened by technological progress, as well as by the potentialities of their vast territories. By emerging as winners in World War II, they proved – to themselves, as well as to everyone else – the power of their ideologies and social foundations, and the broad horizons that they had for further development.

Nevertheless, the historical outcome of the 20th century turned out to be a totally different experience for the United States and the Soviet Union. This statement is not in conflict with the postulate concerning the similarities between these two states, suggesting, rather, that they manifested themselves at different periods. The United States, being less etatist (in other words, more “European” than the Soviet Union), had no (nor did it seek any) opportunities to mobilize and overstrain its internal resources – it was partly for that reason that it not so much defeated as outlived the Soviet Union. Presently, it is difficult to predict what is going to happen with Russia in the 21st century. Its territory and population has decreased considerably, while the Communist idea, central to the Soviet Union, collapsed completely with nothing to replace it. Meanwhile, Russia has preserved its “Eurasian identity;” the Europeans do not see it as a natural part of Europe, nor do many Russians for that matter. At the same time, the Russian system of state governance and its instruments have changed little compared with what they were before.

These days, Russia – like the United States but unlike the European countries – does not cast itself as “one of many” states in a diverse world, nor does it search for normalcy in its European sense.

ATTITUDES TO THE WORLD

There is also a remarkable similarity in the attitudes to the world that are typical of the United States and Russia. This seems to be based on the history of the two European outskirts combining, first, prolonged periods of expansion; second, a predetermined space over which these countries could spread their influence; and third, their political influence, which sometimes substantially exceeded their economic power.

The striving for territorial expansion is a characteristic feature of almost all European states. Their territorial gains can only be compared with the nomadic invasions of the 4th-13th centuries. Furthermore, as Asian expansion subsided (the last military expeditions by the Arabs occurred in the 7th-10th centuries and by the Turks in the 15th-17th centuries), European empires continued to gain momentum.

From this perspective, there are two similarities between Russia and the U.S. that set them apart from West European countries. On the one hand, their expansion did not occur at the expense of European possessions. Russia smashed the Ottoman Empire, defeated Sweden and Prussia, vanquished Napoleon, and took control of the Caucasus and Central Asia only in the “European,” post-Petrine period of its history. The United States was essentially a European country, asserting its domination in North America by using European experience and immigrants from the Old World.

On the other hand, unlike European countries – Spain, France, and Great Britain – neither Russia nor the United States established global empires in the European meaning of the term. By constantly expanding their own territories, they evolved as continental powers, seeking little control over territories lying far beyond their borders. This predetermines one of their most fundamental differences from Europe: Old World countries have already passed the peak of their expansionist drive, whereas many in Russia believe (while in the United States they are even convinced) that they have yet to reach their zenith. The opposition between the European and “periphery” approaches is reflected in current political rhetoric.

Unlike the European countries, Russia and the United States throughout the 19th century and during the first half of the 20th century had an insignificant global presence. Until World War II, they remained continental powers with no experience in building overseas empires. It is noteworthy that as soon as the Soviet Union and the United States strengthened militarily, their rivalry sparked serious armed conflicts in the global periphery – from the Korean Peninsula and Indochina to Mozambique and Congo, and from Egypt and Syria to Cuba and Chile (it is equally noteworthy that the European countries had not been involved in colonial wars with each other since the late 18th century). They built their policy primarily on their geopolitical interests and ideological goals, whereas the Europeans were looking for economic advantages, and when the latter disappeared, colonialist practices swiftly discontinued in the 1960s-80s. Neither the maintenance nor the loss of colonies caused economic upheavals in Europe. On the other hand, the striving for global leadership bled the Soviet Union dry, thus leading to its collapse, while today the United States continues to enthusiastically follow this path.

Such a historical legacy seriously distorts Russia’s and America’s attitude toward the world. Both tend to exaggerate the role of force in modern international relations and the possibility of defeating an adversary with state-of-the-art weapons. Russian and U.S. strategists act on the premise that the enemy must be destroyed, not put under control. Both Russia and the United States consider themselves to be centers of global politics, treating the rest of the world as an area where they can find allies but not any models to replicate. They are often plagued by the question: “Who are our allies?” but never ask themselves: “Whose allies could we become?”

The modern European countries have none of this arrogance, and this fact makes them far more adaptable to the political realities of the 21st century. Both Russia and the U.S. regard the outside world above all as a source of threats; the rhetoric of their incumbent leaders makes this abundantly evident. The Europeans, on the contrary, regard the world, rather, as a source of challenges than threats, and are acting accordingly.

Finally, unlike the United States, which is attempting to impose its values on the world, and Russia, which since the Soviet times has been laying claim to a unique vision of the future, the Europeans have no interest in exporting their model of development to the rest of the world.

It is also important to note that the economic development not only of Russia but also of the United States is lagging behind their political aspirations. During the imperial era, Great Britain and France were the largest net exporters of industrial goods and capital, while the European continent was the world’s largest exporter of people. Today, Russia and the U.S. are far away from these trends. It is also important that the Europeans (it is essential to remember in this context that Russia shared all of their hardships) rebuilt their continent twice after the two world wars, so the claims that the U.S. showed higher economic growth in the 20th century have little relation to reality. The fate of the Soviet Union shows how dangerous the gap between political and economic capabilities can be. The U.S. is also beginning to appreciate the danger.

INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY; CITIZEN AND THE STATE

Indicative of the similarities between the outskirts and their difference from the center are specific problems – e.g., the social structure, relationships between the individual and society and the citizen and the state, and the level of socialization – although they can be less pronounced than in the geopolitical realm.

The only point on which there seems to be no direct similarity between Russia and America is the relationship between the individual and the state. In the U.S., government and political authority appear to be forces that are separate from society, although not hostile toward it. A political career is less prestigious than a business career, while politicians do not enjoy much public credibility. This is partly due to the dual attitude toward government on the part of the American people: on the one hand, the country was built as a model of self-governance, while political authority was limited until the early 20th century; on the other, the present status of the United States, and the status of the decisions made in Washington require strong governing authority with broad powers. The right balance has normally been struck via judicial rulings; this is why modern America is rather a country of courts and precedents than of laws. The ruling authorities are so concerned by domestic security that the U.S. could be described as a land of criminals (2.09 million individuals are behind bars in prisons and jails, which makes 715 people per 100,000 – that is to say, 600 percent higher than in the EU with 103 per 100,000).

In Russia, the state is a kind of an antipode to society – “a society within society,” which is effectively separated from it. The governing authority has never been perceived as originating from the will of the people or as representing it. Although the prestige of the civil service is high, bureaucracy has minimal public credibility. The system of governance is not balanced with either the individual economic autonomy or an independent judiciary; at the same time, there is little opposition to “strong government” on the grassroots level. As is well known, strict Russian laws are counterbalanced by their loose observance. This reality is somewhat similar to the American practice of optional law enforcement through well-debugged system of defense counseling. But just as in the U.S., the ruling authorities in Russia are not particularly concerned with assisting its citizens. Instead, they readily seize on the opportunity of shifting the focus from economic to security problems (as in the U.S., 0.53 percent of Russia’s population is in prison, while up to 15 percent of the working-age population are employed in the Armed Forces, state security organizations, law enforcement or private security agencies).

Unlike the U.S. and Russia, the state in the EU countries plays a different role in society’s life, performing different functions. First, the share of GDP re-distributed through the budgets of the 25 EU countries stands at 47.8 percent, as compared with 28 percent in the U.S. and 29 percent in Russia. Second, the share of spending on external and internal security programs in the EU is 3-4 percent of GDP, whereas in Russia and America it is close to 10 percent. Third, the Europeans tend to respond more aggressively to any attempts by the state to infringe upon their rights (in Europe, participation in demonstrations, strikes and other protest actions is 14 times higher than in the United States, while there is no way this indicator can be reasonably compared with the situation in Russia). Fourth, EU governments are more socially oriented than in the U.S. or Russia: fifteen EU countries spend up to 60 percent of their budgets on social programs, as compared with 38 percent in the United States and a mere 18 percent in Russia. Over the centuries, the Europeans have developed a respect for the law, treating their rulers as community’s servants. In the United States (to a lesser degree) and in Russia (to a greater degree), the state is separated from society, telling it how to act. The majority of the people in those countries do not expect any help from the state, seeking to reduce the scale of their obligations to it by any means.

The place of the state in society is predetermined above all by the nature of relations between the people, and here the differences between the center and the outskirts become increasingly pronounced. Reality belies the purported collectivism and communality of the Russians/Eurasians. What does collectivism have to do with a society where fences are built not only around luxury country homes, but also around poor men’s graves at village cemeteries? A society that has long lost the ability to formulate its interests unless being prompted by the state-controlled media? A society where glaring social inequality arouses no protests? A society whose members are almost not involved in any forms of social activism except for purely formal membership in officially allowed political parties? Probably the most reliable communality indicator is known as the Gini coefficient [a measure of inequality of wealth distribution], which is virtually the same in Russia and the United States. Today, according to official statistics, 10 percent of Russia’s wealthy possesses 16 times as much national wealth as the poorest 10 percent (in the United States, it is 14.8 times higher, while in the EU-15 it is 7.6).

America and Russia are rigid individualistic societies going through – for different reasons – a phase that Europe passed if not in the late 19th century, then soon after World War II (this is not to suggest that France or Italy are model collectivist societies, but rather that Europe, where the state has assumed the role of a social protector, has found a counterweight to wild individualism).

This of course is rooted in the attitude to religion where the Europeans are heading into one direction whereas the Americans and Russians are moving in the opposite. Before World War I, the level of religiosity of all three societies was quite comparable. Today, people in the majority of European countries (except perhaps for Poland) who describe themselves as religious are clearly in the minority. However, in America and Russia, the share of citizens saying religion occupies an important or very important place in their life is steadily growing. In contrast with Europe, the ruling elites inside Russia and the U.S. are increasingly using religion as a means for reaching their political goals. 

It will never occur to any head of state in a European country to explain his foreign policy decisions by directives received straight from God (as does George W. Bush). Nowhere in Europe will a pontiff consider it fitting (as does Patriarch Alexy II of Russia) to thank his president obsequiously for the wonderful life that his flock enjoys under his wise leadership. The United States and Russia are far ahead of the rest of the world according to the scale on which religious sermons and services are broadcast live, as well as in the frequency and duration of presentations by religious figures on the radio and television (in this respect, only Islamic states can compete with them). Both countries are seeing the vigorous development of “nationally specific” trends of Christianity (Orthodoxy in Russia and Protestantism and Christian sectarianism in the United States). Finally, both the U.S. and Russia are effectively competing in invoking and tapping the supreme forces to deal with economic problems: the Americans remind every bearer of U.S. dollars that “In God We Trust,” while top corporate executives in Russia sincerely hope that the domestic automotive industry will perform better since St. John the Baptist’s relics were brought to the AvtoVAZ car-making plant.

One can argue about the specifics of American and Russian religiosity, but it is clear that while the population of Europe is becoming increasingly indifferent to religion, both outskirts rely on religious-messianic rhetoric to strengthen their identities.

In closing this section, I would venture to suggest that Europe is gradually turning into a kind of a community of personalities, whereas the United States and Russia are not only preserving but are also consolidating a society of citizens (or even subjects). The cohesiveness of the Europeans is built on natural social solidarity, whereas the cohesiveness of the Russians and Americans is based on extolling their not entirely indisputable values, as well as on the mobilization of efforts to attain some equally dubious goals. Without suggesting that one model is better than the other, I only attempt to show the differences between them.

ECONOMIC REALITIES

Money as a measure of economic success is perhaps one of the most notable things that the two outskirts have in common, setting them apart from Europe. In America (and nowadays also in Russia), money is an object of worship, a yardstick of personal success, and a basic criterion of social value. The effect of such an attitude is, on the one hand, growing social stratification and, on the other, an economy that is oriented toward the immediate pocketing of profits as opposed to the maximization of public benefit. It would be appropriate in this context to recall, for instance, the lack of any effort to make a more effective use of resources in the United States or managerial decisions in Russia that are reckless from the standpoint of social benefit but “useful” for individual businessmen and government officials. Unlike Europe, where the incomes of corporate executives rarely exceed those of their employees by more than 30 times, in the United States executives at major corporations can make 160 to 250 times (some experts argue this ratio exceeds 400 times) as much as their employees, while in Russia the gap is even more glaring.

The formation of narrow groups of individuals receiving excessive incomes leads to the merging of business and political elites, which is less pronounced in Europe. In the United States, a country with longer and more stable entrepreneurial traditions, the general movement is from business to politics: for example, many officials in the Bush administration formerly held positions in businesses whose interests they openly lobbied for in government. In Russia, the trend is rather the reverse: government officials use every opportunity not only to enrich themselves, but also to acquire effective control over commercial structures. In Europe – unlike America and Russia – access to society’s upper levels depends not so much on one’s financial status as on one’s social, cultural or intellectual proximity to members within these elite. The merging of corporate and state governance functions is rare and usually purely formal, without much real control.

Such differences between the economic priorities of the outskirts and the center have manifested themselves in the imbalance and ineffectiveness of the Russian and American economic systems. Today, the EU produces 10 percent more cars than the U.S., 60 percent more chemical products, 75 percent more pharmaceuticals, and 100 percent more steel, while in the textile and light industries the disparity is even wider.

As for Russia, in the 1990s it ceased to exist as an industrial power, becoming instead a “pipeline economy.” Needless to say, this scenario has little in common with the United States, but it has to be recognized that in the late 20th century both outskirts effectively dismantled their industrial facilities.

Today, U.S. imports exceed exports by $800 billion a year, while Russia’s trade surplus is based on high prices for raw materials, which will be shaved off if the price of oil falls to $37 per barrel. There are growing signs of parasitism: the rapid increase in immigration as the primary source of a workforce has been equally characteristic of the United States since the late 1980s and of Russia since the early 2000s. The governments of both countries strive to control not the production of goods, but rather the transport, information, and financial infrastructures. In the United States, this manifests itself in the increasing role of financial, banking and brokerage services in the economic realm, as well as in control over global information networks. Russia, following the strategy of an “economic superpower,” positions itself as a network of oil and gas pipelines, and is obsessed with the idea of becoming a “bridge” between Europe and Asia in the new century. However, historical practice shows that not a single great nation has ever managed to retain its political influence amid a lack of competitiveness and declining production.

This does not mean that the outskirts are now lagging behind the center that is far in the lead. But the fact remains that Europe’s economic development today seems to be more balanced than that of Russia or the United States. This is apparent by Europe’s greater focus on intensive economic growth, steady reduction of working hours, tighter environmental standards, and the balance of trade, as well as, e.g., the degree to which high-tech products, initially developed in the U.S., penetrate American and European consumer markets. It is an open secret that the percentage of people who use mobile communication technology in the United States is about 56 percent, as compared with almost 100 percent in the EU. Meanwhile, only 19 percent of new American cars are equipped with GPS systems, as compared with Europe’s 65 percent. The U.S. maintains a lead only in the use of the Internet (which is regularly used by 56.7 percent of the Americans, as compared to 44.2 percent of the Europeans). As for Russian inventions that gained recognition in the West while being ignored in Russia, it is impossible to make even a rough estimate here.

In other words, although the Europeans’ creative potential may be inferior to America’s or Russia’s, the Europeans are unrivaled in implementing technological achievements to improve the quality of their daily life.

CONSUMER PREFERENCES

Many social, economic and even political processes in the modern world are reflected in consumer preferences and behavior stereotypes. There are also some differences between Europe and its outskirts that have evolved over decades.

In the United States and in Russia, the individual is perceived (and perceives himself) above all as a consumer. His principal preoccupation is to buy more and buy cheaper and, if possible, of better quality. This process has assumed the most exaggerated forms in America. Suffice it to consider the main idea of most advertising campaigns: now the consumer can get more for the same price (a second hamburger, 30 percent more of coca cola, 50 percent more of detergent, etc.)! When a consumer boom runs out of steam, large-scale lending programs feed it; the principal message is that there will always be enough money. Meanwhile, the greatest threat for the consumer is “pleasure denied.”

In Russia, almost all of these trends are reproduced in those social groups that are approaching Western consumption standards. Today, Russia is the most lucrative and dynamic market for Western retail chains and supermarkets. Sales on credit are growing 30-40 percent each year, and sales of luxury cars are growing at the same rate. At the same time, wealth in Russia has acquired cult status, regardless of its source. Print and electronic media are promoting this image: “New Russians” are the masters of life, whereas all other people – those who cannot afford such a lifestyle – are just a gray mass slavishly following the new elite. Spiritual poverty is even becoming an object of pride. A middle-aged Russian woman who visited Paris on a very cheap bus tour described the French capital as “nothing special – in Moscow, the cars are much cooler.” It does not even occur to people that those “cool cars” were bought with money that was stolen from them. Many Americans, too, do not realize that America’s “grandeur” is a peculiar trait that the people in a majority of countries do not want to reproduce.

While developing as consumer societies, America and Russia are similar in their bigotry for luxury, which oftentimes becomes the only thing that distinguishes the “elite” from the “masses,” which otherwise are like two peas in a pod. In the United States, the word “luxury” is applied to makeshift houses in Florida, giant gas-guzzling SUVs, the seats of which look more like couches from the past century, any clothes except blue jeans, and almost all hotels except those located along major highways. In Russia, “luxury” became equated with “elitism” (which emphasizes the importance of wealth and status in the public eye). “Elitist” is applied to everything from gold-plated jewelry to cosmetics, from restaurants to cars, and from apartments to country homes. There are even advertisements for the wholesale shipment of “elite toilet paper.” It seems that almost everyone, except for the really poor, can partake of this “elitism” without even stopping to think about the real meaning of the word.

All of this is at odds with the European approach, where the word “elitist” is never used in advertising, while the word “luxury” is used very rarely (being substituted with “upscale” and “private” – e.g. for advertising nightclubs).

Yet another distinguishing feature of the United States and Russia that is alien to Europe is the level of deception, large and small, that confronts any first-time visitor to either of the two countries. For example, in the U.S., all prices are indicated without taxes, so real price of an item may be up to 25 percent higher. “Suggested gratuity,” which adds up to 20 percent to a restaurant bill, can be especially baffling. And then a cab passenger who pays $5 on top of the $15 shown on the meter is asked for a tip; this scenario has become rather commonplace. Given that the sphere of the services industry (where a consumer comes into direct contact with a service provider) generates about two-fifths of American GDP, the volume of unregistered financial transactions can in fact account for as much as 8-10 percent of GDP.

In Russia, the role of American cab drivers and bartenders is played by clerks and civil servants: it is an open secret that in addition to the official price, the cost of services provided by the so-called ‘state unitary enterprises’ also includes kickbacks, gratuities, and so on. According to some estimates, this low-level corruption in Russia is put at 10-15 percent of GDP.

Whenever I visit the United States after traveling in Europe, I have a sense of provincialism clumsily hidden by beautiful packaging. Foreign visitors coming to Russia also get this feeling – not immediately though, but as they start judging it beyond the appearance of the store shelves.

*   *   *

In conclusion, I would like to point to yet another circumstance that speaks volumes about America and Russia. There is a common belief that the United States was made into a great country by people who were driven by the American Dream. The popularity of this dream explains why America has been unaffected by public movements that are so typical in Europe: the Americans in their majority eschew the European tradition of striving for income equality in favor of the equality of opportunities. It is noteworthy that Russia (except for the late 19th-early 20th centuries, when it built the closest rapprochement with Europe) also has not seen egalitarian movements. Can it be that this passivism stems from the same illusion that so successfully immobilizes public movements in the United States? It seems to me that some parallels could be drawn between the American and Russian dreams insofar as it concerns the principles underlying the organization of their societies.

The American Dream glorifies success much more than those who have achieved it. At the same time, the Americans praise the capitalist system based on personal liberties, economic independence and freedom – as the core element of their society. Does the Russian Dream resemble the American one? Yes and no. As distinct from the Americans, the Russians perceive society as centered around the state, rather than the market. It is indicative that nothing arouses so much contempt and hostility in Russian society as corrupt and inefficient state and government officials, but at the same time the president, who appointed many of them and effectively placed them above the law, has huge public credibility as a symbol of the state. Is this not reminiscent of the Americans’ attitude toward successful capitalists and capitalism in general?

So, up to a certain point, the Russian approach is similar to the American one: yes, the governing authorities in Russia are indifferent to their citizens, but a substantial part of these citizens also naively believe that they can eventually join them, just like a street vendor in a provincial American town hopes to become a millionaire. Even the Russian democrats in the early 1990s drafted an essentially authoritarian Constitution – in part because they wrote it to suit themselves, not the country as a whole. It is this harboring of rosy illusions, as opposed to a degree of normalcy, that characterizes both the Russians and the Americans, and establishes the striking difference between themselves and the Europeans.