In the last few years, there have been marked efforts by the United States to deploy a strategic missile defense system. Before the end of 2007, for example, there are plans to increase the number of antimissiles deployed in Alaska (Fort Greely) from 14 to 21 (by 2011, it is projected that 40 antimissiles will be deployed in Alaska), while in California the number will increase from two to four.

In Europe, negotiations are underway on the deployment of one Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) missile base in Poland (which contains 10 interceptor missiles), together with Ground-Based Radar (GBR) in the Czech Republic. It has also been reported there are plans to deploy antimissile and radar bases in other nearby countries, including the UK, Germany, Turkey, the Caucasus, and even Ukraine.

What consequences may Washington’s plans have?

COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM

The U.S. missile defense system is intended to protect the country’s territory, in addition to forces stationed abroad and allied forces. This system is meant to defend against ballistic missiles by intercepting them in all phases of flight (initial, middle and terminal). It is an open-ended system that can be upgraded and modernized by including new levels (tiers), or increasing the number of elements in each level.

An integrated missile defense system will comprise ground, sea, air and space-based information assets, as well as ICBM interception assets and combat command and control assets. The majority of these assets were developed earlier as part of the Star Wars program.

All missile defense tiers are intended for target interception with conventional assets, using either the so-called kinetic interception of missiles or high-explosive fragmentation projectiles to destroy them.

In 1975, the United States, acting fully in compliance with the 1972 ABM Treaty, deployed a strategic nuclear missile defense system at the Grand Forks ICBM Base (North Dakota), very much like the one that is now deployed around Moscow. But after four months of operation, it was dismantled by Senate decision with only the radars kept in place. The reason given was that, on the one hand, its effectiveness was generally low, since the majority of assets slated for a retaliatory strike are deployed in the naval component of the U.S. strategic nuclear triad (the nuclear triad comprises intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles deployed on strategic bombers). Meanwhile, the defense of one ICBM base can ensure the protection of not more than 4-5 percent of total warheads.

On the other hand, a nuclear missile defense system is a serious hazard, because an incoming missile or warhead cannot be identified as to its type – nuclear, conventional, chemical, or a dummy. In any event, its interception can provoke a nuclear fireworks display over America’s own territory with all the ensuing consequences. This must have been the most serious reason that forced the U.S. to abandon the nuclear interception option in favor of conventional assets.

Missiles in the boost phase of flight are to be intercepted with airborne lasers, as well as sea and ground-based antimissiles.

Laser weapons are far more effective against liquid propellant missiles which, compared to solid-propellant missiles, have a longer boost stage and a weaker airframe.

There are plans to deploy laser weapons aboard Boeing-747 aircraft hovering at an altitude of about 10 kilometers. The laser has a maximum range of up to 800 km and can apparently destroy missiles within 60 seconds after launch. Target exposure time is one to five seconds; the technology can only destroy a missile if the latter is under heavy thermal or power stress.

Aircraft equipped with laser weapons can be promptly redeployed to areas near enemy missile bases. This requires that several attack, cover and refueling aircraft remain ready for deployment and in combat readiness. It is unlikely that such air assets can be used to intercept missiles based in the hinterland and protected by effective missile defense systems. But deployment of aircraft in patrol areas where there are missile-carrying submarines will create a real threat to ballistic missiles launched from them.

The use of sea- and ground-based Standard-3 and THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) interceptor missiles for destroying missiles at launch is made possible by their deployment several hundred kilometers away from missile launch centers in the sector of their flight paths, with the assistance of essential information support. In this context, submarine-launched ICBMs, as well as missiles launched from coastal areas, will be the most vulnerable to sea-based antimissiles.

Standard-3 antimissiles have a maximum interception range of 300 kilometers, a maximum interception altitude of up to 250 kilometers, and a maximum speed of 4.5 km/s. A three-stage missile has a mass of about 1,500 kilograms, and a warhead mass of 15-18 kilograms.

THAAD is a U.S. defensive weapon system primarily designed to protect troops, civilian and military facilities against missiles in their terminal (descending) phase of flight. In certain scenarios and geographic locations, it can be used to destroy missiles at launch. It has a maximum range of up to 200 kilometers, an interception altitude of 30-40 to 150 kilometers, and a maximum speed of up to 4 km/s. This one-stage missile has a mass of a mere 600 kilograms, and a warhead mass of 40-45 kilograms.

In the longer term, work could resume on the deployment of space-based laser weapons. Under the Star Wars programs, there were plans to deploy laser complexes in different circular orbits. Up to six spacecraft can be deployed in one orbit, at an altitude of about 1,200 kilometers and with the maximum range of 4,000-5,000 kilometers.

The main means of missile interception in mid-flight (the highest point of the flight path) is the ground-based strategic missile defense system with GBI missiles and GBR locators. This system has an effective interception range of up to 4,000 kilometers, at an altitude of up to 1,500 kilometers. With such specifications, a single GBI missile unit, deployed, for example, at the Grand Forks base, can ensure defense against single launches of ICBMs that target installations located virtually across the country’s entire territory.

The three-stage interceptor missile has a maximum speed of up to 8 km/s; the EKV warhead has a mass of 50-60 kilograms. The payload stage has its own engines and a homing system. It is equipped with an infrared homing head. There may be three types of detectors, working in the IR, UV and optical bands. This substantially enhances the accuracy of aiming even in the presence of decoy flares. Four micro-engines ensure good maneuvering.

The effective range of 4,000 kilometers can be ensured only with complete information support, that is, when a space-based information system is deployed in a low orbit for target detection, tracking and designation. Without a space-based information component, and with only ground-based information available, the GBI will only be effective at a range of 2,000-2,500 kilometers.
Missile warheads at the descending stage of flight are to be intercepted with ground and sea-based THAAD and Standard-3 systems, as well as the Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) antimissile complex (interception range of 25 km, altitude of up to 15 km, minimum altitude 2 km, maximum speed of about 2 km/s), which can only intercept tactical missiles. However, it cannot be ruled out that this complex can be effectively used against maneuvering and homing ICBM warheads that have lower speeds at descending phases of their flight, moving for a relatively long time in the atmosphere.

Maximum effectiveness of a strategic missile defense system with GBI missiles, as well as other assets, can be ensured by an information component comprising the existing space, ground and sea-based missile defense information assets and a prospective space-based missile launch-detection system with six satellites in stationary and high elliptical orbits. In the future, its key components will include the Space Tracking and Surveillance System, or STSS, comprising 24 to 30 low-orbit satellites.

CURRENT AND FUTURE MISSILE AND ANTIMISSILE THREATS

Washington claims that the main motive for the deployment of missile defense bases in European countries was the growth of missile threats posed to the U.S. and Europe by Iran. How real are these threats?

Iran has been working on ICBM complexes since the early 1980s. These programs are given high priority in Iran’s military development and modernization plans. Missile building is among the country’s most dynamic sectors. There are plans to create the most powerful missile arsenal in the region by 2015. At the same time, the Iranian leadership refuses to recognize the Missile Technology Control Regime.

In 1992, Iran launched the Shehab missile program, featuring several types of liquid-propellant missile systems. Its cooperation with North Korea enabled Iran to develop and adopt Shehab-3 one-stage missiles (based on North Korea’s Nodong-1 missile technology), with a range of at least 1,500 km and a payload of about 1 ton. This enables Iran to effectively engage targets in Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and parts of Russia (including the cities of Volgograd, Rostov on Don, and Astrakhan). If its payload is halved, the missile’s range will increase to at least 2,000 km and can be increased even more by enlarging its fuel tanks. The Shehab-4 two-stage missile, based on the North Korean Taepodong-1 medium-range missile, is comprised of a Shehab-3-based first stage and a Scud-based second stage. The project, launched 12 years ago, may soon be completed, thereby enabling Iran to target installations in Europe at a distance of more than 3,000 km.

There are also reports about the Shehab-5 ICBM project, based on the North Korean Taepodong-2 missile, whose only test launch (in July 2006) ended in failure.

Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that in the future Iranian missiles can threaten the whole of Europe. If Iran’s current policy is maintained by its future regimes, eventually Iranian missiles could also reach U.S. territory.

But this may happen only in a very distant future. What are the reasons then for America’s hurried actions – from putting unproven antimissiles on alert in Alaska and California, and planning to deploy them in Europe?

One reason is that the administration of George W. Bush is striving to deliver on its election and post-election pledges to protect U.S. territory against attacks from “rogue states.” In the 1990s, a CIA report pointed out that missile threats to the U.S. territory from “rogue nations” could not materialize before 2015, which almost completely coincided with Russian assessments. However, such a forecast, which made the missile defense issue irrelevant, did not suit everyone in the United States, primarily those corporations that develop missile defense elements and systems. In the late 1990s, a special commission, led by Donald Rumsfeld, concluded that such threats would emerge much earlier – in 2005. That became the principal argument cited by the George W. Bush team in favor of withdrawing from the 1972 ABM Treaty (which was opposed by Russia), as well as plans for launching full-scale development, and subsequent adoption of plans to deploy, a national missile defense system.

In 2004, the decision was made to deploy the first battery of antimissiles in Alaska, even though they were still in the experimental stages of development. This was a reckless military adventure without precedent. In the Soviet Union, there were only isolated instances when missile complexes had to be put on alert without sufficient testing. In the U.S., such hurriedness had never occurred before. Yet, U.S. officials explained their behavior, arguing that swift action was common practice both in Russia and the United States. It seems that the main reason for the U.S. haste was to appease the military-industrial lobby and make the development of the missile defense system irreversible. Thus, there is good reason to say that the existing and planned strategic missile defense bases in Alaska, California and Europe will not be combat-ready for at least the next five years.

One may get the impression that the U.S. does everything very sensibly: by the time the missile defense system is deployed in Europe, Iran will have appeared on the scene as a real missile threat. But first, the U.S. should have completed testing its missile defense systems before it started to deploy them. Second, there is already an effective and credible first tier missile defense, namely, precision-guided conventional weapons for engaging missiles and ground-based launchers. Former U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry and former Assistant Defense Secretary Ashton Carter advised using this weapon immediately following North Korea’s missile launches in the summer of 2006 (True, Senator Richard Lugar responded by saying that all of the political options had not been exhausted yet). So, it is quite likely that should a real missile threat emerge from Iran, this first tier missile defense tier will be used by the United States, especially considering that Iranian long-range missiles will be deployed at unprotected ground-based stationary launchers.

DANGER FOR RUSSIA?

The extension of the U.S. missile defense system will not threaten Russia’s nuclear-missile potential in the near future, that is, until around the year 2015. The flight paths of Russian strategic missiles, capable of hypothetically deterring the U.S., indeed pass outside the antimissile operation zone in Europe, especially since they are designed to destroy warheads in mid-flight, rather than shoot down missiles at the boost stage. Moreover, Russian strategic missiles are equipped with such powerful ABM defense suppression systems and other assets, including hundreds of decoy targets and jamming stations, that even with “favorable” (in terms of missile defense) flight paths, as many as ten antimissiles would be needed to destroy just one warhead. Therefore, President Vladimir Putin and ex-Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov were quite right when they said that no missile defense system poses a threat to Russia’s strategic missiles. This will also hold true even if the U.S. deploys ten such bases in Poland and the Czech Republic. Ditto for missile defense bases on U.S. soil.

It is not ruled out, however, that the U.S. will not stop at the current stage. Should laser and kinetic weapons start being deployed in space on a massive scale, the nuclear deterrence potential could be reduced. But this problem is not on the agenda yet.

At the same time, there is a potential danger that seems to have been ignored until now – the direct threat posed by the U.S. strategic missile defense system for spacecraft in low and medium orbits. As these spacecraft have permanent and therefore predictable orbits, they prove defenseless against GBI antimissiles. In his latest state-of-the-nation address to the Federal Assembly in May 2006, Vladimir Putin said, “there are still no firm guarantees of … non-deployment of weapons in outer space.” Given the anti-spacecraft potential of the strategic missile defense system, there is reason to say that as the GBI antimissile tests began, these weapons already began their deployment in space – for the first time since the closure of Soviet and U.S. anti-satellite programs.

In these conditions, Russian and U.S. independent experts immediately began to draft a code of conduct for space activities. Such a document would ban any activities designed to weaken the stability of space systems, including by deploying space weapons. This code should also ban tests, deployment and use of all assets designed to destroy space systems or hinder their operation. But because a missile defense system with an anti-satellite capability has already been deployed, at least its testing for destroying spacecraft must be banned.

BLOW TO PARTNERSHIP

Even though the possible deployment of a U.S. missile defense system in Europe does not pose an immediate military threat to Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, these plans are provoking serious criticism within the Russian leadership and causing serious concern among the leaders of some “Old” European countries. German Chancellor Angela Merkel believes it necessary to get NATO involved in Russian-U.S. consultations on the problem of the U.S. missile shield in Europe.

French President Jacques Chirac also expressed concern over the U.S. plans to deploy missile defense elements in Eastern Europe. “We should be very cautious, taking care not to encourage the creation of new dividing lines in Europe or the return of past stages of history,” Chirac said, referring to the period of confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West during the Cold War era. “The American project raises many questions, which require much thinking over,” the French leader added. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder was even more blunt, describing the U.S. missile defense plans in Europe as not only dangerous but also absurd, urging German diplomats to persuade the United States to abandon its plans.

In Russia, the American plans have provoked a strong “asymmetric” reaction. Top military brass, starting from Sergei Ivanov, immediately brought up the question of Russia’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty, retargeting Russian strategic missiles at missile defense installations in Europe.

The issue of a possible pullout from the INF Treaty was raised earlier, as well, but for a different reason: the infringement of Russia and the U.S. to possess intermediate and shorter-range missiles. Many countries have these types of missiles, whereas the world’s two leading missile powers have their hands tied by a treaty of unlimited duration, which prohibits them from not only having such missiles, but developing them as well. Such missiles are not really necessary to the United States because they may be substituted with thousands of air- and sea-based cruise missiles with nuclear warheads (presently in their stockpile).

In a bid to somewhat soften the West’s negative reaction to Russia’s possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty, statements began to be made in favor of arming intermediate and shorter range missiles with conventional precision-guided warheads. Of course, such moves can be well substantiated, particularly by potential threats in the South and the East. But in the prevailing situation, the negative fallout greatly exceeds the apparent gains.

It is quite likely that concern in Europe over U.S. plans to deploy missile defense bases in Poland, the Czech Republic and other countries has less to do with Russia’s generally negative reaction than with its possible withdrawal from the INF Treaty. But if Russia makes the decision to pull out of the Treaty, there will hardly be any state in Europe that would not insist on U.S. missile defense bases being deployed on its soil. Thus, there will emerge a strong incentive for the unification of European countries. None of them would probably object to the deployment of surface-to-air ballistic and medium-range cruise missiles in Europe as a retaliatory measure.

The ongoing crisis can trigger a further deterioration toward a Cold War-like period. For example, if Washington continues building up its missile defense system both quantitatively and qualitatively, while Moscow pulls out of the INF Treaty, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, for example, would be only too happy to host Russian medium-range missiles with any warheads, in addition to other types of weapons from Russia. It seems that some people in power never really learned the lessons of the Caribbean Crisis.

One of the reasons for Moscow’s sharp reaction to Washington’s missile defense plans is the arrogance with which the incumbent White House administration makes unilateral decisions on strategic issues. And although U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice asserted that Moscow had been informed about U.S. plans to deploy missile defense bases in Poland and the Czech Republic on a dozen occasions, apparently this is not the type of format for relations that suits Russia. Rice’s statement evoked immediate reaction from European leaders, who called for close consultations on missile defense problems in a U.S.-NATO-Russia dialogue. An even more constructive solution would be Russia’s direct participation in developing and jointly using not only a European antimissile system, but also a global system.

The White House’s policy undermines the possibilities for strategic partnership and trust, vital for countering new threats to global and regional security. Plans to deploy missile defense bases in Europe have already become a factor in aggravating relations between Moscow and Washington. These plans are hindering cooperation necessary for tackling the crisis of the nonproliferation regime, the war on terror and drug trafficking, averting regional crises, environmental disasters and other threats; unfortunately, given the current situation, these real dangers are receding into the background.

At the same time, Washington’s recent proposals on the need for deep missile defense consultations with Russia and prospects for its participation in the joint development, in addition to the use of information and combat systems of the global and European missile defense systems, inspire some optimism. Progress in these efforts would rule out a return to any semblance of a new confrontation and would allow the parties to focus on jointly countering real security threats, among them nuclear and missile proliferation.