At the end of last November, the Heads of State and Government of NATO’s 26 member countries met in the Latvian capital of Riga for their most recent summit meeting. Over the past ten years or so, NATO summits became increasingly busy two-day events, featuring meetings between the Allies as well as with their Partner countries. The Riga Summit was different, however. Unlike previous summits, NATO’s Partner countries were not present. There was no meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, which brings together the NATO members and their 20 partners from Europe to Central Asia. Neither was there a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, nor of the NATO-Russia Council. The 26 NATO members decided to stay on their own, and their meeting took less than 24 hours.

Why was the Riga Summit, as a British defense journal put it, organized in such an “introverted” way? And why did a NATO meeting which took place so close to the borders of Russia not at least seek some high-level Russian participation? The answer becomes clear if one places the Riga Summit in its proper context, which is NATO’s broader evolution from an Alliance initially founded to provide for the territorial defense of Western Europe into an instrument for safeguarding transatlantic security interests wherever they may be at stake.

THREE PHASES OF NATO’S EVOLUTION

Historical categorizations often invite the charge of oversimplifying a complex story. Still, it is instructive to look at NATO’s 58-year history as an evolution that has proceeded in three distinct phases:  the Cold War, the decade following the end of the Cold War, and the period that began with the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York on 11 September 2001.  Each of these periods posed very distinct security challenges.  Each required a different set of responses.  And accordingly, each of these three phases produced a different NATO.

The first phase, the Cold War, stretched well over four decades. During these 40 years, NATO’s role was essentially static: preventing an attack against the territory of its member countries. Given the specific conditions of the East-West conflict, NATO could accomplish this objective by deterrence alone, which is to say by the mere threat of using force in response to an aggression.
As both sides knew what was at stake and thus exerted considerable caution in dealing with one another, the use of force to advance political aims was effectively excluded in Cold War Europe.

The second phase of NATO, the period between the collapse of the Berlin Wall and that of the Twin Towers in New York, saw NATO acting in a role that was fundamentally different from that of the Cold War. While some observers, not least in Russia, expected NATO’s demise, the realities of post-Cold War Europe gave NATO a new – if very different – lease of life. As a transatlantic framework for managing change, NATO became a major factor in Europe’s post-Cold War transformation. Politically, this new role of NATO manifested itself in the policy of building partnerships with virtually all countries in Europe as well as the Southern Mediterranean region. Militarily, NATO’s new role was demonstrated most clearly in the Western Balkans. In trying to stop the violence and bloodshed after the collapse of Yugoslavia, NATO became increasingly involved in crisis management efforts outside its own treaty area.

Both dimensions of NATO’s post-Cold War evolution reflected a changing notion of security. As the threat of invasion disappeared, the exclusive focus on territorial defense had clearly run its course. However, instability in NATO’s wider European neighborhood could well affect NATO members’ security. This instability could not be remedied by a policy based solely on the display of military strength. Security policy was to become a policy of broader political engagement and, in the case of the Western Balkans, of long-term military engagement as well.

Just like the Cold War, the second phase of NATO’s evolution concluded with a certain sense of optimism. At the end of the 1990s, Europe seemed to have managed a “soft landing” from the Cold War. Advances in Europe’s integration, in Russia’s democratization, and the emergence of a general cooperative momentum throughout the continent had clearly put any remnants of the Cold War to rest. While NATO’s enlargement process, and particularly NATO’s Kosovo air campaign, had met with considerable Russian disapproval, NATO could claim to have played a constructive, indeed essential role as a framework for managing Europe’s post-Cold War transformation, and for pacifying the Western Balkans.

FROM GEOGRAPHICAL TO FUNCTIONAL SECURITY

The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 marked the beginning of the third phase of NATO’s evolution. It now became clear that the major threats to NATO Allies – and, for that matter, to many more countries – no longer emanated from Europe, as was the case during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, but from regions outside the “old continent.” In the face of international terrorism, failing states and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, NATO’s traditional self-image as a “eurocentric” Alliance, which had prevailed in the previous two phases, now became obsolete. The further consolidation of Europe as a unified democratic space would continue to rank high on NATO’s agenda. Yet the global nature of the new threats rendered a purely geographical approach meaningless. If NATO was to continue to provide for the security of its member states in a world of “globalized insecurity,” it had to adopt a functional approach and be prepared to tackle problems at their source.

The first indication of this new approach was NATO’s first ever invocation of its collective self-defense obligation in response to the attacks of 11 September 2001. In the Cold War, this obligation had been widely understood to apply in the case of a military attack by the Warsaw Pact. However, by extending this obligation to a major terrorist attack by non-state actors, and indeed with tacit Russian support, NATO became part of a struggle that was global in essence. In August 2003, NATO assumed the command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, demonstrating that it was now fully prepared to take a functional approach to security.

This third phase of NATO’s evolution is clearly the most demanding. Taking the logic of engagement seriously means that the Alliance now has to cope with an ever broader spectrum of missions, ranging from combat operations to humanitarian relief. Today, the Alliance is keeping the peace in Kosovo; assisting defense reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina; patrolling the Mediterranean Sea in a naval antiterrorist mission; engaged in combat as well as in peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan; and airlifting African Union troops to the Sudanese crisis region of Darfur. In addition, NATO has provided humanitarian relief to the United States after hurricane Katrina and to Pakistan after the October 2005 earthquake. And NATO is training Iraqi security forces, both inside and outside the country. Not surprisingly, given their importance to security and stability more widely, many of these missions and operations enjoy the support of the Russian Federation – either through the UN Security Council or through the actual contribution of military forces or logistical support.

For NATO, sustaining this broad agenda poses a range of political, military and financial challenges. Not only are most of NATO’s missions today long-term in nature; their ultimate success depends on political and economic development rather than military preponderance. Hence, more than ever before NATO needs to calibrate its military contribution with the work of civilian actors. The long-term nature of NATO’s engagements also raises questions of how to finance these operations in a way that all Allies perceive as fair and equitable. As shown by the fierce fighting in the South of Afghanistan over the past year, some of NATO’s assignments have become extremely demanding militarily. Moreover, NATO’s nations now face the specter of suffering casualties in missions very far away from home, which is a major challenge for democratic societies.

COPING WITH OPERATIONAL DEMANDS

Against this backdrop of mounting operational demands, the challenge for the Riga Summit was to ensure that NATO has the military, political and financial means to continue to perform as required. With respect to NATO’s ongoing military transformation, Riga did indeed produce a number of significant results. The NATO Response Force is now fully operational, giving NATO a more than 20,000-strong rapid reaction capability to address new risks and threats. In addition, NATO Allies worked out arrangements for making use of American, Russian and Ukrainian large transport aircraft for NATO missions. The NATO members also agreed on new initiatives in areas such as tactical missile defense, air-to-ground surveillance, and cooperation between special operations forces. And major reforms of NATO’s defense planning, force generation and funding arrangements will ensure that NATO’s missions are better prepared and paid for in the future.

The Riga Summit was a major step forward as well with respect to NATO’s political transformation. For example, Allies agreed to deepen their cooperation with partner countries, including those in the Middle East and the Gulf region. Work was set in train to build new relationships with countries in the Asia-Pacific region that share the Alliance’s security interests and, in the case of Australia and New Zealand, already make valuable contributions to NATO-led operations. And in line with the need for a more comprehensive approach to security, it was emphasized that NATO will continue to seek closer cooperation with other international actors, such as the United Nations, the European Union, the G-8, or the World Bank, as well as with non-governmental organizations.

All these decisions will help advance NATO’s transformation into an organization that is even better able to respond to today’s global challenges. But while the Riga Summit was clearly geared toward the third phase of NATO’s evolution, the meeting also took a number of decisions to promote the Alliance’s longstanding objective of helping to create a Europe whole, free and at peace. One such decision was to invite Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia to join the Partnership for Peace program. And NATO’s Heads of State and Government also clearly stated their intention, at their next summit in the spring of 2008, to extend further invitations to those countries that are able to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. This is a strong signal of encouragement to Albania, Croatia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, who all aspire to become members of NATO. NATO’s relations with Georgia and Ukraine will continue to develop within the framework of the so-called Individual Dialogs that the Alliance is conducting with these countries.

The operational focus of the Riga Summit should explain why that gathering was an Allies-only meeting. From the outset, however, Riga was not planned to be an isolated event. Even before NATO’s Heads of State and Government met in the Latvian capital, the next summit had already been set for the spring of 2008. Moreover, NATO’s 60th anniversary in April 2009 will probably be yet another opportunity for a meeting of Heads of State and Government. This rapid sequence of high-level meetings indicates the accelerating speed of NATO’s transformation – a transformation that requires regular high-level political guidance and direction. 

With Riga behind it and one or even two summits waiting ahead in the not too distant future, NATO is now busier than ever.  In addition to fulfilling its ongoing, demanding operational engagements, the Alliance will continue to pursue longer-term, structural changes, both in terms of its own internal political and military organization, and in its relations with other nations and organizations.  

A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

One major feature of the current third phase of NATO’s evolution is the organization’s closer interaction with other major institutions. The deployment of NATO forces into a crisis area may be indispensable for ending a conflict and providing a secure environment for political and economic reconstruction. However, that reconstruction – “nation-building” in the broadest sense – can only be achieved through cooperation with other actors, including the European Union, the United Nations and non-governmental organizations. This imperative of combining “hard” and “soft” power has raised the challenge of building new institutional ties between NATO and those other actors that are most likely to provide the “soft” part of the security bargain in future contingencies.

This means, first and foremost, that NATO needs to build a true strategic partnership with the European Union. Although the current NATO-EU relationship is far too limited in scope, the logic of pragmatic coordination and cooperation should ultimately prevail over petty notions of institutional uniqueness. This marriage of “hard” and “soft” security would dramatically broaden the range of political, military and economic tools at the disposal of the international community. A more structured relationship between NATO and the United Nations is another near-term aim. NATO and the UN operate in the same areas, yet daily cooperation in the field contrasts with a glaring lack of political consultation at the strategic level.

With NATO emerging as a major “enabler” of the UN, the value of a more coherent strategic relationship has become increasingly obvious. In addition to more immediate operational benefits, it would help NATO in providing training and mentoring of UN peacekeepers, or advice on planning and interoperability issues. And that kind of assistance would greatly help a currently overstretched UN to perform its role as a custodian of global peace and stability.

Another feature of NATO’s “third phase” is broader and deeper political dialog. Unlike the Cold War, where the visibility of the threat made achieving consensus on a response relatively easy, the range of today’s security challenges no longer allows for the convenient assumption that the Allies will always arrive at similar answers. Building consensus will become harder, and require more regular, open debate among the Allies.

At a time when many traditional tenets of national security are being revisited, the Alliance must grapple with these questions rather than dodge them for the sake of unity. In an environment where new security players, such as the EU, are finding their role, and where other parts of the world, such as the Broader Middle East, are growing in relevance, the transatlantic community can only make real progress if contending ideas are put to the test through informed and frank debate. Moreover, where NATO troops are engaged in an operation, the Alliance must also be part of the process leading to a political solution.  And this is one more reason for the Allies to debate their policy intensively – among themselves, with their Partner countries, and with other international organizations and key regional players.

MOVING NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS FORWARD

The immediate post-Riga period should also be a time to deepen the NATO-Russia partnership. The Russian Federation is a major security actor in the Euro-Atlantic area, and following the last round of NATO enlargement in 2004, Russia shares land or sea borders with six NATO member countries. NATO and Russia have common interests in areas as diverse as the fight against terrorism and countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Russia’s permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council gives her a significant voice on issues that affect the security of NATO Allies. Russia’s influence in Central Asia and northern Afghanistan is important to the success of the NATO-led ISAF mission. It is clear, at the same time, that the success of that mission would significantly enhance the overall security situation for Russia and its neighbors.

Over the past ten years, Russia has already made welcome contributions to the success of NATO missions in the Balkans, the Mediterranean and Afghanistan. In particular, since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the hesitancy that dominated the NATO-Russia relationship through much of the 1990s has given way to a less cautious and more pragmatic approach.  A major step forward was the replacement of the rather inward-looking and conservative Permanent Joint Council with the more operational NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in May 2002.

Although there has been significant progress, the potential of the NATO-Russia relationship is far from exhausted. For example, the pattern of military-to-military cooperation remains uneven, with some common projects progressing well while others lack momentum. The 5th anniversary of the NRC this spring represents a great opportunity for the Alliance and the Russian Federation to reaffirm their commitment to the NATO-Russia partnership at the highest political level, and substantiate this commitment with the launch of new common projects, supported by sufficient resources. Such projects could encompass enhancing military interoperability between Russian and NATO forces, better coordination of efforts to combat terrorism and organized crime in Afghanistan, or closer cooperation in responding to natural disasters.

Although neither Russia nor NATO’s other partners were present at the Riga Summit, they have every reason to welcome its results. The Riga Summit marked a significant step in NATO’s evolution toward a security provider within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.  This ongoing evolution will see NATO working together ever more closely with other nations and organizations to tackle new, global risks and threats.  Russia has nothing to fear, and a lot to gain, from this evolution.  It has both a strong interest and ample opportunity to play a greater part in the process.  And we hope that it will.