Participants of armed ethno-political conflicts - simmering, or frozen but unresolved - tend to invoke principles of international law that best serve their interests. Some uphold the territorial integrity of nation states, while others defend the self-determination of peoples. Although this is a delicate matter, there is a pressing need to harmonize these provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.

INTERNAL VS. EXTERNAL

Both of the abovementioned principles, like all 10 Helsinki principles, have equal value, and each one should be treated in conjunction with the others. However, some believe them to be mutually exclusive; others are inclined to interpret the first postulate as stipulating protection of state interests and privileges, and the second as positing the defense of individual or communal rights. In other words, the priority of the rights of a state over human rights is being called into question.

In some instances, attempts are made to eliminate the contradictions by separating the spheres of their application. Thus, the principle of territorial integrity is regarded as external (as a guarantee against encroachment by other states), while self-determination of peoples as internal. But oftentimes states attempt to use the first principle to fight internal movements for self-determination.

If the people agree to autonomy status, which leaves national borders unaffected, the collision between the two principles is minimized. But what happens when there are attempts to secede, to break away from a "union" state? No Constitution (except the former Constitution of the Soviet Union) grants such a right. However, consider how many instances of secession there have been - sometimes peaceful, but more often bloody. In some instances, the first principle prevails, but then the second wins over, and vice versa. Conflicts with a combination of factors are especially complex: movements for self-determination often rely on active support from the outside (cf. Kosovo and Albania, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia, and South and North Ossetia).

Typically, the first reaction to a perceived clash of the two principles is the natural, conservative defense of territorial integrity and the inviolability of state borders. Only as it becomes clear that it is impossible to preserve the status quo in one state are the rights of those advocating self-determination recognized - at least, these forces are recognized as a party to the conflict. Ironically, national movement leaders, as a rule, stand firm on the self-determination of peoples. However, once they have come to power, they change allegiances to the principle of territorial integrity of states.

This brings up the first question: How applicable is this principle in a conflict situation? And the second, how viable and effective is each of them in a specific historical/geographic situation? It is essential to discover the logic, the internal springs, and their connections with other rules and norms. This would help mitigate the intensity of conflicts and prevent the parties involved from blindly relying on a principle that they believe better suits their interests.

There is a need for a concept to gauge the effectiveness of both provisions with a clear-cut set of criteria, as well as a comprehensive, systemic approach, not merely an approach based on precedent (precedent is convenient on the tactical level, but the issue at hand requires a more thorough, in-depth study).

HERE AND NOW

The idea of a "Kosovo precedent” provoked strong objections from the West. It would rather see special emphasis being placed on the specific, even unique characteristics of each particular conflict. But the concept of precedent does not presuppose a comprehensive or complete analogy. In the case with Kosovo, it is reduced to a narrow but fundamental question: Can a breakaway state acquire independence without the consent of the state from which it wants to secede? From this question we can see that the entire campaign against the "Kosovo precedent” is off the mark.

Yet it is more important to set the record straight on the two principles as such.

First, a principle (especially in interrelation with other principles) is not a dogma. If any of the Helsinki principles can be assigned an "absolute status,' these should rather be two other principles, which are also more applicable to conflict situations - namely, refraining from the threat or use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes.

Second, a principle is an abstraction: it does not work outside specific circumstances. They predetermine the viability and effectiveness of both principles, which is relative and comparable. But a standard yardstick is needed to gauge their effectiveness. Their application in conjunction with "counterforce' principles is a demand of modern civilization: in the 21st century, the international community should raise the bar on these standards.

Third, historicism is an essential element in analyzing specific processes and events. After all, the array of Final Act principles is a product of a specific historical period, predetermined by the outcome of World War II in Europe. This comprised the existence of two systems and two opposing camps, as well as nuclear weapons. It serves as a kind of a truce, a ceasefire - between antagonists in an effort to avoid World War III. The 10 Helsinki principles provided a legal framework to the balance of interests between the two centers of power, serving as the "rules of the game" for relations between states during that era. But that era is over.

Both principles are inviolable, but today the emphasis should be shifted to their applicability and especially their viability and effectiveness. No international processes or events occur outside specific circumstances. So it is not enough to accurately cite a principle: each side should also substantiate its applicability and effectiveness.

What were the main characteristics of the 1990s? It was an era marked by the disintegration of states and formation of new ones in Eurasia and elsewhere. During that tectonic, force majeure period, the principle of territorial integrity proved to be not as fail-proof as it had been before. If this proposition is absolute and incontestable as some say it is, why then did it not save the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia or Ethiopia? The principle of self-determination granted sovereignty to 23 Union republics (15 in the Soviet Union, six in the SFRY, and two in Czechoslovakia), as well as to Eritrea.

Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transdnestria, and Nagorno-Karabakh are both actors and products of objective circumstances - demographic and political changes, disintegration of states, wars, etc. It is essential to understand the logic of change to take reality into account. Kosovo may become yet another argument, but only an additional one, for one or the other approach.

CRITERIA

There is a large number of factors in the applicability and viability of principles in each specific conflict - primarily the factors of "civilization”. Following are some of these requirements: the period of time that a specific entity has been part of a "union state;' the ethnic makeup of a territory that has become a subject of dispute, and its evolution and dynamics over at least the past 100 years; is this a popular movement or a struggle between some mafia clans; what kinds of methods are being used - peaceful or terrorist; how long has a seceding entity been in control of its territory; have there been any clashes; if so, how long, frequent and intensive have they been?

Needless to say, both the course and specifics of an armed conflict are critical. Are all parties committed to the idea that there is no alternative to a peace settlement? Who advocates a peaceful solution and who is inclined to favor the use of force? Which of the parties involved is ready to back up its commitment to peace by signing a ceasefire agreement? Who is for dialog, direct contacts and confidence building measures, and who is against? Are there any displaced persons and refugees? How many are there on each side? Are there conditions for their repatriation or what impediments are there? Who is observing the agreements that have been signed? Have the norms of international humanitarian law been violated (obviously, their gross and massive violations seriously affect the viability of any of the two principles under consideration)? Have any attempts been made to find a peaceful solution - for example, through a referendum? If so, how was it organized? Or how can it be organized? Does the entity in question have trappings of statehood, self-governance, etc.? How representative and democratic is its system, especially compared to the "opposite" system? What are its chances for survival?

It is extremely important to differentiate between the causes and effects of a conflict: each has its own pre-history and legal specifics. Other essential factors include the form of secession, the extent of succession with respect to a "union" state, and the validity of these succession rights from the perspective of international law.

The recognition of a state's borders by the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, etc. is oftentimes cited as an argument here. This is important, of course, but has no legal force since, in admitting new members, international organizations do not approve their socio-economic or political systems, their borders or prevailing religion. Any recognition of a state is a political act: its legal effects rarely go beyond the framework of relations between two particular entities.

There have been some rather amusing developments along these lines. The Soviet Union's administrative borders, for example, were sometimes rather arbitrary (remember Karabakh and the transfer of the Crimea to Ukraine). Today, by a quirk, Westerners, who reject all things Soviet, uphold the administrative borders that existed during the Soviet Union. Is such a precedent good or bad? It is good if it can prevent new conflicts. But what if bloodshed has already occurred in such regions? Should we pretend that nothing happened?

In short, a well defined, graduated, and formalized scale of criteria is needed. A broad discussion with the participation of all parties concerned - including experts on international law, political scientists, journalists, and diplomats - would be extremely helpful in this situation.

This "political atlas" of confrontation - i.e., a sum total of characteristic features of an era, region, conflict specifics, etc. - will help establish a kind of a viability and effectiveness coefficient for each of the two principles under consideration. This would help cool some hot heads and provide valuable guidelines to the international community in its entire diversity.

But conflicts should be ultimately resolved at the negotiating table or through popular referendums. This rules out the use of "random" principles, ignoring essential characteristics and circumstances of a specific conflict.

AN "ATLAS OF CONFLICTS"

The international community is, without a doubt, interested in a peaceful settlement of disputes between states or parties to a conflict with full respect for the norms of international humanitarian law.

With regard to conflicts, any of the two aforementioned principles must definitely be linked with the requirement for peace settlement. International organizations would be well advised to be more consistent and persevering in this regard. All Helsinki principles are elements of civilization as compared to war. Therefore the scale of criteria should be built on principles of civilization, with special priority being given to the aforementioned requirements of the international community for all parties to a conflict. There must be no incentives to a party that continues to threaten the use of force, refuses to pursue a peaceful solution, arouses hatred and hostility or destabilizes the overall situation.

The development of a "political atlas" of any conflict comprises three main stages:

• elaboration of a general scale of criteria or characteristics of conflicts;
• determination of the share value of each criterion depending on how useful it is for a peaceful solution;
• application of these guidelines to a specific conflict, taking into account historical, geographic, regional, and other characteristics of a conflict.

Needless to say, this is not about producing some numerical indices but only general guidelines and proportions.