Shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, it seemed – especially since the Cold War was over – that the threat of a nuclear conflict had disappeared. Nevertheless, nuclear confrontation remains a real threat.

Nuclear terrorism poses an even greater threat. In the 1990s, nuclear scientists supposed that amid globalization and scientific-technological progress, the majority of countries would not be able to acquire nuclear weapons before 2020. But the process is moving along much more rapidly. The “nuclear club” is expanding, but not all “newcomers” can ensure the security of their nuclear arsenals. This greatly increases the likelihood that weapons of mass destruction (WMD), primarily nuclear or radioactive weapons, as well as arms grade material, could fall into terrorist hands.

Andrei Kokoshin, Head of the State Duma’s Committee for CIS Affairs and Contacts with Russians Abroad, is convinced that terrorist attacks with the use of nuclear weapons or fissile materials are especially dangerous and should remain an overriding priority for the world community.

DETERRENCE/INTIMIDATION WEAPONS

The uncontrolled circulation of various radioactive materials gives potential nuclear terrorists greater possibilities. According to experts at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), a ’dirty bomb’ can be created with any radioactive isotopes (Vienna, November 2006). Although an atomic chain reaction from such a bomb is impossible, the detonation of such a device would cause radioactive contamination of the terrain. The contamination level from such a device would not be high enough to affect human health, but the implementation of WMD and the threat of radiation could provoke widespread fear and panic. Intimidation is the terrorists’ main objective: their aim is to force states to yield to their demands or act in their interests.

According to the Chicago-based organization Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, as reported by the BBC, it is primarily organizations like al Qaeda that are seeking to obtain and use nuclear weapons. Jamal al-Fadl, a key prosecution witness in the U.S. vs. bin Laden case (New York, February 2001), said that in 1993 al Qaeda had conducted negotiations with a Sudanese citizen on the purchase of uranium in South Africa. In September 2006, Abu Hamza al Muhajir, al Qaeda’s purported leader in Iraq, urged scientists to join the organization and conduct experiments with radioactive devices to adapt them for use against coalition forces. In October 2006, the Al Arabiya TV channel aired video footage of an address by Abu Yahim, another bin Laden associate, which contained calls to assemble “the nuclear bomb of jihad.”

Lewis Smith, writing in The Times, argues with good reason that even reported seizures of radioactive material can fuel fears of a potential dirty bomb, especially when several kilograms of the so-called ’yellow cake’ were discovered in December 2003 in a scrap metal shipment at a Rotterdam port. There was another case of strontium 90 and cesium 137 being seized by Georgian police from a taxi driver in Tbilisi in May 2006.

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said recently that in the past decade his agency has recorded 650 international attempts to smuggle nuclear material, and urged the global community to multiply its efforts to protect the existing stockpiles of nuclear material against terrorists. Furthermore, The Times adds that the number of smuggling attempts in Europe (with the aim of making the dirty bomb) has doubled since 2002, reaching 300, according to the IAEA. But the real level of smuggling operations, the agency warns, could be much higher. In 2005 alone, Western security services disrupted no less than 16 attempts to smuggle uranium and plutonium.

The post-Soviet space is another front line in this struggle. According to the RF Federal Customs Service, in 1995 it discovered four attempts to illegally transfer radioactive materials across the border; in 2004, this number increased to approximately 200. According to the RF Prosecutor General’s Office, over 40 attempted thefts of radioactive materials have been foiled in the past decade. In Belarus, between 1996 and 2003, customs authorities thwarted 26 attempts to smuggle nuclear materials into their country; two of the attempts originated from Russia.

While Western experts are especially concerned by the possibility of radioactive leaks from “legal” nuclear power installations, atomic scientists in the CIS see the main danger coming from abandoned industrial facilities and installations, medical and scientific organizations, mothballed ore deposits, and tailing dumps.

In March 2002, Tajik police in the town of Chkalovsk seized two kilograms of low-enriched uranium from four men who had been trading in radioactive materials since 1998. In 2005, there was a marked increase in attempts by unidentified individuals to access the Bobodzhan-Gafur tailing dump. Furthermore, reckless actions by individuals who are searching for nonferrous metals have resulted in a substantial increase in background radiation, exceeding the maximum permissible level by 10 times or more (see: www.caresd.net 21.06.05).

Contrary to popular belief that Afghanistan has no significant potential for mineral resources (except for a ruby deposit), rich uranium ore was discovered in its Khanneshin region. According to some reports, the Taliban showed interest in uranium, while low enriched material was exported from Kandahar. Addressing a Russia-NATO Council session, then Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said transport containers with inscriptions in Russian, purportedly with enriched uranium, were available on Afghanistan’s black market. Such finds can be seen as preparations for provocative terrorist acts, while responsibility for them may be blamed on Russia, which allegedly does not ensure effective control of its nuclear installations.

LOSS OF NUCLEAR CONTROL

Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, a number of former Soviet republics were confronted with the problem of ensuring the security of nuclear installations on their territory. Economic difficulties, political instability and armed conflicts undermined the old system that had guaranteed strict control of nuclear arsenals and radioactive materials.

Some CIS countries partially lost control of radioactive materials, as their nuclear backyards began to attract criminal elements. Potential dirty bomb producers/buyers are closely watching nuclear submarine dismantling plants and other industrial (especially abandoned) enterprises that in some way or other used radioactive materials, as well as medical, scientific and research organizations, and to a lesser degree, abandoned uranium mines.

According to a report entitled Inventorying and Disposal of Ionizing Radiation Sources in the CIS, which was presented in June 2005 to the Seventh Session of the CIS Commission on the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes in Kiev, “sources of ionizing radiation cannot be reliably protected, on the same level as nuclear power plants or nuclear waste storage facilities; in the past decade, following reforms that caused the closure of a number of institutions, there are increasing numbers of ’orphaned’ ionizing radiation sources; the relatively small dimensions and weight of ionizing radiation sources make them convenient targets of theft or unauthorized transfer, which causes particular concern today in light of the growing threat of terrorism” (http://sng.ainf.ru/po/images/stories/zasedaniya_komissii/7zasedanie/6.pdf).

Without calling into question the competence and good faith of the governments of states on whose territory hazardous installations are located, it is critical to take into account the possibility of theft and uncontrolled circulation of radioactive materials. The radiological situation can also be affected by natural cataclysms, as well as man-made impacts, including acts of sabotage or subversion. The CIS should be fully aware of these threats, especially since Central Asia is a major black market for the sale of uranium. The region is characterized by a number of unfavorable conditions for the storage of nuclear waste, including political, geomagnetic and climatic instability. At the same time, it is in geographical proximity to Afghanistan and the Middle East.

For example, about 13 percent of Kazakhstan’s territory is contaminated with radionuclides, according to the country’s Institute of Nuclear Physics, an affiliate of the National Nuclear Center. According to scientists quoted by Interfax-Kazakhstan, there are more than 100 million metric tons of waste at uranium storage facilities in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.

From every indication, Astana is greatly interested in eliminating the “radiological risks.” It is considering such large-scale international projects as Navruz and Caspian Rivers, which are designed to create and put in place a system of radiological monitoring along rivers that border Central Asia, Russia and the Caucasus.

In 2006, during an official visit by U.S. Vice President Richard Cheney to Kazakhstan, a raft of joint documents was signed on this issue, thus marking an important step forward. These documents included an amendment to the agreement between Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources and the U.S. Department of Defense on the elimination of WMD infrastructure, as well as an implementation agreement between the Kazakh Finance Ministry and the U.S. Department of Energy on cooperation in the suppression of the illegal circulation of nuclear and radioactive materials.

In Kyrgyzstan, “the threat of radiation security for the public is posed by closed radiation sources, a total of 1,200, which are stored at such installations, but due to funding shortages, it is impossible to bury them” (from the report entitled, Inventorying and Disposal of Ionizing Radiation Sources in the CIS).

In Kyrgyzstan’s Batken Province, there are more than 20 major radioactive tailing dumps (left behind since the time when the Soviet Union was actively mining uranium there). The Kyrgyz authorities have stated repeatedly that many of these facilities are in need of modernization, but the republic does not have enough financial resources for such a project. Experts do not rule out the possibility that should these dumps come under an adverse impact (for example, as a result of a massive earthquake), the densely populated Fergana Valley could be faced with an environmental disaster.

In the estimate of Ecosan experts, at least 7,000 tons of radioactive semi-liquid waste is stored in 23 burial sites on the banks of the Mailisu River in Kyrgyzstan. In addition to this, there are also 13 waste dumps of discarded ore with a total mass of 2.7 million cubic meters and active uranium content of around 200 grams per ton. Background radiation on the surface of these waste dumps is 100-200 microroentgens per hour (mR/hr) (the maximum permissible level is 17 mR/hr). Independent environmentalists say radiation levels in certain places can be as high as 2,000-3,000 mR/hr.

Tajikistan’s uranium mines are concentrated in the Fergana Valley – Tyuyamyun, Taboshar, Adrasman, Mailisu, and other fields. This is where the Leninabad combine, one of the first uranium production facilities in the Soviet Union, was built (since the 1990s, it has been called the VostokRedMet uranium mining and processing enterprise).

In July 2005, an international conference, entitled Uranium Legacy Issues in the Republic of Tajikistan, was held in the city of Kairakkum in the north of the republic. It was organized within the framework of the Bishkek Declaration (2003) and attempted to solve the radioactive waste disposal problem. Conference participants – experts from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Russia and Germany – visited waste burial sites in the Sogd Province where, according to various estimates, up to 54.8 million metric tons of waste from hydro-metallurgical enterprises was buried. Although it is low-level radioactive waste, it can remain a source of danger for hundreds of years, while Tajikistan does not have the necessary technology to handle such sites.

According to environmental experts, unless urgent measures are taken, a natural or man-made disaster could result in the spread of radionuclides from the Sogd burial sites and abandoned uranium mines through the Syr Darya River, which cuts across the region.

Hotam Murtazoyev, director of the Ecology and Scientific-Technical Progress research and development company, says the most serious source of danger is an industrial waste dump in the town of Dehmai, located nine kilometers from the river. This site, which contains 36 million tons of waste, has not been guarded for more than 10 years. A vast amount of water accumulates in its pit during the winter period, which then dries up in summer. Thus, radioactive dust rises from the dump and settles in some parts of the city of Chkalovsk, not far from Khujand, the center of the province. According to experts, in some parts of Khujand (primarily residential areas) the background radiation reading is 80 mR/hr and higher. But in certain parts of the Sogd area, background radiation can be as high as 1,000 mR/hr (IWPR; nuclear.kz 04.04.05). The maximum permissible concentration in Tajikistan is 57 mR/hr.

CIS member countries are certainly not indifferent to nuclear security problems. For example, in Ukraine (with its problem of “Chernobyl looters”) amendments were introduced to the Code of Administrative Infractions and the Criminal Law Code, which are designed to toughen penalties for violations of radiation safety rules. According to the Seventh Session of the CIS Commission on the Use of Atomic Energy for Peaceful Purposes, the best radioactive waste storage and disposal practices are to be found in Russia, Kazakhstan and Armenia. The Commission’s Eighth Session (Yerevan, September 2006) addressed the containment of radioactive sources in the CIS, and elimination of the effects caused by atomic energy enterprises from the Soviet Union.

Comprehensive monitoring and analysis of radiological security threats in the CIS on the regional level is still a sensitive issue. In this connection, the collective efforts of the CIS should be aimed at establishing control over all sources that may attract potential creators of a dirty bomb.

NUCLEAR ENERGY AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM

The so-called ’nuclear problem,’ as part of the energy security problem, has yet another aspect. Fearing another energy crisis, governments are striving to diversify their energy sources. Suffice it to mention that in early 2007, Washington decided to lift an oil drill ban on Alaska, and build about 30 nuclear power plants. Japan and China announced a significant increase in nuclear power generation. China is planning to build 30 nuclear reactors in addition to its already existing nine by 2020. Without this, it will be impossible for China to achieve its ultimate goal: double GDP by 2020.

According to the IAEA, construction of NPPs can ensure a 30 to 80 percent increase in power generating capacities in Asia alone. Mukhtar Dzhakishev, president of Kazakhstan’s Kazatomprom company, citing international energy experts, points out that by 2030, global energy consumption will double. The conclusion from such a prediction is that only nuclear power can save mankind from an energy shortage – that is, until thermonuclear power plants are built (www.c-asia.org/analit 01.12.06).

According to the U.S. based company, International Nuclear Inc., from 1985 to 2003, the world’s commercial uranium reserves reduced 50 percent. In 2005, global uranium production was around 40,000 metric tons with annual consumption at 69,000 tons. Thus far, the uranium shortage is covered from existing stocks, reserves and secondary sources. In an IAEA estimate, by 2020, global uranium production will grow to 65,000-70,000 tons, while consumption will rise to 82,000-85,000 tons. Experts say there is a total of over 5 million tons of untapped uranium reserves in the world. The world’s leader in proven reserves is Australia (989,000 tons), followed by Kazakhstan (622,000), Russia (615,000), Canada (441,000), South Africa (398,000) and Ukraine (250,000). Canada has the richest ore in the world (10 percent content), as compared to Australia’s 0.5 percent and Russia’s 0.1 percent.

Today, Russia is experiencing a uranium shortage of 5,000 tons a year, and this figure is steadily growing. Moscow plans to increase its NPP capacity more than 50 percent by 2010, and over 350 percent by 2050. Russia will first need to form a strategic reserve of 22,000 tons, which, considering its domestic needs, will require at least five to six years. Experts believe that Russia will soon go from being a natural uranium exporter to an importer. The amount of uranium coming from secondary sources (stocks) is expected to decline sharply, which will lead to a crisis. At this point, not even skyrocketing prices will be able to prevent a substantial shortage of uranium on the market. None of the key producers will have enough time to boost output (http://nuclear.kz/ru/illiteracy/uran).

Kazakhstan is actively developing its energy resources. According to Russia’s Tekhsnabexport company (which holds 35 percent of the world’s nuclear fuel market), a joint Russian-Kazakh-Kyrgyz venture, Zarechnoye, which is situated in Kazakhstan, has about 19,000 tons of uranium reserves. Kazatomprom, a national exporter/importer of uranium and other dual purpose materials, has increased uranium production to 3,363 tons, and hopes to become the world’s leading uranium producer by 2010. Meanwhile, a uranium ore field with a capacity of 1,000 tons of uranium concentrate a year has opened in Vostochny Mynkuduk, southern Kazakhstan. According to some reports, the deposit has an estimated reserve of 22,000 tons of uranium. Similar mines are to be opened before the end of this year at Tsentralny Mynkuduk (2,000 tons), Yuzhny Inkai (2,000), Irkol (750), and Kharasan (2,000). In 2008, operations are due to start at Zapadny Mynkuduk and Budenovskoye fields (1,000 tons each).

South Korea signed a nuclear energy cooperation agreement with Kazakhstan, in which it is to receive around 1,000 tons of uranium a year. Kazakhstan (Kazatomprom) and Japan (Sumitomo Corporation and Canzay Electric Corporation) signed a memorandum of intent foreseeing the creation of a joint venture to develop the Mynkuduk uranium field in southern Kazakhstan.

Tajikistan has 14 percent of the world’s uranium reserves. Uzbekistan’s proven reserves vary from an estimated 80,000 to 120,000 tons, according to different sources. In the estimate of the IAEA, its possible reserves are at 230,000 tons, which will ensure sustained production for the next 50-60 years. According to the IAEA, Uzbekistan ranks seventh in the world in uranium reserves and fifth in uranium production. The republic does not have its own nuclear industry, exporting all of the low enriched uranium that it produces. Now, Uzbekistan has agreed to allow a South Korean investor, Korea Resources Corporation, to develop its uranium deposit at Dzhantuar in Central Kyzylkum. The South Korean market can digest up to 300 tons of uranium a year. Russia also has shown interest. Tekhsnabexport and Rusburmash are planning to create a joint venture with their Uzbek partners in 2007 to develop the Aktau uranium field, which has an estimated capacity of 300 tons of uranium per annum.

Within the next few years, the majority of energy dependent countries will take an even stronger interest in Central Asia. Competition will grow and possibly be accompanied by military-political pressure, including the use of force. Nor can one rule out the possibility of terrorist acts with the use of nuclear weapons or the threat of their use as a means of acquiring alternative energy sources and placing them under control.

To avert such a scenario, it is critical, in pursuing energy expansion programs, first to comply with technical and antiterrorism security standards at nuclear power installations; second, the states concerned should assume responsibility for the dismantling and removal of abandoned mines and mothballed installations; third, high priority needs to be given to tailing dumps and soil reclamation.

Antiterrorism measures are an indispensable element of all energy programs and projects. ElBaradei’s comment that nuclear security is “a race against time” should not be interpreted as a figure of speech. He warned that the world faces a real threat from nuclear terrorism, adding that an extensive black market in radioactive materials is increasing the danger. “The world is engaged in a race against time to control the spread of nuclear material,” he said, warning that action was needed to prevent a nuclear or radioactive emergency.

CIS PRIORITIES

In 2005, the UN adopted an International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. The Convention calls for states to develop appropriate legal frameworks to fight against nuclear terrorism-related offenses, investigate alleged offenses, and arrest, prosecute and extradite offenders as appropriate. It also calls for international cooperation with nuclear terrorism investigations and prosecutions through information-sharing, extradition and the transfer of detainees to assist with foreign investigations and prosecutions. The Convention provides for a mechanism for returning stolen radioactive material, device or nuclear facility, used by terrorists. It also provides that “upon seizing or otherwise taking control of radioactive material, devices or nuclear facilities, following the commission of an offence,” the State Party in possession of such items shall render them harmless and ensure that “any nuclear material is held in accordance with applicable IAEA safeguards.” Thus far, 107 states (with only five ratifying it) have signed on to the Convention. The document may only enter into force once it has been ratified by at least 22 states.

Implementation of this fundamental document has both a national and subregional aspect. Within the CIS, effective preventive action cannot be limited to the territory of just one state; especially considering that one of the CIS’s essential functions is to ensure collective security, including protection against terrorist threats.

To eliminate the threat of nuclear terrorism, the CIS member countries need, as a matter of urgency, to implement the following measures:

• implement procedures to expedite the ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism;
• draft a CIS agreement on the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, including an array of preventive measures, in line with the basic provisions of the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (IAEA, 2003);
• inventory all CIS installations that handle radioactive materials, accompanied by a realistic assessment of possible threats, such as thefts, illegal circulation of such materials and their use in building dirty bombs, taking into account the IAEA Categorization of Radioactive Sources (IAEA-TECDOC-1344);
• ensure effective monitoring, on a CIS scale, of aforementioned hazardous installations, as well as any criminal acts relating to trafficking in such materials, especially those moved across state and customs borders;
• put in place a unified radiation control system on the sub-regional level, primarily a “radiological barrier” on the borders between the CIS Member States; and
• continue joint antiterror exercises at radiation-hazardous installations.