The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), an international legal document that sets out the basic principles of relations between Russia and the European Union, was signed on the Greek Island of Corfu in 1994 and entered into force on December 1, 1997. The agreement was signed for ten years. Therefore, the PCA expires at the end of this year, which brings up the question of the future legal framework for Russia’s relations with its main trade and economic partner.

CAMPAIGN PLAN

Russia and the EU were faced with three possible options – extending the 1997 PCA, “modernizing” it or drafting a basically new agreement – and they chose the latter. But if we discard PR declarations to the effect that the document should be “concise,” “balanced,” and “addressed to the future,” it becomes evident that Moscow and Brussels have basically different positions.

Differences start with the very title (status) of the document. Russia wants it to be a treaty. In the hierarchy of international law documents, ’treaty’ stands a notch above ’agreement,’ and Moscow believes that the signing of a document with a higher status will in and of itself reflect the priority, long-term and strategic importance that both sides attach to each other. By contrast, Brussels acts on the premise that EU tradition is that treaties are only concluded between member countries (the Treaty of Rome, the Maastricht Treaty, the Nice Treaty, etc.). In other words, EU member states only regard each other as priority, strategic partners and sign agreements with the rest of the world.

Moscow believes the future basic document should be of a framework kind, proposing that the sides confine themselves to declaring that they regard each other as strategic partners on the international arena, committed to the rules and regulations of the World Trade Organization (which Russia is about to join), and striving to develop privileged trade and economic relations (’WTO-plus’ or a free trade zone). On human rights and freedoms, they should also declare their commitment to general democratic values (which are still interpreted differently), the rule of law, and facilitation of people-to-people contacts (including the gradual lifting and abolition of the visa regime). Later, a basic treaty would be followed up with special “branch” agreements regulating specific aspects of political, trade and economic, humanitarian and other relations.

The advantage of this arrangement is primarily the relative ease and simplicity of its implementation. It is far easier to reach agreement on a framework 10-15 page document than on a comprehensive agreement (the current PCA with appendices is more than 100 pages long). The same applies to branch agreements: it is easier to consider, for example, transport matters separately than by mixing them with trade, political and other issues. This also helps avoid numerous links and “horse trading,” as has often been the case in the past.

Meanwhile, Brussels does not intend to abandon the tactics of linkages, which it has often found to be beneficial. This is why, while paying lip service to the idea of signing a framework document, EU bureaucrats are already pushing to include principal demands to Russia in the main document, not branch agreements. At the same time, human rights, media freedoms, civil society and ’democratic values’ will most likely be used as bargaining chips on economic matters. EU officials have long been using such tactics with respect to China, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and countries of the Middle East and North Africa: democracy is important, but the EU’s economic interests come first.

POSITIONS

Paradoxically, neither side is, in effect, ready for negotiations. The differences existing between Russia and the EU are attributed to their lack of understanding as to exactly what they want from each other, especially in the long term.

The EU is still in a state of confusion, compounded by the unclear situation in its principal member states: a change of government in France and the UK, weak government coalitions in Italy and Poland, etc. In this situation, the EU leadership is not prepared to rack its brains over what to do with Russia, and will choose to hand over the Russian dossier to EU bureaucrats to revisit it later, if and when the situation within the EU improves. This setup is even more acceptable to the European Commission, which will have more freedom of action to concentrate on obtaining trade and economic concessions from Moscow.

The EC-formulated mandate is unremarkable in its strategic thinking. It has been reduced to the demands that Russia grant access to its hydrocarbon deposits and transport infrastructure, open its domestic market to goods and services from the EU (under the slogan of ’WTO plus’ or free trade zone), and harmonize its laws with EU legislation, regulations and standards. In democracy-building and human rights, it should submit to monitoring by EU institutions and follow their recommendations.

The implementation of this “maximum program” by the EC would provide an answer to the question about Russia’s place in the EU’s “system of coordinates” in the long term: energy appendix, sales market, and political satellite. But hardly anyone in Brussels expects this approach to produce a 100 percent result. Therefore, in reality the EU is only preparing to wrest trade, economic and political concessions out of Russia. To Brussels, there is no question about working out a new “partnership” formula.

But what is the Russian view? On the one hand, analysts, experts and certain politicians in Russia have moved a little further in this respect than their EU colleagues have. On the other hand, apart from an occasional news conference, roundtable or TV panel, the Russian public is not involved in this discussion. With a few exceptions, representatives of government agencies and departments concerned are also not involved. Meanwhile, without the participation of officials who possess complete information and extensive experience in interaction with the EU, there can be little hope that this brain storming will produce any meaningful result.

Lacking a coherent political and philosophical concept, the long-term interests of the Russian public with respect to the EU have to be gauged through the daily, routine needs of the people – the possibility, first, for visa-free travel to EU countries, and to study or work there, and second, promote Russian goods and services on the EU market, plus see some letup in attacks on Russia over its human rights record.

Visa facilitation seems to be the most realistic proposition. An agreement on mutual simplification of the visa procedure for certain categories of Russian and EU citizens is already being applied. This means that the next step could be the extension of a simplified visa regime for tourists and individuals. However, Russia should be prepared to assume appropriate commitments: not simply to provide similar treatment to citizens of EU countries, but also strictly adhere to the requirements inherent in freedom of movement under EU law (readmission [of illegal immigrants], cooperation between law enforcement, judiciary, border and customs agencies, etc.).

Furthermore, there should be no particular impediments with respect to freedom of choosing the place of study, especially in the context of Russia’s participation in the Bologna process. Here, it is essential to mention the problem of mutual recognition of qualifications, diplomas, and certificates of education, as well as academic degrees, which will require additional efforts, since it is related to employment opportunities, among other things.

The free movement of labor is a more complex problem. It will not be easy to remove obstacles to the employment of Russians in EU countries, since unlike immigrants from the Third World, Russians will start claiming the same labor niches as locals. Although the situation can also change here as negative demographic trends worsen both in the EU and in Russia.

As for Russians’ economic interests in the EU, some of them could be implemented within the WTO framework. However, this factor must not be overestimated: the WTO has been unable to resolve any serious trade contradictions or disputes yet. Nevertheless, the sheer fact that a particular product or service originates from a WTO member state can protect this state against discrimination – something that is still being practiced against Russian business and capital on the EU market. All other goals can be attained by signing special branch agreements as appendices to a basic Russia-EU document. Nor should the idea of creating a Russian-EU free trade zone (in 10 to 15 years) be abandoned a priori, although this will require additional study as to the implications of this move for domestic business and the national economy as a whole.

Finally, concerning the desire to see an end to the constant criticism and lecturing on democracy from European institutions, one thing is clear: Russia will not be able to completely free itself from this. Yet it should set the goal of strengthening to such a degree (not only militarily, politically and economically, but also democratically) that these attacks could be simply ignored, as is done, for example, by the U.S. with respect to a flow of criticism from Brussels. As soon as Russia attains such a level of development (and this, to reiterate, should include the strengthening of democratic institutions, civil society, the rule of law and an independent judiciary), accusations by EU or EC officials will no longer attract media attention.

The ideological vacuum that exists both in Moscow and in Brussels on the strategy of Russian-European relations did not appear yesterday. It came to a head with the concept of four ’common spaces,’ which was put forward by France, taken up and distorted by the EU, and ended in the adoption of incoherent ’action plans.’ These included a chaotic array of declarations, wishful thinking and “homework” addressed primarily to Russia. For a while, the work on action plans and their adoption filled the pause in these relations, creating (mainly for the authors themselves) an illusion of progress. The problem, however, is that these plans are just not good enough as a conceptual platform for a future basic Russia-EU document.

Neither Russia nor the EU has a coherent idea about the place that they should have in their respective “systems of coordinates.” So both sides will probably not talk about the strategic aspects of their relations but will engage in horse trading, and lobbying for specific trade, economic and political interests. Its outcome will largely hinge on the intellectual, personnel, and administrative resources of the negotiating teams, their coherence, and professionalism.

ON THE FRONT LINE

Unlike the European Comission, whose bureaucratic machine is always “on alert” (the EC is constantly negotiating on some matter or other both with EU countries and with the outside world), Moscow has yet to start working. Not only is there no concept for future negotiations or understanding of what they should produce, but there is not even a tentative make up of the delegation, a “short list” of its key members. There are no draft guidelines, which will need to be harmonized with all agencies and departments concerned (including federal agencies and services, there are about 20) and approved by the Russian government.

Generally, Russia is ill equipped to negotiate on matters that fall within the scope of several ministries and agencies at once. There are plenty of such examples, while concessions and mistakes made in the course of WTO accession talks are some of the most glaring ones.

Let us start with figures. Only officials (bureaucrats) participate in the negotiating process on the Russian side. There are not more than 30 people directly concerned with EU matters at all Russian federal agencies and departments, whereas in the EU (the EC, the EU Secretariat, the European Parliament, the European Court, the European Space Agency, etc.), there are at least 250 Russia specialists or experts on basic points of a common agenda.

True, we should not ignore the Russian Mission to the European Communities in Brussels, but unfortunately, despite its relatively large staff, it can do nothing to substantially change the balance of forces. Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, when he was head of this diplomatic mission (2003-2004), was instrumental in securing a special presidential decree effectively granting it the status of a ’field interagency commission.’ Under this decree, the mission’s staff was to be substantially enlarged by including responsible representatives of government agencies authorized to decide on the majority of matters on the Russia-EU agenda while dealing with other matters by accessing the heads of respective federal power agencies in Moscow. Unfortunately, the incumbent prime minister did not get around to translating this decision into reality: as a result, only a small proportion of government agencies sent their representatives to Brussels, but on a rather low level and with virtually no decision making powers.

EU institutions have a staff of over 100,000 employees, i.e., at least 10 times larger than the staff of Russian agencies and departments concerned. Furthermore, unlike their Russian counterparts, EU bureaucrats receive good wages, are provided with state of the art office equipment, have access to broad databases and have no problems with funding when they need to travel abroad. By contrast, in Russia, delegations are often formed without key experts in the field since the agencies for which they work cannot afford to pay for their trips.

Nor should we forget the substantial differences in outsourcing. The EC has not only an incomparably larger budget to finance various R&D projects, but also a diversified network of institutions, associations, and other think tanks that are ready at any moment to work on virtually any subject for upcoming negotiations.

Needless to say, such centers also exist in Russia, albeit not very many. The Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Europe is by far the most influential and authoritative one on the list. The problem, however, is that Russian research centers have to work, first, with considerably less financial resources, second, in separation from the practical activity conducted by the respective agencies and departments, and without adequate informational support. The EC not only commissions and provides ample compensation for R&D projects, but also uses their results in its activity – the exact opposite of what is happening in Russia.

Finally, it should be taken into account that standing behind the negotiating delegation are the bureaucratic machines of 27 EU countries. They will not be directly involved in negotiations, but will indirectly provide Brussels with intellectual and information support, as well as exert pressure on Moscow over specific elements of a future document. The Russian side will have to divert a part of its rather limited resources for this purpose.

SHAPE UP OR SHIP OUT

Of course, there are still some real professionals, but they are very few and far between. Therefore, it is essential to use them as effectively as possible.

As mentioned earlier, at the upcoming negotiations, Moscow and Brussels will not deal with the strategic aspects of their relations, but will engage in horse trading, and push for their respective trade, economic and political interests. This should be the main guideline in the formation of the Russian delegation – at least its core (certain members can change depending on the specific issues that are addressed). Following is a tentative profile of experts that could fulfill this mission.

First, there is a pressing need for “generators of ideas,” ready to put forward specific, realistic proposals both with respect to the structure and substance of the future basic document. Unfortunately, there are almost no such people left in Russian government agencies and departments that are responsible and capable not only of advancing fresh, innovative ideas, but also defending them before internal and external opponents.

Meanwhile, the success of the upcoming negotiations (from Russia’s perspective) will largely depend on who will be the first to submit the draft document for discussion. So far it looks like the EC will do it first, and its draft will be based on the mandate that it has already prepared. It is based on unilateral demands to Russia in the energy, trade, economic, regulatory and legislative sectors, as well as on democracy and human rights. If this scenario is played out, the subsequent negotiating process will be based on a draft that is absolutely unacceptable to the Russian side.

It is extremely difficult to present a counter draft, especially with delays; and given the EC’s superior administrative resources, it is virtually impossible. This means that the Russian delegation would have to beat off the EC’s requirements and statements, trying to replace them by its own ones and “pegging in” its own vision of the document on the whole.

Although Moscow and Brussels have generally agreed on a bilateral structure of the document (a short framework treaty or agreement that will then be followed up with cooperation agreements in specific areas), their approaches are basically different. The EC will work to include its principal demands in the energy, economic and trade sectors in the main document, while Russia’s counter demands will be put off – to be recorded in branch agreements. For its part, Moscow should stand firm that the basic document stay confined to general principles and declarations with no links or swaps (energy-for-democracy, etc.).

Second, experienced, effective negotiators will be needed – experts and specialists who have dealt with the EC, who know its structure, scope of activity, mechanisms of operation, and its procedure for making decisions. There are also considerable problems here, even at the Foreign Ministry, not to mention other government agencies and departments. Even those officials who have done business with the EU and the EC for more than just one year typically make at least two serious mistakes. The first is that the EC’s logic of action is assessed as though it was a state upholding its national interests. But this is not the case: EC bureaucrats act exclusively in their own interests, the interests of European integration as a whole, and are ready to make decisions infringing on the interests of individual member countries, but helping increase Brussels’ weight with respect to EU capitals.

The second common mistake made by Russian officials negotiating with the EC is that they allow it to play the game of “a third missing party:” in refusing to adopt a particular proposal, Brussels cites the position of “certain member countries” (who are never identified), who in turn cite the EC’s position, express concern, and promise to do something, but never do.

Third, the negotiating team should include very good lawyers specializing in various spheres of international law – from business law to EU law. The situation here seems to be a little better: there are such specialists in Moscow, and not only at the Foreign Ministry.

Fourth, there is also a need for industry experts, regardless of how successful the Russian delegation’s proposals on the future Russia-EU framework document may be. This document will need to make at least some reference to priorities of bilateral cooperation – e.g., trade, industry, transport, science, communications, finances, etc. There should be no problem with such experts.

Fifth, it is necessary to exercise good judgment in selecting the head of the delegation who should know very well what the EU is all about, have personal experience in dealing with Brussels, understand Russia’s political and economic interests in Europe, and have a high status and direct access to the top decision-making level. Otherwise he or she will be under constant pressure (often mutually exclusive) from a horde of officials at the Executive Office of the Russian president, the government, and various government agencies and departments. There is a narrow choice here, and given that the delegation chief will need considerable courage and push, the selection of an appropriate candidate becomes a problem.

Sixth, it is important, right from the start (preparation, communication and approval of the negotiating mandate), to ensure effective coordination both within the delegation and between the agencies and departments concerned. In the present situation in Russia, this mission is all but impossible to accomplish. Prior to the spring 2004 administrative reform, the coordination functions were performed by a governmental commission on cooperation with the EU, led by a deputy prime minister. Its performance left much to be desired (key agencies often bypassed or ignored its decisions), but it provided a convenient platform for sharing information and opinions on matters of interaction with the EU at a very high level.

Three years have passed since the commission was abolished, and the situation with interagency coordination, especially on the EU, has become simply deplorable. Before these comprehensive and complex negotiations with Brussels begin, such a body should be restored, to be led by, at least, a deputy prime minister.

Seventh, special attention should be given to drawing up clear guidelines and ensuring regular reporting back on their implementation. Otherwise certain agencies and departments, or their individual representatives, will continue to act separately and autonomously, issuing contradictory signals to the other side and “coordinating” some decisions – only to present members of the delegation and the Russian side as a whole with a fait accompli.

This leads to the last, but not least, requirement – transparency. Complete and reliable information about the negotiating process should be provided not only to agencies and departments concerned, but also to the Executive Office of the Russian president, the State Duma, the expert community and – even in a somewhat reduced form – to the general public. This is the only way of securing against mistakes and miscalculations, taking all interests (including those of domestic business) into account and expanding the arsenal of arguments in defense of Russia’s negotiating position.

Only this will help avoid the unjustified concessions which are often made by Russian negotiators and which often have serious consequences for national interests, including economic interests, with no one taking responsibility for such decisions. The risk of such a lamentable practice continuing is especially high today with the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia.

Russia’s long-term economic and political interests must take precedence over the plans and schemes of political technologists and spin doctors.