Six years ago, I published an essay in Nezavisimaya Gazeta that began as follows: “It is hardly a secret that U.S.-Russian relations are at one of their lowest points, if not the lowest, since the end of the Cold War. Gratuitous anti-Americanism, once confined to the fringe, has become regular fare for the mainstream Russian press, while Russophobia is penetrating increasingly into American discourse on Russian developments. Russian leaders have been disturbed by what they see as excessively harsh or dismissive rhetoric coming out of the new Bush Administration, while American leaders have been shocked by language they find reminiscent of the Cold War coming from senior Russian officials. The appearances of then-Russian Security Council Secretary Sergei Ivanov and U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld at the Munich Conference on European Security Policy, in early February, neatly encapsulated each side’s grievances.” Replace Sergei Ivanov with President Putin and Secretary Rumsfeld with Secretary Gates at the Munich Conference, and what I wrote six years ago pretty much sums up the situation today.

Relations are deteriorating. And yet today, as was the case six years ago, as was the case fifteen years ago, each side – and the rest of the world – still stands to gain considerably from constructive, forward-looking relations. Instability in the Middle East, the rise of China, non-proliferation and international terrorism, energy security, pandemic diseases, global warming, among other things, can all be dealt with more effectively when the United States and Russia are working as partners and not at cross purposes. At some level, each side understands that. But on both sides injured pride and arrogance, the desire to appear strong coupled with a sense of vulnerability, and great disappointment with the accomplishments of the past six years coupled with a breakdown in communications, have deepened suspicions about the other side’s motives and undermined cooperative efforts.

Halting and reversing the current deterioration in relations is critical to the national interests of both countries. But it will not be easy, particularly given that each country is preparing for a transition of power, a process that shortens timeframes, politicizes issues, and disrupts decision-making. A necessary step – and in preparation for those transitions – is trying to understand the character of the current world and how that affects U.S.-Russian relations. In that spirit, let me offer eight theses on U.S.-Russian relations in the current world.

1. We have entered a period of great flux of uncertain duration.

Although the bipolar international system ended with the Cold War nearly two decades ago, it is only now that the struggle for the shape of the new international system has been engaged in earnest. The easy optimism in the West in the immediate post-Soviet period that history had ended with the victory of liberal democracy and free markets was undone by the mounting global disorder of the last years of the 20th century and the first years of this century. 9/11 punctured the complacency, at least for Americans.

Global dynamism – and therefore power – is ineluctably shifting from Europe to Asia. The vast expanse of the Islamic world has entered a fierce struggle between tradition and modernity. Rapid global economic growth and nationalistic economic policies in producer countries are tightening energy markets and deepening concern about energy security. Under these circumstances, it will take years for a new equilibrium to form.

Liberal democracy and free markets may in the end prove better able to master the challenges of the present – and certainly most Americans believe that based on our own national experience. But this is something that has to be demonstrated in reality, not simply asserted. In particular, the great liberal democracies of the West have to demonstrate that they can forge a sense of common purpose and offer models of success for others to emulate.

2. Relations among the great powers remain the key to global security and prosperity, but it is not clear what countries will have the greatest sway in world affairs.

Despite the fascination with the power of stateless terrorist organizations, states still remain the dominant players in international affairs. The great powers by definition will play the leading role in determining the shape of the new international system. In particular, relations among the great powers will determine how, and how soon, the terrorist threat is mastered and at what cost to societal openness and pluralism.

What countries will have the greatest sway in world affairs over the next decade remains an open question. Although its margin of superiority has narrowed over the past several years and will likely continue to narrow, the United States remains the preeminent power. China’s rise is widely assumed, but it must still overcome the seeming contradiction between its more open economy and closed political system. Current European disunion militates against a growing role in world affairs, and the unwillingness to bear major sacrifices to advance national interests precludes a larger role over time. India and Japan could play larger roles under various scenarios. As for Russia, its rapid recovery from the crisis of the 1990s surprised most observers, but it must master formidable challenges – in health, education, infrastructure – to sustain that recovery into the next decade if it is to maintain and enhance its position as a major power.

3. Russia’s self-assertion masks continuing weakness.

President Putin’s chairing of the G8 summit last summer highlighted Russia’s return to the high table of global politics. On a number of high-profile issues – Iran, Syria/Lebanon, Israel/Palestine – Russia is increasingly effective in ensuring that its voice is heard. The next step is to demonstrate that Russia can help forge durable solutions to urgent global problems. Too often, Russia’s advice is simply to continue the dialogue or negotiations. But great powers have a responsibility to persuade other powers, through the use of incentives and disincentives, that their interests lie in pursuing reasonable solutions. In short, great powers must bring to the table more than just words; they must bring the hard and soft power necessary to forge solutions within a reasonable timeframe.

In addition, many observers doubt whether Russia’s self-assertion, particularly vis-a-vis its immediate neighbors, in fact advances Russia’s long-term strategic interests. Economic boycotts, for example, of Georgia and, more recently, Estonia appear to have persuaded those countries to reorient their commercial ties away from Russia, without in any way encouraging more positive interactions with Russia. So the question: Are these policies signs of strength or evidence of weakness?

Finally, outsiders look at Russia’s domestic politics and wonder whether what they see as overreaction to small opposition groups and autonomous NGO’s inside Russia is a sign of the Kremlin’s strength and confidence or speaks more clearly of doubts and vulnerability. Similarly, outsiders look at the rise of aggressive nationalist ideologies, seemingly with the Kremlin’s encouragement, that threaten the very social fabric of multinational Russia and wonder whether this is a sign of strength or of weakness.

4. The United States remains the power best positioned to help Russia deal with its security threats.

Although much attention is now focused on growing tensions between Russia and the West, and Russian officials often speak as if alleged U.S. attempts to create a unipolar world are the gravest threat to Russia, the real threats to Russia lie elsewhere: to its South in the guise of radical Islamic fundamentalism in the near term and in East Asia in the guise of a shifting balance of power in the longer term. Add to this the various transnational sources of disorder: terrorism, WMD proliferation, organized crime, pandemic diseases, and so on. The United States remains the only country with the capability to help Russia confront all of these challenges. Europe is too disunited and lacks the hard power; China is an integral part of the East Asian equation, but its reach on other issues of interest to Russia is limited. At some level, Russian leaders understand that their strategic challenge is to harness American power to Russian purpose, even as the United States pursues its own national interests. It is particularly hard for Russia to act on this understanding now because, from its standpoint, U.S. policy has exacerbated instability in the Middle East and elsewhere and energized and radicalized Islamic fundamentalists, thus complicating Russia’s security challenge.

5. The United States needs a strong, capable, confident Russia.

Throughout the 1990s, the United States was more concerned about Russia’s glaring weakness than its potential strength. We feared internal instability in a country that housed one of the world’s largest stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction, bordered on other fragile states, and possessed vast natural resources that other countries might be tempted to seize. So the United States should welcome Russia’s growing strength. A strong Russia could prove valuable to creating and sustaining a new political and economic equilibrium in East Asia. A strong Russia is critical to building reliable security structures in Central Asia and the Caucasus; it could help manage the instability in the Middle East, rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan, and deal with the problem of Iran. A strong Russia would be more able to work constructively in Europe on a range of European issues of importance to the United States. And a strong Russia should be a leader in dealing with non-proliferation, terrorism, and other transnational issues. But the United States, so long accustomed to dealing with a weak Russia, finds it difficult to adjust to a more assertive Russia. While there is much that Russia does abroad that raises concerns, there is still a tendency in many circles in the United States to exaggerate the problems and to favor “pushing-back” to searching for pragmatic solutions to those matters that divide us.

6. Current fears of Russia are less a reflection of Russian strength than of Western weakness and insecurities.

An astute historian of Russia, Martin Malia, wrote several years ago that “Russia has at different times been demonized or divinized by Western opinion less because of her real role in Europe than because of the fears and frustrations, or hopes and aspirations, generated within European society by its own domestic problems.” Such is the case today. To be sure, mounting Western concerns about Russia are a consequence of Russian policies that appear to undermine Western interests, but they are also a reflection of declining confidence in our own abilities and the efficacy of our own policies. Ironically, this growing fear and distrust of Russia come at a time when Russia is arguably less threatening to the West, and the United States in particular, than it has been at any time since the end of the Second World War. Russia does not champion a totalitarian ideology intent on our destruction, its military poses no threat to sweep across Europe, its economic growth depends on constructive commercial relations with Europe, and its strategic arsenal – while still capable of annihilating the United States – is under more reliable control than it has been in the past fifteen years and the threat of a strategic strike approaches zero probability. Political gridlock in key Western countries, however, precludes the creativity, risk-taking, and subtlety needed to advance our interests on issues over which we are at odds with Russia while laying the basis for more constructive long-term relations with Russia.

7. To rebuild relations, we need to focus on common interests, but we can’t ignore values.

To a great extent, this is already happening in U.S.-Russian relations. Because of an overlap in interests, the two countries are working together effectively on a number of nuclear security, counterterrorism, and non-proliferation issues, including Iran and North Korea. But we cannot avoid the issue of values, because they shape the way we think about our interests and are critical to the trust needed to deal with sensitive issues, even when outside observers would posit a common interest.

A few guidelines for my American colleagues: (1) We need to respect Russian choices and preferences. It is their country and they will decide how it will be governed and bear ultimate responsibility for Russia’s successes and failures. (2) We need to be patient. Russia is still only a short distance from its totalitarian past. Like any other country, it needs time and space to determine what political institutions work best for it, based on its traditions and current and future challenges. (3) We need to recognize that Russia is part of European civilization. Although it has lagged behind in many respects – and the Soviet period derailed its development in many ways – Russia has followed the main European path, which has witnessed an expansion of liberty for the past several hundred years. (4) We need to raise our concerns, but we must do it in a way that demonstrates that we understand the complexity of Russia’s reality, including the contradictions in developments in the 1990s.

And what do we ask of our Russian colleagues? (1) That they not dismiss American discussion of values as a cynical ploy to advance geopolitical interests. Based on their own experience, Americans believe deeply in the power of democracy and markets to build free, prosperous societies. (2) That when they raise counter-concerns that they too do that in a way that demonstrates understanding of the complexity of American reality. (3) That they acknowledge that they bear ultimate responsibility for the conditions in Russia, including how they use any advice that is provided from outside.

8. Rebuilding relations requires sustained engagement at the highest levels of government and supportive constituencies.

The deterioration in relations has been paralleled by a breakdown in the channels of communication between the two governments, although there has been an effort since President Putin’s Munich speech to step up engagement. Given the complexity of the issues involved, the persistence of Cold-War attitudes in the bureaucracies of both countries, and national sensitivities, U.S.-Russian relations cannot progress without sustained high-level engagement by the two presidents and their ministers.

But even that will not be enough without the expansion of constituencies in both countries that have a deep interest in improving U.S.-Russian relations. Such constituencies are limited at the moment. As a result, there is little political price to pay in either country for sharp – and often unreasonable – criticism of the other; in fact, in each country sharp criticism is a way of currying favor with powerful political forces and manipulating the fears and anxieties of the publics.

For the moment, commercial relations present the best opportunity for building the needed constituencies. American companies already working in Russia are expanding operations; others are considering entering or re-entering the market. Russian firms are looking for investments in the United States. We need to encourage the governments in both countries to facilitate such investment. The American companies themselves need to be more active in getting out the news of the business opportunities in Russia, without denying the obvious hurdles. And together, the Russian and American business communities must be more vocal in publicizing the benefits of U.S.-Russian cooperation and pressing the governments to seek pragmatic solutions to the problems that divide us.

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As we look at U.S.-Russian relations over the next few years, we face a fundamental choice in attitude and approach, in Russia and in the United States. We can play to our fears, stress the threats, and focus on our vulnerabilities. Or we can play to our hopes, stress the opportunities, and focus on our strengths. The actual approach in each country will surely fall somewhere between these two poles, but, I would argue, each country would be better off – and U.S.-Russian relations would revive – if we leaned toward the pole of hope, opportunity, and strength.

And so the question I ended my article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta six years ago stands: Does Russia have sufficient confidence in its own strength to enter a constructive dialogue with the United States, or will doubts about its abilities and injured pride lead it to seek ways to work against the United States? But I would add a second question now: Does the United States have sufficient confidence in its own strength and optimism about its future to engage in a constructive dialogue with Russia, or do the doubts growing from a less than successful foreign policy and injured pride lead it to see Russia as a source of its problems rather than as a potential partner?