Russia pursued this line until recently – to be more precise, until President Vladimir Putin’s speech in Munich. For quite some time, Russia tried to ignore negative developments that had been increasing (not on Moscow’s initiative) in its relations with the West. We cherished all constructive moments in our relations with the United States and the European Union and refrained from making dramatic moves in order not to destroy what had been achieved.

Well, what is the real cause of the differences?

In interpreting Moscow’s position, the West demonstrates its lack of understanding of the true nature of the processes and sentiments that have been prevailing in Russia’s government and government agencies over the last 20 years. Neither Mikhail Gorbachev, nor Boris Yeltsin or Vladimir Putin viewed Russia’s openness to the West as a manifestation of their country’s weakness. All three leaders believed that the Soviet Union/Russia and the West were to meet each other halfway. The Soviet Union – followed by Russia – covered its half of the road, despite the fact that many particularly sensitive stops along the way presupposed real responses, as opposed to mere promises.

By the beginning of the new century, Russia had reached the halfway mark in its rapprochement with the West. At this point, any sort of further unilateral movement by Russia would have meant the following:

The Russian leadership stopped at this point; there was simply nowhere else to go, except beyond the frameworks of national sovereignty. In this sense, Putin was less fortunate than his predecessors who had had more room for maneuver, and who had received large personal political dividends from their grand gestures.

By the beginning of the century, one thing had become clear to Russia: we thought that we were covering our part of the distance, while our partners/opponents in the West believed that our conduct was natural for the loser in the Cold War.

The Western powers view their Cold War victory not just as a historic event, but as an event that adds moral and political legitimacy to all of the policies of the West over the last decade and a half. Indeed, if the end of the bipolar confrontation is not considered to be a victory for one of the parties, there arises a reasonable question: By what right does a group of states, even powerful and highly developed states, dare to reshape the world order according to their own ideas, without taking into account the views of other countries?

Viewed from this standpoint, the anxiety of the West is quite understandable. Soviet people experienced similar sentiments when, for example, they saw manifestations of a revanche policy in Germany in the second half of last century. However, given that Russia has never acted as under capitulation, nor viewed its unilateral moves – even in the most sensitive areas – as forced and painful concessions, the picture changes dramatically.

However, if we put aside the root cause of our present problems – that is, an adherence to winner/loser logic – and thoroughly examine the key points of our differences, we will find that none of them are truly systemic (that is, of course, if the West does not have a systemic desire to counter Russia under any circumstances).

The differences between the two sides flare up when the West begins to impose its security agenda on Moscow; invariably, this is topped by threats from “rogue countries.” The West takes it for granted that “suspicious” political regimes, with their nuclear programs and international terrorists (not all terrorists, incidentally, just those that struggle against Western nations), are primary threats for Russia as well.

In the eyes of the West, NATO is the main, if not the only, universal and irreplaceable security structure in the world. This attitude explains the tendency to deliberately devalue the UN role in security matters, and the desire to place all the eggs of the OSCE into one humanitarian basket. Other security structures, for example, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, are not viewed as potential partners, since any alternative collective security systems are out of the question. All non-members of NATO are invited only to decide on the degree of their interaction with the North Atlantic Alliance, and on how far they are ready to go toward rapprochement with it. Non-members are almost automatically ranked in order from potential candidates to outright “rogue states,” that is, potential enemies.

However, the problem is that NATO does not live up to the description of a “universal” organization. And there are no signs that it will be able to replace the security instruments and forums inherited from the last century. The Alliance was conceived as an instrument of a global fight against preponderant opponents, whereas networked terrorism cannot be ranked as such an opponent. If serious opponents cannot be found, they are either invented or designated. NATO, which claims universality, in practice demonstrates its inability to undertake a global mission that is sought by its leaders. It is common knowledge that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is experiencing a very serious conceptual crisis, as it is simply unable to adequately react to the real, as opposed to imaginary, threats of the 21st century. The difficult situation that the Alliance now finds itself in Afghanistan is an illustrative example of that.

This impasse can be overcome only by strengthening the role of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and by developing a strategic partnership among various security organizations. NATO, as a military-political structure intended to protect the interests of its members only, rather than the whole of mankind, can only serve as one of the partners, albeit the mightiest one, in any collective security system.

The abovementioned factors do not mean that Russia must patiently wait for the situation to change. Russia’s diplomatic aggressiveness, based on the proposal of creative ideas aimed at achieving end results, is more than manifest. The contours of this basically new foreign policy emerged in the summer of 2007 when Russia invited the United States to jointly operate a radar system in Azerbaijan’s Gabala; it followed up on this proposal with initiatives made public at a Russian-American summit in Kennebunkport, Maine.

This is not the first move of its kind: some time ago, Russia made a strong move by proposing to establish international uranium enrichment centers. In view of Iran’s nuclear program, this initiative was supported even by the United States. Regrettably, Teheran declined to cooperate; yet the initiative has not been removed from the agenda.

Russia should continue to accommodate its new international policy with more specific ideas. It may take an inventory of all of the accumulated problems – for example, in Ukraine, Georgia, Kosovo, and the Baltic States – and search for Gabala-style ways to solve them. This does not mean, of course, that Russia should back off or damage its own national interests. But it is in our power to make such proposals to our partners and opponents that will throw them into a dilemma: either cooperation and the desired solution, or admission that the problem is actually rooted in their biased attitude toward Russia. This would help materialize a diplomacy of new quality, and we have resources for that.

Regarding the “values” dialog, allegedly full of discord, Russia does not see any real grounds for conflict here. Oftentimes, we seem to be at odds with each other when actually we are in accord. The West prefers to point to the situation inside Russia, while we tend to raise other issues, such as the controversial practice of “exporting democracy,” and the real situation in countries that like to criticize Russia. As a result, instead of a dialog we have two monologs, and both fail to reach the other party’s ears. But if we do not listen to each other, conflict will always seem inevitable.

The “export model of democracy” contains a genetic defect: as a rule, it contains elements of desovereignization of the target country. And it cannot be otherwise, because “democracy exporters” seek to complete several missions at once. Apart from introducing their standards in the field of rights and freedoms (which would cause the least rejection, but such introduction never takes place without other kinds of interference), outside forces seek to increase their influence, carry out geopolitical reorientation, neutralize competitors, take control over resources and major economic assets, and create footholds for the deployment of military facilities.

Yet the illusion of conflict will arise each time Russia declares its interests. When Russia stands firm in upholding its interests, or shows evidence of its independence in conduct and thinking, it is treated in the West as a signal for ideological attacks. Conflict of values is a matter of propaganda, rather than ideological, civilizational or psychological realities; so the issue should be resolved from this point of view, instead of using this sensitive topic as a political weapon.

It cannot be ruled out that we are witnessing a new phenomenon that can be described as the “Bolshevization” of democratic consciousness: progressive and positive ideas are becoming dogmatic in essence and aggressive in form. This impression underlines the fact that some of the world’s major “progressors” – i.e., American neo-cons – originate from Trotskyism.

Hence, the notorious “conflict of values,” the essence of which lies not so much in the peculiar perception of democratic ideas in Russia (where they have been developing independently for centuries), as in the transformation of ideology in the West.

To ease such tensions, the West should look for other ways to consolidate its ranks than the habits of the 20th century. Today’s world is a far cry from the highly ideological realities of the last century; Ronald Reagan’s emotional speeches would be as appropriate now as Alexander the Great’s chariots would be on today’s battlefields. There is no “empire of evil” or “bad” Russia and “good” West. However, there are normal countries, whose interests are close and compatible if their leaders and elites have the will and sober mind to understand this.

The subject of the post-Soviet space has broadened of late, and now it makes sense to speak of a post-Communist space. The range of these issues includes not only the conflict of influences in the Commonwealth of Independent States, but also problems pertaining to the Baltic States, Poland, as well as to some countries of Central and Eastern Europe (the issues that require immediate consideration in this region involve the deployment of armaments, an understanding of the “Soviet occupation” and the revision of history, the war against monuments, the status of Russian-speaking minorities, neo-Nazi marches, etc.). Many of the abovementioned factors overlap, among them the redivision of spheres of influence, security problems, the struggle for Eurasian resources, and the use of post-Soviet countries as proving grounds for testing democracy-export technologies.

Those representatives of the Ukrainian elites, for example, who pinned their hopes on the West and Euro-Atlantic structures, believed that by embracing socio-economic standards of the European Union they would ensure national unity and overcome their dependence on Russia. Instead, Ukraine is now deeply divided and gripped by a stubborn political crisis. Furthermore, it has no chances for gaining membership into the EU, while it must pay world market prices for Russian gas.

Meanwhile, the Asian republics of the CIS are becoming increasingly convinced that the price for Western protection may turn out exorbitant and simply destructive for their sovereignty; moreover, it will not add stability to these countries nor improve the wellbeing of their societies.

The consequences of the “divorce” began to be seriously felt only after Russia made the decision to stop subsidizing energy prices; there are no more guarantors of independence left in the world that do not demand anything in return.

However, it is clear that if Moscow only passively watches other countries propose their models for settling conflicts and solving problems in regions that are vital to it, no one will guarantee that Russia’s interests will be met. This is why a passive position is absolutely detrimental for us.