The European Union, together with its geography, institutions and mechanisms, is changing. So is the regional integration philosophy per se. The single vector movement is giving way to a variety of constantly changing scenarios.

There are no more railway cars where the passengers are reading the same morning newspaper and looking at the same scene out the window. Nor is there any sort of set schedule. But most importantly, there is no destination as such.

Instead, there are common working hours, parking lots, clean floors and toilets, and functional escalators. There are also fountains, winter gardens, and music that plays around the clock. There is plenty of space here for everybody – civil servants, businessmen, senior citizens, teenagers, and families with children. A person can purchase a plasma TV set, a bunch of bananas, a can of coffee or an investment share acquisition certificate – whatever he prefers.

The metaphoric train transformed into a hypermarket so quickly that neither the EU member states nor their neighbors have appreciated the fact yet. Thus, the frequent setbacks in EU integration plans, as well as unprecedented tension in relations with third countries, including Russia.

GLOBAL RACE

What is regional integration and why is it necessary? The European discourse provides four definitions.

Finally, within the framework of neo-functionalism, integration is seen as a collective method of fulfilling practical tasks. National authorities may delegate executive functions, but not sovereignty. The public, seeing the practical utility of common institutions, recognizes and embraces them.

These definitions differ from one another appreciably, but they have two shortcomings: they fail to answer the main question, which concerns the strategic purpose of integration, and they blur the difference between aims and means.

In accordance with the federalist concept, which foresees the creation of strong supra-national bodies, the EU has already passed most of the distance toward the ultimate goal. However, the ultimate goal – federation or confederation – is unlikely to be achieved any time soon. Does this mean that the EU’s current activities are pointless? Certainly not.

From the perspective of the communication theory, the EU’s major success story has been the consolidation of common values. But the EU’s sense of identity is still extremely ambiguous, as its evolution is being hampered not only by cultural differences but also by the absence of a unified political system, as well as the priority of national over pan-European citizenship.

The intensity of regional economic relations is an even trickier issue. Trade between EU member countries only grew at the initial stage of integration. Since the 1970s, it has been about 60 percent. That is hardly surprising: further economic rapprochement between the partners would have disqualified them from international relations, cutting them off from attractive markets and sources of raw materials.

The central idea of the pragmatic economists – i.e., the purpose of integration is the formation of a single market and a single economy – has failed the test of time. Although the EU’s internal market has on the whole been operating since 1993, the “single price” law has been applied haphazardly at best. Any well-traveled tourist knows that prices in Sweden are high, moderate in Spain, and low in Bulgaria. For many types of services, not least financial assets, convergence of prices is impossible in principle; at best it can be regarded as a goal for succeeding generations of Europeans.

Bela Balassa’s theory that says integration passes through four stages of development – from a free trade zone to a currency union – has now lost its relevance. According to this logic, the EU has only one goal left, namely, to expand the euro zone to 27 member countries without wasting resources on a common defense identity or scientific and technical policy.

In 2005, the European Integration Department at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), following a series of seminars, proposed a new definition of regional integration. It bases its conclusions within the context of globalization, which has two essential but opposing elements – unifying and divisive.

On the one hand, globalization intensifies ties between countries and regions, but, on the other, it divides them into strata, thereby establishing a rigid hierarchy. Each stratum has its own level of wellbeing, political, economic and cultural influence, access to resources and information, the use of advanced technology, and so on.

Under these conditions, the principal driving force of regional integration is the striving of the member states to advance to a better stratum (or otherwise to build a stronger stratum through concerted efforts) than the one to which they belong (or would belong) without integration. Not surprisingly, the unification of Europe started after World War II. That was the time when colonial empires, which had been calling the shots in the previous era, began to fall apart, while the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as the world’s main powers.

Therefore, the following definition was proposed: regional integration is a model of conscious and active participation by groups of countries involved in the globalization-driven stratification of the world. As mentioned previously, the main goal is to create the most successful stratum – i.e., strengthening the group’s positions in those realms of activity that are the most important for a given stage of globalization. The goal of each individual country is to ensure the most favorable strategic environment. Integration makes it possible to maximize the advantages of globalization and minimize its negative impact.

So, regional integration is a model of collective behavior in the context of global stratification. The creation of supra-national bodies, the expansion of regional trade, and the introduction of a common currency or citizenship – all of these are the instruments and products of regional integration. If tomorrow it is decided that global leadership will depend upon a country’s ability to grow square tomatoes, the EU will immediately adopt a detailed plan of action to that effect.

The most important element of regional integration is the idea of a common future of the EU nations. It is important to stress: a common future, as opposed to a common past. Common histories and similar cultures, as well as comparable political and economic systems, are essential but not sufficient conditions for successful integration. The invisible foundation of integration is constituted by a common view of its present and future global identity. It is no accident that the European Constitution opens with the following line: “Reflecting the will of the citizens and States of Europe to build a common future, this Constitution establishes the European Union…” (Article 1.1).

After the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 permitted individual countries not to adopt the euro, experts started talking about multi-speed integration, and the EU-train metaphor arose once again. But is integration simply a matter of speed?

As shown in the graph, there are five groups of nations, each categorized according to their relative wealth. The first group, which is made up of the least prosperous members, comprised 10 countries – six in Southern Europe (Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, Albania, and Bosnia and Herzegovina), three in the CIS (Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova), and Turkey. The second group includes seven new EU members from Central Europe (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia) and Croatia. The third group is comprised of three backward member countries of the EU-15 (Spain, Greece, and Portugal) and two successful newcomers (Cyprus and Slovenia). The fourth group consists of 11 of the strongest West European EU members. The fifth are the two richest outsiders – Switzerland and Norway.

In the poorest countries (except Bulgaria), secondary education was not available to all adults. However, that problem was effectively resolved already in Group 2, while in Group 4, one person in five has a second secondary education. The incidence of higher education largely depends on the national model. The highest proportion of people with university degrees is in the Scandinavian countries – Norway, Sweden and Finland (80-87 percent of the adult population). In highly developed states of Western Europe, this indicator is on average 62 percent (including in Austria 49 percent and in Germany 50 percent). In the poorest countries of Southern Europe and Turkey, only 31 percent of adults have a higher education, while in the Central European countries the level is 53 percent. As in the case of life expectancy, the most substantial difference is between Groups 1 and 2.

A marked increase in the birth coefficient occurs in Group 4. That refutes the common belief that there is an inverse proportion between income growth and the birth rate. In the Netherlands and Finland, birth rates are higher than in Spain and Greece. It is possible that higher birth rates in more prosperous states are due to an inflow of immigrants from the Third World, as well as the social model (especially in Scandinavia), and family support programs. Whatever the case may be, in rich European countries (except Germany and Italy) the population is aging more slowly than in the relatively poor countries.

Modernization and new technology. In the less developed countries, agriculture generates between 11 and 21 percent of GDP, as compared to 1-3 percent in the most developed countries (Graph 4). But can such a low share of the agrarian sector in West European GDP be attributed to its large-scale services industry? To exclude this factor, the share of industry in material production was calculated for each country. The results show convincingly that economic development goes hand in hand with steady industrialization. Thus, in Bulgaria, industry accounts for 74 percent of material production, as compared to 87 percent and 92 percent in Portugal and France, respectively.

The substantial gap reflects a global move toward specialization. High-tech products in the total export of the manufacturing industry are 3 percent in Group 1, 11 percent in Groups 2 and 3, and 19 percent in Group 4. It is noteworthy that the high-tech export curve is a mirror-like reflection of the share of agriculture in GDP.

The unusual form of the graphs reflecting the process of industrialization (Graph 4) and Internet penetration (Graph 5) – i.e., the equality of Group 2 and Group 3 indicators – may have the following explanation. Group 3 is comprised of states that are the largest agricultural producers in the Mediterranean. Agriculture there has deep historical and cultural roots. By contrast, Group 2 includes former socialist countries, which (during the COMECON period) pursued an active export-oriented industrialization policy. For example, in Hungary, high-tech products account for 29 percent of industrial exports: it ranks second in Europe by this indicator, together with Germany.

Cluster strategies. Analysis shows that different groups of countries in the EU are moving toward integration not only at a different pace. They each have their own priorities.

It is also critical for the Central European states to develop their healthcare and higher education systems. With a balanced economic policy, they have a good chance of catching up with the EU leaders in terms of life expectancy and child mortality rates. But according to EC forecasts, before 2050, the population of these central states will continue to age. Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and the Baltic States have effectively completed their industrialization programs, but they will work many more years to modernize their industry. However, their ability to implement large-scale, investment-intensive R&D programs will remain limited in the foreseeable future.

In Spain, Portugal, Greece, Slovenia, and Cyprus, the categories of life expectancy, infant mortality, and secondary and higher education effectively correspond to the level of the EU’s leading nations. The priority here is to complete the retooling of industry and sharply increase the share of cutting-edge, research-intensive production. Judging by Ireland’s experience, that goal is quite feasible. Spain, Portugal and Slovenia, for example, have set the stage for a new breakthrough in the pursuit of national R&D programs, as well as modern information society.

Therefore, stratification occurs not only worldwide, but also within the EU as a result of global competition and the growing differentiation of the EU countries. In the European “hypermarket,” some stock up on economy-class detergent, others rejoice at the sight of 50 different brands of ice cream, while still others pick and choose from a variety of sea products. One should not, however, get the impression that the first group experiences great difficulties whereas the third group has an easy life. It is important to understand that a hypermarket is not a train that will deliver its passengers to their destination as soon as possible. A hypermarket is a product of globalization. It offers buyers goods from all over the world, goods that meet international standards of quality. Unlike the train, where the choice is made only once, the burden of freedom in the hypermarket is constant. Everyone has to make a decision every minute as to how to spend his money and time.

THE POWER OF EMOTION

At the beginning of this century, the extremely complex goal of building a common European identity became one of primary importance.

Second, following the breakup of the Soviet bloc, the EU no longer had an ideological adversary, whose existence helped European nations – so different and not always amenable toward one another – to share something of a common identity. It has to be said that the Soviet Union was an ideal opponent for Western Europe, and today it cannot be replaced either by the United States or by other global forces or regions.

The sharp alteration in the global system of orientations has produced two conflicting sentiments among the West Europeans. On the one hand, there is a sense of pride, which oftentimes reaches the point of conceit, with the market system and its historical vindication. On the other, there is a sense of confusion and anxiety about the future. It is important to understand that it is psychologically more difficult for Western Europe to adapt to a new stage of globalization than it is for any other part of the world. European civilization is based on sheer rationalism, aspiration for optimal calculations of action, and a sense of morality. Meanwhile, globalization is destroying stereotypes, requiring unconventional solutions and demanding creativity. The majority of average Europeans feel extremely uncomfortable about this new scenario.

“Consumer tuning” of EU programs and institutions has become a separate genre. Thus, the campaign in favor of a currency union was built on the assumption that people will save up on exchange costs and that new jobs will be created in Europe. The former belief was a proven truth, while the latter proved to be a bit of an exaggeration; however, neither goal has really anything to do with the real purposes of the project. The main goal of integration is to ensure Europe new global advantages and accelerate economic modernization by invigorating market forces. But that is not enough to convince the people of the importance of the project. Every time the European Central Bank raises the refinancing rate, it cites the threat of rising prices. In reality, however, the real reason is either the declining rate of the euro or a change of interest rates in the United States. But the public must believe that the ECB safeguards its interests.

A mere nine percent of the EU budget has been earmarked for the first category, including scientific and technical policy and innovation, education, trans-European networks, social policy and a functioning market economy. The second line, aimed at providing assistance to backward regions, will consume a whopping 36 percent of the budget. Thus the EU’s traditional regional policy has ended up under the respectable slogan of sustainable growth. The second priority is far more disingenuous: “preservation and management of natural resources” is used as a cover for agricultural policy, which has long been out of tune with the times, and is also an unbearable burden for the EU (43 percent of the entire budget).

At the same time, the philosophy of the Copenhagen Criteria and the condemnation of everything that had existed in the Soviet bloc contributed to the inferiority complex. Aspiring countries, as represented by their leaders and elites, worked hard to prove to the West that they had always been 100 percent Europeans. Some countries were resentful of their new partners. Problems dating back to World War II and the postwar world order quickly came to the fore.

Many people in Central Europe proved unable to accept their own history. That fed the illusion about ‘the good old days.’ Since many of those countries appeared on the map after World War I, their nostalgia focused on the period in between the two wars, one full of nationalism and brutality. Those considerations were used as a sedative for the subsequent resentment. For example, The Estonia Passport, an official publication, asserted that more than 60 countries boycotted the 1980 Olympic Regatta in Tallinn as a token of solidarity with the occupation of the Estonian Republic.

Whatever the case, Brussels is making a serious mistake by withdrawing the history of the socialist era from public discourse. Serious analysis of this subject is, as a rule, replaced by an ideological caricature. Essentially, the life of two or three generations of Czechs, Poles and Hungarians is surrounded by a conspiracy of silence and sheer condemnation. But without respect for one’s predecessors, or the history of one’s country, a nation cannot really have a sense of dignity or self-respect, which enables it to make vitally important decisions.

But the danger of this practice is not only that Europe is jeopardizing its most valuable assets – democracy and common sense. It could eventually give the Central European countries a sense of inferiority with respect to other EU members, as a result of which they will be unable to embrace its common goals and assume responsibility for its future. This author has often asked her colleagues from Central Europe about the type of contribution they would be ready to make to attain the EU’s common goals. Invariably, this question caused incomprehension, surprise or confusion.

Lack of initiative, the reluctance to forge one’s future with one’s own hands, and the inability to creatively appraise the ongoing developments are the greatest sins of the globalization era. Its principal assets are the assertion of the finest global standards, innovation, a multidimensional view of reality, and tolerance toward others. That applies both to the EU as a whole, and to its individual member states.

The new model of European integration responds to the needs of globalization better than the previous model, but it is far more difficult to manage and control it.