On the serious side, the current state of EU-Russia wrangling is alarming: recurring problems are detrimental as they distract the parties from the real business of developing a truly strategic partnership that would be to their mutual benefit. These problems – which are undeniably mounting – reveal the haggling at the tactical level and the absence of a truly strategic vision of a genuine partnership.

WHY THE EU AND RUSSIA NEED EACH OTHER

Today, the mood seems to be entirely different. On the Russian side, there seems to be more and more contempt expressed for the European Union. The Russian side ridicules the internal problems of the Union, such as its failure to ratify the Constitutional Treaty; the cohesion of the Union as a viable international player is questioned (although Moscow itself has done a lot to undermine this cohesion); and even the EU’s successful eastern enlargement is questioned by remarks that “Poland is now the EU’s problem.” Russia seems to be very self-assured at the moment and does not conceal its satisfaction over the shortcomings it finds in the European Union.

On the EU side, things are hardly any better. There seems to be a growing frustration with regard to Russia in many spheres: the “strategic partnership” has not advanced; there are worries about the future of Russia as the electoral cycle has started; the EU’s hopes of moving ahead with projects in the common neighborhood with Russia (the ‘four common spaces’) are clearly failing; and there are increasing bilateral frictions between Russia and some of the member states, as exemplified by recent events in Estonia and Poland. In essence, everything seems to be grinding to a halt with Russia and the hopes and dreams of strategic partnership, instead of becoming stronger, are disappearing.

This current state of affairs comes across as very strange, especially when we consider that the links between Russia and the European Union are intimate and significant. We must remember that half of Russia’s trade is with the EU, while a quarter of the EU’s energy supplies come from Russia. There is also mutual interdependence in other areas, especially in the North where the EU and Russia share a common environment that is fragile and in need of cooperation. Russia and the EU share a common neighborhood. At the same time, there are common international challenges, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and so on.

In addition to these obvious considerations, which do not seem to be sufficient enough to bind the EU and Russia closer together, there are more fundamental factors that are being overlooked by representatives on both sides.

The need for mutual cooperation stems from the fact that the 21st century does not belong to the Europeans (that is, all people living in the EU, Russia and countries in between). One could even argue that the 20th century was not Europe’s finest hour, either. If we ask which European countries were better off in 1999 as compared with 1899 in terms of relative power and standing, Finland and the Baltic states did not even have independence at that time. Furthermore, none of the major countries – Britain, France, Germany or Russia – fared particularly well during the last century: most of them suffered terrible setbacks in terms of international power and prestige. True, these losses were not altogether bad: they inoculated the western half of Europe against the most atavistic and aggressive instincts in interstate and international relations – Europe’s fate no longer revolves around the concepts of ‘power politics’ and ‘spheres of influence.’ More importantly, the end of the Cold War allowed Central and Eastern Europe to enter the process, which should be taken to its logical end by embracing the rest of Europe, including Russia.

Today, such findings may sound surprising, especially to Russians who are currently basking in their new-found prosperity as an “energy superpower.” Yet the signs that all is not rosy in Europe are already evident. When all of the categories of power – be it population, economy or military – are factored together, the combined relative power of Europe (Russia included) is decreasing. Thus, by remaining aloof and continuing in its passive aggressiveness, the European Union and Russia do not stand a chance in the face of rapidly emerging global realities.

The same lesson applies to Russia, as well: it is seen as little more than a source of hydrocarbons in the world. Of course, this position will continue to generate considerable export revenues, but it is unlikely to be enough to turn Russia into a self-standing global player of the kind Moscow clearly aspires to be, especially over the long term. To gain this status, Russia must diversify its economy, which is overly dependent on a few natural resources, reverse the dramatic demographic crisis, modernize its substandard infrastructure and armed forces, while fighting against corruption and inefficiency, the main features that have come to characterize modern Russia. This array of systemic challenges is enough to overwhelm even the most strategic and efficient modernizer, which present-day Russia clearly is not. The internal and external challenges facing Moscow are formidable, and by continuing on its present course Russia may be unable to meet them. Thus, it is obvious that only as a viable part of some “Greater Europe” can Russia hold sway in the world in the coming decades.

Importantly – and somewhat puzzlingly – neither party denies the basic need for genuine partnership. The European Union openly acknowledges the key role that Russia plays in Europe and the need to develop a strategic partnership with Moscow. In a similar vein, Russia voices its wish to be a part of “Greater Europe” and to have a voice in shaping the wider European, and even global, processes. However, thus far this basic understanding has not been translated into actual choices and policies.

THE TOMORROW IS NOW

What the European Union and Russia need is a markedly new relationship, a program of radical rapprochement. But how can this be achieved in reality?

It is obvious that the kind of rapprochement between Russia and the European Union suggested here will entail far-reaching political and economic cooperation, even integration. It will also demand both substantial political rapprochement and economic convergence in several sensitive areas and can only take place on the basis of mutually accepted principles. Since the early 1990s, Russia, it must be admitted, has been in a rather disadvantageous position in this respect, as it was asked to accept rules that had been largely adopted without its involvement. But it is precisely for this reason that Russia should seek swift accession to international forums, for example, in the WTO. Once Russia becomes a full member of the WTO, it will be able to legitimately set the rules of the game for global trade. This should alleviate Moscow’s concerns about a one-way street where Russia is currently unable to affect the norms it is expected to implement.

In essence, this program would entail a new post-PCA agreement that would be ambitious and comprehensive in scope, and stand in stark contrast to the present mood of cynicism on both sides.

In its turn, the European Union should reciprocate by being open to such a new agenda, accepting that it would entail a radically upgraded role for Russia in the construction of Greater Europe. Over time, this should result in new ambitious institutions, such as providing Russia with established forms of consultation when it comes to certain key EU policies that directly affect it. However, until there is mutual understanding of the issues, it is pointless to speculate about what the provisions might be.

Many may view these suggestions naïve or unrealistic in light of the recent acrimony between the European Union and Russia. Yet the fact that the European Union and Russia need each other to fare well in the future, in conditions of tough economic competition, makes the continuation of present trends not really a realistic option, either.

I can also imagine people thinking that even if the agenda is the right one, the timing is not. Some may argue that with the Russian electoral cycle in progress, there is hardly any room for ambitious initiative concerning a radical change in Russia’s course. But this is equally wrong. One of the most baffling things about the current impasse is the parties’ illusion that they somehow have ample time on their hands. This applies especially to Russia which has so far failed to make up its mind as to whether it truly belongs to Europe and what that factor entails for its domestic policy. In this respect, the high prices of oil and gas have been a mixed blessing as they made Russia put off some of the severely needed decisions.

The stakes are high, the decisions have to be taken promptly and implemented swiftly. The tomorrow is now: the globalizing world will not wait for the laggards and history will judge harshly those who fail to act in time.