– Can we therefore be threatened by many local arms races, including nuclear ones?

– The United States continues building a missile shield, although there may arise problems with support from Congress, and the technologies still do not work. There is a lot of money invested in this project and in defense in general, but the war in Iraq has made the financial situation in America worse than before. Now Washington wants Europe to spend more money on defense: not two to three percent, but three to four percent like in America. But I cannot imagine that any marked increase in defense spending – which would thus spark an arms race – is possible in Europe now.

– And in the Middle East?

– Things are different there, of course. The U.S. sells weapons to anyone wishing to buy them, and the Gulf States actively purchase these weapons. The Americans have pointed to the source of the threat, namely Iran, and the more aggressive Teheran’s conduct, the more actively the rich Arab countries arm themselves. In the Far East, everything depends on the behavior of China. If China starts modernizing its defense potential, that will be okay, because this potential is rather outdated. However, today China is significantly building up its military capabilities. Considering Washington’s conduct, this is not very surprising, but Beijing’s policy will determine the attitude to its military buildup.

– Why do countries want to possess nuclear weapons? Is this a matter of status or security?

By the way, Pyongyang has not forgotten the year 1950, when at the height of the Korean War General Douglas MacArthur received permission to use nuclear weapons if need be. He never used them, of course, but he was prepared to do so in principle. Because of the specificity of their political regime, North Koreans are paranoid. They feel totally isolated, because even their traditional allies, Russia and China, are obviously annoyed with them, while the United States has ominously warned that “all options are open,” including military options. In a sense, this is a matter of status, as well, or rather, a way to attract others’ attention and to make them speak with you.

As for Iran, its work on elements of a nuclear program began in the 1980s, when that country was at war against Iraq. At that time, there were more than sufficient grounds to suspect that Baghdad was developing nuclear weapons as well. These suspicions caused Israel in 1981 to bomb and destroy Iraq’s Osirak nuclear research facility near Baghdad. So the Iranian nuclear program was aimed against a specific enemy. As this enemy has now ceased to exist, Teheran has named the United States its main threat.

– Exactly. Many think that Hussein’s regime was destroyed because he did not have nuclear weapons. If he had, America would have spoken with him in a different manner.

– On the eve of the war in Iraq, there was an impression that George Bush and Tony Blair really believed that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. Later, it began to seem that they had lied deliberately.

– They wanted to believe in that very much. It may be said that at first they misled themselves and then the whole world. One must have grounds to accuse someone of lying. I don’t have such grounds, so I have never said that they lied. Yet Bush and Blair could be reproached – and with good reason – for their reluctance to critically assess the information they received. They did not ask questions and took the position of witch-hunting inquisitors: “This woman is guilty, and now let’s get evidence. She has a black cat – this is the evidence!” It is difficult to say what is worse: when people lie deliberately or when they take a biased approach to a situation.

– Scott Ritter, a chief United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq in the 1990s, accused you of not having done everything possible to prevent the war.

– Ritter rebuked us for not saying that there were no WMD in Iraq. But such accusations attest to a lack of understanding about the code of conduct for inspectors. We had no right to say that there was nothing there, because a negative statement cannot be proved. Iraq is a large country; theoretically there may be very many facilities there. The only thing that we had the right to say was that, having made 500 inspections in different places, we found nothing and could assume, with a high degree of probability, that the American statements about the presence of WMD in Iraq were based on invalid data.

If the inspections had continued for two or three more months, we would have visited all the facilities that American intelligence had suspicions about. After such a search, all would have had to admit that the information sources were not reliable. But even in that case, we would not have been able to say unequivocally that Iraq possessed no WMD. That would be a political conclusion, which inspectors do not make. By virtue of their professional qualities, inspectors can provide the most representative results of studies. But there is always a level of uncertainty, and the decision to believe or not to believe is made by the politicians. Previously, it was decided to believe South Africa, and, as it has turned out, that decision was not a mistake.

– But why did Saddam bluff? Why did he behave as if he had something to hide? He must have known for sure that he had no WMD. His suicidal behavior cost him power and life.

– I did not meet with him. He did not meet with the commission’s heads, neither Ekéus, nor Butler or me, in principle. We met with Taha Yasin Ramadan, the then-vice president of Iraq. Saddam’s behavior really cannot be described as reasonable. I cannot rule out that his own generals misled him. Perhaps they assured him that there were some WMD left – in the hope of receiving some funds or to bolster their own significance. This is only my guess, I cannot say for sure, of course. In addition, Saddam played a double game, trying to convince the United Nations that he had destroyed all WMD, and Iran – that he had something left.

– Iran?

– Yes, Iran was his main enemy. He behaved like a man who puts up a “Beware of the Dog” sign on his front gate. One need not necessarily have a dog – suffice it to pretend one has one.

– Earlier you said more than once that the Iraqi tragedy was caused by mistakes committed by the special services. Their psychology and attitudes are increasingly becoming important elements of policy, be it in the United States, Russia or some other countries. But they view the world in black and white colors.

– Special services often say their picture is more accurate because they know what others do not know.

– Speaking of the Security Council, many believe that the UN has become obsolete and cannot be reformed, because UN members, above all the Security Council members, are unable to agree on anything.

– A slander campaign? But there were serious and proven charges of corruption and misuse of funds there.

As regards peacemaking missions (there are 100,000 UN peacekeeping troops around the world), or the solution of the Iranian problem, where the Security Council permanent members demonstrate a high degree of mutual understanding, the UN has proven to be rather effective.

The question is, what political balance is being formed in the Security Council? Does it reflect the international situation? The present combination is not representative enough. From the point of view of economic clout, of course, it must include Japan and Germany, which are far ahead of such permanent members as France or Britain. There is, however, another problem. The permanent members of the Security Council each pursue their own policies, whereas the Council, as a matter of fact, is an executive committee of the General Assembly, that is, the entire international community. However, representatives of the permanent members only think of themselves and their national interests.

– Perhaps, but in this case, Germany and Japan will uphold their own interests, and the process will become even more complicated. It is worth considering that countries elected to the Security Council should have consultations with the regional groups of states that have chosen them. For instance, the voice of Angola, which was a Security Council member during the Iraqi campaign, would have been more effective if it had consulted with African countries and therefore represented its continent to a greater degree.

– And how do things stand with the Nonproliferation Treaty? Is it alive?

– The Iraqi solution is in no way related to the NPT.

– And what about further proliferation? Are there any doubts in the ability of Japan, for example, to become a nuclear state within a short period of time?

– Why did you not mention Israel as one of the NPT’s setbacks?

But there was one more serious setback for the NPT – namely, the conduct of the Nuclear Five: Britain, China, Russia, the United States, and France. Since the signing of the NPT, the overall number of nuclear devices has been reduced from 55,000 to 22,000. Under the 2002 Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT), this figure is to be cut still further. But all these reductions only represent the disposal of excess stocks, whereas real military capabilities have not been reduced. Moreover, the United States and Britain are developing new nuclear weapons, while military doctrines are becoming more tolerant toward the possibility of their employment. This is an obvious violation of the treaty by the Nuclear Five, which, of course, is the cause of great disappointment among non-nuclear countries. There is no direct link, however, between their desire to obtain nuclear weapons and America’s development of new types of such weapons. Rather, this desire is caused by threats coming from neighboring countries. Egypt, for example, may develop nuclear ambitions not because of the U.S. but because of Iran and Israel. It would be much easier to convince Iran and North Korea if the great powers themselves set an example of nuclear disarmament. In Geneva, I heard the following idea: states officially united in nuclear-free zones could withdraw from the NPT – not in order to develop nuclear weapons (the nuclear-free zones would remain), but to demonstrate to the Nuclear Five that the great powers do not honor their commitments.

– Would it be easier to negotiate with Iran, if simultaneously measures were taken against Israel’s nuclear program?

– You mentioned the attack against Osirak, which took place when you headed the IAEA. What do you think now? Was it the right move by Israel? After all, it saved the world from a nuclear Iraq.

– That is, Osirak cannot serve as a model for solving, for example, the Iranian problem, right?

We can mention other facilities, for example, Natanz. Of course, the destruction of these facilities would slow down Iran’s nuclear program, whatever objectives it may have set for itself. But then we can forget about any future interaction with Tehran; and if centrifuge prototypes remain elsewhere in the country, then efforts to build up nuclear capabilities would only intensify.

There are still good prospects for negotiations, although I am not enthusiastic about the way they are conducted. Now the matter is put in the following way: you stop your enrichment program, and then we will start negotiations. But this is unproductive – it is the termination of enrichment that should be the subject of negotiations at the first stage.

– Many say that Pakistan is the most dangerous place in the world as regards proliferation.

– But the scandal involving Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, who opened a “nuclear supermarket” of sorts, is something fantastic. And most importantly, he has never been punished.

– Abdul Qadeer Khan is a national hero of Pakistan, a man who created its nuclear program and achieved parity with India. Of course, it is hard to imagine that he was acting alone when trading nuclear technologies: at the very least, someone from the country’s top leadership was in the know. And the reasons were obviously economic, although attempts were made to hide the profit considerations behind a noble ideology.

– What do you think of the present atmosphere of international relations? Military force is returning as a key factor on the global stage. The U.S. and Russia now and then resort to the Cold War rhetoric. Is this a rollback to the past or, on the contrary, the beginning of a new era?

Simultaneously with the disappearance of the rivalry, the military had no more need to make concessions and limit themselves. The U.S. military stopped being shy, so to speak. It began under Bill Clinton. The bombing of Afghanistan, strikes against Sudan after attacks on the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania… When it turned out that a factory in Sudan was bombed by mistake, the U.S. simply expressed regret. This is the psychology of the only military superpower. And why are new types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery being developed today? This cannot be explained by the need to combat terrorism; this is an offensive type of strategic thinking.

The idea to build an anti-missile shield, which is now much talked about, is very old. From the very beginning, it caused suspicions in Moscow and Beijing that the United States wanted to ensure for itself an ability to strike with impunity. Of course, this is also an element of that strategic thinking, which does not provide for the construction of a “common home.” Washington insists that its plans are directed against Iran and North Korea, but hardly anyone believes this. Most likely, the two specific facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic really do not threaten Russia, but they will become part of an entire system, which seriously worries both Russia and China.

Another element is the enlargement of NATO. It began with Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary – countries occupied by the Soviet Union, and I understand very well why they and the Baltic States sought to join the Alliance. On the other hand, I understand what Russia feels as well: “We no sooner left those countries and NATO entered them.” This is how the rivalry psychology is fed. Now candidate countries already include Ukraine and Georgia, and last year Senator Richard Lugar suggested that the doors should be open also for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

It is quite understandable why Russia feels encircled, especially as this is really so from the point of view of the struggle for oil and gas sources. In a recent article, Henry Kissinger said that he had supported the first wave of NATO’s enlargement, but was against the continuation of the process. He, at least, understands psychology, while generals do not understand psychology at all and do not want to understand it.

As regards China, the United States points to Beijing’s increased defense spending, which stands at U.S. $45 billion a year. But Washington’s own defense spending exceeds $600 billion! Simultaneously, the U.S. signs agreements with New Delhi, which can hardly be interpreted otherwise than a desire to incorporate India into an anti-Chinese “barrier,” which already comprises Australia, Japan, the Philippines, and Taiwan.

This approach is based on outdated military-strategic thinking, which manifested itself in all its glory during the Iraqi campaign of 2003. The neoconservative idea for rebuilding the Middle East was approximately as follows: “After removing Saddam, we will be able to redeploy troops from Saudi Arabia to Iraq, where there is a more favorable secular environment. Besides, it is close to Iran, which will be under our watch.” However, in reality the war demonstrated that problems couldn’t be solved by force alone.

The change of power and the probable victory of Democrats will shift the balance toward the State Department’s position. However, the American public is consolidated around the idea of a strong America, and the Democrats will have to refute the widespread stereotype that they are weak. A major role in U.S. policy belongs to the military-industrial complex, which must have continuous production because this implies jobs. So, one should hardly expect any radical changes. Yet I do hope that the situation will be influenced by globalization, increased interdependence, and integration. These factors make the use of military force in relations between great powers less likely – not at the local level, not in intrastate conflicts, but globally.

The most vivid example of this today is Japan and China. There are high emotional tensions between them. But both of their new leaders have made it clear that they are interested in developing trade and economic cooperation. China is a huge market for Japanese products, and vice versa. So they are trying to achieve a positive development of relations.

– With regard to China and Japan, or China and the United States, this is true. But the level of mutual dependence between, for example, Russia and the United States is very low.

– But there is very high mutual dependence between Russia and the European Union. Of course, energy plays a major role in Russia-EU relations; this is a sensitive issue. I think Europe reacted too much when Russia had conflicts with Ukraine and Belarus. The problems there did not lie in the policies of Presidents Yushchenko or Lukashenko – it was a matter of money, wasn’t it?

– I thought the same, so the reaction was exaggerated. But I, as a supporter of nuclear power, only gain from this. I have always said that nuclear power is the primary replacement for hydrocarbons, but the Europeans should not have accused Russia of unreliability. What they are right about is when they criticize violations of civil liberties. If Russia really wants to move toward Greater Europe, this cannot be achieved without ensuring a certain level of rights and freedoms of the individual. It is time to depart from traditions of a state dominated by the KGB or the FSB – depart gradually, step by step. There should be no illusion that this can be done quickly and easily, but this line should be maintained.