Strategic Objectives of Russian-U.S. Relations

Yevgeny Savostyanov is a prominent public and political figure, former Deputy Chief of the Kremlin staff.

After a period of political cooling in relations between Moscow and Washington, there is again hope for their improvement. However, resumption of the dialogue poses the question that the parties have failed to answer since the end of the Cold War: What are the strategic objectives of Russian-U.S. relations in the 21st century?

Presumably, Russia and the U.S. should work towards concluding a comprehensive alliance treaty. The prospects for such an agreement were discussed by Sergei Dubinin in his article “A New Entente” (Russia in Global Affairs, 4/2008), which largely anticipated my arguments. Yet this issue remains extremely topical and thereby deserves a detailed analysis.

RECORD OF DEVELOPMENT

There have been several periods in the history of Russian-U.S. relations.

The first period spans the years of the American Revolutionary War that the North American colonists fought against the British Empire. At that time Russia provided tremendous assistance to the establishment of the young North American states. Empress Catherine the Great turned down London’s request to recruit 20,000 Cossacks to fight against the colonists, which might have been a decisive factor in turning the tide of the war. Some time later, Catherine the Great’s “Armed Neutrality Act” foiled Britain’s attempts to strangle the young North American state by a sea blockade. Add to this the colonization by Russia of the Pacific coast (Russian America) and a considerable inflow of immigrants to Russia, and you get a picture of good-neighborly, even if not intensive, relations between the two large countries until the 1870s.

Occasional frictions were caused by competition between Russian and U.S. farmers (although the European market was large enough for all) and Russian frigates and corvettes that would sometimes intercept slave ships (but this only soured the mood of southern plantation owners). Also, the reprisals practiced by Nicholas I’s regime against democratic revolts in Eastern and Central Europe spoiled Russia’s image in the U.S. But in general, Russia-U.S. relations were free of conflicts – until oil flowed into the business life of both countries.

Almost 150 years ago, the rapid increase in oil production on the Apsheron Peninsula near Baku fueled a drop in world prices, first inflicting heavy losses on individual, poorly organized oil producers, and then damaging the strategic interests of Rockefeller’s Standard Oil. There is a widespread belief that the company was complicit in masterminding and funding the strikes and sabotage (murders of engineering personnel, theft at financial organizations and the burning of wells and derricks), which swept across the Baku oil fields at the turn of the 20th century and helped make the carriers of Bolshevik, Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary leaders, including Joseph Stalin.

These events marked the beginning of the second period of relations between the Russian Empire and the U.S. The struggle for markets caused rivalry in two crucial spheres – oil and Eastern Asia (above all, China and Japan). The cooling in relations was also rooted in the sharply contrasting political systems of the two countries: the archaic absolute monarchy of the Romanov dynasty was increasingly viewed in the U.S. as barbaric, inadequate and profoundly anti-Semitic (the latter being particularly significant for the political climate).

By and large, there were no major conflicts between the two states, while their strategic interests still had much in common. It was not accidental that the U.S. provided the venue for and brokered the least humiliating peace treaty Russia could hope for when it lost its war with Japan. Later apprehensions about the growing hegemony of Germany made Russia and the U.S. allies in World War I, and then again in a brief and unsuccessful clash with Bolsheviks.

Strange as it may seem, this period ended not in 1917 when the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia, but in the middle of the 1940s. Despite a short period of U.S. participation in the Entente’s anti-Bolshevik activities and the Soviet Union’s anti-capitalist rhetoric, the two countries maintained pragmatic relations until 1942. A letter written in 1921 by Mikhail Kalinin, Chairman of the All-Union Central Executive Committee, illustrates the state of relations in those years: “From the very beginning of its existence, Soviet Russia hoped for the possible rapid establishment of friendly relations with the great North American Republic and expected that both republics would create close and stable ties to their mutual benefit…. The Soviet Republic… does not intend in any way to interfere in America’s internal affairs.”

The Americans made a large contribution to Soviet industrialization that was second only to that of Germany. Curiously, the American contribution was personified by an enterprising and unscrupulous Armand Hammer.

Pavel Sudoplatov, a famous representative of the Soviet intelligence service, wrote about the Soviet Union’s approach towards the U.S: “Before that time [October 1941] work on collecting political intelligence information in America was minimal as we had no conflicting interests in the geopolitical sphere.” (This does not mean of course that the United States was beyond the scope of Soviet intelligence activities – the Milshtein espionage ring was formed in the prewar years. Yet the U.S. was not on the list of priorities then.)

The “conflicting interests” emerged in 1943 (the start of discussions on the division of post-war Europe), which marked the beginning of the third period of Russian-U.S. relations, although formally the starting point is attributed to 1946, the year of mounting confrontation between the two countries. Importantly, it was not a confrontation between the peoples, but between the countries that eventually turned into the merciless opposition on the principle of a zero sum game. This period culminated in the conventional and nuclear arms race, the fanning of local conflicts and notorious phrases like “We will bury you” (Nikita Khrushchev) and “the Evil Empire” (Ronald Reagan).

The fourth period began with the collapse of the Communist dictatorship and the breakup of the Soviet Union, and it still continues. It may be called “a transitional period” as both countries, first of all Russia, are trying to find – by trial and error – a proper mode of relations.

TOWARDS A “CIVILIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY”

Over the last two decades Russia has failed to find an answer to the key question of its identity: What is the country’s geopolitical legacy? There seems to be two possible options.

First option: we will return to the community of countries to which Russia belonged until 1918. These are countries with a democratic political system, respect for human rights and free enterprise. Let us call this community of states a “civilization of technology” because it is characterized by technological progress and a minimal impact of abstract doctrines. Russia developed along the same vector in the first half of its post-Soviet period.

Second option: we will keep the Soviet political legacy, when the countries mentioned above are viewed as natural opponents and a source of threat. In line with this logic, Russia should look for allies among the “enemies of my enemy;” that is, countries with authoritarian or totalitarian political systems, an overblown influence of doctrines (both religious and secular), a lack of civil rights and freedoms, and depletion of internal political and information fields.

This category includes two types of countries which can be divided into a “civilization of doctrines” (China, North Korea, Cuba, many Islamic countries, and adherents to the “Bolivarian Revolution” ideology) and a “civilization of survival” (the majority of African countries and some countries in Central and Eastern Asia).

Historical experience shows that no other option is possible. The example of China as a counter-argument, where the economic system of the first type coexists with the political system of the second, can hardly apply. China has been walking along a “special path” for a mere 30 years, rising from what can be described as the bottom even by socialist standards, to which it fell due to the “Great Leap Forward” and the “Cultural Revolution” launched by Mao Zedong. Even today its per capita income is more than twice as low as that of Russia and the level of corruption is much higher, while the regional and individual property differentiation is exceptionally high. Presumably, China is approaching a point where it will either move onto the track of one of the two aforementioned options or will face serious destabilization.

A compromise between the two options is only possible within a very limited timeframe. The ongoing economic crisis, the need to revise the “consumer society” model (to which four billion people aspire today instead of 400 million) and the risks related to resources and environment – all these factors generate new benchmarks of global division.

Humanity is increasingly moving from the East-West to the North-South pattern. This division rests on a gap in technology: the producers of the 19th century (raw materials and, partially, foodstuffs) and the first half of the 20th century (unsophisticated industrial goods) versus producers of the second half of the 20th century (hi-tech industrial goods) and the 21st century (computer and information products and services, and biotech products). The first of these groups includes countries of the South, and the second – countries of the North.

The second option, in essence, is inertial, and hence its implementation is easier – countries simply do not have to do anything. They automatically enter the ranks of autocratic regimes resting upon free hydrocarbon resources or a very cheap work force. This scenario preserves technological backwardness. The time when the role of hydrocarbon fuels in the world will begin to diminish rapidly is not far off (experts estimate in 25-35 years). This implies that Russia has little time to spare. If it is not thoroughly prepared for this turn of events, a national catastrophe will be inevitable. But even if there is no drastic landslide in development, a gradual degradation against the background of prosperous countries will bring the country to collapse sooner or later.

The first option, if chosen, gives the chance for modernization, yet it provides no guarantees. Treading on this path, we may eventually find ourselves in an environment favorable for modernization (although amid tough competition), and it is up to us to make proper use of it. This, in turn, will require a profound internal transformation.

For fairness sake we must make two important reservations.

First, there is no 100-percent guarantee that competition between ultra-conservative countries (but with stockpiles of energy) and progressive (but decaying, like Europe) countries will necessarily end in the latter’s victory. Unfortunately, there is also the possibility of a decaying West in the 21st century, which may lead to chaos and regression, like what happened with the Roman Empire after its collapse.

Second, by choosing the first option, Russia will find itself on the frontline of the above-mentioned cultural and economic division, and, taking the main burden of the expansion of conservatism, it will run the risk of confronting it all alone, as it did 800 years ago.

A UNION WITH THE U.S.

I will briefly touch on the specifics of the implementation of the first option.

Ever since the time of Peter the Great, Russian authorities have been driven by the desire to catch up with Europe and make Russia a full-fledged European country. This objective has been achieved in a number of fields. During the reign of Elizabeth of Russia, Russia played a crucial role in European affairs, while from the Napoleon wars until the 1917 Revolution the question of whether or not Russia is part of Europe was never on the agenda. Had it not been for the tragic 75-year-experiment conducted on the country and its people, Russia would have certainly taken an active part in all European integration processes.

But history played a malicious joke: as Russia was catching up with Europe and vying for its own niche, Europe itself shed the significance it had had in world politics. Today’s Europe has lost its strategic thinking; it is incapable of resolving important geopolitical issues on its own and securing its own vital interests. You can trade with Europe or go there for a holiday, medical treatment or to get an education there, but you cannot rely on it. This factor is becoming increasingly obvious for the U.S. and Russia should not have any illusions about it either.

Recent developments in the world make it necessary to focus on a dramatic revision of Russian-U.S. relations on a scope not seen before. The point at issue is a course for concluding a full-fledged Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Russia and the U.S. (I use the Soviet-style wording deliberately as it is better suited to convey the essence of the proposal.)

This takes us back to the beginning of our contemplation. Russia, the world’s largest country with immense resources, and the U.S., the richest, most powerful and advanced country in the world, have no immanent contradictions. There are no insurmountable obstacles against building a full-scale partnership.

Washington’s abortive attempt to play the role of the sole global hegemon after the end of the Cold War forces it to look for ways to protect its interests in interacting with other players. Russia, which has preserved its resource, geostrategic and military potential, cannot but be of interest to the U.S. as a partner. At the same time, improved relations with the U.S. will add confidence to Russia in the coming decades when it will have to deal with ambitious rising powers (above all China) and face dangerous spots of instability (the Middle East, South and Central Asia).

As was noted above, we have a rich history of positive cooperation in various fields. The resetting of Russia-U.S. relations has several basic components:

• Recognizing each other not just as bona fide partners, but also as potential allies, and mapping out a strategy towards the establishment of allied relations.
• Specifying areas for short- and long-term interaction; encouraging the promotion and development of areas of bilateral cooperation.
• Revising the list of issues on the bilateral agenda and removing those that are of a historical-metaphysical, rather than real, nature.
• Fostering a favorable psychological climate in both countries towards each other.

There are obvious areas where Russia and the U.S. could interact. These are, first of all, measures to overcome global human-induced problems (climate change, scarcity of natural resources, poverty and hunger in countries of the “civilization of survival”). There are also security problems caused by the conflict between the “civilization of technology” on the one hand and the “civilization of doctrines” and the “civilization of survival” on the other.

The “civilization of technology” now includes only three countries that can use force to defend their values: the U.S., Russia and Great Britain (as a junior partner). Division and confrontation inside this group is a luxury that they cannot afford and would be a strategic mistake.

If something divides us, it is the speculative ideological constructs and problems which ceased to be acute after the end of the Cold War. A way out of the situation is to create long-term, mutually-binding and mutually-committed relations – where Russia and the U.S. would be not just partners, but genuine allies. This path should take us towards concluding a treaty that would become an unshakable basis of a Russian-U.S. union for decades in the future. This path, if the relevant political decision is made, will be long and difficult. Such a goal makes sense only in the context of the path towards modernization – a political, economic and structural one – in the spirit of the “civilization of technology.”

This should not be a romantic infatuation or a reckless drive for rapprochement. It should be a precisely and realistically formulated task, with each step carefully calculated, and mutual concessions thoroughly coordinated.

We need mechanisms of guarantees against mutual aggression. Not just against nuclear weapons, but against armed conflict of any form. Otherwise, the obvious disproportion in conventional arms will become a source of justified irritation by the weakest of the parties, namely Russia.

One might of course focus again on limiting the advance of foreign contingents to Russian borders, although this issue is purely decorative. The war against Russia will not come from the European theater: Russia will still have the opportunity to cause unacceptable damage to any European country or all of them put together for a long time (I would even say forever but everything is finite). There is a very simple argument: democracies never fight each other. So the best guarantee of peace is democratic development in all the countries bordering on Russia and in Russia itself. We must agree with the need to learn much, accept much, and give up much. This is what modernization is about.

We must overcome our fear of the “civilization of technology,” the reflex of being obsessed with confrontation with the West and re-integrate into the affairs and plans of the civilization of the North, to which Russia belonged before 1917. In this sense (and not only in this particular sense) we cannot maintain the legacy of both pre-Bolshevik Russia and the Soviet Union: the first was in the Euro-Atlantic civilization, whereas the second stood aloof from it.

Despite the skeptic attitude towards the potential of the Old World, Russia’s rapprochement with the U.S. should by no means give cause for regarding it as yet another attempt to drive a wedge between former Euro-Atlantic allies. No matter how helpless the European component of NATO looks now, Russia’s joining the alliance would probably be one of the most technically expedient solutions in attaining the above task. Russia will have to join the efforts for working out norms and rules which will regulate humanity’s progress in the 21st century, and monitor compliance with these norms and rules based on uniform principles.

A difficult task does not mean it cannot be fulfilled. If successful, the significance of the new union, open to other countries under certain conditions, would be tremendous for world stability. We saw it during the post-Soviet years: the aggressiveness of certain regimes decreases dramatically under concerted Russian-U.S. actions, and conversely, this aggressiveness begins to gain momentum at the first signs of discord between our countries.

Movement towards the aforesaid treaty, signing it and launching the practice of joint Russian-U.S. activity on key global political issues may become the cornerstone of a new system of international relations, one much safer, more stable and more comfortable.

Perhaps as the first step on this long path it would make sense to revive something along the lines of the Russia-U.S. Friendship Society, provided, of course, that this would be a symmetric, non-bureaucratic organization, fully focused on improving relations between the two nations, not on handling minor tasks. A significant positive factor would be the participation in this forum of representatives of the administration of the Russian president and the Foreign Ministry.