The last few months have been marked by heated debates as to whether a multipolar world is now a reality and whether a new Cold War is imminent.
One of the reasons for Moscow’s sharp reaction to Washington’s missile defense plans is the arrogance with which the incumbent White House administration makes unilateral decisions on strategic issues. The White House’s policy undermines the possibilities for strategic partnership and trust, vital for countering new threats to global and regional security.
The West does not want to see Russia strong; it fears it. However, it seems that it is not the West but Russia itself that is driving the country onto a self-destructive path. The executive power has become hostage to forces whose well-being depends on defense orders. Moreover, under the influence of these forces a new defense policy of Russia has begun to take shape.
The methodologies being implemented by President Vladimir Putin will continue to determine foreign policy beyond 2008 regardless of who will be the presidential successor in the Kremlin. The key issue will remain the same, namely, what resources and levers can help Russia return to the Greater Orient in practical terms, and whether it needs this return at all.
Civil 8 and its G8 connection in 2006 thus set an unprecedentedly high standard that has inspired the G8 for the years ahead. Even before her year as host started, the German sherpa team declared that the G8 dialog with civil society pioneered by the Russians would continue on a permanent basis in their year and in those to come.
Over 32 years of its history, the G7/G8 has expanded both its agenda and institutional system, and is now appreciated as an instrument of deliberation, direction-giving and decision-making on global governance issues. It has also become a subject for criticism and reform proposals. The critique mainly focuses on the forum’s representativeness, legitimacy and effectiveness.
The immediate post-Riga period should be a time to deepen the NATO-Russia partnership. The Riga Summit marked a significant step in NATO’s evolution toward a security provider within and beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Russia has nothing to fear, and a lot to gain, from this evolution.
Russia can no longer rely on the general assurances of the bloc’s good intentions. In the early 1990s, Moscow placed its faith in such promises and got its fingers burnt. Today, it has no intention of repeating those mistakes.
The main lesson from the past 50 years of European history shows that a nation’s involvement in the ongoing integration process does not necessarily cause it to lose its sovereignty. However, the next few decades may prove that a country outside the integration process that declares its sovereignty can in effect lose these rights.
In drafting a free trade area agreement, both Russia and the EU must avoid unjustified pessimism and excessive expectations, not to mention euphoria. The drafting of such an agreement is going to be a long-term process, which Russia should enter only after careful and intensive preparations.
Russia generates a weaker gravitational power than the top trade leaders but, nevertheless, it has sufficient “mass” to attract Eurasian states. Apart from Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, which definitely belong to its orbit, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan weakly gravitate toward Russia. In their turn, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are local centers of attraction for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan respectively, while Ukraine is the local center for Moldova.
If Belarus becomes a member of the European Union, its role in Europe will differ substantially from that which is played by the “newcomers” (those admitted in 2004) today: unlike Poland or Baltic states, Belarus will be an outpost of “Old Europe” in the east of the European continent.
Why do we accept organization of European territories in the 21st century along ethnic lines as an uncontested value and goal? It is one thing to restore the independence of nation-states that once existed and were suppressed, but it is quite another thing to create ex nihilo ethnic states, following the “Russian stacking doll” model.
The overriding priority for Moscow today is not to acquire new territories. Russia has to show to the Georgian elite, as well as to the international community, that rejection of Russian peacekeepers is bound to revive conflicts, jeopardizing the security of Russia’s North Caucasus.
Putin can with the stroke of a pen fire any government official or the Cabinet as a whole, dissolve the State Duma or a local legislature, or put the squeeze on an oligarch. However, the president is powerless to get rid of a whole class of the Russian post-Communist nomenklatura, or compel them to act contrary to their corporate interests.
Building relations with Russia reminds of the process of integrating Europe. We began by establishing direct ties – first within the framework of the European Coal and Steel Community. So if tomorrow Russia and the EU come up with a good agreement that suits both parties from the point of view of oil and gas supplies, this will lend credence to their declarations that they are pursuing mutual forms of cooperation and joint responsibility.
The primary importance of Putin’s Munich speech is that it helped to foil
a conspiracy of silence on fundamental issues concerning the global security architecture, that is, on issues that directly concern everyone. The president’s speech outlined the borders for a “territory of freedom” – freedom of thought and freedom of speech in international relations.
When the Baltic countries entered NATO and the European Union a couple of years ago, many thought it was the end of the centuries-old "red line." Euro-Atlantic organizations had crossed into the former Russian and Soviet empires.
In September 2004, the Russian city of Novgorod hosted an international conference entitled Russia at the Turn of the Century: Hopes and Reality. Its organizers were the RIA Novosti news agency, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia in Global Affairs, and The Moscow Times.