Arkady Moshes is Director of the Russia-EU Program of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
For all the complexity and diversity of Russian interests in the neighboring country, an adequate model of relations between them requires that Moscow view Belarus as an independent state and an ally whose interests are not necessarily identical with Russia’s.
Ukraine may simply remain an exceptional case in the territory of the former Soviet Union – an interim transitional type, a country treading after its Central European neighbors, but never catching up with them as regards the development of democratic institutions or the degree of economic modernization. And yet it may implement the declared “European choice” in one form or another.
In the next few years, Russian-Ukrainian relations will not be easy; the relationship will include turbulent moments of partnership, competition and even conflict. Such relations, however, are not at odds either with Ukraine’s present status as a new “transit” state or with its membership in Euro-Atlantic structures – when and if that moment comes.
The most important objective for Russia in its relations with the EU is to make a strategic choice. Integration with the EU must be considered the main strategic goal. This can be achieved through a gradual horizontal (sectoral) integration and through increasing its role in the EU political decision-making process.
Within the next five to ten years, Russia and Ukraine will have to decide whether their common border will be a conventional boundary connecting their peoples, or whether it will become a new frontier of a Europe divided. Ukraine and Russia will have to make a choice on their own – and then live with its consequences.
Russia and the European Union have recently experienced a cooling-off in their relations. The partnership model, which the parties adopted ten years ago to achieve their gradual integration, is now obviously in conflict with reality. The reality is that Russia and the EU represent different political and economic systems that are not integrable in principle.
For all the complexity and diversity of Russian interests in the neighboring country, an adequate model of relations between them requires that Moscow view Belarus as an independent state and an ally whose interests are not necessarily identical with Russia’s.
Ukraine may simply remain an exceptional case in the territory of the former Soviet Union – an interim transitional type, a country treading after its Central European neighbors, but never catching up with them as regards the development of democratic institutions or the degree of economic modernization. And yet it may implement the declared “European choice” in one form or another.
In the next few years, Russian-Ukrainian relations will not be easy; the relationship will include turbulent moments of partnership, competition and even conflict. Such relations, however, are not at odds either with Ukraine’s present status as a new “transit” state or with its membership in Euro-Atlantic structures – when and if that moment comes.
The most important objective for Russia in its relations with the EU is to make a strategic choice. Integration with the EU must be considered the main strategic goal. This can be achieved through a gradual horizontal (sectoral) integration and through increasing its role in the EU political decision-making process.
Within the next five to ten years, Russia and Ukraine will have to decide whether their common border will be a conventional boundary connecting their peoples, or whether it will become a new frontier of a Europe divided. Ukraine and Russia will have to make a choice on their own – and then live with its consequences.
Russia and the European Union have recently experienced a cooling-off in their relations. The partnership model, which the parties adopted ten years ago to achieve their gradual integration, is now obviously in conflict with reality. The reality is that Russia and the EU represent different political and economic systems that are not integrable in principle.
When the Baltic countries entered NATO and the European Union a couple of years ago, many thought it was the end of the centuries-old "red line." Euro-Atlantic organizations had crossed into the former Russian and Soviet empires.
In September 2004, the Russian city of Novgorod hosted an international conference entitled Russia at the Turn of the Century: Hopes and Reality. Its organizers were the RIA Novosti news agency, the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, Russia in Global Affairs, and The Moscow Times.